




Nikil Dutt   Editors
Embedded Systems
Series Editors
Nikil Dutt, Irvine, CA, USA
Grant Martin, Santa Clara, CA, USA
Peter Marwedel, Informatik 12, TU Dortmund, Dortmund, Germany
This Series addresses current and future challenges pertaining to embedded hard-
ware, software, specifications and techniques. Titles in the Series cover a focused
set of embedded topics relating to traditional computing devices as well as high-
tech appliances used in newer, personal devices, and related topics. The material
will vary by topic but in general most volumes will include fundamental material
(when appropriate), methods, designs and techniques.
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/8563











University of California, Irvine
Irvine, CA, USA
ISSN 2193-0155 ISSN 2193-0163 (electronic)
Embedded Systems
ISBN 978-3-030-52016-8 ISBN 978-3-030-52017-5 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52017-5
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2021. This book is an open access publication.
Open Access This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book’s Creative Commons
license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the book’s
Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the
permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or
the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
To Wolfgang,
our inspiring colleague, co-initiator of the
SPP 1500 program and a good friend.
We will truly miss him.
Prof. Dr. rer. nat. Wolfgang Rosenstiel
5.10.1954–19.08.2020
Preface
Dependability has become a major issue since Moore’s law had hit its limits.
While Moore’s law has been the pacemaker for the microelectronics age for about
four decades, the exponential growth has led to the microelectronic revolution
that has changed our lives in multifarious ways starting from the PC through the
internet and embedded applications like safety in automotive to today’s personal
communication/entertainment devices. The positive side effects of this exponential
growth were:
(a) Decreased Costs: This refers to the costs per transistor that decreased expo-
nentially as complexity (i.e., number of transistors per chip) increased. In other
words, for the same costs, the customer received far more functionality when
migrating from one technology node to the next one.
(b) Increased Performance: Since transistors shrank, the effective capacitances
shrank, too. Hence, signal delays decreased and allowed for higher clocking,
i.e., the clock frequency could be raised and significant performance gains could
be achieved.
(c) Decreased Power Consumption: Since smaller transistors have lower effective
switching capacitances, the power consumption per transistor and the overall
power consumption per chip went significantly down. This opened the opportu-
nity for new application areas like mobile devices, etc.
In summary, Moore’s law had provided a win–win situation for four decades in
virtually all relevant design constraints (i.e., cost, power consumption, performance,
and chip area). However, as Gordon E. Moore had already stated in a talk at ISSCC
2003: “No exponential is forever . . . but we can delay ‘forever’. . .,” he indicated
that the exponential growth cannot be sustained forever but that it may be possible
to delay the point when scalability finally comes to an end.
However, systems in the nano-CMOS era are inherently undependable when
further advancing from one technology node to the next.
In particular, we can identify the following challenging problems which neg-
atively impact the dependability of future systems. If not addressed properly, the
dependability of systems will significantly decrease.
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The effects can be divided into two major groups: The first group comprises those
effects that stem from fabrication/design time issues, whereas the second group
stems from operation/run-time execution.
Fabrication and Design-Time Effects
Yield and Process Variations
Yield defines the number of flaw-free circuits in relation to all fabricated circuits. A
high yield is so far considered vital for an economic production line. Unfortunately,
the yield will dramatically decrease because feature sizes reach a point where the
process of manufacturing underlies statistical variances. Future switching devices
may be fabricated through “growing” or “self-assembly.” All known research
suggest that these processes cannot be controlled entirely, leading to fabrication
flaws, i.e., circuits with faulty devices. As per the definition of yield, it will
at a not-that-distant point in time go to zero, i.e., no circuit can be produced
without at least a single faulty switching device. The traditional way of sorting
out faulty circuits will not work any longer! Rather, faults will be inherent. On
the other hand, fabricated circuits (although functionally correct) will continue to
exhibit increasing levels of “process variability”: i.e., a high degree of variability
in the observed performance, power consumption, and reliability parameters both
across manufactured parts and across use of these parts over time in the field.
The traditional “guardbanding” approach of overdesigning circuits with a generous
margin to hide these process variations will no longer be economically viable
nor will fit into a traditional design flow that assumes a rigid specification of
operational constraints for the performance, power, and reliability of manufactured
circuits. Newer design techniques and metholodologies will therefore need to
address explicitly the effects of process variation, rather than assuming these are
hidden through traditional overdesigned guardbanding margins.
Complexity
In about 10 years from now, the complexity of systems integrated into one single die
will amount to basic switching devices. The steadily increasing integration complex-
ity is efficiently exploited by the current trend towards many-core network-on-chip
architectures. These architectures introduce hardware and software complexities,
which previously were found on entire printed circuit boards and systems down
to a single chip and provide significant performance and power advantages in
comparison with single cores. A large number of processing and communication
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elements require new programming and synchronization models. It leads to a
paradigm shift away from the assumption of zero design errors.
Operation and Run-Time Effects
Aging Effects
Transistors in the nano-CMOS era are far more susceptible to environmental
changes like heat, as an example. It causes an irreversible altering of the phys-
ical (and probably chemical) properties which, itself, lead to malfunctions and
performance variability over time. Though effects like electromigration in current
CMOS circuits are well known, they typically do not pose a problem since the
individual switching device’s lifetime is far higher than the product life cycle. In
future technologies, however, individual switching devices will fail (i.e., age) earlier
than the life cycle of the system (i.e., product) they are part of. Another emergent
altering effect is the increasing susceptibility to performance variability resulting in
changing critical paths over time. This, for instance, prevents a static determination
of the chip performance during manufacturing tests.
Thermal Effects
Thermal effects will have an increasing impact on the correct functionality. Various
degradation effects are accelerated by thermal stress like very high temperature
and thermal cycling. Aggressive power management can produce opposite effects,
e.g., hot spot prevention at the cost of increased thermal cycling. Higher integration
forces to extend through the third dimension (3D circuits) which in turn increases
the thermal problem since the ratio of surface-area/energy significantly worsens.
Devices will be exposed to higher temperatures and increase, among others, aging
effects. In addition, transient faults increase.
Soft Errors
The susceptibility of switching devices in the nano age against soft errors will
increase about 8% per logic state bit for each technology generation, as recently
forecasted. Soft errors are caused by energetic radiation particles (neutrons) hitting
silicon chips and creating a charge on the nodes that flips a memory cell or logic
latches.
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The idea of this book has its origin in several international programs on
dependability/reliability:
– The SPP 1500 Dependable Embedded Systems program (by DFG of Germany);
– The NSF Expedition on Variability (by NSF of USA); and
– The Japanese JST program.
While this book is not a complete representation of all of these programs, it does
represent all aspects of the SPP 1500 and some aspects of the NSF Expedition on
Variability and the Japanese JST program.
The book focuses on cross-layer approaches, i.e., approaches to mitigate depend-
ability issues by means and methods that work across design abstraction layers.
It is structured in the main six areas “Cross-Layer from Operating System to
Application,” “Cross-Layer Dependability: From Architecture to Software and
Operating System,” “Cross-Layer Resilience: Bridging the Gap between Circuit and
Architectural Layer,” “Cross-Layer from Physics to Gate- and Circuit-Levels,” and
“Cross-Layer from Architecture to Application.” Besides, it contains a chapter in
the so-called RAP model: the resilience articulation point (RAP) model aims to
provision a probabilistic fault abstraction and error propagation concept for various
forms of variability-related faults in deep submicron CMOS technologies at the
semiconductor material or device levels. RAP assumes that each of such physical
faults will eventually manifest as a single- or multi-bit binary signal inversion or
out-of-specification delay in a signal transition between bit values.
The book concludes with a perspective.
We want to thank all the authors who contributed to this book as well as all the
funding agencies that made this book possible (DFG, NSP, and JST).
We hope you enjoy reading this book and we would be glad to receive feedback.
Karlsruhe, Baden-Württemberg, Germany Jörg Henkel
Irvine, CA, USA Nikil Dutt
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1 Introduction/Motivation
Conquering System-on-Chip (SoC) architecture and design complexity became
a major, if not the number one, challenge in integrated systems development.
SoC complexity can be expressed in various ways and different dimensions:
Today’s single-digit nanometer feature size CMOS technologies allow for multi-
billion transistor designs with millions of lines of code being executed on dozens
of heterogeneous processing cores. Proving the functional correctness of such
designs according to the SoC specifications is practically infeasible and can only
be achieved probabilistically within tolerable margins. Further consequences of
this ever-increasing hardware/software complexity are: Increasing susceptibility of
application- and system-level software codes to security and safety exposures, as
well as operational variability of nanometer size semiconductor devices because
of environmental or manufacturing variations. The SPP1500 Dependable Embed-
ded Systems Priority Program of the German Research Foundation (DFG) [8]
focused on tackling the latter class of exposures. NBTI (negative-bias temperature
instability) aging, physical electromigration damage and intermittent, radiation
induced bit flips in registers (SEUs (single event upsets)) or memory cells are some
manifestations of CMOS variability. The Variability Expedition program by the
United States National Science Foundation (NSF) [6] is a partner program driven by
the samemotivation. There has been and still is a good amount of bi- and multilateral
technical exchange and collaboration between the two national-level initiatives.
Divide and conquer strategies, for example, by hierarchically layering a system
according to established abstraction levels, proved to be an effective approach
for coping with overall system complexity in a level by level manner. Layering
SoCs bottom-up with semiconductor materials and transistor devices, followed by
combinatorial logic, register-transfer, micro-/macro-architecture levels, and runtime
environment middleware, as well as application-level software at the top end of the
hierarchy, is an established methodology used both in industry and academia. The
seven layer Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model of the International Orga-
nization for Standardization provides a reference framework for communication
network protocols with defined interfaces between the layers. It is another example
of conquering the complexity of the entire communication stack by layering.
Despite these merits and advantages attributed to system layering, a disadvantage
of this approach cannot be overlooked. Layering fosters specialization by focusing
the expertise of a researcher or developer to one specific abstraction level only (or to
one layer plus certain awareness for the neighboring layers at best). Specialization
and even sub-specialization within one abstraction layer became a necessity as the
complexity within one layer raises already huge design challenges. However, the
consequence of layering and specialization for overall system optimization is that
such optimizations are typically constrained by the individual layer boundaries.
Cross-layer optimization strives to pursue a more vertical approach, taking the
perspectives of two or more, adjacent or non-adjacent, abstraction levels for certain
system properties or qualities into account. A holistic approach (considering all
abstraction levels for all system properties) is not realistic because of the overall sys-



























Fig. 1 RAP covers probabilistic error modeling and propagation of physics induced variabilities
from circuit/logic up to application level
tem complexity. Nevertheless, for some properties, cross-layer approaches proved
to be effective. Approximate computing, exploiting application-level tolerance
to on-purpose circuit level inaccuracies in arithmetic operations for savings in
silicon area and a lower power dissipation, is a widely adopted example of cross-
layer optimization. Cross-layer approaches have also been suggested as a feasible
technique to enhance reliability of complex systems [21, 26].
A prerequisite for effective cross-layer optimization is the ability to correlate the
causes or events happening at one particular level with the effects or symptoms they
will cause at other abstraction levels. Hierarchical system layering and specializa-
tion implies that subject matters and corresponding terminology are quite different
between levels, especially when the levels of interest are several layers apart. The
objective of the presented Resilience Articulation Point (RAP) model is to provision
probabilistic fault abstraction and error propagation concepts for various forms
of variability induced phenomena [9, 28]. Or, expressed differently, RAP aims to
help annotate how variability related physical faults occurring at the semiconductor
material and device levels (e.g., charge separation in the silicon substrate in response
to a particle impact) can be expressed at higher abstraction levels. Thus, the impact
of the low-level physical faults onto higher level fault tolerance, such as instruction
vulnerability analysis of CPU core microarchitectures, or fault-aware real-time
operating system middleware, can be determined without the higher level experts
needing to be aware of the fault representation and error transformation at the
lower levels. This cross-layer scope and property differentiates RAP from traditional
digital logic fault models, such as stuck-at [18] or the conditional line flip (CLF)
model [35]. These models, originally introduced for logic testing purposes, focus
on the explicit fault stimulation, error propagation and observation within one and
the same abstraction level. Consequently, RAP can be considered as an enabler
for obtaining a cross-layer perspective in system optimization. RAP covers all SoC
hardware/software abstraction levels as depicted in Fig. 1.
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2 Resilience Articulation Point (RAP) Basics
In graph theory, an articulation point is a vertex that connects sub-graphs within a
bi-connected graph, and whose removal would result in an increase of the number
of connecting arcs within the graph. Translated into our domain of dependability
challenges in SoCs, spatially and temporally correlated bit flips represent the single
connecting vertex between lower layer fault origins and the upper layer error and
failure models of hardware/software system abstraction (see Fig. 2).
The RAP model is based on three foundational assumptions: First, the hypothesis
that every variability induced fault at the semiconductor material or device level
will manifest with a certain probability as a permanent or transient single- or multi-
bit signal inversion or out-of-specification delay in a signal transition. In short, we
refer to such signal level misbehavior in terms of logic level or timing as a bit flip
error, and model it by a probabilistic, location and time dependent error function
Pbit(x, t). Second, probabilistic error functions PL(x, t), which are specific to a
certain abstraction layer and describe how layer characteristic data entities and
compositional elements are affected by the low-level faults. For example, with what
probability will a certain control interface signal on an on-chip CPU system bus, or a
data word/register variable used by an application task be corrupted in response to a
certain NBTI transistor aging rate. Third, there has to be a library of transformation
functions TL converting probabilistic error functions PL(x1, t) at abstraction level
L into probabilistic error functions PL+i (x2, t +t) at level(s) L + i (i ≥ 1) (see
Fig. 3).
PL+1(x2, t +t) = TL o PL(x1, t) (1)
Please note, although the existence of such transformation functions is a founda-
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Fig. 2 Fault, error, and failure representations per abstraction levels



















Fig. 3 Error transformation function depending on environmental, design, and system state
conditions
TL cannot come from or be a part of RAP. Transformation functions are dependent
on a plurality of environmental, design and structure specific conditions, as well as
implementation choices (EL,DL,SL) within the specific abstraction layers that are
only known to the respective expert designer. Note further, the location or entity
x2 affected at a higher abstraction level may not be identical to the location x1,
where the error manifested at the lower level. Depending on the type of error, the
architecture of the system in use, and the characteristic of the application running,
the error detection latency t during the root cause analysis for determining the
error source at level L typically represents a challenging debugging problem [17].
3 Related Work
Related approaches to describe the reliability of integrated circuits and systems have
been developed recently.
In safety-critical domains and to ensure reliable systems, standards prescribing
reliability analysis approaches and MTTF (mean time to failure) calculations have
been in existence for many decades (e.g., RTCA/DO-254—Design Assurance
Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware, or the Bellcore/Telcordia Predictive
Method, SR-332—Reliability Prediction Procedure for Electronic Equipment, in the
telecom area [33]). These approaches, however, were not developed with automation
in mind, and do not scale well to very complex systems.
The concept of reliability block diagrams (RBDs) has also been used to describe
the reliability of systems [19]. In RBDs, each block models a component of the
considered system. A failure rate is associated to each block. The RBD’s structure
describes how components interact. Components in parallel are redundant, whereas
for serially connected components the failure of any one component causes the
entire system to fail. However, more complex situations are difficult to model
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and analyze. Such more complex situations include parametric dependencies (e.g.,
reliability dependent on temperature and/or voltage), redundancy schemes which
can deal with certain failures, but not other (e.g., ECC which, depending on the
code and number of redundant bits, can either deal with the detection and correction
of single-bit failure, or detect, but not correct, multi-bit failures), or state-dependent
reliability characteristics.
In 2012, RIIF (Reliability Information Interchange Format) was presented [4].
RIIF does not introduce fundamentally new reliability modeling and analysis
concepts. Rather, the purpose is to provide a format for describing detailed reliability
information of electronic components as well as the interaction among components.
Parametric reliability information is supported. State-dependent reliability (modeled
by Markov reliability models) is planned to be added. By providing a standardized
format, RIIF intends to support the development of automated approaches for
reliability analysis. It targets to support real-world scenarios in which complex
electronic systems are constructed from legacy components, purchased IP blocks,
and newly developed logic.
RIIF was developed in the context of European projects, driven primarily by the
company IROC Technologies. The original concept was developed mostly within
the MoRV (Modeling Reliability under Variation) project. Extensions from RIIF
to RIIF2 were recently developed in collaboration with the CLERECO (Cross-
Layer Early Reliability Evaluation for the Computing Continuum) project. RIIF is a
machine-readable format which allows the detailed description of reliability aspect
of system components. The failure modes of each component can be described,
depending on parameters of the component. The interconnection of components to a
system can be described. RIIF originally focused only on hardware. RIIF2 has been
proposed to extend the basic concepts of RIIF to also take software considerations
into account [27].
4 Fault Abstraction at Lower Levels
The RAP model proposes modeling the location and time dependent error prob-
ability Pbit(x, t) of a digital signal by an error function F with three, likewise,
location and/or time dependent parameters: Environmental and operating conditions
E , design parameters D, and (error) state bits S .
Pbit(x, t) = F(E,D,S) (2)
This generic model has to be adapted to every circuit component and fault
type independently. Environmental conditions E , such as temperature and supply
voltage fluctuations, heavily affect the functionality of a circuit. Device aging
further influences the electrical properties, concretely the threshold voltage. Other
environmental parameters include clock frequency instability and neutron flux
density.
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System designD implies multiple forms of decisions making. For example, shall
arithmetic adders follow a ripple-carry or carry-look-ahead architecture (enumer-
ative decision)? What technology node to choose (discrete decision)? How much
area should one SRAM cell occupy (continuous decision)? Fixing such design
parameters D allows the designer to make trade-offs between different decisions,
which all influence the error probability of the design in one way or the other.
In order to model the dependence of the error probability on location, circuit
state, and time, it is necessary to include several state variables. These state variables
S lead to a model which is built from conditional probabilities P(b1|b2), where the
error probability of the bit b1 is dependent on the state of the bit b2. For example,
the failure probability of one SRAM cell depends on the error state of neighboring
SRAM cells due to the probability of multi-bit upset (MBU) [8]. For an 8T SRAM
cell it also depends on the stored value of the SRAM cell as the bit flip probability
of a stored “1” is different from a stored “0.”
Finally, the error function F takes the three parameter sets E , D, and S and
returns the corresponding bit error probability Pbit. The error function F is unique
for a specific type of fault and for a specific circuit element. An error function can
either be expressed by a simple analytical formula, or may require a non-closed
form representation, e.g., a timing analysis engine or a circuit simulator.
In the sequel, we show by the example of SRAM memory technology, how the
design of an SRAM cell (circuit structure, supply voltage, and technology node) as
well as different perturbation sources, such as radiating particle strikes, noise and
supply voltage drops, will affect the data bit error probability Pbit of stored data bits.
4.1 SRAM Errors
The SRAM is well known to have high failure rates already in current technologies.
We have chosen two common SRAM architectures, namely the 6-transistor (6T) and
8-transistor (8T) bit cell shown in Fig. 4. For the 6T architecture we have as design
choices the number of fins for the pull-up transistors (PU), the number of fins for the
Fig. 4 Circuit schematics for standard 6T (a) and 8T (b) SRAM bit cells
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pull-down transistors (PD), and the number of fins for the access transistors (PG).
The resulting architecture choice is then depicted by 6T_(PU:PG:PD). For the 8T
architecture we have additionally two transistors for the read access (PGR). Hence,
the corresponding architecture choice is named 8T_(PU:(PG:PGR):PD).
An SRAM cell can fail in many different ways, for example:
• Soft Error/Single Event Upset (SEU) failure: If the critical charge Qcrit is low,
the susceptibility to a bit flip caused by radiation is higher.
• Static Voltage Noise Margin (SVNM) failure: An SRAM cell can be flipped
unintentionally when the voltage noise margin is too low (stability).
• Read delay failure: An SRAM cell cannot be read within a specified time.
• Write Trip Voltage (WTV) failure: The voltage swing during a write is not high
enough at the SRAM cell.
We selected these four parameters, namely Qcrit , SVNM, Read delay, and WTV
as resilience key parameters. To quantify the influence of technology scaling (down
to 7 nm) on the resilience of the two SRAM architectures we used extensive Monte-
Carlo simulations and predictive technology models (PTM) [12].
4.1.1 SRAM Errors due to Particle Strikes (Qcrit )
Bit value changes in high density SRAMs can be induced by energetic particle
strikes, e.g., alpha or neutron particles [34]. The sensitivity of digital ICs to such
particles is rapidly increasing with aggressive technology scaling [12], due to the
correspondingly decreasing parasitic capacitances and operating voltage.
When entering the single-digit fC region for the critical charge, as in current
logic and SRAM devices and illustrated in Fig. 5a, lighter particles such as alpha
and proton particles become dominant (see Fig. 5b). This increases not only error
rates, but also their spread, as the range of lighter particles is much longer compared
to residual nucleus [10].




















































Fig. 5 Technology influence on SRAM bit flips: (a) Critical charge dependency on technology
node and supply voltage for 6T SRAM cell, (b) Particle dominance based on critical charge
(adapted from [10])
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These technology-level faults caused by particle strikes now need to be abstracted
into a bit-level fault model, so that they can be used in later system-level resilience
studies. In the following this is shown for the example of neutron particle strikes.
Given a particle flux of , the number of neutron strikes k that hit a semiconductor
area A in a time interval τ can be modeled by a Poisson distribution:
P(N(τ) = k) = exp(− · A · τ) ( · A · τ)
k
k! (3)
These neutrons are uniformly distributed over the considered area, and may only
cause an error if they hit the critical area of one of the memory cells injecting
a charge which is larger than the critical charge of the memory cell. The charge
Qinjected transported by the injected current pulse from the neutron strike follows











The probability that a cell flips due to this charge can then be derived as




With increasing integration density, the probability of multi-bit upsets (MBU)
also increases [16]. A comparison of the scaling trend of Qcrit between the 6T
and 8T SRAM bit cell is shown in Fig. 6. The right-hand scale in the plots shows
the 3 sigma deviation of Qcrit in percent to better highlight the scaling trend.
The 8T-cell has a slightly improved error resilience due to an increased Qcrit







































































Fig. 6 Qcrit results for a 6T_(1:1:1) high density (left) and an 8T_(1:(1:1):1) (right) SRAM cell






























































Fig. 7 SVNM results for a 6T_(1:1:1) and an 8T_(1:(1:1):1) SRAM cell
4.1.2 SRAM Errors due to Noise (SVNM)
The probability of an SRAM error (cell flip) due to noise is given by
Pnoise_error(Vnoise ≥ VSV NM) =
∞∫
VSV NM
fVnoise (V )dV (6)
The distribution function fVnoise is not directly given as it depends largely on the
detailed architecture and the environment in which the SRAM is integrated. Figure 7
plots the scaling trend for SVNM for both SRAM cell architectures. Due to its much
improved SVNM the 8T_(1:(1:1):1) cell has an advantage over the 6T_(1:1:1) cell.
Not only is the 8T cell approximately 22% better in SVNM than the 6T cell, but it
is also much more robust in terms of 3σ variability (28% for 8T 7 nm compared to
90% for 6T 7 nm).
4.1.3 SRAM Errors Due to Read/Write Failures (Read Delay/WTV)
The probability of SRAM read errors can be expressed by the following equation:
Pread_error(tread < tread_delay) =
tread_delay∫
0
f tread (t)dt (7)
In Fig. 8 the trend of the read delay for the two SRAM cell architectures is shown.
Although the read delay decreases with technology scaling, which theoretically
enables a higher working frequency, its relative 3σ variation can be as high as 50%
at the 7 nm node. This compromises its robustness and diminishes possible increases
in frequency.







































































































































Fig. 9 WTV results for a 6T_(1:1:1) and an 8T_(1:(1:1):1) SRAM cell
If the actual applied voltage swing Vs is not sufficient to flip the content of a
SRAM cell, then the data is not written correctly. The probability of such a write
failure is given by
Pwrite_error(Vs < Vswing_min) =
Vswing_min∫
0
fVs (V )dV (8)
Similar to fVnoise both distribution functions for tread and Vs depend strongly on the
clock frequency, the transistor dimensions, the voltage supply, and the noise in the
system. Figure 9 plots the scaling trend of WTV for 6T and 8T cells. The results for
6T and 8T cells are similar due to the similar circuit structure of 6T and 8T cells
regarding write procedure.
4.1.4 SRAM Errors due to Supply Voltage Drop
Figure 10 shows the failure probability of a 65 nm SRAM array with 6T cells and 8T
cells for a nominal supply voltage of 1.2V. When the supply voltage drops below
1.2V the failure probability increases significantly. Obviously, the behavior is differ-
ent for 6T and 8T cells. The overall analysis of the resilience key parameters (Qcrit ,
SVNM, read delay, WTV, and VDD) shows that the variability increases rapidly as






















Fig. 10 Memory failure probability (65 nm technology) [1]
technology is scaled down. Investigations considering the failure probabilities of
memories (SRAMs, DRAMs) in a system context are described in chapter “Design
of Efficient, Dependable SoCs Based on a Cross-Layer-Reliability Approach with
Emphasis on Wireless Communication as Application and DRAM Memories”.
5 Architecture Level Analysis and Countermeasures
5.1 Instruction Vulnerability
Due to the wide variety in functionality and implementation of different application
softwares as well as changes in the system and application workload depending
on the application domain and user, a thorough yet sufficiently abstracted quan-
tification of the dependability of individual applications is required. Even though
all application software on a specific system operate on the same hardware, they
use the underlying system differently, and exhibit different susceptibility to errors.
While a significant number of software applications can tolerate certain errors with
a relatively small impact on the quality of the output, others do not tolerate errors
well. These types of errors, as well as errors leading to system crashes, have to be
addressed at the most appropriate system layer in a cost-effective manner. Therefore,
it is important to analyze the effects of errors propagating from the device and
hardware layers to all the way up to the application layer, where they can finally
affect the behavior of the system software or the output of the applications, and,
therefore, become visible to the user. This implies different usage of hardware
components, e.g., in the pipeline, as well as different effects of masking at the
software layers while considering individual application accuracy requirements.
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Fig. 11 Cross-layer reliability modeling and estimation: an instantiation of the RAP model from
the application software’s perspective
These different aspects have to be taken into account in order to accurately quantify
the susceptibility of an application towards errors propagating from the lower layers.
An overview of the different models as well as their respective system layer
is shown in Fig. 11 [30]. A key feature is that the software layer models consider
the lower layer information while being able to provide details at the requested
granularity (e.g., instruction, function, or application). To achieve that, relevant
information from the lower layers has to be propagated to the upper layers for
devising accurate reliability models at the software layer. As the errors originate
from the device layer, a bottom-up approach is selected here. Examples for
important parameters at the hardware layer are fault probabilities (i.e., PE(c)) of
different processor components (c ∈ C), which can be obtained by a gate-level
analysis, as well as spatial and temporal vulnerabilities of different instructions
when passing through different pipeline stages (i.e., IV Iic). At the software layer,
for instance, control and data flow information has to be considered as well as
separation of critical and non-critical instructions. In addition, decisions at the
OS layer (e.g., DVFS levels, mapping decisions) and application characteristics
(e.g., pipeline usage, switching activity determined by data processed) can have
a significant impact on the hardware. Towards that, different models have been
developed on each layer and at different granularity as shown in Fig. 11. The
individual models are discussed briefly in the following.
One building block for quantifying the vulnerability of an application is the
Instruction Vulnerability Index (IVI) [22, 24]. It estimates the spatial and temporal
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vulnerabilities of different types of instructions when passing through different
microarchitectural components/pipeline stages c ∈ C of a processor. Therefore,
unlike state-of-the-art program level metrics (like the program vulnerability factor:
PVF [32]) that only consider the program state for reliability vulnerability estima-
tion, the IV I considers the probability that an error is observed at the output PE(c)
of different processor components as well as their area Ac.
IV Ii =
∑
∀c∈C IV Iic · Ac · PE(c)∑
∀c∈C Ac
For this, the vulnerability of an instruction i in a distinct microarchitectural
component c has to be estimated:
IV Iic = vic · βc(v)∑
∀c∈C βc
The IV Iic is itself based on an analysis of the vulnerable bits βc(v) representing
the spatial vulnerability (in conjunction with Ac) as well as an analysis of the nor-
malized vulnerable period vic representing the temporal vulnerability. Both capture
the different residence times of instructions in the microarchitectural components
(i.e., single vs. multi-cycle instructions) as well as the different usage of components
(e.g., adder vs. multiplier) while combining information from the hardware and
software layers for an accurate vulnerability estimation. An example for different
spatial and temporal vulnerabilities is shown in Fig. 12a: Comparing an “add”- with
a “load”-instruction, the “load” additionally uses the data cache/memory component
(thus having a higher spatial vulnerability) and might also incur multiple stall
cycles due to the access to the data cache/memory (thus having a higher temporal
vulnerability).
The IV I can further be used for estimating the vulnerabilities of functions
and complete application softwares. An option for a more coarse-grained model

































































Fig. 12 (a) Temporal and spatial vulnerabilities of different instructions executing in a processor
pipeline; (b) Examples for error propagation and error masking due to data flow; (c) Example for
error masking due to control flow
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vulnerability of a function as the weighted average of its susceptibility towards
application failures and its susceptibility towards giving an incorrect output. In order
to achieve this, critical instructions (i.e., instructions potentially causing application
failures) and non-critical instructions (i.e., instructions potentially causing incorrect
application outputs) are distinguished.
The quantification of the error probability provided by the IV I is complemented
by capturing the masking properties of an application. The Instruction Error
Masking Index (IMI) [31] estimates the probability that an error at instruction i
is masked until the last instruction of all of its successor instruction paths. At the
software layer, this is mainly determined by two factors: (a) Masking due to control
flow properties, where a control flow decision might lead to an erroneous result
originating from instruction i not being used (see example in Fig. 12c); (b) Masking
due to data flow properties, which means that a successor instruction might mask an
error originating from i due to its instruction type and/or operand values (e.g., the
“and”-instruction in Fig. 12b). On the microarchitectural layer, further masking
effects may occur due to an error within a microarchitectural component being
blocked from propagating further when passing through different logic elements.
Although masking plays an important role, there are still significant errors which
propagate to the output of a software application. To capture the effects of an
error not being masked and quantify the consequences of its propagation, the Error
Propagation Index (EPI) of an instruction can be used [31]. It quantifies the error
propagation effects at the instruction granularity and provides an estimate of the
extent (e.g., number of program outputs) an error at an instruction can affect the
output of a software application. This is achieved by analyzing the probability that
an error becomes visible at the program output (i.e., its non-masking probability)
by considering all successor instructions of a given instruction i. An example of an
error propagating to multiple instructions is shown in Fig. 12b.
An alternative for estimating the software dependability at the function granular-
ity is the Function Resilience model [23], which provides a probabilistic measure
of the function’s correctness (i.e., its output quality) in the presence of faults. In
order to avoid exposing the software application details (as it is the case for FV I ), a
black-box model is used for estimating the function resilience. It considers two basic
error types: Incorrect Output of an application software (also known as Silent Data
Corruption) or Application Failure (e.g., hangs, crashes, etc.). Modeling Function
Resilience requires error probabilities for basic block outputs1 and employs a
Markov Chain technique; see details in [23].
As timely generation of results plays an important role, for instance, in real-
time systems, it is not only important to consider the functional correctness
(i.e., generating the correct output) of a software application, but also to account
for the timing correctness (i.e., whether the output is provided in time or after the
1One potential method to obtain these error probabilities is through fault-injection experiments in
the underlying hardware during the execution of these basic blocks
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Fig. 13 Composition and focus of the different modeling approaches
deadline). This can be captured via the Reliability-Timing Penalty (RTP) model [25].
It is defined as the linear combination of functional reliability and timing reliability:
RT P = α · R + (1− α) ·miss_rate
where R is the reliability penalty (which can be any reliability metric at func-
tion granularity like FV I or Function Resilience) and miss_rate represents the
percentage of deadline misses for the software application. Via the parameter α
(0 ≤ α ≤ 1), the importance of the two components can be determined: if α is closer
to 0, the timing reliability aspect is given a higher importance; when α is closer to 1,
the functional reliability aspect is highlighted. The tradeoff formulated by the RT P
is particularly helpful when selecting appropriate mitigation techniques for errors
affecting the functional correctness, but which might have a significant time-wise
overhead.
A summary of the different modeling approaches discussed above is shown in
Fig. 13, where the main factors and corresponding system layers are highlighted.
5.2 Data Vulnerability Analysis and Mitigation
A number of approaches to analyze and mitigate soft errors, such as ones introduced
by memory bit flips or logic errors in an ALU, rely on annotating sections of code as
to their vulnerability to bit flips [2]. These approaches are relatively straightforward
to implement, but regularly fail to capture the context of execution of the annotated
code section. Thus, the worst-case error detection and correction overhead applies
to all executions of, e.g., an annotated function, no matter what the relevance of
the data processed within that function to the execution of the program (stability or
quality of service effects) may be.
The SPP 1500 Program project FEHLER [29], in contrast, bases its analyses
and optimizations on the notion of data vulnerability by performing joint code and
data flow analyses. Here, the foremost goal is to ensure the stability of program
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Fig. 14 Horizontal propagation of an error in the RAP model
execution while allowing a system designer to trade the resulting quality of service
of a program for optimizations of different non-functional properties such as real-
time adherence and energy consumption.
However, analyses on the level of single bit-flips are commonly too fine-grained
for consideration in a compiler tool flow. Rather, the level of analysis provided
by FEHLER allows the developer to introduce semantics of error handling above
the level of single bit-flips. In the upper half of the RAP model hourglass [9], this
corresponds to the “data” layer.
The seminal definition of the RAP model provides the notion of a set of bits that
belong to a word of data. This allows the minimum resolution of error annotations
to represent basic C data types such as char or int.2 In addition, FEHLER allows
annotations of complex data types implemented as consecutive words in memory,
such as C structures or arrays.
In terms of the RAP model, data flow analyses enable the tracking of the effects
of bit flips in a different dimension. The analyses capture how a hardware-induced
bit error emanating in the lower half of the RAP hourglass propagates to different
data objects on the same layer as an effect of arithmetic, logic, and copy operations
executed by the software. As shown in Fig. 14, a bit error on the data layer can now
propagate horizontally within the model to different memory locations. Thus, with
progressing program execution, a bit flip can eventually affect more than one data
object of an application.
In order to avoid software crashes in the presence of errors, affected data objects
have to be classified according to the worst-case impact an error in a given object
can have on a program’s execution.
Using a bisecting approach, this results in a binary classification of the worst-
case error impact of a data object on a program’s execution. If an error in a data
object could result in an application crash, the related piece of data is to be marked
as critical to the system stability. An example for this could be a pointer variable
which, in case of a bit error, might result in a processor exception when attempting
to dereference that pointer. In turn, all other errors are classified as non-critical,
which implies that we can ensure that a bit flip in one of these will never result in a
system crash.
2Single bit annotations could be realized by either using C bit fields or bit banding memory areas.
However, the use of bit fields is discouraged due to portability issues, whereas bit banding is not
generally available on all kinds of processors and the compiler possesses no knowledge of aliasing
of bit banding areas with regular memory, which would result in more complex data flow analyses.
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unreliable int x;
reliable int y;
Listing 1.1 Reliability type qualifiers in FEHLER
In the FEHLER system, this classification is indicated by reliability type
qualifiers, an addition to the C language that allows a programmer to indicate the
worst-case effect of errors on a data object [3]. An example for possible annotations
is shown in Listing 1.1. Here, the classification is implemented as extensions to the
C language in the ICD-C compiler. The reliable type qualifier implies that the
annotated data object is critical to the execution of the program, i.e., a bit flip in
that variable might result in a crash in the worst case, whereas the unreliable
type qualifier tells the compiler that the worst-case impact of a bit flip is less
critical. However, in that case the error can still result in a significant reduction







unreliable int u, x;
reliable int y, z;
...
x = y - (z + u) * 4;
Listing 1.2 Data flow analysis of possible horizontal error propagation and related AST
representation
It is unrealistic to expect that a programmer is able or willing to provide
annotations to each and every data object in a program. Thus, the task of analyzing
the error propagation throughout the control and data flow and, in turn, providing
reliability annotations to unannotated data objects, is left to the compiler.
An example for data propagation analysis is shown in Listing 1.2. Here, data
flow information captured by the static analysis in the abstract syntax tree is used
to propagate reliability type qualifiers to unannotated variables. In addition, this
information is used to check the code for invalid assignments that would propagate
permissible bit errors in unreliable variables to ones declared as reliable.
Here, the unreliable qualifier of variable u propagates to the assignment to the
left-hand side variable x. Since x is also declared unreliable, this code is valid.
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unreliable int u, pos, tmp;
reliable int r, a[10];
u = 10;
r = u; // invalid assignment
pos = 0;
while ( pos < r ) { // invalid condition
tmp = r / u; // invalid division
a[ pos++ ] = tmp; // invalid memory access
}
Listing 1.3 Invalid assignments
Listing 1.3 gives examples for invalid propagation of data from unreliable (i.e.,
possibly affected by a bit flip) to reliable data objects, which are flagged as an error
by the compiler.
However, there are specific data objects for which the compiler is unable to
automatically derive a reliability qualifier for. Specifically, this includes input and
output data, but also possibly data accessed through pointers for which typical static
analyses only provide imprecise results.
The binary classification of data object vulnerability discussed above is effective
when the objective is to avoid application crashes. If the quality of service, e.g.,
measured by the signal-to-noise ratio of a program’s output, is of relevance,
additional analyses are required.
FEHLER has also been applied to an approximate computing system that utilizes
an ALU comprised of probabilistic adders and multipliers [7]. Here, the type
qualifiers discussed before are used to indicate if a given arithmetic operation can
be safely executed on the probabilistic ALU or if a precise result is required, e.g.,
for pointer arithmetics. The impact of different error rates on the output of an H.264
video decoder using FEHLER on probabilistic hardware is shown in Fig. 15. Here,
lowering the supply voltage results in an increased error probability and, in turn, in
more errors in the output, resulting in a reduced QoS as measured by the signal-to-
noise ratio of the decoded video frames.
Fig. 15 Effects of different error rated on the QoS of an H.264 video decoder using FEHLER. (a)
VDD = 1.2V. (b) VDD = 1.1V. (c) VDD = 1.0V. (d) VDD = 0.9V. (e) VDD = 0.8V
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5.3 Dynamic Testing
Architectural countermeasures that prevent errors from surfacing or even only detect
their presence come at non-neglectable costs. Whether a specific cost is acceptable
or not, in turn, depends on many factors, most prominently criticality. The range of
associated costs is also extensive, on one end triple modular redundancy (TMR) or
similar duplication schemes such as duplication with comparison (DWC) or on the
other end of the spectrum time-multiplexed methods such as online dynamic testing
proposed by Gao et al. [5]. In the former examples, the costs directly correlate to the
kind of assurance each technique can provide, i.e., TMR can not only continuously
monitor a given component like DWC, but it can also mask any detected errors.
Using TMR in the right manner, it virtually guarantees the absence of errors, but
also comes at a 50% increase in both area and power consumption when compared
to DWC.
Whether such cost is sensible or not depends on a complex probabilistic tradeoff
with the probability of an error to occur at a specific point in time, and the criticality
of an application, on the other hand, also expressed as a probabilistic term, e.g.,
the maximum tolerable error probability per time, often expressed as failure rate
per time λ. While some applications cannot tolerate any errors such as banking
transactions (or so we hope), many embedded applications have surprisingly large
margins such as applications for entertainment or comfort purposes. For such
applications, rather than giving absolute assurances in terms of error detection
and masking (e.g., TMR or DWC), temporal limits with confidence levels are
far more usable and have much higher utility for the engineering of architectural
countermeasures.
Dynamic testing is a probabilistic testing scheme which can exploit such limits
as its primary metric is by definition latency detection, that is the time a given
dynamic testing configuration requires to detect an error with a given probability.
Dynamic testing periodically samples inputs as well as associated outputs of known
algorithms implemented in designated components of a SoC in a time-multiplexed
fashion. Thereby obtained samples are then recomputed online on a component,
the checker core, which is presumed to be more reliable. If the output sample of
the device under test (DUT) does not match the recomputed sample, an error on
the DUT is assumed. This testing method offers many ways to be tuned towards a
specific scenario and to meet particular reliability requirements. By specifying how
often a DUT is checked, how many samples per time window are being checked as
well as how many such DUTs are checked using the same checker core, effort and
the achievable level of assurance can be fine-tuned. Furthermore, depending on the
properties of the checker core, even more ways to tailor dynamic testing towards a
concrete scenario emerge.
In the presented research as demonstrated in [15], specially hardened Dynami-
cally Reconfigurable Processors (DRPs) have been used to implement the checker
functionality (See chapter ‘Increasing Reliability Using Adaptive Cross-Layer
Techniques in DRPs’). DRPs are similar to FPGAs as they are reconfigurable
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Fig. 16 General DRP structure (left) and temporal application mapping in DRPs (right)
architectures. In terms of functionality, however, they are much closer to many-core
architectures, as they consist of an array of processing elements (PE) (Fig. 16 left)
which operate on word granularity and possess an instruction concept combined
with processor-like cycle-by-cycle internal reconfiguration. Therefore, DRPs do
not only allow applications to be mapped spatially like FPGAs but also offer an
extensive temporal domain to be used for better area utilization using so-called
multi-context application mappings (Fig. 16 right).
For dynamic testing, this means that a DRP as a checker core is more suitable
than, e.g., an embedded field programmable gate array (eFPGA) as conventional
error detection ensures that the hardened DRP itself is checked regularly during
non-checker operation. Furthermore, the high structural regularity also allows
workloads to be shifted around on the PE array, adding additional assurances that if
a DUT checks out faulty on several different PEs, the likelihood of false-positives
decreases. Most importantly, however, it does not need to be dedicated to dynamic
testing, but dynamic testing could be executed alongside regular applications. In
turn, this, of course, also means that checker computations take longer to complete,
reducing the number of samples computed per time window.
While this adaptability makes DRPs and dynamic testing an interesting match,
for this combination to be useful, realistic assumptions about the error probability
P are essential. If we can obtain P through, e.g., the RAP model, there are two
significant advantages. Firstly, P is not constant over the lifetime of a SoC and
knowledge about its distribution can help reduce testing efforts with dynamic
testing. At a less error-prone time, dynamic testing allows for trade-offs such as
increased time to react to errors if the error is unlikely enough to only affect a
small minority of devices. Secondly, for an error with probability P to have any
effect, it needs to be observable, and, thus, for all practical purposes we equate P
and observation probability q which then allows us to use P to fine-tune dynamic
testing to a resource minimum while meeting an upper bound for detection latency.
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Fig. 17 Feasibility region for an error to be detected within 2 s, with N = 4 running at 100MHz,
an observable error probability of P = 10−5, a reconfiguration and setup overhead of 1ms and
different scaling factors s and time windows TT W
Assume a dynamic testing setup withN = 4 DUTs, a reconfiguration and general
setup overhead of TOV = 1ms and time windows of TT W = {1, . . . , 40ms},
one round of checking requires between 8ms and 44ms for all DUTs. Now let s
denote the scaling factor by which the temporal domain is used to map the checker
functionality, e.g., s = 3 means using a third of the original spatial resources
and, instead, prolonging the time to compute one sample by a factor of three.
Consequently, a scaling factor of s = 3 divides the number of samples checked
within one time window by three.
Now consider Fig. 17 which depicts the feasibility region by time window size
TT W and scaling factor s. The area which is not marked by the red dashes means
that in this region, a reliability goal of a maximum detection latency DL of 2 s
can be guaranteed with two-sigma confidence. However, apart from all adaptability,
dynamic testing may be also waived or reduced to a minimum during times of
low error probability (after early deaths in the bath tub curve). Ideally, we would
only start with serious testing once the error probability is high enough to be
concerned and then also only as much that the expected detection latency is within
the prescribed limit. In other words, without detailed knowledge of vulnerability P ,
the only possibility is to guess the probabilities and add margins. If, however, P
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can be estimated close enough, dynamic testing using DRPs as checker core offers
a near resource optimal time and probability based technique.
Furthermore, if the characteristics of P and its development over time is
understood well enough, dynamic testing could pose an alternative to DWC or
even TMR for certain applications. The better P can be modeled, the smaller
the margins become that have to be added to give assurances with high enough
confidence. Especially for more compute intensive applications without 100%
availability requirements, dynamic testing could serve as a low-cost alternative.
6 Application-Level Optimization—Autonomous Robot
Autonomous transportation systems are continuously advancing and become
increasingly present in our daily lives [37]. Due to their autonomous nature, for
such systems often safety and reliability are a special concern—especially when
they operate together with humans in the same environment [11]. In [13], we studied
the effect of soft errors in the data cache of a two-wheeled autonomous robot. The
robot acts as a transportation platform for areas with narrow spacing. Due to safety
reasons, the autonomous movement of the robot is limited to a predefined path. A
red line on the ground, which is tracked by a camera mounted on the robot, defines
the path which the robot should follow.
Since we want to study the impact of single event upsets in the data cache, the
whole system memory hierarchy including accurate cache models is included in
the simulation environment. We utilized in this example Instruction Set Simulation
(ISS) to emulate the control SW, which consists of three main tasks: (1) the
extraction of the red line from the camera frames, (2) the computation of orientation
and velocity required to follow the line, and (3) evaluation of the sensor data to
control the left and right motor torques to move the robot autonomously. The last
task has especially hard real-time constraints because the robot must constantly
be balanced. In this setup we used a fault model based on neutron particle strike
induced single event upsets as shown in Sect. 4.1.1. Further, to make the fault-
injection experiment feasible we used Mixture Importance Sampling to avoid
simulation of irrelevant scenarios [14].
In this experiment the processor of the robot is modeled in a 45 nm technology
together with a supply voltage of 0.9V. Further, we assume a technology dependent
parameter Qs of 4.05 fC and a flux  of 14Neutrons/cm2/h (New York, Sea Level)
[20, 36]. In our fault injection experiment we start with an unprotected, unhardened
data cache to find the maximal resilience of the application to soft errors.
Figure 18 depicts traces of position, velocity, and orientation of the robot while
it autonomously follows a line for 10 s. The injected faults lead to two types of
changed system behavior:
1. strong deviations in orientation and velocity where the robot eventually loses its
balance (crash sites are marked with crosses in the x −−y plane graph).
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Fig. 18 Robot movement in x − −y plane together with velocity and orientation angle. Dashed
lines indicate crashes by CPU stalls
2. slight deviations, e.g., temporarily reduced velocity or changed orientation,
where the robot still rebalances due to its feed-back control loop and still reaches
its goal at the end of the line.
Further investigations showed, that for the more severe failures in (1) the
simulator always reported a CPU stall. This led finally to the crash of the robot
in the simulation as the balancing control was not executed any longer. Such
failures are much more severe compared to (2). Still, such problems are detectable
on microarchitectural level. In (2), silent data corruption (SDC) in the control
algorithm happens. SDC is a severe problem for an application because it typically
cannot easily be detected. Interestingly for our experiment, the algorithm shows
a very high fault tolerance and often moves the robot back on its original path.
This, possibly, guarantees a safe movement dependent on how narrow the robot’s
movement corridor is specified. The inherent error resilience of the application, thus,
mitigates the SDC effect.
Based on these insights an overall cross-layer design approach for this appli-
cation could look as follows: The severe crashing failures in (1) are handled by
additional protection solution which detects such problems and causes a restart of
the application and hence the balancing control. One typical solution to this problem
is the addition of a watchdog timer to the system or a small monitoring application
to key state variables of the control loop. The silent data corruption in (2) can be
accepted in a certain frequency and limit according to the overall system constraints.
Hence, further system design techniques and resilience actuators can be used to
tune this into the required limits. This is further described in chapter ‘Cross-Layer
Resilience Against Soft Errors: Key Insights’.
A further use case for applying the RAP model to the cross-layer evaluation of
temperature effects in MPSoC systems is presented in chapter ’Thermal Manage-
ment and Communication Virtualization for Reliability Optimization in MPSoCs’.
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Part I
Cross-Layer from Operating System to
Application
Horst Schirmeier
In the embedded systems domain—particularly in highly competitive areas such as
the automotive industry—per-device monetary cost reduction is often a first-class
optimization goal. The prevailing approach to keeping costs low is to implement
more and more functionality in software instead of hardware, with side effects also
on other non-functional properties such as total system weight, energy consumption
or in-system upgradability. However, this trend towards software shines in the dis-
concerting light of ever-increasing soft-error rates: As the industry moves towards
single-digit nanometer semiconductor structure sizes, the circuits’ susceptibility to
soft errors continuously increases—unless countered with costly hardware measures
that can diminish the gains achieved through scaling.
In consequence, embedded software must cope with increasingly unreliable
hardware. In the stack of software layers, the operating system is the layer closest to
the hardware, and figuratively the first line of defense against soft errors that are on
their way of propagating to the application layer. But as software countermeasures
against unreliable hardware tend to be even more costly than their hardware
counterparts, they must be used sparingly and tailored for a particular application
and use-case scenario.
The three chapters within this area of the book address this cross-layer con-
nection between the operating system and the application layer, and offer different
approaches of constructing a reliable system from unreliable hardware components
that exhibit erroneous behavior triggered by soft errors.
The first chapter by Engel and Marwedel addresses the problem of error-
correction overhead in the context of embedded real-time systems (chapter “Soft
Error Handling for Embedded Systems using Compiler-OS Interaction”). The
described FEHLER approach introduces error semantics, which provides infor-
mation about the criticality of data objects. A combination of explicit source-code
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annotations and static data-flow analysis, which derives information for other, non-
annotated variables, is used on the application layer to generate a database that
allows to classify data objects at runtime. The gathered information is handed across
layers to the operating system: When an error is detected—by a mechanism outside
of FEHLER’s scope—the proposed system-software stack can use this classification
database to assess the actual damage, and to flexibly choose one of several possible
error-handling methods. Among the information incorporated in this decision is the
current real-time scheduler’s state, e.g., whether immediately scheduling an error-
correction task would cause a deadline miss and should therefore be either delayed
or completely skipped. This chapter also introduces the concept of the Reliable
Computing Base (RCB), a part of the system that is critical in ensuring that the
error-handling mechanism is effective, and that must not be affected by soft errors
itself.
The second chapter, contributed by Rambo and Ernst, describes how to achieve
the goal of application-specific and selective fault tolerance at a much coarser
granularity (chapter “ASTEROID and the Replica-Aware Co-scheduling for Mixed-
Criticality”). Set in a scenario with a given set of mixed-critical applications, the
ASTEROID approach requires a manual criticality classification of application
tasks—information that, similar to the FEHLER approach, is passed cross-layer
from the application to the operating system. Critical tasks are executed redun-
dantly by the Romain system service, exploiting future manycore platforms for
the increased system load, and coexist with non-critical tasks. Unlike FEHLER,
the ASTEROID approach also comprises a concrete error-detection solution: a
microarchitecture-level pipeline fingerprinting mechanism that allows Romain to
compare replicas with low overhead, facilitated through a cross-layer design involv-
ing both the hardware and operating-system layers. Quantifying the minimized
overhead, the chapter puts a special focus on the performance of replicated
execution, introducing a replica-aware co-scheduling strategy for mixed-critical
applications that outperforms the state of the art.
The third chapter by Schirmeier et al. describes the DanceOS approach, focus-
ing on application-specific operating-system construction techniques, similar to
FEHLER aiming at fine-grained fault-tolerance approaches (chapter “Dependability
Aspects in Configurable Embedded Operating Systems”). The chapter first investi-
gates the general reliability limits of static system-software stacks, and demonstrates
a technique to reduce the proverbial “attack surface” of a newly constructed,
AUTOSAR-compliant operating system by exploiting knowledge from static task
descriptions. By additionally applying classic fault-tolerance techniques to the
remaining dynamic kernel data structures, the DanceOS approach yields a highly
reliable software system. The second part of the chapter addresses the problem
how a pre-existing, legacy dynamic operating-system codebase can be hardened
against soft errors in an application-specific way. Using programming-language and
compiler-based program transformation techniques—in particular aspect-oriented
programming—this part shows how generic fault-tolerance mechanisms can be
encapsulated in separate modules, and applied to the most critical data structures
identified, e.g., by fault-injection experiments. In both operating-system scenarios—
I Cross-Layer from Operating System to Application 31
and similar to FEHLER and ASTEROID—the application drives the fault-tolerance
hardening process: In the AUTOSAR-compliant static OS scenario, statically
known structural application knowledge is handed to an operating-system tailoring
and minimization process; in the dynamic legacy-OS scenario, the application’s
runtime behavior while being exposed to injected faults provides the information
relevant for targeted, selective fault-tolerance hardening. In the third and last part,
the chapter expands the considered fault model to whole-system power outages, and
demonstrates that persistent memory—combined with transactional memory—can
be used for state conservation.
To conclude, all three chapters share the common insight that a cross-layer
combination of application layer knowledge and operating-system layer fault
tolerance—in the case of ASTEROID additionally involving the hardware layer—
enables overhead minimization and optimal, application-specific hardening against
soft errors.
Soft Error Handling for Embedded
Systems using Compiler-OS Interaction
Michael Engel and Peter Marwedel
1 New Requirements for Fault Tolerance
The ongoing downscaling of semiconductor feature sizes in order to integrate
more components on chip and to reduce the power and energy consumption of
semiconductors also comes with a downside. Smaller feature sizes also lead to
an increasing susceptibility to soft errors, which affect data stored and processed
using semiconductor technology. The amount of disturbance required to cause soft
errors, e.g. due to the effects of cosmic particles or electromagnetic radiation on
the semiconductor circuit, has declined significantly over the last decades, thus
increasing the probability of soft errors affecting a system’s reliable operation.
2 Semantics of Errors
Traditionally, system hardening against the effects of soft errors was implemented
using hardware solutions, such as error-correcting code circuits, redundant storage
of information in separate memories, and redundant execution of code on additional
functional units or processor cores. These protection approaches share the property
that they protect all sorts of data or code execution, regardless of the requirement to
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Fig. 1 Enabling profitable scaling using software-based fault tolerance [1]
actually enforce protection. In other terms, they do not possess knowledge about the
semantics of data and code related to the reliable operation of a system.
As shown by Austin [1], reproduced on the left-hand side of Fig. 1, together with
a rising probability of soft errors, this results in a significantly increasing overhead
in hardware required to implement error protection. As technology progresses, at
a certain point in time, the cost of this overhead will exceed the savings due to
the utilization of more recent semiconductor technologies, resulting in diminishing
returns that render the use of these advancements unattractive.
The fundamental idea applied by the FEHLER project is to reduce the amount of
error handling required in a system by introducing semantic knowledge. We enable
a system’s software to dynamically decide at runtime whether an error that occurred
is critical to the system’s operation, e.g. it might result in a crash in the worst case,
or is not critical, e.g. an error might only result in an insignificant disturbance of
a system’s output. In turn, this enables the system to handle only critical errors
and ignore the others. This flexible error handling results in a significantly reduced
hardware overhead for implementing fault tolerance, which leads to an increased
profitability window for semiconductor scaling, as shown on the right-hand side of
Fig. 1.
One important consideration when designing such a selective approach to fault
tolerance is which components of a system actually have to be protected from errors.
Inspired by the concept of the trusted computing base in information security, we
introduced the Reliable Computing Base (RCB) [6] to indicate the hardware and
software components of a system that are critical in ensuring that our flexible error
handling approach is effective.
Accordingly, we define the RCB as follows:
The Reliable Computing Base (RCB) is a subset of software and hardware
components that ensures the reliable operation of software-based fault-
tolerance methods. Hardware and software components that are not part of
(continued)
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the RCB can be subject to uncorrected errors without affecting the program’s
expected results.
To design efficient fault-tolerant systems, it is essential to minimize the size of
the reliable computing base. In the case of FEHLER, this implies that the number
and size of hardware and software components required to ensure that upcoming
critical errors will be corrected are to be reduced as far as possible.
Commonly, code-based annotations such as [13] are used to indicate sections of
code to be protected against errors regardless of the data objects handled by that
code. This implies an overhead in runtime—protection of the executed section of
code applies to all its executions without considering its execution semantics—as
well as in programmer effort, since error propagation analyses using control and
data flow information would have to consider all data objects handled in annotated
code sections. In order to increase the efficiency of this approach, additional manual
annotations seem indispensable.
A more efficient approach from a software point of view is to identify the
minimal amount of data objects that have to be protected against soft errors. Data
flow analyses provided by FEHLER allow to determine the worst-case propagation
of errors throughout a program’s execution, thus determining the precise set of
data objects requiring protection against errors. Additional savings at runtime
are achieved by employing a microkernel system tailored to exclusively address
error handling, leaving the remaining operating system functions to a traditional
embedded kernel running on top of it. An analysis of the possible savings for a
real-world embedded application is given in Sect. 7.
3 FEHLER System Overview and Semantic Annotations
Based on the observations described above, one central objective of the FEHLER
system is to enable the provision of semantics describing the worst-case effects of
errors on data objects.
Commonly, the hardware of a system only has very limited knowledge about the
semantics of data that it processes.1 More semantic information, such as the types
of data objects, is available on the source code level. However, this information
is commonly discarded by the compiler in later code generation and optimization
stages when it is no longer required to ensure program correctness. Some of this
information can already be utilized to provide error semantics. For example, pointer
1For example, a processor could distinguish between integer and floating point data due to the
use of different registers and instructions to process these, but a distinction between pointer and
numeric data is often not possible on machine code level.
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Fig. 2 Interaction of compile time and runtime components of FEHLER
data types and variables influencing the control flow (e.g. used to conditionally
execution of code or control loops) are deemed essential in ensuring correct program
execution. Accordingly, static analyses performed during compile time are able to
extract this information.
However, additional information about the relevance of data with regard to the
correct behavior of a system in its intended context, e.g. in embedded systems where
an incorrect output controlling a peripheral might result in damaging effects, is not
expressed explicitly in the code. Hence, we have to provide additional information
in order to enable static analyses to derive more information about the worst-case
criticality of a data object.
This additional semantic information allows the system to classify errors. Data
objects which are deemed critical to a program’s execution, i.e. may cause the
program to crash, are annotated with a reliable type qualifier. All objects for
which errors in data will result only in an insignificant deviation of the program’s
behavior in the worst case are provided with an unreliable type qualifier.
Classifying data objects into only these two classes is a rather coarse approach.
However, as shown later, this minimalistic approach is effective and efficient for
systems experiencing normal error rates, i.e. applications not exposed to radiation-
rich environments, such as space and aviation systems. Approaches for improved
QoS assessment are discussed in Sect. 10.
The interaction of compile time and runtime components of a FEHLER-based
system is shown in Fig. 2. Here, the compile time component, realized as a compiler
performing static analyses and transformations in addition to code generation,
extracts semantic information on the criticality of data objects, analyzes the
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program’s control and data flow to determine possible error propagation paths and
to generate appropriate type qualifiers, and encodes this information along with the
generated program binary.
This information lies dormant as long as no error affects the system’s operation.
Since error detection is outside of the scope of FEHLER, the system is prepared
to interface with a number of different error detection methods. In the example
in Fig. 2, we assume that a simple hardware mechanism, such as memory parity
checks, is employed. When an incorrect parity is detected during a memory access,
a special interrupt is raised that informs the system of the error.
Here, our runtime component, the Fault-aware Microvisor Environment (FAME)
[11] comes into play. FAME is intentionally restricted to only provide functionality
that enables decisions about the necessity of error handling, relegating all other
functionality typically found in system software to components outside of the
microkernel. This reduced functionality is an additional contribution to RCB
minimization. FAME provides a handler for the given error signalization method,
which is able to determine the address of the affected memory location. As soon as
the microkernel is able to ensure that itself is not affected, which can be ensured
by RCB analysis and minimization, it determines whether the embedded OS kernel
running on top or the application is affected. If this is the case, error handling is
initiated. In case of an error affecting the application, FAME consults the semantic
information provided by the compile time components and determines if error
correction is required or if the error can be safely ignored. Further details of FAME
are described in Sect. 6.
Like error detection, specific correction methods are not the focus of FEHLER.
Instead, FEHLER is enabled to interface with different standard as well as
application-specific correction methods. An example for a standard error correction
would be the application of checkpointing and rollback. An application-specific
method would be a function that corrects an affected macro block in a video
decoder by interpolating its contents from neighboring blocks instead of redecoding
the complete video frame, thus saving a considerable amount of compute time.
4 Timing Behavior
Figure 3 shows possible scheduling orders in case of a detected error. In an approach
that neglects to use criticality information (“naive approach”), the detection of
an error implies an immediate correction action in hardware or software. This
potentially time-consuming recovery delays the execution of subsequent program
instructions, which may result in a deadline miss.
The flexible approach enabled by FEHLER allows the system to react to an error
in a number of different ways. Here, the classifications described above come into
play. Whenever an error is detected, the system consults the classifications provided
alongside the application (“C” in Fig. 3). This lookup can be performed quickly
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Fig. 3 Different scheduling possibilities for error handling
and provides information on how to handle the error at hand. Specifically, it can be
determined if, how, and when the error needs to be corrected:
• if: Whether errors have to be handled or not depends mainly on the error impact.
If an error has a high impact, error recovery will be mandatory. In contrast, if an
error only has a low impact at all, e.g. the color of a single pixel in a frame buffer
is disturbed, further handling can be omitted. Handling errors in the latter case
will improve the quality of service at the cost of requiring additional compute
time. Error impacts are deduced using static analysis methods as described below.
• how: Error handling depends on the available error correction methods, the
error impact, and the available resources. In FEHLER, commonly a bit-precise
correction method such as checkpoint-and-recovery as well as an “ignore”
method (case 4 in Fig. 3) doing nothing is available. In addition, the programmer
can provide application-specific correction methods, denoted by “R*”. Such a
method may be preferable, since it can be faster than the generic correction
method provided.
• when: Error scheduling can decide when an error correction method has to be
scheduled. In a multitasking system, often, the task with the highest priority is
executed. Hence, if a high priority task is affected, error correction has to be
scheduled immediately (cases 1 and 2). If a low priority task is affected, the high
priority task can continue execution and the error handling will be delayed (case
3). In order to enable the mapping of errors to different tasks, a subscriber-based
model can be employed [12].
Overall, this flexibility allows a system to improve its real-time behavior in
case of errors. While this may not be acceptable for hard real-time systems, the
behavior of soft real-time applications, such as media decoding, can be significantly
improved. The example of an H.264 video decoder is used in Sect. 7 to evaluate the
effectiveness and efficiency of FEHLER.
To enable the flexible handling of errors at runtime, the runtime system requires
the provision of detailed, correct meta information about the data objects in the given
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application. The static analyses employed to obtain this information are described
in the following section.
5 Static Analyses
The correct determination of all data objects critical to a program’s execution, which
form part of the RCB, is crucial to ensure that errors threatening to result in a system
crash are corrected before they affect its operation.
Our static analysis is based on the concept of subtyping [7]. In FEHLER,
additional semantic information on the criticality of a data object to the application’s
stability is provided by extending the C language using reliability type qualifiers.
These qualifiers enable a developer to indicate to the static analysis stages whether a
data object is deemed critical to a program’s execution (reliable classification)
or if errors in data will result only in an insignificant deviation of the program’s
behavior in the worst case (using the unreliable type qualifier).
Accordingly, we have to ensure that reliable data objects must not be modified
unpredictably to guarantee that the application will not crash. In contrast, the
application can tolerate deviations from the expected values in unreliable data
objects.
Rules for the use of our new type qualifiers applied by our static code analysis
fall into two groups: prohibit and propagation rules. Prohibit rules ensure that oper-
ations on the annotated data objects are executed error-free, whereas propagation
rules reflect the possible propagation of errors from an affected data object to others
throughout the control and data flow.
Errors in certain data objects may result in a large deviation in the control flow
or even an unintended termination of the application. Prohibit rules ensure that
those data objects are annotated with the reliable type qualifier; accordingly, errors
affecting that data are classified as fatal errors. Data objects serving as a reference
to a memory address, i.e. pointers in C, are an important example for this. An error
in a pointer that is used for reading will result in either a different address that is
read, possibly resulting in the loading of a completely unrelated data object, or even
an access to a non-existing memory location, resulting in a processor exception
that terminates the application. Pointers used for writing data can result in correct
data being written to an unintended memory location, resulting in unexpected error
propagation that is especially hard to diagnose. Indexes for arrays behave in a similar
way, resulting either in a write to a different array element or, due to the lack of
bounds checking for array indexes in C, a write to an arbitrary memory location.
Other critical data types include controlling expressions for loops and conditional
statements, divisors, branch targets, and function symbols. For details, we refer the
reader to the description in [15].
unreliable int u, x;
reliable int y, z;








x = y - (z + u) * 4;
Listing 1 Data flow analysis of possible horizontal error propagation and related AST
representation
The content of a data object annotated as unreliable may be affected by an
uncorrected error. In turn, that error can propagate to other data objects whenever its
content is copied or used in an arithmetic or logic expression, as shown in Listing 1.
Here, the curved arrows indicate that an error can propagate from one subexpression
to the following along the edges of the syntax tree. Accordingly, the content of
a resulting data object cannot be considered reliable and thus has to be qualified
as unreliable. The dependencies between type qualifiers of different data objects
are modeled by the FEHLER propagation rules. In addition to calculations and
assignments, other uses of data objects affected by error propagation are the copying
of parameters to functions using call-by-value semantics and cast expressions.
int step(int x) {
return x << 2;
}
void main(void) {




// omitted for brevity
while (a < b)
a += step(c);
w = c - v;
}
Listing 2 Code example and related type deduction graph
Propagation rules not only help in detecting erroneous data flow from unreliable
to reliable data objects, but also reduce the overhead required by the programmer
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to create annotations. Since it is unrealistic to expect that each and every data
object in a complex program will be annotated manually, our static analyses help
to deduce correct type qualifiers for unannotated data. This deduction is enabled
by the construction of a type deduction graph (TDG), as shown in Listing 2. Here,
the shaded special vertices marked r© and u© represent an enforcement of the type
qualifiers reliable and unreliable by prohibit rules or explicitly stated annotations.
The set of edges of the TDG then reflects the dependencies between the type
qualifiers, data objects, operations, and assignments.
unreliable int u, pos, tmp;
reliable int r, a[10];
u = 10;
r = u; // invalid assignment
pos = 0;
while (pos < r) { // invalid condition
tmp = r / u; // invalid division
a[pos++] = tmp; // invalid memory access
}
Listing 3 Invalid assignments
Accordingly, the use of the TDG enables the compiler to flag invalid data
propagation from unreliable to reliable data objects. An example containing a
number of such invalid propagations is given in Listing 3.
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Overall, the static analyses provided by the FEHLER compiler toolchain enable
programmers to state reliability requirements that cannot be deduced from the
program itself while ensuring that these manual annotations do not accidentally
provide a way to propagate unreliable data to reliable data objects. During runtime,
the annotations are then used to enable flexible error handling by allowing the
operating system to ignore errors in data objects marked as unreliable, thus enabling
a tradeoff between the obtained quality of service and the required error correction
overhead, e.g. in terms of time or energy.
6 FEHLER Runtime System
Viewed from the top, as shown in Fig. 6, an application with integrated classification
information is running on a virtualized guest OS. The guest OS is linked against
the FAME Runtime Environment (FAMERE). FAMERE is responsible for the
flexible error handling as well as the interfacing with the microvisor. The microvisor
runs low-level error correction and ensures the feasibility of software-based error
handling (Fig. 4).
The FAMERE runtime is based on our specialized microvisor component which
has control over the hardware components relevant to error handling. The main
purpose of the microvisor is to isolate critical system components from possible
error propagation and schedule the error handling if required. Critical components
in this context are resources required to keep error detection and correction running.
Depending on the underlying hardware, the actual critical resources vary. If, for
example, errors are signaled via interrupts, the interrupt controller will be an element
of the critical resource set.
Since the microvisor itself can be affected by errors, it is considered to be a part
of the RCB. The microvisor is incapable of protecting itself, since it implements
the basic error handling routines. In order to ensure the effectiveness of error
Fig. 4 The runtime software stack of FEHLER. The microvisor is only involved in case of an
error, whereas all other resources are administered by the paravirtualized guest OS. The guest
OS is extended by FAMERE, the system component responsible for evaluating compiler-provided
information on the criticality of errors
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handling, fault-free hardware components are required to execute the software-
based fault-tolerance mechanisms. In turn, these hardware components also have
to be considered part of the RCB. Reducing the code and data size of the microvisor
itself is, thus, an optimization objective required to reduce the overall size of the
RCB.
To shield the RCB from error propagation, our microvisor uses paravirtualization
[16]. The microvisor is tailored to the needs of embedded systems and fault
tolerance. To keep the virtualization overhead low, it supports only a single guest
operating system. This removes the requirement to provide virtual CPUs and CPU
multiplexing. In addition, caches and TLB entries need not be switched between
different guest OS instances. An additional responsibility of the microvisor is the
creation of full system checkpoints. These are used to restore a valid system state
in case of a severe error affecting the FAMERE runtime. FAMERE is a library in
the guest OS that combines compile and runtime information required to implement
flexible error handling [12].
Error handling is the central task of FAMERE. Figure 5 gives a detailed view of
the error-handling procedure at runtime (the right-hand side of Fig. 2). In order to
enable a prioritization of error handling, tasks affected by an error in the OS running
on top of the microvisor have to be identified. FAMERE determines affected tasks
using a memory subscriber model [12] in which tasks explicitly subscribe to and
unsubscribe from data objects prior resp. after their use. Accordingly, each data
object is annotated with a set of tasks currently using the object, enabling FAMERE
to assign a memory address to the set of tasks using the address at the current
moment.
If there are higher prioritized tasks not affected by current error, further error
handling will be delayed until all higher prioritized tasks finish execution. Error
classification will then be performed when the error handling is scheduled again by
the microvisor, thus minimizing the impact on system timing when an error occurs.
Together with classification information for data objects, our microvisor and
the FAMERE library enable the FEHLER system to implement the envisioned
flexible error-handling principles. By keeping the amount of functionality and the
related code and data sizes of the microvisor low, the RCB size could be reduced
significantly.
7 Use Case: A Fault-Tolerant QoS-Aware Soft Real-time
Application
In order to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the selective error correction
approach enabled by FEHLER, we analyzed typical embedded applications in the
presence of errors. Since microbenchmarks only tend to give a restricted view of the
effects of errors, we used a real-world application to evaluate the possible reduction
in overhead.
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Fig. 5 Error handling in the
runtime software stack of
FEHLER. If an error is
signaled (red flash symbol),
the microvisor checks
whether the fault affects the
RCB. If the RCB is affected,
the microvisor automatically
restores the last system
checkpoint. Otherwise, error
handling is delegated by
sending a message to
FAMERE, which includes an
error description containing
information about the
occurred error as well as the
user space context
As mentioned above, the class of applications that we expect to benefit most from
our flexible error-handling approach are soft real-time applications that are able to
accept—or even make use of—varying levels of QoS in their output. Thus, we used
a constrained baseline profile H.264 video decoder application comprising ca. 3500
lines of ANSI C code as a real-world benchmark to assess the effectiveness and
efficiency of FEHLER [9].
The evaluation is performed on a simulated embedded system using Synopsys’
CoMET cycle-accurate simulator as well as a physical platform based on a Marvell
ARM926-based SoC. CoMET is configured to resemble the real system by simu-
lating a 1.2GHz ARM926 system with 64MiB RAM, 16MiB ROM, and 128KiB
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Fig. 6 Analysis of error impacts on the H.264 video decoder using different injection rates
reliable RAM (using ECC-based hardware error protection). All components are
considered reliable, except the 64MiB of RAM.
The H.264 video decoder is configured to create a checkpoint after every
displayed frame. In each experiment, we decoded 600 frames in total at a rate of
10 frames per second and a resolution of 480×320 pixels.2
We were primarily interested in evaluation results showing the impact of the
injected errors themselves on the achievable QoS of the decoded video, the possible
reduction of the RCB size using flexible error handling as well as the impact of error
handling on system timing.
To assess the impact on the QoS, we developed the quality assessment tool shown
in Fig. 6 [8]. It receives video frames decoded by the target ARM system under the
influence of errors using FEHLER’s flexible error correction and compares these
frames to the correctly decoded reference frames (indicated by the yellow and red
squares in the lower left pictures–the more red, the larger the difference between
the two frames is). For each frame, the tool then calculates several different metrics
indicating the QoS, e.g. the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) and the E color
distance metrics. The left-hand side of Fig. 6 shows a moderate error injection rate
resulting in some visible defects in the output, whereas the right-hand side shows an
artificially high injection rate which renders the output unusable.
For evaluation, we injected uniformly distributed transient faults into RAM. For
each memory access, error detection in hardware is simulated. If the processor
2Although resolution and frame rate seem rather low, this setup leads to a CPU utilization of more
than 65%, since we decode H.264 in software only. However, higher resolutions and frame rates
will be possible if more computing power is available.
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Table 1 Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) for different error injection rates [dB]
λ = 1 · 10−16 λ = 1 · 10−15 λ = 1 · 10−14
All errors handled 36.19 36.15 n/a
Flexible error handling 36.19 36.18 29.01
Flexible + application-specific 36.20 36.12 28.95
accesses an erroneous word, an interrupt will be raised. The number of faults to
be injected is determined by a Poisson distribution with a configurable parameter
λ.3
Table 1 shows QoS results given as PSNR values for different injection rates
and correction approaches. We compare a standard correction approach–correcting
all errors irrespective of the worst-case outcome–with two approaches based on
FEHLER, one which only uses generic error correction such as checkpoint-and-
restore and one which, in addition, applies more efficient, application-specific error
correction methods. It can be seen that for low error injection rates (λ = 1 · 10−16
and 1 · 10−15), uncorrected errors result in a PSNR of about 36 dB, which is still a
reasonable quality for lossy compressed media and is similar to the quality of VHS
video. For the high error rate (λ = 1 · 10−14), however, the PSNR drops below
30 dB.4
It is important to notice that, although high injected error rates can lead to a
significant degradation of the perceived QoS, the primary objective of the binary
classification of error impacts employed by FEHLER is achieved—we were unable
to provoke the system to crash no matter what the used error injection rate was.
Based on the configuration described above, we analyzed the fraction of memory
that the compiler annotated as unreliable, implying no protection against errors
is required. This fraction is a direct indicator of the reduction of the size of memory
that has to be protected, i.e., the RAMmemory component of the RCB. In traditional
software-based error correction approaches, all of the RAM would be considered
part of the RCB. Table 2 shows the results of this evaluation for different video
resolutions. It can be observed that for low resolutions, the amount of data classified
as reliable dominates the memory usage. However, the share of this type of
memory is reduced when decoding videos with higher resolutions. For a 720p HD
video, already 63% of the RAM used by the H.264 decoder can remain unprotected
using FEHLER classifications.
The remaining interesting evaluation is the impact of flexible error handling
on the soft real-time properties of the video decoder application. In the first two
3Not all injected faults are visible by the application, since faults are only detected when the
corresponding memory cell is accessed.
4To control the amount of faults to inject, a Poisson distribution with configurable parameter λ is
used. The time base used for the Poisson distribution is memory bus ticks. Faults are randomly
injected and are equally distributed over the memory. Hence, the locations of the accesses have no
influence on the fault distribution.
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176 × 144 90 kB 55% 74 kB 45%
352 × 288 223 kB 43% 297 kB 57%
1280 × 720 1585 kB 37% 2700 kB 63%
Table 3 Average deadline misses for different error-handling configurations
Error rate
Naive error
















λ = 1 · 10−16 0.14 0.00 0.00ms 0.00 0.00ms 0.00 0.00ms
λ = 1 · 10−15 1.44 2.86 8.15ms 0.52 7.93ms 0.36 4.89ms
λ = 1 · 10−14 35.84 – – 1937.87 10,268.98ms 1887.12 9346.16ms
columns of Table 3, the observed average error rates (of detected faults) are given,
ranging from several faults per minute to an artificially high rate of 36 per second.
We analyzed three different scenarios. In naive error handling, the system treats
every error as an error which cannot be handled by FAMERE. Hence, a checkpoint
is immediately restored. For this scenario, columns three and four in Table 3 show
the average amount of missed deadlines and the average duration of a deadline miss,
respectively. For the lowest error rate, no deadline misses occur since enough slack
time is available for the recovery of checkpoints. If the error rate increases by an
order of magnitude, deadline misses can be observed. On average, deadlines were
missed by 8.15ms. For the highest error rate, no run of the experiment terminated
within a set limit of 2 h of simulation time, thus no results are given here.
The results for flexible error handling are shown in columns five and six. Here,
only errors affecting reliable and live data are handled by checkpoint recovery.
Errors affecting other data are ignored. Flexible error handling reduces the number
of deadline misses significantly (81.75%). The time by which a deadline is missed
is reduced as well (2.70%). For the artificially increased rate of 35.84 errors per
second, however, significant deadline misses could be observed.
The final timing evaluation scenario augmented flexible error handling by
including an application-specific error-handling method. For data objects with a
special annotation, this method is able to transform a corrupted motion vector into
a valid state. For these cases, a time-consuming rollback to a valid system state
is not required, reducing the overhead for error correction. Accordingly, using this
approach, deadline misses could be reduced by 87.37% for the second highest error
rate.
To conclude the overview of our evaluation, we provide an overview of a possible
use of application-specific error correction approaches for our H.264 video decoder.
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No Impact none ignore
Fig. 7 Classification of error impacts for the H.264 video decoder
As shown in Fig. 7, errors can occur in different data structures, such as frame header
or macro blocks. These can be handled by a number of efficient application-specific
error correction approaches.
8 Use Case: Adaptive Error Handling in Control
Applications
Control-based systems are the basis of a large number of applications for embedded
real-time systems. The inherent safety margins and noise tolerance of control
tasks allow that a limited number of errors might be tolerable and might only
downgrade control performance; however, such limited errors might not lead to
an unrecoverable system state. In control theory literature, techniques have been
proposed to enable the stability of control applications even if some signal samples
are delayed [14] or dropped [2]. Accordingly, we expect that our idea of flexible
fault tolerance as described for the video decoder case will also be applicable to
control applications.
As described above, software-based fault-tolerance approaches such as redun-
dant storage or code execution may lead to system overload due to execution time
overhead. For control tasks, an adaptive deployment of related error correction is
desired in order to meet both application requirements and system constraints.
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Fig. 8 Different ways to deal with soft errors: red blocks represent reliable executions, green
blocks represent executions with error detection, while yellow blocks represent unreliable version
without any protection (deadlines are implicit in the schedules shown)
Thus, it has to be investigated how and when to compensate, or even ignore
errors, given a choice of different techniques. In an initial case study, we observed
that a control task can tolerate limited errors with acceptable performance loss [5].5
The general approach used to investigate the effectiveness of this approach is
to model the fault tolerance of control applications as a (m, k)-constraint which
requires at least m correct runs out of any k consecutive runs to be correct. We
investigate how a given (m, k) constraint can be satisfied by adopting patterns of task
instances with individual error detection and compensation capabilities. Figure 8
shows four different ways to handle soft errors. Some of the presented schedules are
infeasible, since they lead to deadline misses.
5This section is based on joint work with Kuan-Hsun Chen, Björn Bönninghoff and Jian-Jia Chen,
TU Dortmund.
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A static approach to ensure this property is Static Pattern-Based Reliable
Execution. In this approach, we enforce the (mi , ki) constraints by applying (m,
k) static patterns to allocate the reliable executions for task τi . While the adopted
pattern will affect the schedulability, stability, and flexibility, deciding the most
suitable pattern is out of scope of this work.
Due to its inability to react dynamically to changes at runtime, it is obvious
that this approach has to be overprovisioning. Thus, we introduce a runtime
adaptive approach called Dynamic Compensation that enhances Static Pattern-
Based Reliable Execution by recognizing the need to execute reliable instances
dynamically instead of having a static schedule.
It is too pessimistic to allocate the reliable instances strictly due to the fact that
soft errors randomly happen from time to time. To mitigate the pessimism, we pro-
pose an adaptive approach, called Dynamic Compensation, to decide the executing
task version on-the-fly by enhancing Static Pattern-Based Reliable Execution and
monitoring the erroneous instances with sporadic replenishment counters.
The idea is to execute the unreliable instances and exploit their successful
executions to postpone the moment that the system will not be able to enforce
an (m, k) constraint, in which the resulting distribution of execution instances still
follows the string of static patterns in the worst case.
With Dynamic Compensation, we prepare a mode indicator 	 for each task to
distinguish the behaviors of dynamic compensation for different status of tasks,
i.e., 	 ∈ {tolerant, safe}. If a task τ i cannot tolerate any error in the following
instances, the mode indicator will be set to safe and the compensation will be
activated for the robustness accordingly. If it can tolerate error in the next instance,
the mode indicator will be set to tolerant and execute the unreliable version with
fault detection.
Our investigation showed that in embedded systems used for control applications
which are liable to both hard real-time constraints and fulfillment of operational
objectives, the inherent robustness of control tasks can be exploited when applying
error-handling methods to deal with transient soft errors induced by the environ-
ment. When expressing the resulting task requirement regarding correctness as a
(m, k) constraint, scheduling strategies based on task versions with different types
of error protection become applicable. We have introduced both static- and dynamic-
pattern-based approaches, each combined with two different recovery schemes.
These strategies drastically reduce utilization compared to full error protection while
adhering to both robustness and hard real-time constraints. To ensure the latter for
arbitrary task sets, a schedulability test is provided formally. From the evaluation
results, we can conclude that the average system utilization can be reduced without
any significant drawbacks and be used, e.g., to save energy. This benefit can
be increased with further sophistication; however, finding feasible schedules also
becomes harder.
For an in-depth discussion in the context of a follow-up investigation of this topic,
we refer the reader to [17].
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9 Application of FEHLER to Approximate Computing
Whereas the work described above concentrates on handling bit flips in memory,
more recently, approximate computing approaches have been investigated to design
energy-efficient systems that trade result precision for energy consumption.
One of the novel semiconductor technologies at the basis of approximate com-
puting is Probabilistic CMOS [3] (PCMOS). Figure 9 shows the general layout of a
ripple-carry adder based on PCMOS technology (PRCA). While traditional energy-
conserving circuits use uniform voltage scaling (UVOS), PCMOS employs biased
voltage scaling (BIVOS), which provides different single-bit full adder components
with differing supply voltages that increase from the least to the most significant bit
in multiple steps. As a consequence, the delay required to calculate a bit decreases
from the LSB to the MSB; accordingly, the probability pc of bit errors due to carry
bits arriving too late is larger in the least significant bits. Using the PCMOS voltage
scaling approach, we also employed a probabilisticWallace-tree multiplier (PWTM)
component and added a related energy model and instructions enabling the use of
the probabilistic components to our ARMv4 architecture simulator.
We investigated whether FEHLER reliability annotations would also be appli-
cable to determine which arithmetic operations of a program could be executed on
PCMOS-based arithmetic components instead of a less energy-efficient traditional
ALU without sacrificing the program’s stability [10]. A first evaluation using
floating point data objects showed that the use of PCMOS technology has the
potential for significant energy conservation. Accordingly, we investigated the
possible conservation potential for a real-world embedded application. FEHLER
type qualifiers were used to indicate data which accepts precision deviation
(unreliable). Accordingly, our compiler backend generated instructions using
probabilistic arithmetic instructions operating on these data objects.
Table 4 shows that a significant fraction of arithmetic ARMmachine instructions
of our H.264 video decoder could be executed safely on probabilistic components.6
Fig. 9 Probabilistic ripple-carry adder
6rsb is the ARM reverse subtract instruction.
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Table 4 Instructions executed using probabilistic components
Instruction type Add Sub rsb Mul Overall
Executed using PRCA/PWTM 18.59% 18.60% 43.01% 76.27% 13.36%
Fig. 10 PSNR (peak signal-to-noise ratio) values for different supply voltage configurations
Surprisingly, our results indicated that for our typical embedded H.264 decoder
application, the use of PCMOS components did not result in energy conservation for
the identical level of QoS compared to uniform voltage scaling.7 This result con-
tradicts the microbenchmarks described in [4]. Figure 10 shows the PSNR of the
H.264 decoder output for different video clips decoded with circuits using four
different UVOS (0.8V–1.1V) as well as three BIVOS schemes with similar energy
consumption to the UVOS schemes. It can be observed that the PSNR of the BIVOS-
decoded videos does not increase, which is a counterintuitive result at first.
A subsequent investigation of the differences between our H.264 decoder and the
code used in the microbenchmarks gave insights into the observed effects. Whereas
the microbenchmarks employed floating point numbers, our video decoder is a
typical embedded application that employs integer and fixed-point numbers.
void enter(unreliable uchar *ptr, unreliable int q_delta) {
unreliable int i = *ptr + ((q_delta + 32) >> 6);
*ptr=Clip(i);
}
Listing 4 H.264 decoder clipping code
This difference in data representation is one of the reasons for the observed
phenomenon. The H.264 specification requires a special behavior when copying
32 bit integer values into an eight bit value in the frame buffer. Here, a saturating
clipping function (cf. Listing 4) is used. This function restricts the value to 255 if
7This only concerns the static and dynamic energy consumption of the PCMOS components. The
additional static energy required by the traditional ALU has not been considered here.
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the input is larger than that. Accordingly, the shift operation used has the ability
to eliminate bit errors in the least significant bits, diminishing the gains of BIVOS
scaling.
In contrast, floating point values are always normalized after arithmetic opera-
tions. This implies that the bits most relevant to a floating point number’s value–sign,
exponent, and the MSBs of the mantissa–are always the MSBs of the memory word.
In this case, the BIVOS approach to construct arithmetic components that show
larger error probabilities in the LSBs is beneficial.
Since it is unrealistic to assume that separate adders for different data widths
and data types will be provided in future architectures, an analysis of the number
of bits actually used in arithmetic operations is required. However, this implies
further complications. One idea for future compiler-based analyses is an approach
that combines bit-width analysis methods for arithmetic operations and code
transformations to use bits with optimal supply voltage for the operation at hand.
The effectiveness of this approach, however, requires further implementation and
analysis work.
10 Summary and Outlook
The results of the FEHLER project have shown that for a large class of embedded
applications, software-based fault tolerance is a feasible way to reduce the overhead
of error handling. The results, as demonstrated using real-world applications, show
that already the simple binary classification employed so far is able to avoid crashes
due to soft errors while reducing the size of the reliable computing base, i.e. the
amount and size of hard- and software components requiring protection from errors.
The technologies developed in the context of FEHLER suggest a number of
ways to further improve on the ideas and design of the approach. One constraint
of the current design is that the current version of reliability type qualifiers is
too coarse-grained. Correcting only errors that affect reliable data objects will
result in avoiding program crashes. However, a sufficiently high error rate affecting
unreliable data might still result in a significant reduction of the QoS, rendering
its output useless.
The existing static analysis in FEHLER is based on subtyping. Accordingly, to
provide a more fine-grained classification of errors, additional error classes have to
be introduced. These classes would have to be characterized according to a given
total order, so that an error can be classified with the correct worst-case effect. If,
for example, the impact of errors is measured in the degradation of a signal-to-noise
ratio, a total order can be determined by the resulting amount of degradation.
However, for the overall assessment of a program’s QoS, the resulting overall
error visible in the output that accumulated throughout the data flow is relevant.
Here, one can imagine setting an acceptable QoS limit for the output data and
backtracking throughout the arithmetical operations in the program’s data flow to
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determine the worst-case deviation that an error in a given variable can cause in the
output. Here, we intend to employ approaches related to numerical error propagation
analysis.
We expect that approximate computing approaches will be able to directly benefit
from these analyses. Since the approximations already trade precision for other non-
functional properties, such as energy consumption, a Pareto optimization of the
differing objectives could benefit from worst-case QoS deviation analyses. Here,
our initial analysis of the use of binary classifiers for the PCMOS case has already
given some interesting preliminary insights.
References
1. Austin, T., Bertacco, V., Mahlke, S., Cao, Y.: Reliable systems on unreliable fabrics. IEEE Des.
Test Comput. 25(4), 322–332 (2008)
2. Bund, T., Slomka, F.: Sensitivity analysis of dropped samples for performance-oriented
controller design. In: 2015 IEEE 18th International Symposium on Real-Time Distributed
Computing, pp. 244–251 (2015)
3. Chakrapani, L.N., Akgul, B.E.S., Cheemalavagu, S., Korkmaz, P., Palem, K.V., Seshasayee,
B.: Ultra-efficient (embedded) SoC architectures based on probabilistic CMOS (PCMOS)
technology. In: Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
(DATE ’06), pp. 1110–1115. European Design and Automation Association (2006)
4. Chakrapani, L.N., Muntimadugu, K.K., Lingamneni, A., George, J., Palem, K.V.: Highly
energy and performance efficient embedded computing through approximately correct arith-
metic: a mathematical foundation and preliminary experimental validation. In: Proceedings of
the 2008 International Conference on Compilers, Architectures and Synthesis for Embedded
Systems (CASES ’08), pp. 187–196. ACM, New York (2008)
5. Chen, K.H., Bönninghoff, B., Chen, J.J., Marwedel, P.: Compensate or ignore? Meeting control
robustness requirements through adaptive soft-error handling. In: Languages, Compilers, Tools
and Theory for Embedded Systems (LCTES). ACM, Santa Barbara (2016)
6. Engel, M., Döbel, B.: The reliable computing base—a paradigm for software-based reliability.
In: INFORMATIK 2012, pp. 480–493. Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V., Bonn (2012)
7. Foster, J.S., Fähndrich, M., Aiken, A.: A theory of type qualifiers. In: Proceedings of the ACM
SIGPLAN 1999 Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI
’99), pp. 192–203. ACM, New York (1999)
8. Heinig, A., Engel, M., Schmoll, F., Marwedel, P.: Improving transient memory fault resilience
of an H.264 decoder. In: Proceedings of the Workshop on Embedded Systems for Real-time
Multimedia (ESTIMedia 2010). IEEE Computer Society Press, Scottsdale (2010)
9. Heinig, A., Engel, M., Schmoll, F., Marwedel, P.: Using application knowledge to improve
embedded systems dependability. In: Proceedings of the Workshop on Hot Topics in System
Dependability (HotDep 2010). USENIX Association, Vancouver (2010)
10. Heinig, A., Mooney, V.J., Schmoll, F., Marwedel, P., Palem, K., Engel, M.: Classification-
based improvement of application robustness and quality of service in probabilistic computer
systems. In: Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Architecture of Computing
Systems (ARCS’12), pp. 1–12. Springer, Berlin (2012)
11. Heinig, A., Schmoll, F., Bönninghoff, B., Marwedel, P., Engel, M.: Fame: flexible real-time
aware error correction by combining application knowledge and run-time information. In:
Proceedings of the 11th Workshop on Silicon Errors in Logic-System Effects (SELSE) (2015)
12. Heinig, A., Schmoll, F., Marwedel, P., Engel, M.: Who’s using that memory? A subscriber
model for mapping errors to tasks. In: Proceedings of the 10th Workshop on Silicon Errors in
Logic-System Effects (SELSE), Stanford, CA, USA (2014)
Soft Error Handling for Embedded Systems using Compiler-OS Interaction 55
13. de Kruijf, M., Nomura, S., Sankaralingam, K.: Relax: an architectural framework for software
recovery of hardware faults. In: Proceedings of the 37th Annual International Symposium on
Computer Architecture (ISCA ’10), pp. 497–508. ACM, New York (2010)
14. Ramanathan, P.: Overload management in real-time control applications using (m, k)-firm
guarantee. IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst. 10(6), 549–559 (1999)
15. Schmoll, F., Heinig, A., Marwedel, P., Engel, M.: Improving the fault resilience of an H.264
decoder using static analysis methods. ACM Trans. Embed. Comput. Syst. 13(1s), 31:1–31:27
(2013)
16. Whitaker, A., Shaw, M., Gribble, S.: Denali: lightweight virtual machines for distributed and
networked applications. In: Proceedings of the 2002 USENIX Annual Technical Conference
(2002)
17. Yayla, M., Chen, K., Chen, J.: Fault tolerance on control applications: empirical investigations
of impacts from incorrect calculations. In: 2018 4th International Workshop on Emerging Ideas
and Trends in the Engineering of Cyber-Physical Systems (EITEC), pp. 17–24 (2018)
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
ASTEROID and the Replica-Aware
Co-scheduling for Mixed-Criticality
Eberle A. Rambo and Rolf Ernst
1 The ASTEROID Project
1.1 Motivation
Technology downscaling has increased the hardware’s overall susceptibility to
errors to the point where they became non-negligible [17, 21, 22]. Hence, current
and future computing systems must be appropriately designed to cope with errors
in order to provide a reliable service and correct functionality [17, 21]. That is a
challenge, especially in the real-time mixed-criticality domain where applications
with different requirements and criticalities co-exist in the system, which must
provide sufficient independence and prevent error propagation (e.g., timing, data
corruption) between criticalities [24, 42]. Recent examples are increasingly complex
applications such as flight management systems (FMS), advanced driver assistance
systems (ADAS), and autonomous driving (AD) in the avionics and automotive
domains, respectively [24, 42]. A major threat to the reliability of such systems
is the so-called soft errors.
Soft errors, more specifically Single Event Effects (SEEs), are transient faults
abstracted as bit-flips in hardware and can be caused by alpha particles, energetic
neutrons from cosmic radiation, and process variability [15, 22]. Soft errors
are comprehensively discussed in chapter “Reliable CPS Design for Unreliable
Hardware Platforms”. Depending on where and when they occur, their impact
on software execution range from masked (no observable effect) to a complete
system crash [3, 12, 13]. Soft errors are typically more frequent than hard errors
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Fig. 1 Main abstraction layers of embedded systems and this chapter’s major (green, solid) and
minor (yellow, dashed) cross-layer contributions
(permanent faults) and often remain undetected, also known as latent error or silent
data corruption, because they cannot be detected by testing. Moreover, undetected
errors are a frequent source of later system crashes [12]. To handle soft errors,
the approaches can vary from completely software-based to completely hardware-
based. The former are able to cover only part of the errors [12, 13] and the latter
result in costly redundant hardware [22], as seen in lock-step dual-core execution
[29]. Cross-layer solutions can be more effective and efficient by distributing the
tasks of detecting errors, handling them and recovering from them in different layers
of software and hardware [12, 13, 22].
1.2 Overview
The ASTEROID project [5] developed a cross-layer fault-tolerance solution to
provide reliable software execution on unreliable hardware. The approach is based
on replicated software execution and exploits the large number of cores available in
modern and future architectures at a higher level of abstraction without resorting to
hardware redundancy [5, 12]. That concentrates ASTEROID’s contributions around
the architecture and operating system (OS) abstraction layers, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
ASTEROID’s architecture is illustrated in Fig. 2. The reliable software execution is
realized by the OS service Romain [12]. Mixed-critical applications may co-exist in
the system and are translated into protected and unprotected applications. Romain
replicates the protected applications, which are mapped to arbitrary cores, and
manages their execution. Error detection is realized by a set of mechanisms whose
main feature is the hardware assisted state comparison, which compares the replicas’
state at certain points in time [5, 12]. Error recovery strategies can vary depending
on whether the application is running in dual modular redundancy (DMR) or triple
modular redundancy (TMR) [3, 5].
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Fig. 2 ASTEROID’s architecture
ASTEROID comprised topics ranging from system-level conceptual modeling,
to the OS and all the way down to Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC)
synthesis and gate-level simulation. We summarize selected work that were devel-
oped in the project next. An initial overview of the ASTEROID approach was
introduced in [5]. Romain, the OS service that provides replicated execution for
unmodified binary applications, was introduced in [12]. The vulnerabilities of the
system were assessed in [9, 13], giving rise to the reliable computing base (RCB),
the minimum set of software and hardware components on which the approach
relies. The runtime overheads related with the OS-assisted replication were inves-
tigated in [10]. Later, RomainMT extends Romain in [11] to support unmodified
multithreaded applications. A systematic design process was investigated in [28],
followed by the definition of a trusted component ecosystem in [19].
In terms of modeling, the reliability of replicated execution was modeled and
evaluated in [3]. The approach was modeled in Compositional Performance Analy-
sis (CPA), a worst-case performance analysis framework, as fork-join tasks and the
performance evaluated in [6] and revised in [2]. Later, co-scheduling was employed
to improve the worst-case performance of replicated execution with the replica-
aware co-scheduling for mixed-criticality [34]. Off-chip real-time communication
under soft errors was modeled in [4] with a probabilistic response-time analysis.
On-chip real-time communication with and without soft errors were modeled in
CPA and evaluated in [33] and [38], where Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ)-based
protocols were employed in a real-time Network-on-Chip (NoC). As part of the
RCB, the NoC’s behavior under soft errors was further researched with thorough
Failure Mode and Effects Analyses (FMEAs) in [35–37]. Based on those findings,
a resilient NoC architecture was proposed in [32, 39, 40], which is able to provide a
reliable and predictable service under soft errors.
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The remainder of this chapter focuses on the performance of replicated execution
under real-time constraints, first published in [34]. It is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces the replica-aware co-scheduling for mixed-criticality and its
related work. Section 3 describes the system, task, and error models. Section 4
introduces the formal response-time analysis. Experimental results are reported in
Sect. 5. Finally, Sect. 6 ends the chapter with the conclusions.
2 Replica-Aware Co-scheduling for Mixed-Criticality
2.1 Motivation
Replicated software execution is a flexible and powerful mechanism to increase the
reliability of the software execution on unreliable hardware. However, the scheduler
has a direct influence on its performance. The performance of replicated execution
for real-time applications has been formally analyzed in [6] and revised in [2].
The work considers the well-known Partitioned Strict Priority Preemptive (SPP)
scheduling, where tasks are mapped to arbitrary cores, and assumes a single error
model. The authors found that SPP, although widely employed in real-time systems,
provides very pessimistic response-time bounds for replicated tasks. Depending
on the interfering workload, replicated tasks executing serially (on the same core)
present much better performance than when executing in parallel (on distinct cores).
That occurs due to the long time that replicated tasks potentially have to wait on each
core to synchronize and compare states before resuming execution. That leads to
very low resource utilization and prevents the use of replicated execution in practice.
The replica-aware co-scheduling for mixed-criticality explores co-scheduling
to provide short response times for replicated tasks without hindering the
remaining unprotected tasks. Co-scheduling is a technique that schedules
interacting tasks/threads to execute simultaneously on different cores [30]. It
allows tasks/threads to communicate more efficiently by reducing the time they
are blocked during synchronization. In contrast to SPP [2, 6], the proposed replica-
aware co-scheduling approach drastically minimizes delays due to the implicit
synchronization found in state comparisons. In contrast to gang scheduling [14],
it rules out starvation and distributes the execution of replicas in time to achieve
short response times of unprotected tasks. The proposed approach differs from
standard Time-Division Multiplexing (TDM) and TDM with background partition
[25] in that all tasks have formal guarantees. In contrast to related work, it supports
different recovery strategies and accounts for the NoC communication delay and
overheads due to replica management and state comparison. Experimental results
with benchmark applications show an improvement on taskset schedulability of
up to 6.9× when compared to SPP, and 1.5× when compared to a TDM-based
scheduler.
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2.2 Related Work
L4/Romain [12] is a cross-layer fault-tolerance approach that provides reliable
software execution under soft errors. Romain provides protection at the application-
level by replicating and managing the applications’ executions as an operating
system service. The error detection is realized by a set of mechanisms [5, 12, 13]
whose main feature is the hardware assisted state comparison, which allows an
effective and efficient comparison of the replicas’ states. Pipeline fingerprinting [5]
provides a checksum of the retired instructions and the pipeline’s data path in every
processor, detecting errors in the execution flow and data. The state comparison,
reduced to comparing checksums instead of data structures, is carried out at certain
points in time. It must occur at least when the application is about to externalize
its state, e.g., in a syscall [12]. The replica generated syscalls are intercepted by
Romain, have their integrity checked, and their replicas’ states compared before
being allowed to externalize the state [12].
Mixed-criticality, in the context of the approach, is supported with different
levels of protection for applications with different criticalities and requirements
(unprotected, protected with DMR1 or TMR) and by ensuring that timing constraints
are met even in case of errors. For instance, Romain provides different error recovery
strategies [3, 5]:
• DMR with checkpoint and rollback: to recover, the replicas rollback to their last
valid state and re-execute;
• TMR with state copy: to recover, the state of the faulty replica is replaced with
the state of one of the healthy replicas.
This chapter focuses on the system-level timing aspect of errors affecting the
applications. We assume thereby the absence of failures in critical components
[13, 32], such as the OS/hypervisor, the replica manager/voter (e.g., Romain), and
interconnect (e.g., NoC), which can be protected as in [23, 39].
The Worst-Case Response Time (WCRT) of replicated execution has been
analyzed in [6], where replicas are modeled as fork-join tasks in a system imple-
menting Partitioned SPP. The work was later revised in [2] due to optimism
in the original approach. The revised approach is used in this work. In that
approach, with deadline monotonic priority assignment, where the priority of tasks
decreases as their deadlines increase, replicated tasks perform worse when mapped
in parallel than when mapped to the same core. This is due to the state comparisons
during execution, which involves implicit synchronization between cores. With
partitioned scheduling, in the worst-case, the synchronization ends up accumulating
the interference from all cores to which the replicated task is mapped, resulting
in poor performance at higher loads. On the other hand, mapping replicated tasks
1DMR per se can be used for system integrity only. However, DMR augmented with checkpointing
and rollback enables recovery and can be used to achieve integrity and availability (state rollback
followed by re-execution in both replicas) [3, 5].
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to the highest priorities results in long response times for lower priority tasks and
rules out deadline monotonicity. The latter causes the unschedulability of all tasksets
with at least one regular task whose deadline is shorter than the execution time of a
replicated task.
Gang scheduling [14] is a co-scheduling variant that schedules groups of
interacting tasks/threads simultaneously. It increases performance by reducing the
inter-thread communication latency. The authors in [26] present an integration
between gang scheduling and Global Earliest Deadline First (EDF), called the Gang
EDF. They provide a schedulability analysis derived from the Global EDF’s based
on the sporadic task model. In another work, [16] shows that SPP Gang schedulers
in general are not predictable, for instance, due to priority inversions and slack
utilization. In the context of real-time systems, gang scheduling has not received
much attention.
TDM-based scheduling [25] is widely employed to achieve predictability and
ensure temporal-isolation. Tasks are allocated to partitions, which are scheduled to
execute in time slots. Partitions can span across several (or all) cores and can be
executed at the same time. The downside of TDM is that it is not work-conserving
and underutilizes system resources. A TDM variant with background partition [25]
tackles this issue by allowing low priority tasks to execute in other partitions
whenever no higher priority workload is executing. Yet, in addition to the high cost
to switch between partitions, no guarantees can be given to tasks in the background
partition.
In the proposed approach, we exploit co-scheduling with SPP to improve the
performance of the system. The proposed approach differs from [6] in that replicas
are treated as gangs and are mapped with highest priorities, and are hence activated
simultaneously on different cores. In contrast to gang scheduling [14, 16] and to [6],
the execution of replicas is distributed in time with offsets to compensate for the
lack of deadline monotonicity, thus allowing the schedulability of tasks with short
deadlines. We further provide for the worst-case performance of lower priority tasks
by allowing them to execute whenever no higher priority workload is executing.
However, in contrast to [25], all tasks have WCRT guarantees. Moreover, we also
model the state comparison and the on-chip communication overheads.
3 System, Task, and Error Models
In this work, we use the CPA [20] to provide formal response-time bounds. Let us
introduce the system, task, and error models.
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3.1 System Model
The system consists of a standard NoC-based many-core composed of processing
elements, simply referred to as cores.
There are two types of tasks in our system, as in [2]:
• independent tasks τi : regular, unprotected tasks; and
• fork-join tasks 
i : replicated, protected tasks.
The system implements partitioned scheduling, where the operating system
manages tasks statically mapped to cores. The mapping is assumed to be given as
input. The scheduling policy is a combination of SPP and gang scheduling. When
executing only independent tasks, the system’s behavior is identical to Partitioned
SPP, where tasks are scheduled independently on each core according to SPP. It
differs from SPP when scheduling fork-join tasks.
Fork-join tasks are mapped with highest priorities, hence do not suffer inter-
ference from independent tasks, and execute simultaneously on different cores, as
in gang scheduling. Note that deadline monotonicity is, therefore, only partially
possible. To limit the interference to independent tasks, the execution of a fork-join
task is divided in smaller intervals called stages, whose executions are distributed in
time. At the end of each stage, the states of the replicas are compared. In case of an
error, i.e. states differ, recovery is triggered.
Fork-join stages are executed with static offsets [31] in execution slots. One stage
is executed per slot. On a core with n fork-join tasks, there are n + 1 execution
slots: one slot for each fork-join task 
i and one slot for recovery. The slots are
cyclically scheduled in a cycle . The slot for 
i starts at offset φ(
i) relative to
the start of  and ends after ϕ(
i), the slot length. The recovery slot is shared by
all fork-join tasks on that core and is where error recovery may take place under a
single error assumption (details in Sects. 3.3 and 4.3). The recovery slot has an offset
φ(recovery) relative to  and length ϕ(recovery). Lower priority independent
tasks are allowed to execute whenever no higher priority workload is executing.
An example is shown in Fig. 3, where two fork-join tasks 
1 and 
2 and two
independent tasks τ3 and τ4 are mapped to two cores. 
1 and 
2 execute in their
respective slots simultaneously in both cores. When an error occurs, the recovery of

2 is scheduled and the recovery of the error-affected stage occurs in the recovery
slot. The use of offsets enables the schedulability of independent tasks with short
periods and deadlines, such as τ3 and τ4. Note that, without the offsets, 
1 and 
2
would execute back-to-back leading to the unschedulability of τ3 and τ4.
3.2 Task Model
An independent task τi is mapped to core σ with a priority p. Once activated, it
executes for at most Ci , its worst-case execution time (WCET). The activations of
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Fig. 3 Execution example with two fork-join and two independent tasks on two cores [34]
a task are modeled with arbitrary event models. Task activations in an event model
are given by arrival curves η−(t) and η+(t), which return the minimum and
maximum number of events arriving in any time interval t . Their pseudo-inverse
counterparts δ+(q) and δ−(q) return the maximum and minimum time interval
between the first and last events in any sequence of q event arrivals. Conversion
is provided in [41]. Periodic events with jitter, sporadic events, and others can be
modeled with the minimum distance function δ−i (q) as follows [41]:
δ−i (q) = max((q − 1) · dmin, (q − 1) · P − J ) (1)
where P is the period, J is the jitter, dmin is the minimum distance between any
two events, and the subscript i indicates the association with a task τi or 
i .
Fork-join tasks are rigid parallel tasks, i.e. the number of processors required by
a fork-join task is fixed and specified externally to the scheduler [16], and consist of
multiple stages with data dependencies, as in [1, 2]. A fork-join task 
i is a Directed
Acyclic Graph (DAG) G(V,E), where vertices in V are subtasks and edges in E
are precedence dependencies [2]. In the graph, tasks are partitioned in segments and
stages, as illustrated in Fig. 5a. A subtask τσ,si is the s-th stage of the σ -th segment
and is annotated with its WCET Cσ,si . The WCET of a stage is equal across all
segments, i.e. ∀x, y : Cx,si = Cy,si . Each segment σ of 
i is mapped to a distinct
core. A fork-join task 
i is annotated with the static offset φ(
i), which marks the
start of its execution slot in . The offset also admits a small positive jitter jφ , to
account for a slight desynchronization between cores and context switch overhead.
The activations of a fork-join task are modeled with event models. Once 
i is
activated, its stages are successively activated by the completion of all segments of
the previous stage, as in [1, 2]. Our approach differs from them in that it restricts the
scheduling of at most one stage of 
i in a cycle , and the stage receives service at
the offset φ(
i). Note that the event arrival at a fork-join task is not synchronized
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Fig. 4 The composition of WCET of fork-join subtasks [34]. (a) WCET of a fork-join subtask.
(b) WCET of recovery
with its offset. The events at a fork-join task are queued at the first stage and only
one event at a time is processed (FIFO) [2]. A queued event is admitted when the
previous event leaves the last stage.
The interaction with Romain (the voter) is modeled in the analysis as part of the
WCETCσ,si , as depicted in Fig. 4a. TheWCET includes the on-chip communication
latency and state comparison overheads, as the Romain instance may be mapped to
an arbitrary core. Those can be obtained, e.g., with [38] along with task mapping and
scheduler properties to avoid over-conservative interference estimation and obtain
tighter bounds.
3.3 Error Model
Our model assumes a single error scenario caused by SEEs. We assume that all
errors affecting fork-join tasks can be detected and contained, ensuring integrity.
The overhead of error detection mechanisms is modeled as part of the WCET (cf.
Fig. 4a). Regarding independent tasks, we assume that an error immediately leads to
a task failure and assume also that its failure will not violate the WCRT guarantees
of the remaining tasks. Those assumptions are met, e.g., by Romain.2 Moreover, we
assume the absence of failures in critical components [13, 32], such as the OS, the
replica manager/voter Romain, and the interconnect (e.g., the NoC), which can be
protected as in [23, 39].
Our model provides recovery2 for fork-join tasks, ensuring their availability.
With a recovery slot in every cycle , our approach is able to handle up to one
error per cycle . However, the analysis in Sect. 4.3 assumes at most one error
per busy window for the sake of a simpler analysis (the concept will be introduced
in Sect. 4). The assumption is reasonable since the probability of a multiple error
scenario is very low and can be considered as an acceptable risk [24]. A multiple
error scenario occurs only if an error affects more than one replica at a time or if
more than one error occurs within the same busy window.
2Romain is able to detect and recover from all soft errors affecting user-level applications. For
details on the different error impacts and detection strategies, the interested reader can refer to [5,
12].
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3.4 Offsets
The execution of fork-join tasks in our approach is based on static offsets, which are
assumed to be provided as input to the scheduler. The offsets form execution slots
whose size do not vary during runtime, as seen in Fig. 3. Varying the slots sizes
would substantially increase the timing analysis complexity without a justifiable
performance gain. The offsets must satisfy two constraints:
Constraint 1 A slot for a fork-join task 
i must be large enough to fit the largest
stage of 
i . That is, ∀s, σ: ϕ(
i) ≥ Cσ,si + jφ .
Constraint 2 The recovery slot must be large enough to fit the recovery of
the largest stage of any fork-join task mapped to that core. That is, ∀i, s, σ :
ϕ(recovery)≥Cσ,si,rec + jφ .
where a one error scenario per cycle is assumed and Cσ,si,rec is the recovery WCET of
subtask τσ,si (cf. Sect. 4.3).
We provide basic offsets that satisfy Constraints 1 and 2. The calculation must
consider only overlapping fork-join tasks, i.e. fork-join tasks mapped to at least
one core in common. Offsets for non-overlapping fork-join tasks are computed
separately as they do not interfere directly with each other. The indirect interference,
e.g., in the NoC, is accounted for in the WCETs. First we determine the smallest


























i)} + ϕ(recovery) (4)
The offsets then depend on the order in which the slots are placed inside .
Assuming that the slots φ(
i) are sorted in ascending order on i and that the








i−1) if x = 
i and i > 1
− ϕ(recovery) if x = recovery
(5)
ASTEROID and the Replica-Aware Co-scheduling for Mixed-Criticality 67
4 Response-Time Analysis
The analysis is based on CPA and inspired by Axer [2] and Palencia and Harbour
[31]. In CPA, the WCRT is calculated with the busy window approach [43]. The
response time of an event of a task τi (resp. 
i) is the time interval between the event
arrival and the completion of its execution. In the busy window approach [43], the
event with the WCRT can be found inside the busy window. The busy window wi of
a task τi (resp. 
i) is the time interval where all response times of the task depend on
the execution of at least one previous event in the same busy window, except for the
task’s first event. The busy window starts at a critical instant corresponding to the
worst-case scheduling scenario. Since the worst-case scheduling scenario depends
on the type of task, it will be derived individually in the sequel.
Before we derive the analysis for fork-join and for independent tasks, let us
introduce the example in Fig. 5 used throughout the section. The taskset consists
of four independent tasks and two fork-join tasks, mapped to two cores. The task
priority on each core decreases from top to bottom (e.g., τ 1,11 has the highest priority
and τ4 the lowest).
4.1 Fork-Join Tasks
We now derive the WCRT for an arbitrary fork-join task 
i . To do that, we need
to identify the critical instant leading to the worst-case scheduling scenario. In case
Fig. 5 A taskset with 4 independent tasks and 2 fork-join tasks, and its mapping to 2 cores. Highest
priority at the top, lowest at the bottom [34]. (a) Taskset. (b) Mapping
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of SPP, the critical instant is when all tasks are activated at the same time and the
tasks’ subsequent events arrive as early as possible [43]. In our case, the critical
instant must also account for the use of static offsets [31].
The worst-case scheduling scenario for 
2 on core 1 is illustrated in Fig. 6. 
2
is activated and executed at the same time on cores 1 and 2 (omitted). Note that,
by design, fork-join tasks do not dynamically interfere with each other. The critical
instant occurs when the first event of 
2 arrives just after missing 
2’s offset. The
event has to wait until the next cycle to be served, which takes time  + jφ when
the activation with offset is delayed by a jitter jφ . Notice that the WCETs of fork-
join tasks already account for the inter-core communication and synchronization
overhead (cf. Fig. 4a).
Lemma 1 The critical instant leading to the worst-case scheduling scenario of a
fork-join task 
i is when the first event of 




Proof A fork-join task 
i does not suffer interference from independent tasks or
other fork-join tasks. The former holds since independent tasks always have lower
priority. The latter holds due to three reasons: an arbitrary fork-join task 
j always
receives service in its slot φ(
j ); the slot φ(
j ) is large enough to fit 
j ’s largest
subtask (Constraint 1); and the slots in a cycle  are disjoint. Thus, the critical
instant can only be influenced by 
i itself.
We prove by contradiction. Suppose that there is another scenario worse than
Lemma 1. That means that the first event can arrive at a time that causes a delay to

i larger than  + jφ . However, if the delay is larger than  + jφ , then the event
arrived before a previous slot φ(
i) and 
i did not receive service. Since that can
only happen if there is a pending activation of 
i and thus violates the definition of
a busy window, the hypothesis must be rejected. 	
Let us now derive the Multiple-Event Queueing Delay Qi(q) and Multiple-Event
Busy Time Bi(q) on which the busy window relies. Qi(q) is the longest time
interval between the arrival of 
i’s first activation and the first time its q-th activation
Fig. 6 Worst-case schedule for fork-join gang 
2 on core 1 (cf. Fig. 5) [34]
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receives service, considering that all events belong to the same busy window [2, 27].
For 
i , the q-th activation can receive service at the next cycle  after the execution
of q−1 activations of 
i lasting si · each, a delay  (cf. (cf. Lemma 1), and a jitter
jφ . This is given by
Qi(q) = (q − 1) · si ·++ jφ (6)
where si is the number of stages of 
i and  is the cycle.
Lemma 2 The Multiple-Event Queueing Delay Qi(q) given by Eq. 6 is an upper
bound.
Proof The proof is by induction. When q=1, 
i has to wait for service at most until
the next cycle  plus an offset jitter jφ to get service for its first stage, considering
that the event arrives just after its offset (Lemma 1). In a subsequent q + 1-th
activation in the same busy window, Eq. 6 must also consider q entire executions
of 
i . Since 
i has si stages and only one stage can be activated and executed per
cycle , it takes additional si · for each activation of 
i , resulting in Eq. 6. 	
The Multiple-Event Busy Time Bi(q) is the longest time interval between the
arrival of 
i’s first activation and the completion of its q-th activation, considering
that all events belong to the same busy window [2, 27]. The q-th activation of

i completes after a delay  (cf. Lemma 1), a jitter jφ , and the execution of q
activations of 
i . This is given by
Bi(q) = q · si ·+ jφ + Cσ,si (7)
where Cσ,si is the WCET of 
i’s last stage.
Lemma 3 The Multiple-Event Busy Time Bi(q) given by Eq. 7 is an upper bound.
Proof The proof is by induction. When q=1, 
i has to wait for service at most until
the next cycle  plus an offset jitter jφ to get service for its first stage (Lemma 1),
plus the completion of the last stage of the activation lasting (si−1) ·+Cσ,si . This
is given by
Bi(1) = (si − 1) ·++ jφ + Cσ,si
= si ·+ jφ + Cσ,si
(8)
In a subsequent q + 1-th activation in the same busy window, Eq. 7 must consider
q additional executions of 
i . Since 
i has si stages and only one stage can be
activated and executed per cycle , it takes additional si ·  for each activation of

i . Thus, Eq. 7. 	
Now we can calculate the busy window and WCRT of 
i . The busy window wi
of a fork-join task 
i is given by
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wi = max
q≥1, q∈N
{Bi(q) |Qi(q + 1) ≥ δ−i (q + 1)} (9)
Lemma 4 The busy window is upper bounded by Eq. 9.
Proof The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is a busy window w̆i longer than
wi . In that case, w̆i must contain at least one activation more than wi , i.e. q̆ ≥ q+1.
From Eq. 9, we have that Qi(q̆) < δ
−
i (q̆), i.e. q̆ is not delayed by the previous
activation. Since that violates the definition of a busy window, the hypothesis must
be rejected. 	
The response time Ri(q) of the q-th activation of 
i in the busy window is given
by
Ri(q) = Bi(q)− δ−i (q) (10)
The worst-case response time R+i is the longest response time of any activation
of 




Theorem 1 R+i (Eq. 11) provides an upper bound on the worst-case response time
of an arbitrary fork-join task 
i .
Proof The WCRT of a fork-join task 
i is obtained with the busy window approach
[43]. It remains to prove that the critical instant leads to the worst-case scheduling
scenario, that the interference captured in Eqs. 6 and 7 are upper bounds, and that
the busy window is correctly captured by Eq. 9. These are proved in Lemmas 1, 2, 3,
and 4, respectively. 	
4.2 Independent Tasks
We now derive the WCRT analysis of an arbitrary independent task τi . Two types
of interference affect independent tasks: interference caused by higher priority
independent tasks and by fork-join tasks. Let us first identify the critical instant
leading to the worst-case scheduling scenario where τi suffers the most interference.
Lemma 5 The critical instant of τi is when the first event of higher priority
independent tasks arrives simultaneously with τi’s event at the offset of a fork-join
task.
Proof The worst-case interference caused by a higher priority (independent) task
τj under SPP is when its first event arrives simultaneously with τi’s and continue
arriving as early as possible [43].
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Fig. 7 The worst-case schedule for independent task τ4 on core 1 (cf. Fig. 5) [34]
The interference caused by a fork-join task 
j on τi depends on 
j ’s offset
φ(
j ) and subtasks τ
σ,s
j , whose execution times vary for different stages s. Assume
a critical instant that occurs at a time other than at the offset φ(
j ). Since a task 
j
starts receiving service at its offset, an event of τi arriving at time t > φ(
j ) can
only suffer less interference from 
j ’s subtask than when arriving at t = 0. 	
Fork-join subtasks have different execution times for different stages, which
leads to a number of scheduling scenarios that must be evaluated [31]. Each scenario
is defined by the fork-join subtasks that will receive service in the cycle  and
the offset at which the critical instant supposedly occurs. The scenario is called a
critical instant candidate S. Since independent tasks participate in all critical instant
candidates, they are omitted in S for the sake of simplicity.
Definition 1 Critical Instant Candidate S: the critical instant candidate S is an
ordered pair (a, b), where a is a critical offset and b is a tuple containing one subtask
τ
σ,s
j of every interfering fork-join task 
j .
Let us also define the set of candidates that must be evaluated.
Definition 2 Critical Instant Candidate Set S: the set containing all possible
different critical instant candidates S.
The worst-case schedule of the independent task τ4 from the example in












2 )). Events of the independent task τ3 start arriving at the critical
instant and continue arriving as early as possible.
Let us now bound the interference I Ii (t) caused by equal or higher priority
independent tasks in any time interval t . The interference I Ii (t) can be upper
bounded as follows [27]:
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I Ii (t) =
∑
∀τj∈hpI (i)
η+j (t) · Cj (12)
where hpI (i) is the set of equal or higher priority independent tasks mapped to the
same core as τi .
To derive the interference caused by fork-join tasks we need to define the Critical




i returns the maximum number of activations observable in any time interval t ,
assuming the critical instant S. It can be derived from 





















+ ge(tS mod ( · si) ,  · (s − 1)) (14)







where s is the stage of subtask τσ,si ; si is the number of stages in 
i ; φ
S is the
offset in S; sS is the stage of 
i in S; gt (a, b, c, d) is a function that returns 1 when
(a > b) ∨ (a = b ∧ c > d), 0 otherwise; and ge(a, b) is a function that returns 1
when a ≥ b, 0 otherwise.
Lemma 6 η̌σ,si (t, S) (Eq. 13) provides a valid upper bound on the number of
activations of τσ,si observable in any time interval t , assuming the critical instant
S.
Proof The proof is by induction, in two parts. First let us assume sS=1 and φS=0,
neutral values resulting in tS =t and gt (sS, s, φS, φ(
i)) = 0. The maximum
number of activations of τσ,si seen in the interval t is limited by the maximum
number of activations of the fork-join task 




i’s activation, and limited by the maximum number of times that τ
σ,s
i can
actually be scheduled and served in t . This is ensured in Eq. 13 by the minimum
function and its first and second terms, respectively.
When sS >1 and/or φS >0, the time interval [0,t) must be moved forward so
that it starts at stage sS and offset φS . This is captured by tS in Eq. 15 and by the
last term of Eq. 13. The former extends the end of the time interval by the time it
takes to reach the stage sS and the offset φS , i.e. [0,tS). The latter pushes the start
of the interval forward by subtracting an activation of τσ,si if it occurs before the
stage sS and the offset φS , resulting in the interval [tS −t,tS). Thus Eq. 13.
	
The interference IFJi (t, S) caused by fork-join tasks on the same core in any
time interval t , assuming a critical instant candidate S, can then be upper bounded
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as follows:





j (t, S) · Cσ,sj (16)
where hpFJ (i) is the set of fork-join subtasks mapped to the same core as τi .
The Multiple-Event Queueing Delay Qi(q, S) and Multiple-Event Busy Time
Bi(q, S) for an independent task τi , assuming a critical instant candidate S, can be
derived as follows:
Qi(q, S) = (q − 1) · Ci + I Ii (Qi(q, S))+ IFJi (Qi(q, S), S) (17)
Bi(q, S) = q · Ci + I Ii (Bi(q, S))+ IFJi (Bi(q, S), S) (18)
where q · Ci is the time required to execute q activations of task τi .
Equations 17 and 18 result in fixed-point problems, similar to the well-known
busy window equation (Eq. 9). They can be solved iteratively, starting with a very
small, positive ε.
Lemma 7 The Multiple-Event Queueing Delay Qi(q, S) given by Eq. 17 is an
upper bound, assuming the critical instant S.
Proof The proof is by induction. When q = 1, τi has to wait for service until the
interfering workload is served. The interfering workload is given by Eqs. 12 and 16.
Since η+j (t) and Cj are upper bounds by definition, Eq. 12 is also an upper bound.
Similarly, since η̌σ,sj (t, S) is an upper bound (cf. Lemma 6) and C
σ,s
j is an upper
bound by definition, 16 is an upper bound for a given S. Therefore, Qi(1, S) is also
an upper bound, for a given S.
In a subsequent q+1-th activation in the same busy window, Qi(q, S) also must
consider q executions of τi . This is captured in Eq. 17 by the first term, which is, by
definition, an upper bound on the execution time. From that, Lemma 7 follows. 	
Lemma 8 The Multiple-Event Busy Time Bi(q, S) given by Eq. 18 is an upper
bound, assuming the critical instant S.
Proof The proof is similar to Lemma 7, except that Bi(q, S) in Eq. 18 also captures
the completion of the q-th activation. It takes additional Ci , which is an upper bound
by definition. Thus Eq. 18 is an upper bound, for a given S. 	
The busy window wi(q, S) of an independent task τi is given by
wi(S) = max
q≥1, q∈N
{Bi(q, S) | Qi(q+1, S) ≥ δ−i (q+1)} (19)
Lemma 9 The busy window is upper bounded by Eq. 19.
Proof The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is a busy window w̆i(S) longer
than wi(S). In that case, w̆i(S) must contain at least one activation more than wi(S),
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i.e. q̆ ≥ q + 1. From Eq. 19, we have that Qi(q̆, S) < δ−i (q̆), i.e. q̆ is not delayed
by the previous activation. Since that violates the definition of a busy window, the
hypothesis must be rejected. 	
The response time Ri of the q-th activation of a task in a busy window is given
by
Ri(q, S) = Bi(q, S)− δ−i (q) (20)
Finally, the worst-case response time R+i is found inside the busy window and
must be evaluated for all possible critical instant candidates S ∈ S . The worst-case









where the set S is given by the following Cartesian products:
S = {φ(
j ), φ(
k), . . . }× {σi(
j )× σi(
k)× . . . } (22)
where 
j , 
k, . . . are all fork-join tasks mapped to the same core as τi and σi(
j )
is the set of subtasks of 
j that are mapped to that core. When no fork-join tasks
interfere with τi , the set S = {(0, ())}.
Theorem 2 R+i (Eq. 21) returns an upper bound on the worst-case response time
of an independent task τi .
Proof We must first prove that, for a given S, R+i is an upper bound. R
+
i is
obtained with the busy window approach [43]. It returns the maximum response
time Ri(q, S) among all activations inside the busy window. From Lemmas 7 and 8
we have that Eqs. 17 and 18 are upper bounds for a given S. From Lemma 9 we
have that the busy window is captured by Eq. 19. Since the first term of Eq. 20 is
an upper bound and the second term is a lower bound by definition, Ri(q, S) is an
upper bound. Thus R+i is an upper bound for a given S. Since Eq. 21 evaluates the
maximum response time over all S ∈ S , R+i is an upper bound on the response time
of τi . 	
4.3 Error Recovery
Designed for mixed-criticality, our approach supports different recovery strategies
for different fork-join tasks (cf. Sect. 2.2). For instance, in DMR augmented with
checkpointing and rollback, recovery consists in reverting the state and re-executing
the error-affected stage in both replicas. In TMR, recovery consists in copying and
replacing the state of the faulty replica with the state of a healthy one. The different
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strategies are captured in the analysis by the recovery execution time, which depends
on the strategy and the stage to be recovered. The recovery WCET Cσ,si,rec of a fork-
join subtask τσ,si accounts for the adopted recovery strategy as illustrated in Fig. 4b.
Once an error is detected, error recovery is triggered and executed in the recovery
slot of the same cycle . Figure 3 illustrates the recovery of the s-th stage of 
2’s
i-th activation.
Let us incorporate the error recovery into the analysis. For a fork-join task 
i ,
we must only adapt the Multiple-Event Busy Time Bi(q) (Eq. 7) to account for the
execution of the recovery:
Breci (q) = q · si ·+ jφ + φ(recovery)− φ(
i)+ Cσ,si,rec (23)
where Cσ,si,rec is the WCET of the recovery of last subtask of 
i . The recovery of
another task 
j does not interfere with 
i’s WCRT. Only the recovery of one of 
i’s
subtasks can interfere with 
i’s WCRT. Moreover, since the recovery of a subtask
occurs in the recovery slot of the same cycle  and does not interfere with the
next subtask, only the recovery of the last stage of 
i actually has an impact on its
response time. This is captured by the three last terms of Eq. 23.
For an independent task τi , the worst-case impact of recovery of a fork-join task

j is modeled as an additional fork-join task 
rec with one subtask τ
σ,1
rec mapped to





is chosen as the maximum recovery time among the subtasks of all fork-join tasks
mapped to that core:








rec mapped, Eq. 21 finds the critical instant, where the recovery C
σ,1
rec has the
worst impact on the response time of τi .
5 Experimental Evaluation
In our experiments we evaluate our approach with real as well as synthetic
workloads, focusing on the performance of the scheduler. First we characterize
MiBench applications [18] and evaluate them as fork-join (replicated) tasks in the
system. Then we evaluate the performance of independent (regular) tasks. Finally
we evaluate the approach with synthetic workloads when varying parameters of
fork-join tasks.
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Table 1 MiBench applications’ profile [34]
WCET Observed stages Grouped stages
[ms] #stages Max WCET [ms] #stages Max WCET [ms]
basicmath 32.48 19,738 0.02 5 6.50
bitcount 24.42 30 15.16 3 15.16
susan 9.63 12 9.59 1 9.63
blowfish 0.11 7 0.09 1 0.11
rijndael 13.17 93 0.37 3 5.91
sha 3.49 51 0.11 2 1.90
5.1 Evaluation with Benchmark Applications
5.1.1 Characterization
First we extract execution times and number of stages from MiBench automo-
tive and security applications [18]. They were executed with small input on an
ARMv7@1GHz and a memory subsystem including a DDR3-1600 DRAM [8].
Table 1 summarizes the total WCET, observed number of stages, and WCET of the
longest stage (max). A stage is delimited by syscalls (cf. Sect. 2.2). We report the
observed execution times as WCETs. As pointed out in [2], stages vary in number
and execution time depending on the application and on the current activity in that
stage (computation/IO). This is seen, e.g., in susan, where 99% of the WCET is
concentrated in one stage (computation) while the other stages perform mostly IO
and are on average 3.34μs long.
In our approach, the optimum is when all stages of a fork-join task have the
same WCET. There are two possibilities to achieve that: to aligned very long stages
in shorter ones or to group short, subsequent stages together. We exploit the latter
as it does not require changes to the error detection mechanism or to our model.
The results with grouped stages are shown on the right-hand side of Table 1. We
have first grouped stages without increasing the maximum stage length. The largest
improvement is seen in bitcount, where the number of stages reduces by one order of
magnitude. In cases where all stages are very short, we increase the maximum stage
length. When increasing the maximum stage length by two orders of magnitude,
the number of stages of basicmath reduces by four orders of magnitude. We have
manually chosen the maximum stage length. Alternatively the problem of finding
the maximum stage length can be formulated as an optimization problem that, e.g.,
minimizes the overall WCRT or maximizes the slack. Next, we map the applications
as fork-join tasks and evaluate their WCRTs.















































































Fig. 8 WCRT of fork-join tasks with two segments derived from MiBench [34]
5.1.2 Evaluation of Fork-Join Tasks
Two applications at a time are mapped as fork-join tasks with two segments (i.e.,
replicas in DMR) to two cores (cf. Fig. 5). On each core, 15% load is introduced
by ten independent tasks generated with UUniFast [7]. We compare our approach
with a TDM-based scheduler and Axer’s Partitioned SPP [2]. In TDM, each fork-
join task executes (and recovers) in its own slot. Independent tasks execute in a third
slot, which replaces the recovery slot of our approach. The size of the slots is derived
from our offsets. For all approaches, the priority assignment for independent tasks is
deadline monotonic and considers that deadline equals period. In SPP, the deadline
monotonic priority assignment also includes fork-join tasks.
The results are plotted in Fig. 8, where ba.bi gives the WCRT of basicmath when
mapped together with bitcount. Despite the low system load, our approach also
outperforms SPP in all cases, with bounds 58.2% lower, on average. Better results
with SPP cannot be obtained unless the interfering workload is removed or highest
priority is given to the fork-join tasks [2], which violates DM. Despite the similarity
of how our approach handles fork-join tasks with TDM, the proposed approach
outperforms TDM in all cases, achieving, on average, bounds 13.9% lower. This
minor difference is because TDM slots must be slightly longer than our offsets to
fit an eventual recovery. Nonetheless, not only our approach can guarantee short
WCRT for replicated tasks but also provides for the worst-case performance of
independent tasks.
5.1.3 Evaluation of Independent Tasks
In a second experiment we fix bitcount and rijndael as fork-join tasks and vary
the load on both cores. The generated task periods are in the range [20, 500]
ms, larger than the longest stage of the fork-join tasks. The schedulability of the
system as the load increases is shown in Fig. 9. Our approach outperforms TDM
and SPP in all cases, scheduling 1.55× and 6.96× more tasksets, respectively.
Due to its non-work conserving characteristic, TDM’s schedulability is limited
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Fig. 9 Schedulability as a function of the load of the system. Basicmath and rijndael as fork-join
tasks with two segments [34]


































Fig. 10 Basicmath and rijndael as replicated tasks in DMR running on a dual-core configuration
with 20.2% load (5% load from independent tasks) [34]. (a) WCRT of independent tasks [ms]. (b)
WCRT of FJ tasks
to medium loads. SPP provides very short response times with lower loads but,
as the load increases, the schedulability drops fast due to high interference (and
thus high WCRT) suffered by fork-join tasks. For reference purposes, we also plot
the schedulability of SPP when assigning the highest priorities to the fork-join
tasks (SPP/hp). The schedulability in higher loads improves but losing deadline
monotonicity guarantees renders the systems unusable in practice. Moreover, when
increasing the jitter to 20% (relative to period), schedulability decreases 14.2% but
shows the same trends for all schedulers.
Figure 10 details the tasks’ WCRTs when the system load is 20.2%. Indeed,
when schedulable, SPP provides some of the shortest WCRTs for independent
tasks, and SPP/hp improves the response times of fork-join tasks at the expense
of the independent tasks’. Our approach provides a balanced trade-off between
the performance of independent tasks and of fork-join tasks, and achieves high
schedulability even in higher loads.
5.2 Evaluation with Synthetic Workload
We now evaluate the performance of our approach when varying parameters such
as stage length and cycle .
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Fig. 11 Parameters of two fork-join tasks 
1 and 
2 with two segments running on a dual-core
configuration [34]. (a) Stages of 
1 and 
2. (b) Cycle 
5.2.1 Evaluation of Fork-Join Tasks
Two fork-join tasks 
1 and 
2 with two segments each (i.e., replicas in DMR)
are in DMR) are mapped to two cores. The total WCETs3 of 
1 and 
2 are 15
and 25ms, respectively. Both tasks are sporadic, with a minimum distance of 1s
between activations. The number of stages of 
1 and 
2 is varied as a function
of the maximum stage WCET, as depicted in Fig. 11a. The length of the cycle ,
depicted in Fig. 11b, varies with the maximum stage WCET since it is derived from
them (cf. Sect. 3.4).
The system performance as the maximum stage lengths of 
1 and 
2 increase is
reported in Fig. 12. The WCRT of 
1 increases with the stage length (Fig. 12a) as it
depends on the number of stages and ’s length. In fact, the WCRT of 
1 is longest
when the stages of 
1 are the shortest and the stages of the interfering fork-join task
(
2) are the longest. Conversely, WCRT of 
1 is shortest when its stages are the
longest and the stages of the interfering fork-join task are the shortest. The same
occurs to 
2 in Fig. 12b. Thus, there is a trade-off between the response times of
interfering fork-join tasks. This is plotted in Fig. 13 as the sum of the WCRTs of

1 and 
2. As can be seen in Fig. 13, low response times can be obtained next and
above to the line segment between the origin (0, 0, 0) and the point (15, 25, 0), the
total WCETs1 of 
1 and 
2, respectively.
5.2.2 Evaluation of Independent Tasks
To evaluate the impact of the parameters on independent tasks, we extend the
previous scenario introducing 25% load on each core with ten independent tasks
generated with UUniFast [7]. The task periods are within the interval [15, 500] ms
for the first experiment, and the interval [25, 500] ms for the second. The priority
3The sum of the WCET of all stages of a fork-join task.










WCET Γ1 [ ]
Max. stage



















WCET Γ1 [ ]
Max. stage










Fig. 12 Performance of fork-join tasks 
1 and 
2 as a function of the maximum stage WCET
[34]. (a) WCRT of 
1. (b) WCRT of 
2
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Fig. 14 Schedulable tasksets as a function of the maximum stage WCET of fork-join tasks 
1
and 
2 with 25% load from independent tasks [34]. (a) Task period interval [15–500] ms. (b) Task
period interval [25–500] ms
assignment is deadline monotonic and considers that the deadline is equal to the
period.
The schedulability as a function of the stage lengths is shown in Fig. 14.
Sufficiently long stages cause the schedulability to decrease as independent tasks
with short periods start missing their deadlines. This is seen in Fig. 14a when the
stage length of either fork-join task reaches 15ms, the minimum period for the
generated tasksets. Thus, when increasing the minimum period of generated tasks
to 25ms, the number of schedulable tasksets also increases (Fig. 14b).
The maximum stage length of a fork-join task has direct impact on the response
times and schedulability of the system. For the sake of performance, shorter stage
ASTEROID and the Replica-Aware Co-scheduling for Mixed-Criticality 81
lengths are preferred. However, that is not always possible because it would result
in a large number of stages or because of the application, which restricts the
minimum stage length (cf. Sect. 5.1.1). Nonetheless, fork-join tasks still are able to
perform well with appropriate parameter choices. Additionally, one can formulate
the problem of finding the stage lengths according to an objective function, such as
minimize the overall response time or maximize the slack. The offsets can also be
included in the formulation, as long as Constraints 1 and 2 are met.
6 Conclusion
This chapter started with an overview of the project ASTEROID. ASTEROID devel-
oped a cross-layer fault-tolerance approach to provide reliable software execution
on unreliable hardware. The approach is based on replicated software execution and
exploits the large number of cores available in modern and future architectures at a
higher level of abstraction without resorting to the inefficient hardware redundancy.
The chapter then focused on the performance of replicated execution and the replica-
aware co-scheduling, which was developed in ASTEROID.
The replica-aware co-scheduling for mixed-critical systems, where applications
with different requirements and criticalities co-exist, overcomes the performance
limitations of standard schedulers such as SPP and TDM. A formal WCRT analysis
was presented, which supports different recovery strategies and accounting for
the NoC communication delay and overheads due to replica management and
state comparison. The replica-aware co-scheduling provides for high worst-case
performance of replicated software execution on many-core architectures without
impairing the remaining tasks in the system. Experimental results with benchmark
applications showed an improvement on taskset schedulability of up to 6.9× when
compared to Partitioned SPP and 1.5× when compared to a TDM-based scheduler.
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1 Introduction
Future hardware designs for embedded systems will exhibit more parallelism and
energy efficiency at the price of being less reliable, due to shrinking structure
sizes, increased clock frequencies, and lowered operating voltages [9]. In embedded
control systems, the handling of soft errors—e.g., transient bit flips in the memory
hierarchy—is becoming mandatory for all safety integrity level (SIL) 3 or SIL 4
categorized safety functions [30, 35]. Established solutions stem mostly from
the avionics domain and employ extensive hardware redundancy or specifically
hardened hardware components [55]—both of which are too costly to be deployed
in commodity products.
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Software-based redundancy techniques, especially redundant execution with
majority voting in terms of TMR, are well-established countermeasures against soft
errors on the application level [24]. By combining them with further techniques—
such as arithmetic codes—even the voter as the single point of failure (SPOF) can
be eliminated [53]. However, all these techniques “work” only under the assumption
that the application is running on top of a soft-error-resilient system-software stack.
In this chapter, we address the problem of software-stack hardening for three dif-
ferent points in the system-software and fault-tolerance technique design space:
• In Sect. 3 we investigate soft-error hardening techniques for a statically con-
figured OS, which implements the automotive OSEK/AUTOSAR real-time
operating system (RTOS) standard [5, 40]. We answer the research question what
the general reliability limits in this scenario are when aiming at reliability as a
first-class design goal. We show that harnessing the static application knowledge
available in an AUTOSAR environment, and protecting the OS kernel with AN-
encoding, yields an extremely reliable software system.
• In Sect. 4 we analyze how programming-language and compiler extensions can
help to modularize fault-tolerance mechanisms. By applying the resulting fault-
tolerance modules to a dynamic commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) embedded
OS, we explore how far reliability can be pushed when a legacy software stack
needs to be maintained. We show that aspect-oriented programming (AOP) is
suitable for encapsulating generic software-implemented hardware fault toler-
ance (SIHFT) mechanisms, and can improve reliability of the targeted software
stack by up to 79%.
• Looking beyond bit flips in the memory hierarchy, in Sect. 5 we investigate
how a system-software stack can survive even more adverse fault models such
as whole-system outages. Using persistent memory (PM) technology for state
conservation, our findings include that software transactional memory (STM)
facilitates maintaining state consistency and allows fast recovery.
These works have been previously published in conference proceedings and
journals [8, 29, 36], and are presented here in a summarized manner. Section 6
concludes the chapter and summarizes the results of the DanceOS project, which
was funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) over a period of 6 years
as part of the priority program SPP 1500 “Dependable Embedded Systems” [26]
(Fig. 1).
2 Related Work
Dependable Embedded Operating Systems While most work from the dependable-
systems community still assumes the OS itself to be too hard to protect, the topic of
RTOS reliability in case of transient faults has recently gained attention. The C3 μ-
kernel tracks system-state transitions at the inter-process communication (IPC) level
to be able to recover system components in case of a fault [50]. Their approach,
























Fig. 1 Main abstraction layers of embedded systems and this chapter’s major (green, solid) and
minor (yellow, dashed) cross-layer contributions
however, assumes that faults are detected immediately and never turn into silent
data corruptions (SDCs), and that the recovery functionality itself is part of the
RCB. L4/Romain [19] employs system-call interception to provide transparent
thread-level TMR—and, hence, error detection,—but still requires a reliable μ-
kernel. The hypervisor approach of Quest-V [34] reduces the software-part of the
RCB even further—at the price of increasing the hardware-part for the required
virtualization support. In the end, however, all these approaches assume early and
reliable detection of faults and their strict containment inside the RCB, which our
three approaches provide.
Software-Based Soft-Error Detection and Correction The concept of AN-encoding
has been known for quite a while and has been taken up in recent years in
compiler- and interpreter-based solutions [45]. Yet, these generic realizations are
not practicable for realizing a RCB—not only due their immense runtime overhead
of a factor of 103 up to 105, but also due to the specific nature of low-level
system software. Thus, following our proven CoRed concept [28], we concentrate
the encoded execution to the minimal necessary points. Besides AN-encoding,
several more generic error detection and recovery mechanisms (EDMs/ERMs)
exist and have been successfully deployed. Shirvani et al. [48] evaluate several
software-implemented error-correcting codes for application in a space satellite to
obviate the use of a low-performance radiation-hardened CPU and memory. Read-
only data segments are periodically scrubbed to correct memory errors, whereas
protected variables must be accessed manually via a special API to perform error
correction. Similarly, Samurai [41] implements a C/C++ dynamic memory allocator
with a dedicated API for access to replicated heap memory. Programmers have
to manually invoke functions to check and update the replicated memory chunks.
The latter approach exposes the heap allocator as single point of failure, which
is not resilient against memory errors. To automate the hardening process, some
works extend compilers for transforming code to add fault tolerance [44]. These
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approaches are based on duplicating or even triplicating important variables of
single-threaded user-level programs. Our work differs in that we use the general-
purpose AspectC++ compiler that allows us to focus on the implementation of
software-based EDM/ERMs in the OS/application layer, instead of implementing
special-purpose compilers. AOP also allows to separate the “business logic” from
fault-tolerance implementations, which has, e.g., been pioneered by Alexandersson
et al. [2]—however at the cost of 300% runtime overhead.
State Consistency in Non-volatile Memories Maintaining state consistency in per-
sistent memory has been achieved on the level of process-wide persistence [10, 39]
and specialized file systems [13, 20]. Our DNV Memory approach shares the most
similarities with libraries that provide safe access to a persistent heap [6, 12, 54].
Mnemosyne [54] shows the overall steps that are needed to build a persistent heap,
while NV-Heaps [12] focuses mainly on usability aspects. Both libraries rely on
a transactional-memory model that stores logs in persistent memory and executes
expensive flush operations to ensure data consistency in presence of power failures.
In order to improve performance, the memory allocator of Makalu [6] guarantees
the consistency of its own meta data without the need of transactions. However, it
does not extend this ability to the data stored within. Thus, library support, similar
to Mnemosyne [54], is still needed to enforce durability. DNV Memory shares
with these approaches the transactional model and the goal to provide a persistent
heap, but aims at improving performance and lifetime of persistent applications by
reducing the amount of writes to persistent memory. Additionally, DNV Memory
provides transparent dependability guarantees that none of the previous work has
covered.
3 dOSEK: A Dependable RTOS for Automotive Applications
In the following, we present the design and implementation of dOSEK, an
OSEK/AUTOSAR-conforming [5, 40] RTOS that serves as reliable computing base
(RCB) for safety-critical systems. dOSEK has been developed from scratch with
dependability as the first-class design goal based on a two-pillar design approach:
First we aim for strict fault avoidance1 by an in-depth static tailoring of the kernel
towards the concrete application and hardware platform—without restricting the
required RTOS services. Thereby, we constructively minimize the (often redundant)
vulnerable runtime state. The second pillar is to then constructively reintegrate
redundancy in form of dependability measures to eliminate the remaining SDCs in
the essential state. Here, we concentrate—in contrast to others [4, 50]—on reliable
fault detection and fault containment within the kernel execution path (Sect. 3.2) by
1Strictly speaking, we aim to avoid errors resulting from transient hardware faults.
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employing arithmetic encoding [23] to realize self-contained data and control-flow
error detection across the complete RTOS execution path.
We evaluate our hardened dOSEK against ERIKA [21], an industry-grade open-
source OSEK implementation, which received an official OSEK/VDX certification
(Sect. 3.3). We present the runtime and memory overhead as well as the results of
extensive fault-injection campaigns covering the complete fault space of single-bit
faults in registers and volatile memory. Here, dOSEK shows an improvement of four
orders of magnitude regarding the SDC count, compared to ERIKA.
3.1 Development of a Fault-Avoiding Operating System
Essentially, a transient fault can lead to an error inside the kernel only if it affects
either the kernel’s control or data flow. For this, it has to hit a memory cell or register
that carries currently alive kernel state, such as a global variable (always alive),
a return address on the stack (alive during the execution of a system call), or a
bit in the status register of the CPU (alive only immediately before a conditional
instruction). Intuitively, the more long-living state a kernel maintains, the more
prone it is to transient faults. Thus, our first rule of fault-avoiding OS development
is: ➊ Minimize the time spent in system calls and the amount of volatile state,
especially of global state that is alive across system calls.
However, no kernel can provide useful services without any runtime state. So,
the second point to consider is the containment and, thus, detectability of data and
control-flow errors by local sanity checks. Intuitively, bit flips in pointer variables
have a much higher error range than those used in arithmetic operations; hence, they
are more likely to lead to SDCs. In a nutshell, any kind of indirection at runtime
(through data or function pointers, index registers, return addresses, and so on)
impairs the inherent robustness of the resulting system. Thus, our second rule of
fault-avoiding operating-system development is: ➋ Avoid indirections in the code
and data flow.
In dOSEK, we implement these rules by an extensive static analysis of the
application code followed by a subsequent dependability-oriented “pointer-less”
generation of the RTOS functionality. Our approach follows the OSEK/AUTOSAR
system model of static tailoring [5, 40], which in itself already leads to a significant
reduction of state and SDC vulnerability [27]. We amplify these already good results
by a flow-sensitive analysis of all application–RTOS interactions [17, 18] in order
to perform a partial specialization of system calls: Our system generator specializes
each system call per invocation to embed it into the particular application code. This
facilitates an aggressive folding of parameter values into the code. Therefore, less
state needs to be passed in volatile registers or on the stack (rule ➊). We further
achieve a pointer-less design by allocating all system objects statically as global
data structures, with the help of the generator. In occasions where pointers would be
used to select one object out of multiple possible candidates, an array at a constant
address with small indices is preferred (rule ➋).
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Fig. 2 Overview of the OS data kept in RAM of an example system composed of three tasks and
two alarms. Each box represents a 32-bit memory location. All kernel data are hardened using an
ANB-Code. The remaining application- and architecture-specific values are safeguarded by dual
modular redundancy (DMR) or parity bits
Figure 2 depicts the resulting state of this analysis by the example of a system
consisting of three tasks and two alarms: The remaining volatile state variables are
subsumed under the blocks Application, Architecture, and Kernel. The architecture-
independent minimal Kernel state is condensed to two machine words for the current
task’s priority, its id, and one machine word per task for the task’s dynamic priority
according to the priority ceiling protocol. Depending on the requirements of the
application, the kernel maintains the current state of additional resources: in this
case two alarms (three machine words each) and one counter (one machine word).
The Architecture blocks are related to the dispatching mechanism of the underlying
processor. In case of the IA-32, this is reduced to the administration of one stack
pointer per task.
The most frequently used (but far less visible) pointers are the stack pointer and
the base pointer. Albeit less obvious, they are significant: A corrupted stack pointer
influences all local variables, function arguments, and the return address. Here, we
eliminated the indirection for local variables by storing them as static variables at
fixed, absolute addresses, while keeping isolation in terms of visibility and memory
protection (rule ➋). Furthermore, by aggressively inlining the specialized system
calls into the application code, we reduce the spilling of parameter values and
return addresses onto the vulnerable stack, while keeping the hardware-based spatial
isolation (MPU/MMU-based AUTOSAR memory protection) between applications
and kernel using inline traps [15] (rule ➊).
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3.2 Implementing a Fault-Detecting Operating System
dOSEK’s fault-detection strategies can be split up into two complementary con-
cepts: First, coarse-grained hardware-based fault-detection mechanisms, mainly
by means of MPU-based memory and privilege isolation. Second, fine-grained
software-based concepts that protect the kernel-internal data/control flows.
Hardware-based isolation by watchdogs and memory protection units (MPUs)
are a widely used and a proven dependability measure. Consequently, dOSEK inte-
grates the underlying architecture’s mechanisms into its system design, leveraging a
coarse-grained fault detection between tasks and the kernel. We furthermore employ
hardware-based isolation to minimize the set of kernel-writable regions during
a system call, which leverages additional error-detection capabilities for faulty
memory writes from the kernel space. With our completely generative approach, all
necessary MPU configurations can be derived already at compile time and placed in
robust read-only memory (ROM).
The execution of the dOSEK kernel itself is hardened with a fine-grained
arithmetic encoding. All kernel data structures are safeguarded using a variant of
an AN-code [23] capable of detecting both data- and control-flow errors. The code
provides a constant common key A, allowing to uncover errors when calculating the
remainder, and a variable-specific, compile-time constant signature Bn detecting the
mix-up of two encoded values as well as the detection of faulty control flows—the
ANB-Code:
nenc = A · n + Bn
A particular feature of arithmetic codes is a set of code-preserving arithmetic
operations, which allow for computation with the encoded values. Hence, a
continuous sphere of redundancy is spanned, as the corresponding operands remain
encoded throughout the entire kernel execution.
In addition to the existing elementary arithmetic operations, dOSEK also requires
an encoded variant of the mandatory OSEK/AUTOSAR fixed-priority scheduling
algorithm [40]: The encoded scheduler is based on a simple prioritized task list.
Each task’s current dynamic priority is stored at a fixed location (see also Fig. 2),
with the lowest possible value, an encoded zero, representing the suspended state.
To determine the highest-priority task, the maximum task priority is searched by
comparing all task priorities sequentially. Thus, the algorithm’s complexity in space
and time is linear to the constant number of tasks. Figure 3 shows the basic concept
for three tasks: The sequence processes a global tuple of ANB-encoded values
storing the current highest-priority task id found so far, and the corresponding
priority (〈idg, priog〉, see Fig. 2). Sequential compare-and-update operations, based
on an encoded greater-equal decision on a tuple of values (ge_tuple), compare
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Fig. 3 General sequence of the encoded scheduling operation on the example of three tasks
(T1, T2, T3). All operations on signatures B are calculated already at compile time
the tuples’ priority value and update the global values, if necessary. The sequence
consists of five steps, as shown in Fig. 3:
(1) Initialize priog and idg to the first task.
(2–3) For all further tasks, compare the task’s priority to priog: If greater or equal,
update 〈idg, priog〉.
(4) Repeat the last step for the idle task.
(5) Recode the results to their original signatures.
The idle task priority is constantly bound to an encoded zero that is representing a
suspended state. Thus, if all previous tasks are suspended, the last comparison (in
step 4) will choose the idle task halting the system until the next interrupt.
Aside from the actual compare-and-update operation on fully encoded values,
the ge_tuple function additionally integrates control-flow error detection. For each
step, all signatures of the input operands (Bid,s1..s4, Bprio,s1..s4) and the signature of
the operation itself (Bge1..4) are merged into the resulting encoded values of the
global tuple. Each corresponding signature of a step is then applied in the next
operation accordingly. Thus, the dynamic values of the result tuple accumulate the
signatures of all preceding operations. As the combination of these compile-time
constant signatures is known before runtime, interspersed assertions can validate the
correctness of each step. Even after the final signature recode operation (step 5), any
control-flow error is still detectable by the dynamic signature. Thus, the correctness
of the encoded global tuple can be validated at any point in time. In effect, fault
detection is ensured, as all operations are performed on encoded values.
The remaining dynamic state highly depends on the underlying architecture.
Regarding the currently implemented IA-32 variant, we were able to reduce this
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Fig. 4 Simplified representation of the I4Copter task and resource constellation used as evaluation
scenario
runtime state to an array storing the stack pointers of preempted tasks, and an
corresponding index variable, as shown in Fig. 2. The variables are used within
each interrupt entry as well as during the actual dispatch operation. As they are not
involved in any arithmetic calculations, but only read and written, we can avoid the
overhead of the ANB-encoding in these cases and protect them by DMR or parity
checks, respectively.
3.3 Evaluation
For comparison, we chose ERIKA Enterprise [21], an industry-grade (i.e., formally
certified) open-source implementation of the automotive OSEK standard [40].
The evaluation is based on a realistic system workload scenario considering all
essential RTOS services, resembling a real-world safety-critical embedded system
in terms of a quadrotor helicopter control application (cf. Fig. 4). The scenario
consists of 11 tasks, which are activated either periodically or sporadically by one
of four interrupts. Inter-task synchronization is done with OSEK resources and a
watchdog task, observing the remote control communication. We evaluated several
variants of ERIKA and dOSEK, all running the same task set. As ERIKA does not
provide support for hardware-based memory protection, we also disabled the MPU
in dOSEK:
ERIKA Standard version of ERIKA with enabled sanity checks (SVN r3274).
dOSEK (unprotected) For the dOSEK base version only the indirection avoidance
and the generative approach are used against SDCs.
dOSEK (FT) The safeguarded kernel execution with encoded operations.
dOSEK (FT+ASS) Like FT, but with additional assertions obtained by a flow-
sensitive global control-flow analysis [18].
94 H. Schirmeier et al.
The application flow is augmented with 172 checkpoints. Every RTOS under test
executes the application for three hyper periods, while, at the same time a trace
of visited checkpoints is recorded. It is the mission of the systems under test to
reproduce this sequence, without corrupting the application state. If the sequence
silently diverges in the presence of faults, we record a silent data corruption.2
The application state (task stacks) is checked for integrity at each checkpoint. To
evaluate the fault containment within the kernel execution, we further recorded an
SDC in case of violated integrity. Both SDC detection mechanisms were realized
externally by the FAIL* fault-injection framework [47] without influencing the
runtime behavior of the systems under test. Since FAIL* has the most mature
support for IA-32, we choose this architecture as our evaluation platform. FAIL*
provides elaborate fault-space pruning techniques that allow to cover the entire
space of effective faults, while keeping the total number of experiments manageable.
The evaluated fault space includes all single-bit faults in the main memory, in
the general-purpose registers, the stack pointer, and flags registers, as well as the
instruction pointer.
3.3.1 Fault-Injection Results
All OS variants differ in code size, runtime, and memory consumption—parameters
that directly influence the number of effective injected faults. To directly compare
the robustness independent of any other non-functional properties, we concentrate
on the resulting absolute SDC count, which represents the number of cases in which
the RTOS did not provide the expected behavior. Figure 5 shows, on a logarithmic
scale, the resulting SDC counts.
The results show that, compared to ERIKA, the unprotected dOSEK variant
already faces significantly fewer control-flow and register errors. This is caused by
the means of constructive fault avoidance, particularly the avoidance of indirections
in the generated code. The activation of fault tolerance measures (dOSEK FT)
significantly reduces the number of memory errors, which in total reduces the SDC
count compared to ERIKA by four orders of magnitude. The remaining SDCs can
further be halved by adding static assertions (dOSEK FT+ASS).
3.3.2 Memory- and Runtime Costs
On the downside, aggressive inlining to avoid indirections, but especially the
encoded scheduler and kernel execution path leads to additional runtime and
memory costs, which are summarized in Table 1. Compared again to ERIKA, the
SDC reduction by four orders of magnitude is paid for with a 4× increase in runtime
and a 20× increase in code size. As most of the code bloat is caused by the inlining
2Faults that lead to a hardware trap are not counted as silent, as they are handled by the kernel.



















































Fig. 5 SDC distribution for the evaluated variants of the I4Copter scenario (Fig. 4 on a logarithmic
scale; pruned experiments are factored in). The encoded dOSEK system achieves an improvement
in the SDC count by four orders of magnitude compared to ERIKA (base)





dOSEK (unprotected) 14,985 29,223
dOSEK FT 53,956 110,524
dOSEK FT+ASS 71,049 121,583
dOSEK FT+ASS+OPT 24,955 90,106
of the encoded scheduler at each call site, we have added a fifth variant (dOSEK
FT+ASS+OPT) that employs further whole-program static optimizations to exclude
unnecessary scheduler invocations (see [17] for further details). This version is still
104× less vulnerable to SDCs, but reduces the runtime overhead to 2.5× and the
code overhead to 8×.
4 Modularizing Software-Based Memory Error Detection
and Correction
The dOSEK approach in the previous section showed the general reliability limits
when designing a static OS from scratch, focusing on reliability as a first-class
design goal. However, a different and quite common use case is that the require-
ments entail using a preexisting COTS embedded OS, which is often dynamic in the
sense that it provides an interface for creating and destroying threads or memory
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allocations at runtime. To protect this class of system-software stacks against
transient hardware faults—e.g., bit flips—in memory, we propose a software-based
memory-error recovery approach that exploits application knowledge about memory
accesses, which are analyzed at compile time and hardened by compiler-generated
runtime checks.
A central challenge is the placement of these runtime checks in the control
flow of the software, necessitating an analysis that determines which program
instructions access which parts of the memory. In general, this is an undecidable
problem for pointer-based programming languages; however, if we assume an
object-oriented programming model, we can reason that non-public data-structure
members are accessed only within member functions of the same class. Conse-
quently, data structures—or, objects—can be examined for errors by inserting a
runtime check before each member-function call.
In this section, we describe our experiences with devising such an object-level
error recovery in AspectC++ [51]—an AOP extension to C++,—and applying
it to the embedded Configurable operating system (eCos) [37]. Our software-
based approach, called Generic Object Protection (GOP), offers the flexibility to
choose from an extensible toolbox of error-detecting and error-correcting codes, for
example, CRC and Hamming codes.
4.1 Generic Object Protection with AspectC++
Our experience with the embedded operating system eCos shows that OS kernel
data structures are highly susceptible to soft errors in main memory [8]. Several
kernel data structures, such as the process scheduler, persist during the whole OS
uptime, which increases the chance of being hit by a random soft error.
As a countermeasure, OS kernel data structures can contain redundancy, for
example, a separated Hamming code [48]. Before an instance of such a data
structure—an object in object-oriented jargon—is used, the object can be examined
for errors. Then, after object usage, the Hamming code can be updated to reflect
modifications of the object.
Manually implementing such a protection scheme in an object-oriented program-
ming language is a tedious and error-prone task, because every program statement
that operates on such an object needs careful manipulation. Therefore, we propose
to integrate object checking into existing source code by AOP [32]. Over the last 19
years, we have developed the general-purpose AspectC++ programming language
and compiler [51] that extends C++ by AOP features. A result of the SPP-1500’s
DanceOS project is AspectC++ 2.0, which provides new language features that
allow for a completely modular implementation of the sketched object protection
scheme—the GOP. In the following, we describe these programming-language
features taking the example of GOP.
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Fig. 6 A simplified implementation of the GOP mechanism written in AspectC++
4.1.1 Generic Introductions by Compile-Time Introspection
Figure 6 shows the source code for a highly simplified implementation of the
GOP. The keyword aspect in the first line declares an entity similar to a
C++ class that additionally encompasses pointcut expressions and pieces of
advice. A pointcut expression is a reusable alias for names defined in the
program. For example, the pointcut critical() in line 2 lists two classes,
namely “Cyg_Scheduler” and “Cyg_Thread”, from the eCos kernel. This
pointcut is used by the following line that defines advice that those two classes
get extended by a slice introduction, which inserts an additional member into
these classes. The inserted member “code” is an instance of the template class
HammingCode<typename>, whose template argument is bound to the built-in
type JoinPoint. This type is only available in the body of advice code and offers
an interface to a compile-time introspection API.
AspectC++’s introspection API [7] provides the programmer with information
on the class type that is being extended by the slice introduction. We use this
information within the template class HammingCode to instantiate a generative
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C++ template metaprogram [14] that compiles to a tailored Hamming code for each
class. In particular, we use the number of existing data members (MEMBERS) prior
to the slice introduction, their types (Member<I>::Type) to obtain the size of
each member, and a typed pointer (Member<I>::pointer(T *obj)) to each
data member to compute the actual Hamming code. Furthermore, for classes with
inheritance relationships, we recursively iterate over all base classes that are exposed
by the introspection API. To simplify the iteration over this API, we implemented a
Join-Point Template Library (JPTL) that offers compile-time iterators for each API
entry.
4.1.2 Advice for Control Flow and Data Access
Once the Hamming code is introduced into the classes, we need to make sure that
the code is checked and updated when such an object is used. At first, the Hamming
code needs to be computed whenever an object of a protected class is instantiated.
The advice for construction in line 7 implements this requirement: after
a constructor execution, the update() function is invoked on the “code” data
member. The built-in pointer tjp->target() yields the particular object being
constructed (tjp is an abbreviation for this join point).
The lines 11–14 define further pointcuts that describe situations where the objects
are used. The pointcut function member(...) translates the existing pointcut
critical() into a set of all data members and member functions belonging
to classes matched by critical(). Thus, call(member(critical()))
describes all procedure calls to member functions of the particular classes. Likewise,
the pointcut function get(...) refers to all program statements that read a
member variable, and the other way around, set(...) matches all events in
the program that write to a particular member variable. The get/set pointcut
functions are new features of the AspectC++ language that notably allow observing
access to data members declared as public.
The advice in line 16 invokes the check() routine on the Hamming-
code sub-object based on the trigger_check() pointcut, that is, whenever a
member function is called, or a member variable is read or written. Similarly, the
advice in line 20 invokes the update() function aftermember-function calls
or writing to a member variable. Both pieces of advice invoke these routines only
if the caller object (tjp->that()) and the callee object (tjp->target())
are not identical. This is an optimization that avoids unnecessary checking when an
already verified object invokes a function on itself.
A call to any function is matched by the wild-card expression in line 25. There-
with, the advice definition in line 26 updates the Hamming code whenever a function
call leaves a critical object, as specified by within(member(critical())),
and when the caller object is not identical to the callee object. When the function
returns, the Hamming code gets checked by the advice in line 30.
By defining such generic pieces of advice, AspectC++ enables a modular
implementation of the GOP mechanism, completely separated from the remaining
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source code. More advice definitions exist in the complete GOP implementation,
for instance, covering static data members, non-blocking synchronization, or
virtual-function pointers [8].
4.2 Implementation and Evaluation
In the following, we describe the implementation of five concrete EDMs/ERMs
based on the GOP mechanism. Subsequently, we demonstrate their configurability
on a set of benchmark programs bundled with eCos. We show that the mechanisms
can easily be adapted to protect a specific subset of the eCos-kernel data structures,
e.g., only the most critical ones. After applying a heuristic that benchmark-
specifically chooses this data-structure subset, and protecting the corresponding
classes, we present fault injection (FI) experiment results that compare the five
EDMs/ERMs. Additionally, we measure their static and dynamic overhead, and
draw conclusions on the overall methodology.
4.2.1 EDM/ERM Variants
We implemented the five EDMs and ERMs listed in Table 2 to exemplarily
evaluate the GOP mechanism. For instance, a template metaprogram generates
an optimal Hamming code tailored for each data structure and we applied a bit-
slicing technique [48] to process 32 bits in parallel. Thereby, the Hamming-code
implementation can correct multi-bit errors, in particular, all burst errors up to the
length of a machine word (32 bits in our case). Besides burst errors, the CRC
variants (see Table 2) cover all possible 2-bit and 3-bit errors in objects smaller
than 256 MiB by the CRC-32/4 code [11]. Each EDM/ERM variant is implemented
as a generic module and can be configured to protect any subset of the existing C++
classes of the target system.
In the following subsections, we refer to the acronyms introduced in Table 2, and
term the unprotected version of each benchmark the “Baseline.”
Table 2 EDM/ERM variants, and their effective line counts (determined by cloc)
Variant Description (mechanisms applied on data member granularity) LOC
CRC CRC-32, using SSE 4.2 instructions (EDM) 163
TMR Triple modular redundancy: two copies + majority voting (EDM/ERM) 124
CRC+DMR CRC (EDM) + one copy for error correction (ERM) 210
SUM+DMR 32-Bit two’s complement addition checksum (EDM) + one copy (ERM) 198
Hamming SW-implemented Hamming code (EDM/ERM), processing 32 bits in parallel 355
Framework GOP infrastructure, basis for all concrete EDM/ERM implementations 2371
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4.2.2 Evaluation Setup
We evaluate the five EDM/ERM variants on eCos 3.0 with a subset of the benchmark
and test programs that are bundled with eCos itself, namely those 19 implemented in
C++ and using threads (omitting CLOCK1 and CLOCKTRUTH due to their extremely
long runtime). More details on the benchmarks can be found in previous work [8].
Because eCos currently does not support x64, all benchmarks are compiled for i386
with the GNU C++ compiler (GCC Debian 4.7.2–5), and eCos is set up with its
default configuration.
Using the FAIL* FI framework [47], we simulate a fault model of uniformly
distributed transient single-bit flips in data memory, i.e., we consider all program
runs in which one bit in the data/BSS segments flips at some point in time. Bochs,
the IA-32 (x86) emulator back end that FAIL* currently provides, is configured to
simulate a modern 2.666GHz x86 CPU. It simulates the CPU on a behavior level
with a simplistic timing model of one instruction per cycle, also lacking a CPU
cache hierarchy. Therefore the results obtained from injecting memory errors in this
simulator are pessimistic, as we expect a contemporary cache hierarchy would mask
some main-memory bit flips.
4.2.3 Optimizing the Generic Object Protection
As described in Sect. 4.1.1, the generic object-protection mechanisms from Table 2
can be configured by specifying the classes to be protected in a pointcut expression.
Either a wild-card expression selects all classes automatically, or the pointcut
expression lists a subset of classes by name. In the following, we explore the trade-
off between the subset of selected classes and the runtime overhead caused by the
EDM/ERMs.
We cannot evaluate all possible configurations, since there are exponentially
many subsets of eCos-kernel classes—the power set. Instead, we compile each
benchmark in all configurations that select only a single eCos-kernel class for
hardening. For these sets that contain exactly one class each, we measure their
simulated runtime, and subsequently order the classes from the least to most runtime
overhead individually for each benchmark. This order allows us to cumulatively
select these classes in the next step: We compile each benchmark again with
increasingly more classes being protected (from one to all classes, ordered by
runtime). Observing the cumulative runtimes of the respective class selections
[8], the benchmarks can be divided into two categories, based on their absolute
runtime:
1. Long runtime (more than ten million cycles): For any subset of selected
classes, the runtime overhead stays negligible. The reason is that the long-
running benchmarks spend a significant amount of time in calculations on the
application level or contain idle phases.
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2. Short runtime (less than ten million cycles): The EDM/ERM runtime overhead
notably increases with each additional class included in the selections. These
benchmarks mainly execute kernel code.
After conducting extensive FI experiments on each of the cumulatively protected
programs, it turns out that for our set of benchmarks, the following heuristic
yields a good trade-off between runtime and fault tolerance: We only select a
particular class if its protection incurs less than 1 percent runtime overhead. Using
this rule of thumb can massively reduce the efforts spent on choosing a good
configuration, as the runtime overhead is easily measurable without running any
costly FI experiments. However, in 6 of the initial 19 benchmarks, there are no
classes that can be protected with less than 1% overhead. Those programs are most
resilient without GOP (see Sect. 4.3 for further discussion).
4.2.4 Protection Effectiveness and Overhead
Using this optimization heuristic, we evaluate the EDM/ERM mechanisms
described in Table 2. Omitting the aforementioned six benchmarks that our
heuristic deems not protectable, Fig. 7 shows FI results from an FI campaign
entailing 46 million single experiment runs, using the extrapolated absolute failure
count (EAFC) as a comparison metric that is proportional to the unconditional
failure probability [46]. The results indicate that the five EDM/ERMs mechanisms
are similarly effective in reducing the EAFC, and reduce the failure probability
by up to 79% (MBOX1 and THREAD1, protected with CRC) compared to the
baseline. The total number of system failures—compared to the baseline without
GOP—is reduced by 69.14% (CRC error detection), and, for example, by 68.75%
(CRC+DMR error correction). Note that some benchmarks (e.g., EXCEPT1 or
MQUEUE1) show very little improvement; we will discuss this phenomenon in
Sect. 4.3.
Of course, the increase in system resiliency comes at different static and dynamic
costs. With the GOP in place, the static binary sizes (Fig. 8) can grow quite
significantly by on average 57% (CRC) to 120% (TMR) (up to 229% in the case of
TMR and the KILL benchmark)—showing increases in the same order of magnitude
as those observed in the dOSEK evaluation (Sect. 3.3.2). Looking closer, the DATA
sections of all baseline binaries are negligibly tiny (around 450 bytes) and increase
by 5% up to 79%. The BSS sections are significantly larger (in the tens of kilobytes),
and vary more between the different benchmarks. They grow more moderately by
below 1% up to 15%. In contrast, the code size (TEXT) is even larger in the baseline
(23–145 kiB), and the increases vary extremely between the different variants:
While CRC increases the code by an average of 114%, CRC+DMR on average
adds 204%, SUM+DMR 197%, Hamming 200%, and TMR is the most expensive
at an average 241% code-size increase.
But although the static code increase may seem drastic in places, low amounts
of code are actually executed at runtime, as we only protected classes that introduce
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Fig. 7 Protection effectiveness for different EDM/ERM variants
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Fig. 8 Static code and data/BSS segment size of the EDM/ERM variants: the code (TEXT)
segment grows due to additional CPU instructions, with CRC (detection only) being the most
lightweight
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less than 1% runtime overhead (see Sect. 4.2.3). Verifying the runtime on real
hardware (an Intel Core i7-M620 CPU running at 2.66GHz), we confirm that
the real-world runtime overhead totals at only 0.36% for all variants except for
TMR (0.37%). The results indicate that the GOP—when configured appropriately—
involves negligible runtime overhead on real hardware.
4.3 Discussion
As software-implemented error detection and correction always introduces a run-
time overhead, protected variants naturally run longer than their unprotected
counterparts, increasing the chance of being hit by memory bit flips (assuming
them to be uniformly distributed). Consequently, there exists a break-even point
between, metaphorically, quickly crossing the battlefield without protection (and a
high probability that a hit is fatal), and running slower but with heavy armor (and
a good probability to survive a hit). The benchmarks in our initial analysis [8] we
identified to be not effectively protectable with the GOP are on the unfavorable side
of this break-even point: The additional attack surface from the runtime and memory
overhead outweighs the gains from being protected for all configurations. Also,
some benchmarks are just barely profiting from the GOP, such as, e.g., EXCEPT1
or MQUEUE1 (see Fig. 7).
A more detailed analysis of what distinguishes these benchmarks from the others
reveals that they actually represent the pathologic worst case for GOP: Unlike
“normal” applications that spend a significant amount of time in calculations on
the application level, or waiting for input or events from the outside, this subset of
benchmarks only executes eCos system calls. This reduces the time frame between
an update() after the usage of a system object, and the check() at the begin of
the next usage (cf. Sect. 4.1.2), to a few CPU cycles. The fault resilience gains are
minimal, and the increased attack surface all in all increases the fault susceptibility
significantly. Nevertheless, we do not believe the kernel-usage behavior of these
benchmarks is representative for most real-world applications, and do not expect
this issue to invalidate our claim that GOP is a viable solution for error detection
and correction in long-living data structures.
For the remaining benchmarks, the analysis in Sect. 4.2.4 shows that the EDM/
ERMs mainly differ in their static overhead. CRC is clearly the best choice when
detection-only suffices. For error correction, the Hamming code turns out best. The
high redundancy of the DMR variants and TMR are overkill—at least unless much
more adverse fault models are considered.
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5 Conserving Consistent State in Persistent Memory with
Software Transactional Memory
Recent advances in persistent memory (PM) enable fast, byte-addressable main
memory that maintains its state across power-cycling events. To survive power
outages and prevent inconsistent application state, current approaches introduce
persistent logs and require expensive cache flushes. In fact, these solutions can
cause a performance penalty of up to 10× for write operations on PM. With respect
to wear-out effects, and a significantly lower write performance compared to read
operations, we identify this as a major flaw that impacts performance and lifetime of
PM. Being already persistent, data corruptions in PM cannot be resolved by simply
restarting a system. Without countermeasures this limits the usability of PM and
poses a high risk of a permanently inconsistent system state.
In this section, we present DNV Memory, a library for PM management. For
securing allocated data against power outages, multi-bit faults that bypass hardware
protection and even usage violations, DNV Memory introduces reliable transactions.
Additionally, it reduces writes to PM by offloading logging operations to volatile
memory, while maintaining durability on demand by an early detection of upcoming
power failures. Our evaluation shows a median overhead of 6.5%, which is very low
considering the ability to repair up to 7 random bit-errors per word. With durability
on demand, the performance can be even improved by a factor of up to 3.5 compared
to a state-of-the-art approach that enforces durability on each transaction commit.
5.1 System Model
We assume that hybrid system architectures equipped with both, volatile and
persistent main memory, will become a commodity. This implicates that the
execution state of processes will be composed of volatile and persistent parts.
While Phase Change Memory (PCM) is the most promising PM tech-
nology today, PM modules can also be built using resistive random-access
memory (RRAM), spin-transfer-torque magnetoresistive random-access memory
(STT-MRAM), or even battery-backed DRAM. Thereby, all processes in a system
should be able to access PM directly through load and store operations in order to
achieve optimal performance.
CPU caches can be used to further speed up access to persistent data. However,
in order to survive power failures, cache lines containing data from PM must be
flushed and the data must reach the Durability Domain of the PM module before
the machine shuts down due to a power loss. This requires platform support in form
of an asynchronous DRAM refresh (ADR) [49] or a Flush Hint Address [1]. Under
these premises, we assume that word-level power failure atomicity is reached.
Depending on the used main-memory technology, various effects exist that may
cause transient faults as previously outlined. Additionally, PCM and RRAM have
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a limited write endurance that lies in the range of 106 up to 1010 operations [31].
Once worn out, the cell’s value can only be read but not modified anymore.
We assume that all static random-access memory (SRAM) cells inside the
CPU are guarded by hardware fault tolerance and are sufficiently reliable to
ensure correct operation. Of course reliable DRAM supporting hardware error
correction code (ECC) exists and PM can be protected by hardware solutions too.
However, the common hardware ECC mechanisms only provide single-bit-error
correction, double-bit-error detection (SECDED) capabilities, which is not always
sufficient [52]. We assume that due to economic reasons not every PM module
will support the highest possible dependability standard, leaving a fraction of errors
undetected. Some PM modules may even lack any hardware protection. This paves
the way for software-based dependability solutions.
5.2 Concepts of DNV Memory
The main goal of our design is to provide the familiar malloc interface to application
developers for direct access to PM. At the same time, we want data stored in PM to
be robust against power failures, transient faults, and usage errors.
Our core API functions (see Table 3(a) and (b)) resemble the interface of
malloc and free. The only additional requirement for making legacy volatile
structures persistent with DNV Memory is using our API functions and wrapping all
persistent memory accesses in atomic blocks (see Table 3(e)).
These atomic blocks provide ACID3 guarantees for thread safety, and addition-
ally preserve consistency in case of power failures. Furthermore, DNV Memory
combines software transactional memory (STM) with the allocator to manage
Table 3 Overview of the DNV Memory application programming interface (API)
Category Function Description Ref.
Core API
void* dnv_malloc(size_t sz) Allocates persistent memory like
malloc(3)
(a)





DNV_POD variable Statically places plain old data in
PM at definition
(c)
DNV_OBJ variable Statically places the object in PM at
definition
(d)
Transactions __transaction_atomic{. . . } Atomic block with ACID guaran-
tees and reliability
(e)
3Atomicity, consistency, isolation, durability.
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software-based ECC. Every data word that is accessed during a transaction is
validated and can be repaired if necessary.
In order to store entry points to persistent data structures that survive process
restarts, DNV Memory provides the possibility to create static persistent variables
(Table 3(c) and (d)). On top of this core functionality, DNV Memory introduces the
concepts durability on demand and reliable transactions that are explained in the
following.
If a power failure occurs during the update of persistent data structures, the DNV
Memory might be in an inconsistent state after restart. To prevent this, DNV Memory
follows the best practices from databases and other PM allocators [12, 54] and wraps
operations on PM in atomic blocks. This can be achieved with STM provided by
modern compilers or libraries like TinySTM [22]. The transactions must also be
applied to the allocator itself, as its internal state must be stored in PM as well.
Different to previous works, DNV Memory aims at minimizing write accesses
to PM. We store all transaction logs in volatile memory and utilize a power-failure
detection to enforce durability on demand. When a power outage is imminent, the
operating system copies the write-back logs back to PM in order to prevent state
inconsistency. Therefore, every thread has to register its volatile memory range for
the write-back log at our kernel module, which in turn reserves a PM range for a
potential backup copy. After restart, the write-back logs are restored from PM, and
every unfinished commit is repeated.
Since durability is actually required only in case of a power failure or process
termination, memory fences and cache flushing can be performed on demand. This
preserves persistent data inside the CPU cache and consequently reduces writes
to PM. Additionally, since memory within a CPU is well protected by hardware,
persistent data inside the cache is less susceptible to transient faults and can be
accessed faster.
Enforcing durability on demand requires the ability to detect power failures
in advance. For embedded devices, the power-outage detection is a part of the
brownout detection and state of the art [43]. On servers and personal computers,
power outages can be detected via the PWR_OK signal according to the ATX power
supply unit (PSU) design guide [3]. Although the PWR_OK signal is required to
announce a power outage at least 1ms in advance, much better forecasts can be
achieved in practice. For instance, some Intel machines provide a power-failure
forecast of up to 33ms [39]. An even better power-failure detection can be achieved
by inspecting the input voltage of the PSUwith a simple custom hardware [25]. With
this approach, power failures can be detected more than 70ms in advance, which
leaves more than enough time to enforce durability and prevent further modification
of persistent data.
Crashes that are not caused by power failures can be handled just like power
failures if durability can be secured. For instance, our kernel module is aware of any
process using PM that terminates and enforces durability in that case. Crashes in the
operating-system kernel can be handled either as part of a kernel-panic procedure,
or by utilizing a system like Otherworld [16].
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Fig. 9 DNV Memory ECC
In order to protect persistent data from corruption, DNV Memory reserves
additional memory in each allocation that is meant to store ECC data. Afterwards
fault tolerance is provided through reliable transactions.
As described in the previous section, all accesses to PM should be wrapped by
atomic blocks in order to protect persistent data from power failures. These atomic
blocks simply wrap all read and write operations in TM_LOAD and TM_STORE
functions provided by the STM library, which in consequence control every word
access. In combination with support from the memory allocator, this can be
exploited to provide transparent fault tolerance.
Essentially, any ECC can be used to provide fault tolerance in software. For
instance, we considered the SECDED Hamming code that is common in hardware
protected memory. It protects 64-bit words with additional 8 bits, resulting in a
12.5% memory overhead. However, if implemented in software, the Hamming code
would highly impact the performance of the application. Additionally, as already
mentioned, we do not think that SECDED is enough to protect persistent data.
Consequently, we decided to implement an ECC that provides a high multi-bit
error correction with a memory overhead no more than dual modular redundancy.
In addition, we want a fast error detection in software by exploiting commonly
available hardware support. In general, whenever a data word W is written inside
an atomic block, an ECC word E is created and stored in the additional space that
the allocator has reserved. In theory, any fault-tolerant encoding is possible as long
as error detection can be conducted in a few CPU cycles.
For DNV Memory we combine cyclic redundancy check (CRC) for fast error
detection with an error location hint. Thus, we subdivide E into two halves C and
D as shown in Fig. 9. The error detection half word D is generated with CRC32c
(D = CRC32c(W)). We chose CRC as hardware support is available on many
architectures, including most commodity CPUs. Additionally, with CRC32c—
which is supported by SSE 4.2,—a Hamming distance of 8 is achieved on a word
length of 64 bits [33]. Without further assistance, error correction of up to 3 bits
can be achieved by guessing the error location. However, by augmenting the CRC-
based error detection with an error location hint C, less trials are needed and more
bit-errors can be corrected. Inspired by RAID level 5 [42], we subdivide the data
word W into two halves A and B and compute C according to Eq. (1).
C = A⊕ B ⊕D (1)
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The data validation takes place during a transaction whenever a word W is read for
the first time. At that point, we recompute E′ from W and compare its value with
E. Normal execution can continue if both values match. Otherwise error correction
is initiated.
Since errors can be randomly distributed across W and E, we start the error
correction by narrowing the possible locations of errors. Therefore, we compute the
error vector F via Eq. (2), which indicates the bit position of errors.
F = A⊕ B ⊕ C ⊕D (2)
This information is, however, imprecise, as it is unknown whether the corrupted bit
is located in A, B, C, or D. Thus, for f errors detected by F , 4f repair candidates
Ri are possible, and are computed via Eq. (3). The masking vectors Ma , Mb, Mc,
Md are used to partition F between all four half words.
Ri = Wi‖Ei
Wi = A⊕ (F ∧Ma)‖B ⊕ (F ∧Mb)
Ei = C ⊕ (F ∧Mc)‖D ⊕ (F ∧Md)
(3)
To find the repair candidate Rs that contains the right solution, each Ri needs to
be validated by recomputing E′i from Wi and compare it to Ei . In order to repair
all errors, exactly one Rs must be found with matching E′i and Ei . For instance, if
all errors are located in A, the repair candidate using Ma = F and other masking
vectors set to zero will be the correct result. Additionally, all combinations need to
be considered that have an error at the same bit position in two or all half words, as
these errors extinguish each other in C.
Please note that the set of repair candidates may yield more than one solution
that can be successfully validated if more than three errors are present. To prevent
a false recovery, all repair candidates must be validated for up to n errors. As an
optimization step, we estimate n by counting the population in E⊕E′ and limit the
result to a maximum of n = 7.
To optimize the performance in a cache-aware way, we store the ECC words
interleaved with the original words W as presented in Fig. 10. However, this
interleaved data layout cannot be accessed correctly outside atomic blocks because
the original layout is always expected here. Unfortunately, omitting atomic blocks
around PM access is a very common mistake. We encountered such usage errors in
every single STAMP benchmark [38], and whenever we ported or wrote persistent
applications ourselves. Since the access to PM outside atomic blocks should be
prevented to keep data consistent during power failures, we introduce the concept
of a transaction staging (TxStaging) section as shown in Fig. 10. All memory that is
allocated by DNV Memory has addresses belonging to the TxStaging section. The
same applies to the location of persistent static variables. The TxStaging section
is only a reserved virtual address space without any access rights. Consequently,
any access to this segment will cause a segmentation fault that is easy to debug.
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Fig. 10 DNV Memory persistent data layout and memory sections
However, inside an atomic block every access to the TxStaging section is intercepted
by the STM library and redirected to the persistent virtual address (PVA) section
where the actual persistent data is stored. To simplify the address transformation, the
PVA section should be located at the address of the TxStaging section multiplied by
2. For instance, assuming the TxStaging section begins at address 0x1000 the PVA
section should be placed at 0x2000. In that case a 32-byte object that is located in
the address range from 0x1000 to 0x101f will be transformed into the address
space 0x2000 to 0x203f as shown in Fig. 10.
5.3 Evaluation
We implemented DNV Memory on Linux in the form of a user-space library with a
small companion kernel module and a hardware power-failure detector. Our design
does not require any changes to the operating-system kernel or the machine itself.
All components are pluggable and can be replaced by more extended solutions if
needed. All user-space code is written in C++ and compiled with an unmodified
GCC 5.4.0. A small linker-script extension provides additional sections like the
TxStaging or the PVA section as shown in Fig. 10.
To show the feasibility of durability on demand, we artificially introduced power
failures and measured the time between the detection of a power failure and the
eventual machine shutdown. This period is referred as the shutdown forecast,
and the results of 100 experiments are shown in Fig. 11. Additionally, the time
of critical tasks in the event of a power failure is shown here. As can be seen,
power failures can be detected sufficiently early to conduct all necessary durability
measures. Counterintuitively, an idling CPU has a negative impact on the feasibility
of the approach because the CPU enters the a power-saving mode with reduced
performance. Additionally, less energy is stored within the power supply in the event
of a power failure, thus leading to a quicker shutdown.
The performance impact of durability on demand was evaluated with applications
from the STAMP benchmark suite [38] and the Memcached key-value store that
was retrofitted with transactions. Figure 12 shows for each application the average
relative runtime out of 100 measurements together with the 90% quantile that is
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Fig. 11 Duration of critical
tasks. A Heavy workload is
achieved through kernel
compilation
Measurement Workload Time in msmin max
Stop CPU and Heavy 2.3 3.3
Flush Cache Idle 4.4 5.6
Store Heavy 3.8 4.8
Write-Back Log Idle 7.4 8.6
Shutdown Heavy 34.6 39.4
Forecast Idle 25.2 36.8
Fig. 12 Application runtime
under durability on demand
in comparison to durability














indicated by the error bars. As the 100% baseline we used the state of the art,
which enforces durability on each transaction commit. The results highly correlate
with the cache efficiency of the application. For instance, little to no performance
impact was achieved for Bayes, Labyrinth, and Yada, which operate on large work
sets and show large transactions. If the transactions become large, they do not
fit well into the cache and therefore do not benefit from locality, which severely
impacts performance. Enforcing durability in this case has a low impact because the
overhead from memory barriers and cache flushing becomes negligible. The other
benchmarks, however, have moderate to small work sets, therefore a significant
performance increase of up to 3.5× can be observed.
To investigate the error detecting and correcting capabilities of DNV Memory, we
conducted one billion fault-injection experiments, for one to seven-bit errors each.
Every fault-injection experiment used a random word and bit-error positions that
were randomly distributed over the original data and its corresponding ECC word.
Only in the case of 7-bit errors, a small fraction of 0.000012163% fault injections
produced ambiguous repair solutions that prevented a correction. In all other cases,
including all errors up to 6-bit, a detection and correction was always successful.
As can be seen in Fig. 13 the repair time increases exponentially with the number of
flipped bits. However, even for correcting seven-bit errors, the mean error-repair
time is less than 1.4ms, which is acceptable considering the low probability of
errors. Without any error, the validation only takes 34 ns.
For the performance evaluation of reliable transactions we again used STAMP
benchmark applications [38] and Memcached. The bars depicted in Fig. 14 show
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Fig. 14 Performance impact


















the mean runtime of each benchmark. All values are relative to plain transactional
execution (the 100% baseline), and the error bars represent the 95% and the 5%
quantile. Over all applications, a median runtime of 106.5% is achieved with reliable
transactions. Applications above this median have a workload that is dominated by
reads or short transactions, hence the overhead of data verification has a higher
impact here. Applications with a balanced or write-driven workload, however, have
a higher runtime impact from transactions in general, thus the overhead that comes
from reliable transactions is less prevalent. In summary, these results indicate a very
acceptable performance impact—especially when considering the error-correcting
capabilities of the approach.
5.4 Discussion
DNV Memory provides system support for dependable PM. Unlike previous
approaches, DNV Memory enforces durability on demand, which in turn
reduces write operations on PM and therefore improves reliability, lifetime, and
performance. For tolerating power failures, DNV Memory uses software transactions
that also include and secure the allocator itself. Our system even goes one step
further and provides fault tolerance via software transactional memory. As our
evaluation showed, DNV Memory protects data at word granularity, with an ECC
word that is capable of detecting and correcting a random distributed seven-bit
error, which is by far more than common hardware protection offered by server-
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class volatile main memory. We also demonstrated that power failures can be
detected early, allowing to conduct all necessary cleanup operations.
6 Summary
The work presented in this chapter has gained high visibility in the international
research community. It was on the programme of all major conferences in the field
and the authors received a number of best paper, best poster, and best dissertation
awards, culminating in the renowned Carter Award for Christoph Borchert.
A reason for this success might be the focus on design principles and methods
for hardening the operating system—and only the operating system. Most of
previous research did not consider the specific properties of this special execution
environment, such as different kinds of concurrent control flows, or assumed the
reliable availability of underlying system services.
In our work we made a huge effort to design and implement an embedded
operating system from scratch with the goal to explore the limits of software-
implemented hardware fault tolerance in a reliability-oriented static system design.
As a result we were able to reduce the SDC probability by orders of magnitude and
found the remaining spots where software is unable to deal with hardware faults.
For existing embedded operating systems we have developed and evaluated
Generic Object Protection by means of “dependability aspects,” which can harden
operating systems at low cost without having to change the source code, and also
addressed faults that crash the whole system by means of reliable transactions on
persistent memory.
Finally, the authors have developed a fault-injection framework for their evalua-
tion purposes that implements novel methods, which also advanced the state of the
art in this domain.
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Architecture to Software and Operating
System
Michael Engel
Designers of modern embedded systems have to cope with errors in all kinds
of system components, such as processing elements, memories, I/O devices, and
interconnects. The ever increasing pressure to reduce the size, cost, and energy
consumption of a given system has two effects that tend to amplify each other. On
the one hand, solutions that are able to mitigate errors on the hardware side are
often considered too expensive in terms of product cost or energy consumption and,
thus, are frequently left out of the design for not strictly safety-critical systems. On
the other hand, the ongoing miniaturization of semiconductor feature sizes and the
reduction of supply voltages results in hardware that is increasingly more sensitive
to external effects, such as cosmic radiation, thermal effects, or electromagnetic
interference, that could cause errors.
As a consequence, those errors are much more likely to affect recent and future
designs. The design constraints, thus, require new methods to detect and mitigate
errors and allow designers to create more cost- and energy-efficient systems.
Due to the wide spectrum of possible error causes, approaches to mitigate these
errors vary significantly. In this book section, a number of approaches that have
been developed in the context of SPP 1500 as well as in projects of collaborating
researchers are presented that cover a large part of the possible design space. The
different projects discussed in the following chapters have one important common
property—they are not restricted to work on a single layer of the hardware/software
stack, but instead integrate information from different layers of the stack for
increased efficiency.
The first chapter of this section, written by Kühn et al., analyzes the opportunities
that massively parallel architectures offer in terms of providing a platform for the
reliable execution of software. A large number of available processors enable the
system designer to make use of selective redundancy for differing requirements
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of the system’s software components. The use of online health monitoring allows
the system to detect typical reliability issues such as negative-bias temperature
instability (NBTI) or hot carrier injection (HCI) and adapt to these by using online
hardware reconfiguration before the issues result in an error visible on the software
layers.
The second chapter by Kriebel et al. tries to tackle the reliability problem
from a different direction. In their approach, the authors use error models and
additional information from hardware as well as software layers in order to generate
dependable software. By quantifying the error masking and propagation properties
of a system, an analysis is performed that determines in which way an application’s
output will be affected by the assumed errors. An increase in dependability is then
achieved by avoiding or mitigating the critical situations by means of software
transformation or selective instruction protection.
In the third chapter by Kriebel et al., an approach to protect systems against
transient errors using heterogeneous hardware/software hardening is proposed.
Here, the authors analyze and exploit masking and error tolerance properties of
different levels of the hard- and software stack. By using system components with
different reliability properties from the architecture level to the design of caches,
systems are enabled to adapt to error properties and reliability requirements of the
executed software. The authors also give an outlook onto methods to complement
the described heterogeneous hardware approach with compiler-based heterogeneous
hardening modes on the software level.
The fourth chapter by van Santen et al. concentrates on reliability optimization
for embedded multiprocessor systems on chip (MPSoCs). The problems analyzed
are interdependencies of temperature and the reliable operation of MPSoCs. Here,
the authors employ measured or estimated thermal values for different cores to
determine which measures on system level can be applied to balance the thermal
stress. This balancing, in turn, results in an evenly distributed probability of errors
throughout the system. To enable the balancing, task migration between different
cores based on virtualized interconnects is employed, which enables fast and
transparent switch-over of communication channels.
Memory errors are in the focus of the fifth chapter, contributed by Alam and
Gupta. The optimization of current memory chips to maximize their bit storage
density makes them especially susceptible to soft errors. For cost and efficiency
reasons, this process neglects to optimize for additional parameters such as manu-
facturing process variation, environmental operating conditions, and aging-induced
wearout, leading to significant variability in the error susceptibility of memories.
To improve memory reliability, the authors propose to replace traditional hardware-
based bit-error checking and correction methods by software managed techniques
and novel error correction codes to opportunistically cope with memory errors.
These techniques can take the architectural or application context into consideration
by leveraging semantics information to reduce the cost of error correction.
The final chapter in this section by Ma et al. concentrates on MPSoC systems
again. Here, the focus lies on the contrasting requirements of soft-error reliability
and lifetime reliability. The authors observe that most existing work on MPSoC
fault tolerance only considers one of the described requirements, which in turn
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might adversely impact the other. Accordingly, the possible tradeoffs between soft-
error reliability and lifetime reliability are analyzed in order to achieve a high
overall system reliability. Like some of the previously described approaches, the
authors make efficient use of heterogeneous MPSoC architecture properties, such as
big-little type same-ISA systems and systems that integrate traditional CPUs with
GPGPUs.
Overall, the different approaches discussed in this section cover a large part
of typical modern embedded architectures. Solutions for improved reliability of
processors, memories, and interconnects are presented. A common theme for
all these approaches is that each one operates on several different layers of the
hardware/software stack in order to exploit this fused information to reduce the
hardware and software overhead for error detection and mitigation.
While this common property is shown to be beneficial for embedded design tasks
facing dependability problems, the particular projects show a large variety of detail
in their approaches to achieve that goal. One common approach is to operate in
a bottom-up way. These systems adapt hardware properties to mask problems for
the software level. Other approaches make use of a top-down methodology. Here,
software is adapted in order to handle possible errors showing up in the hardware.
In general, however, most of the projects described above employ sort of a hybrid
approach, in which information from different layers of the system is fused in order
to enable optimization decisions at compile time and runtime.
An important additional research direction reflected in this section is based on
the idea of accepting certain incorrect behaviors of a system in response to an error.
Here, additional semantic information on the relevance of deviating system behavior
is employed to determine the criticality of certain errors. In turn, accepting certain
imprecisions in a system’s results enables more efficient reliable embedded systems.
In general, we can conclude that all of the cross-layer techniques described
above show significant improvements in the non-functional properties or design
constraints a system designer has to consider when creating dependable embedded
systems.
The large variety of analysis and mitigation efforts throughout all layers of the
hardware and software stack show that dependability of systems, even if it is one
of the earliest research topics in computer engineering, is still a highly relevant
and active research topic. Novel challenges due to different hardware components
and their properties increased demands on the computational power and energy
efficiency as well as additional non-functional properties require innovative methods
that combine work on all layers of the hardware and software stack.
However, we have to assess that the current solution landscape, of which we
have tried to show a representative profile in this section, today still tends to
produce isolated solutions which are not designed for interoperability. Here, an
important future research challenge is an overarching effort that allows to flexibly
integrate information from various different layers and, in turn, to enable multi-
criterial optimizations at design and compile time as well as at runtime to enable
general fault tolerant embedded systems. It will be interesting to observe how the
different approaches described in this section will be able to contribute to this overall
objective.
Increasing Reliability Using Adaptive
Cross-Layer Techniques in DRPs:
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1 Introduction
The broad deployment, as well as the increasingly difficult manufacturing of in-
spec semiconductors long make reliable operation and failures across the lifetime of
an embedded system one of the industry’s main concerns. Since ever-increasing
demands do no longer allow us to resort to “robust” technologies, other means
than semiconductor technology have to fill the gap left by cutting-edge technologies
without resorting to unrealistic mainframe like protection mechanisms. As the oper-
ation scenarios become ever more challenging as well (edge computing, intelligent
IoT nodes), hardware architects are faced with ever tighter power budgets for
continuously increasing compute demands. We, therefore, proposed to exploit the
architectural redundancies provided by potent, yet energy efficient massively par-
allel architectures, modeled using Dynamically Reconfigurable Processors (DRP).
Using DRPs, we built an extensive cross-layer approach inspired by the overall
project’s approach as laid out in [1]. Following the idea of cross-layer reliability
approaches, we built interfaces reaching from software layers right down to the
transistor level mainly through computer architecture, allowing us to address both
the varying reliability requirements and the significant computational demands of
prospective workloads.
Figure 1 shows an overview of the layers this project targeted as described
in the previous paragraph. While a strong focus has been on architecture, the
project’s aim was to use computer architecture to connect to the layers above and
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Fig. 1 Main abstraction layers of embedded systems and this chapter’s major (green, solid) and
minor (yellow, dashed) cross-layer contributions
below. We show how DRP architectures can leverage their inherent architectural
redundancies to realize various degrees of reliable computing. On one end of the
spectrum, we highlight how triple modular redundancy (TMR) and duplication with
comparison (DWC) compute modes can be realized to actively secure computations
without permanently binding hardware resources and with only slight hardware
overheads. On the other end of the spectrum, we show how fault-free operation
can be passively ascertained by periodically testing SoC components. Both, active
and passive concepts together with the architectural redundancies allow for graceful
degradation by pinpoint failure detection and subsequently dynamically remapping
applications. Once established, both graceful degradation and low-cost TMR for
critical parts of applications can be used to make specific operations in processor
cores reliable by using the DRP or the demonstrated concepts as a reliable pipeline
within a processor core.
A central point of the proposed methods is an overarching cross-layer approach
[1], tying together these methods from the software layers (Application, Operating
System) to all hardware layers below down to the semiconductor through the
concepts introduced by our DRP architecture. To enable a reach down to the
circuit level, we exemplarily used the extensive Body Biasing capabilities of Fully
Depleted Silicon on Insulator (FDSOI) processes as a means for transistor-level
testing and manipulation. This access down to the transistor level enables continuous
monitoring of the precise hardware health and thereby not only reactive measures
in case of hardware failure but also proactive measures to prevent system failure
and prolong system lifetime if the hardware starts exhibiting signs of wear. Access
to the device state also multiplies the reliability and system health options on
the software layer. With previously having the choice of using TMR/DWC to
minimize the error probability, we also show how DVFS with Body Biasing can
offer both high power but highly reliable over spec versus ultra-low-power but
risky computing modes. These modes’ long-term effects further multiply the set of
operation modes, e.g., slowing down or speeding up degenerative effects such as Hot
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Carrier Injection (HCI) or Negative Bias Temperature Instability (NBTI). However,
with access to actual transistor parameters, the proposed approach also indicates
that even permanent degeneration such as HCI can be temporarily overcome [2]
to prolong system lifetime long enough to extend the graceful degradation period
beyond conventional physical limits. Or to put it in the spirit of the parallel NSF
effort [3], by opportunistically filling the technology gap using cross-layer methods,
there are more means to approach and exploit the hardware’s sheer physical limits.
Within this project, we also faced the challenge of how such cross-layer
approaches can be realistically validated and evaluated. While Software layers down
to the RTL level allow, e.g., fault injection through instrumentation or emulation, the
computational effort quickly becomes too large for realistically sized test samples.
Furthermore, going below the gate level offers an entirely new set of challenges,
both calling for appropriate solutions. For the layers from Software to RTL, we
chose to implement the entire system as a prototype on an FPGA. For this FPGA,
in turn, we developed a precise fault-injection mechanism so we could emulate the
entire SoC with specific faults present. For the gate level and below, we devised
a mix of SPICE simulations, and for body bias effect evaluation we ran in-silicon
evaluations at the laboratory of Professor Amano at Keio University.
This chapter is structured as follows. Since reliability threats and how such
threats surface has been covered in the general introduction, Dynamically Recon-
figurable Processors are briefly introduced. The next section directly dives into how
the inherent architectural redundancy can be put to use to increase the reliability of
computations, as well as how to test these techniques. In the following two sections,
the focus then shifts to both ends of the abstraction layers by focussing on how
to infer the device state at the transistor level and potentially also recovering from
a faulty state using body biasing together with how decisions on the software or
operating system level affect the transistor level. The last technical section before
wrapping up then brings all levels together by highlighting the interplay between
each layer and the synergistic gain thereby achieved.
2 Dynamically Reconfigurable Processors
Dynamically reconfigurable architectures, or short DRP, are a sub-category of
so-called coarse-grained reconfigurable architectures (CGRA). Similar to Field
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA), CGRAs are reconfigurable architectures;
however, in contrast to FPGAs, CGRAs are reconfigurable on a far coarser level.
That is, while FPGAs can efficiently map per-bit configurability, CGRAs only
allow reconfigurability on word-sized units. While this restriction makes CGRAs
unfavorable for random bit logic, CGRAs possess a far greater area and energy
efficiency as the logic overhead for reconfigurability per bit is far lower. DRPs add
the concept of dynamic reconfiguration to CGRAs by having on-chip memories for
multiple configurations, or contexts, as instructions are often called in DRPs. As the
keyword instruction already hints, DRPs resemble much more simple processors
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Fig. 2 Exemplary DRP
instance with additional
controllers and I/O buffers
than classical reconfigurable architectures, hence this reconfiguration mechanism is
also often referred to processor-like reconfiguration.
DRPs at the point of writing date back more than 25 years which makes an
exhaustive overview unfeasible. Instead, three different cited surveys shall give
both a historical, functional, and up-to-date introduction to the field. De Sutter
et al. [4] take a processor-centric view on CGRA architectures using the concept
of instruction slots, that is logic where instructions can be executed. These units
are connected using a simple form of interconnect like, e.g., nearest neighbor
interconnect, and all have shared, or as De Sutter et al. describe them, distributed
register files.
On the other hand, Hideharu Amano defines CGRAs and DRPs from a general
hardware perspective. In [5], he defines a DRP to be an array of coarse-grained
cells as depicted in Fig. 2, so-called PEs, consisting of one or multiple ALU and/or
functional units (FU), a register file and a data manipulator [5]. The third and
last survey cited for the purpose of an encompassing definition takes a similar
approach as the authors of this chapter. In [6], Kiyoung Choi characterizes CGRA
and by extension also DRPs via configuration granularity. All authors’ definitions
encompass an array of PEs and possess dynamic reconfiguration or processor-like
execution and thus DRPs as architectural concept range from small reconfigurable
DSP like blocks to many-core processors.
In theory, this allows the generalization of findings obtained in DRPs to be
extended to far more complex brethren. In practice, however, the definition is
restricted by precisely the architectural complexity as DRPs aim to be more energy
efficient in more specialized fields other than, e.g., GPGPUs. This becomes also
apparent in the general lack of complex caches and big register files, as well as
simplistic, spatial interconnects that reduces both register file accesses and long
and energy inefficient data transfers [4, 5]. For the purpose of this research project,
this minimalism was a welcome attribute as it allowed an abstraction of far more
complex architectures while maintaining generality. For this reason, we refer to the
cited surveys [4–6] for comprehensive coverage of concrete DRP architectures.
Increasing Reliability Using Adaptive Cross-Layer Techniques in DRPs 125
3 Exploiting Architectural Redundancy for Increased
Reliability
3.1 Realizing Low-Cost TMR Using PE Clusters
Among the most apparent aspects of DRPs is their regular structure. One of the first
investigations published in [7] therefore sought to utilize the structural redundancy
to increase DRPs’ reliability by implementing the quasi-gold standard of fault-
tolerance, triple modular redundancy (TMR). The biggest issue of TMR and also
the reason why it is only used in critical systems is the prohibitively high cost,
i.e., everything that is secured through TMR is triplicated. These triplicated copies
then have to perform the exact same operation, and at given checkpoints or most
commonly at the block level of the covered component, the outputs are compared. If
an error surfaced, the correct result, as well as the faulty component, are determined
through a majority vote. The big drawback of this technique is the high cost, both
in circuit size since three copies are required, as well as in power consumption
as all have to perform the same operation all the time. This makes TMR unviable
for all but the most critical applications. With reconfigurable hardware, such as
DRPs, however, hardware resource can be dynamically allocated. Given the addition
of error detection components, the penalty of TMR can be severely reduced as
resources do not have to be committed in a hard-wired fashion, but can be reassigned
temporally, or, TMR could be dynamically used for specially flagged parts of a
program only.
Figure 3 depicts a simplified representation of the Flexible Error Handling
Module. It consists of an actual data error detection module, containing a three-
input comparator. The comparator results are fed to the voter and the timing error
detection. The voter determines the correct results through a majority vote and feeds
the correct channel selection to the multiplexer which then forwards the result that
Fig. 3 The flexible error
handling module (FEHM)
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is now presumed to be correct to the next PE or out of the DRP. The timing error
detection samples the comparison results in a double buffer on Clk the clock signal
as well as on a slightly delayed clock signal. If the double buffer’s contents on each
sample are not the same, a timing error occurred and will be appropriately signaled.
Similarly, if not all comparison results are equal in the first place, it will raise a
data error signal. The entire module’s functionality is controlled using the Mode
signal. Using this signal, the FEHM can be turned off, to Duplicate with Comparison
(DWC) mode or to full TMR mode.
This switch is central to the original goal of attaining TMR at lower cost: By
making the mode signal part of the instruction word, not only does this free up
TMR resources when TMR is not required, but it also allows for some degradation
to DWC. Evaluations of this low-cost TMR evaluation showed that even if it is
used in relatively primitive DRP architectures with very fine-grained data words, the
additional hardware amounts for approximately a 6% increase in area. The power
consumption, on the other hand, increased by about 7.5% which can be attributed
to the constantly used XOR-OR trees and double buffers used for comparison and
timing error detection.
3.2 DRPs as Redundancy for CPU Pipelines
CPUs as central control units in SoCs take a vital role and thus are of great
interest for reliability. However, at the same time, they are among the most difficult
components to harden against any type of fault if blunt and costly instruments
such as TMR are avoided. The extreme degree of dynamism and control involved
in CPUs make static redundancy schemes like TMR virtually mandatory if an
error-free operation needs to be guaranteed. But if some tradeoffs are permissible,
dynamic redundancy schemes can be alternatively used. Such tradeoffs can be
for example an absolute time limit until recovery has to complete. In both cases,
however, some form of spare component is required.
While DRPs will not be able to take over a CPU’s main functions, they certainly
could serve as spare compute pipeline [8], thus reducing the parts that need to be
hardened using conventional methods. Placing a DRP into a processor’s pipeline
is not a novel idea such as [9] or [10] demonstrated and makes much sense from
an acceleration point of view. However, as this chapter shall highlight, they might
be a good pick concerning reliability as well. When used as a static redundancy
as depicted in Fig. 4 (left), DRPs can make use of their structural redundancies
to provide for additional samples computed in parallel to realize true TMR. The
low-cost TMR method proposed in the previous section, on the other hand, can
add an additional level of reliability so that the DRP’s results can be trusted and
false-positives effectively prevented. As dynamic redundancy or as a spare, the
DRP can take over functionality if an error has been detected using other means
as depicted in Fig. 4 (right). The viability of this approach has been validated in a
model implementation inspired by ARM’s Cortex-M3 microcontroller. This serves
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Fig. 4 DRP serving as static redundancy (left) and as dynamic redundancy (right)
as an interesting choice as ARM has its line of cores for safety-critical applications,
the so-called ARM Cortex-R series with support for dual-core lock-step [11]. The
results of this study as published in [8] showed that as long as support for division
units is omitted in the DRP, the area overhead is far lower than the 100% overhead
of an additional core, however, while of course leaving out other components to be
secured separately. In this particular study, a 2 by 2 PE array, that is 4 PEs have
been integrated into the CPU pipeline. Additionally, instructions and infrastructure
to utilize the DRP have been added. Comparing the incurred overheads to a single-
core implementation without any reliability measures, the area overhead for an
implementation without hardware implemented division amounted to 20%. While
this might not be an entirely fair comparison, division implementations in DRPs
have a greater impact due to the far greater number of processing elements.
3.3 Dynamic Testing
In contrast to critical applications, SoCs often also accommodate non-essential
functionality. For these applications, running all parts in TMR mode might be
wasteful, yet a certain temporal assurance would be desirable. For example, in case
of infotainment, brief dysfunction might be tolerable, but if functionality cannot be
restored within a given amount of time, actual damage ensues. To avoid TMR or
DWC for all applications and to implement time and probability based levels of
reliability, we proposed a dynamic testing scheme for reconfigurable hardware.
Dynamic testing or also often called online testing as defined by Gao et al. [12]
describes a testing method where for a known algorithm implemented in a certain
component, input samples, and associated output samples are obtained and then
recomputed separately. If the recomputation’s results match the output samples, no
error is present. If there is a mismatch, an error of the tested component is assumed.
Specifically using DRPs for dynamic testing has a big advantage: the choice
between utilizing the temporal and spatial domains. Instead of competing with
applications for resources on the DRP, dynamic testing resources can be allocated
temporally and inserted interleaved with applications’ instructions to be executed
in a time-multiplexed fashion. By moving and interleaving into the time domain,
testing becomes slower. However, for most non-critical applications, a couple of
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seconds before a system returns to a functioning state can be tolerated. Furthermore,
the spatial domain allows alternating the compute units used to recompute the
samples, further making false-positives less likely apart from the error checking
conducted during TMR usage.
While these two aspects make DRPs appealing for such testing schemes, time-
multiplexing restricting testing to time-windows TT W and further mapping into the
temporal domain slowing down testing by a scaling factor s in combination with the
probabilistic nature of error occurrence and detection make any estimation rather
difficult. Therefore, Monte Carlo simulations can be used to estimate the behavior of
dynamic testing accounting for all DRP specific aspects. For example, aspects such
as reconfiguration overhead TOV which has to be deducted from time-windows TT W
as well as scaling factors which reduces the number of samples that can be computed
within one TT W to detect a fault with an observation probability of q.
Consider Fig. 5, depicting a feasibility plot to detect a fault with an observation
probability of q = 10−5 and a reconfiguration overhead of 1ms. The goal in this
experiment was to detect such a fault within 2 s. The red striped regions indicate
that here, it would take more than 2 s to detect the fault, whereas shades from white
(fastest) to black indicate increasing detection latency DL. This result shows that
even if the temporal domain is massively utilized at e.g. s = 77, the deadline of 2 s is
still met at DL = 1.7 s with a time-window of 2ms for computations thus allowing
to use spatially extremely compact mappings for fault detection. This compaction
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Fig. 5 Dynamic testing feasibility for a detection latency DL of 2 s by scaling factor s and time-
window size for a fault with observation probability q = 10−5, TOV = 1ms, a clock frequency of
F = 100MHz and 2σ confidence
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entire surrounding SoC, expanding the reach of a reliable DRP to other system
components as well.
3.4 Dynamic Remapping
Having various reliable ways to detect errors is vital as any reaction to a false-
positive would just turn any reliability mechanism against itself. With low-cost TMR
and dynamic testing, we have ways to detect errors and in the TMR case even to
mask them. However, once a permanent fault is present and errors surface, TMR
degrades to DWC, and dynamic testing is also limited to reasserting the error’s
presence over and over again. As DRPs are a class of reconfigurable hardware,
to restore proper functionality, the applications have to be mapped anew avoiding
faulty components. To do this, however, the remapping method and sufficient
mapping resources are required.
In case of the FEHM equipped DRP used for our studies, two dimensions of
redundancies can be utilized to run the application on unaffected PEs of the DRP.
(1) spatially moving the application part of one faulty PE to a fault-free unused
PE and (2) temporally adding the application part to an unaffected PE which is
used for other application parts but still has the capacity to accommodate this part.
As in DRPs the amount of instructions that can be stored and executed without
external reconfiguration is limited, compensating for one or more faulty PEs can be
a challenge in highly utilized scenarios. However, even if utilization is not critical,
just moving parts around on the DRPwill yield sub-optimal results, which is why the
application mapping, that is resource allocation and scheduling needs to be rerun.
This task, however, needs to be run on the SoCs CPU without obstructing normal
operation.
To reduce the work-load of the SoC’s CPU, we proposed an incremental
remapping algorithm in [13]. First, the architecture graph is adjusted by removing
the faulty components. Then, from this architecture graph, we extract a subgraph
containing the affected PE and its vicinity. Similarly, the application graph is used
to extract a subgraph containing only the application nodes mapped to the affected
nodes in the architecture subgraph. With these two subgraphs, the mapping is
then attempted as exemplarily depicted in Fig. 6. The mapping algorithm will try
to first utilize the spatial dimension before resorting to the temporal dimension,
i.e. prolonging execution time. If both dimensions do not have the resources to
accommodate the application subgraph on the nodes of the pruned architecture
subgraph, the architecture subgraph is enlarged by adding further neighboring nodes
and remapping is retried until a new mapping has been found or the process fails
altogether. If the process succeeds, the application now can run again without any
errors occurring, even in non-TMR modes.
This prioritization of subgraph size over runtime, i.e., increasing subgraph size
only if both dimensions cannot accommodate the application subgraph is arbitrary
and other tradeoffs might be preferable. In this specific case, the priority was CPU
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Fig. 6 Incremental remapping flow on architecture and application subgraphs to avoid faulty
components. Starting on the direct neighborhood first, expanding if resources do not suffice
usage minimization, and therefore runtime and memory usage were prioritized
by using the smallest subgraphs first at the expense of increased runtimes of the
new mappings. For real-world applications, this needs to be carefully weighted as
increased runtimes might not be viable.
3.5 Testing Reliability Schemes in Hardware
One of the big challenges of hardware manufacturing and particularly of implement-
ing hardware-based countermeasures to reliability issues is testing and verification.
Given the enormous number of input vectors and states, exhaustive testing via
simulation is entirely unfeasible. While big commercial hardware emulators allow
for a much greater design size and ease of use, they are also very costly. For small
to medium-sized designs, FPGAs offer a sweet spot for prototype implementations.
While simulations allow for easy fault injection but very slow simulation speeds,
FPGAs offer speeds close to ASIC implementations but fault injection was virtually
unfeasible.
To develop a prototyping platform, the Gaisler LEON3 SoC [14] served as a
template into which the hardened DRP has been integrated. Parallel to this effort,
different techniques for FPGA fault injection have been studied [15], culminating
in the Static Mapping Library (StML) approach [16]. While instrumentation, i.e.
RTL level insertion of faulty behavior allows unlimited choice in fault type and
temporal behavior, it also requires for the RTL to be recompiled after each change.
As the entire compilation and mapping process of our SoC took more than 4 h, this
approach was abandoned. On the other hand, directly inserting faults into FPGA
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Fig. 7 StML GUI view of a sample logical AND component with fault injectable ports in each
module
mappings or even the bitstream offers a simplistic way to create faulty versions of an
FPGAmapping, but it offers no control over the type or location of the injected fault.
This approach would not even guarantee that the FPGA mapping would behave
in a faulty manner. Ideally, the exact fault location should be specifiable on RTL
level to fully qualify the efficiency of the proposed architectural methods. To realize
this, different intermediate results were utilized, primarily the FPGA’s simulation
netlist containing both RTL level structural information and FPGA mapping names
in combination with the Xilinx Design Language (XDL) file containing the concrete
FPGA mapping. By establishing a bidirectional link between the simulation netlist
and the XDL file, StML enabled to pinpoint ports of module’s implementation right
down to the logic level to insert a stuck-at-zero or stuck-at-one fault. As the placed
and routed XDL file can be directly altered, the only remaining step after fault
injection is bitstream generation. A user-friendly GUI (Fig. 7) offering graphical
representations of the implementation as well as a powerful command line interface
allowed for both smooth experiment and extensive testing. Using this approach, we
were able to reduce the fault-injection experiment time from hours to below 5min,
with most experiments done in below 2min.
To showcase the viability of the proposed techniques, low-cost TMR, dynamic
testing, dynamic remapping, and the FPGA prototype combined with the fault
injection techniques have been successfully demonstrated at ICFPT in 2013 [17].
4 Device-Level State and Countermeasures
Below the architectural level, we studied opportunities to determine the state
of semiconductor devices. Additionally, we also considered specific device-level
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Fig. 8 Transient simulation for a single switching NMOS (upper left) and a single PMOS (upper
right), as well as DC sweep of IDS over VDD = VGS for a NMOS (bottom left) as well as a PMOS
transistor (bottom right), all using a medium degeneration model
countermeasures and their effects to put hardware into a more reliable state for tasks
that require higher levels of reliability.
When considering how to obtain information on the state at the device level, a
transistors’ threshold voltage VT H is a central variable [18] to consider. While of
course, not all reliability phenomena manifest as an actual shift in VT H , they can
be modeled as such. For example, stuck-at faults are either a reduction to 0V or
∞V of VT H or even changes in the drive current and subsequent timing faults can
be viewed as such. With the semiconductor world moving either towards FinFET
or FDSOI technologies, we investigated the options of FDSOI processes such as
ST Microelectronics Ultra Thin Body and Box Fully Depleted Semiconductor on
Insulator (UTBB-FDSOI) technology [19]. While being a planar technology, it is
manufactured in a triple well process, shielding the transistor body against the
substrate using a diode in reverse direction. The transistor is manufactured using
a fully depleted channel which allows for further scaling to compete with FinFET
processes. One of the main advantages of FDSOI technologies is that the insulated
transistor body allows for very high biasing voltages previously unfeasible as it
would have shorted the transistor to the substrate. As this thin body with the thin
box construction equipped with a separate body electrode acts as a second gate, it is
ideal to adjust VT H dynamically after manufacturing. The adjustment of a transistor
via this second gate is also called body biasing.
To study the possibilities to use body biasing to detect faults or even faults
building up, SPICE level models have been considered. Figure 8 depicts the
transient and DC analysis of a medium degeneration transistor-level model. The left
side in Fig. 8 depicts an NMOS transistor whereas the right side depicts a PMOS
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transistor. In each graph, there are several plots: std 0.0V VBB , that is a perfectly
functioning transistor without any body bias applied, med 0.0V VBB transistor
with a medium VT H increase and no body biasing, and then several variants of
the defective transistor with increasing levels of body biasing. When comparing
std 0.0V VBB to med 0.0V VBB , it immediately becomes apparent that there is a
significant gap in the rate at which the signal rises (top two graphs) and signal level,
as well as a strong difference in drive current (bottom two graphs). The effects of a
VT H (about 45mVNMOS and 40mV PMOS) shift of this magnitude are, of course,
relative to the operating conditions. If e.g. a couple of such transistors would be used
somewhere on a critical path within a high-performance circuit, it would surely fail.
On the other hand, if the circuit is used far from timing limits or if only a single
transistor is considered, the effect might be barely noticeable. Given an on-chip test
circuit or a known critical path, they can be used in conjunction with body biasing
to measure degenerative effects. To perform such post-manufacturing bias, ideally
each chip should be tested after production with a sweep over body bias levels as
described in [20], with the minimum body bias, that is the maximum reverse body
bias (the circuit’s timing is intentionally slowed down), at which the circuit checked
out functional written to a non-volatile memory. Later on, this minimum bias point
can be used as a reference, i.e., if the chip or the tested component needs a higher
level of body bias corrected for temperature, then some degeneration occurred. If the
circuit is designed with reasonable margins, a build-up until an actual fault occurs
can be thereby detected.
Similarly, body bias also allows pushing the circuit back conforming to specifi-
cation. The effect depicted in Fig. 8 would be catastrophic for any performance-
oriented component. However, this medium degeneration case has been chosen
specifically so that corrective measures can be taken without special electrical
precautions, which is up to a VBB of 1.3V in most processes. However, it should
be noted that this also leads to significantly increased leakage levels and would
be unfeasible for an entire chip. This being said, it neatly complements DRPs’
architectural granularity, i.e. one PE would be coarse enough to mitigate the
overheads of an individual body bias domain, yet it is small enough to keep the
leakage overhead of strong forward biases down [21]. Additionally, finer steps of,
e.g., 100mV should be used to detect shifts in VT H early on.
5 Synergistic Effects of Cross-Layer Approaches
The question following from the previous section is whether to use architectural
approaches or device-level countermeasures to achieve a certain reliability objective
is an extremely complex and multivariate problem. Beyond the question whether or
not to use a specific technique, there are additional variables such as time, i.e. when
to use these techniques, extend, that is in what parts to use them and also in regard
to criticality, what techniques and with which parameters could be used at all and to
what end?
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In a very insightful collaboration with the FEHLER project (chapter “Soft
Error Handling for Embedded Systems using Compiler-OS Interaction”), their
static analysis of program criticality provided powerful means to determine key
portions for reliable execution at the application level [22]. By annotating source
code with keywords indicating the respective criticality, only those parts marked
as critical will be additionally secured using reliability techniques. It thus was not
only a great fit for selective low-cost TMR on the hardened DRP, but beyond that
offered a proof-of-concept of mixed-criticality applications along with the means to
identify portions critical for reliability. In [22], the targeted application was an h264
decoder. As an entertainment application, the primary metric is whether the service
is provided at a certain perceived quality level above which actually occurring errors
are irrelevant as they are imperceivable.
On the other end of the scale, device state monitoring allows to assess the
physical state of a SoC and also its progression over time. On the architectural
level, low-cost TMR or DWC allows for continuous checking, whereas dynamic
testing makes sure that errors are not left undetected indefinitely, both providing
vital information to potential agents. However, as shall be explored below, reactive
measures cannot be determined on one layer alone.
Once the device-level state is known, this information can be used on every
abstraction layer above. If for example degradation has been detected, this infor-
mation can be used to minimize physical stresses by using a combination of supply
voltage VDD and body bias VBB [2]. As proposed in the previous subsection, a
concrete proposal is to counter VT H drift, that is usually VT H becoming larger, by
using a forward body bias. As, however, Federspiel et al. found in [2], this will also
increase effects like Hot Carrier Injection (HCI) stress which in turn can cause a
decrease in drive current. This could lead to a feedback loop as with the method
described in Sect. 4, this would appear like a VT H increase and cause more forward
bias to be applied, further increasing HCI stress. Thus, such action needs to be a
concerted effort on the operating system level with a full view of the system state
and the resources available.
For this reason, countermeasures could encompass several different options
from the set of available countermeasures with the primary distinction on lifetime
extension or securing error-free functionality in the presence of faults. In both cases,
it should be noted that both distinctions are only two different takes on graceful
degradation. In case the primary goal of reactive measures is lifetime extension,
measures which incur less physical stress should be taken. If e.g. the application
allows for some degeneration of the service level such as the aforementioned h264
decoding, less effort can be spent on uncritical parts of an application or it could
be mapped alongside another application on a DRP. If error-free functionality is
the primary goal because, e.g., the application is critical and does not allow for
any degeneration, there is a two-step cascade. If the application can be remapped
to fault-free components, this should be prioritized. If the resources do not permit
remapping or if no resources are left, the SoC can attempt to mitigate the fault
through, e.g., a forward body bias at the expense of a potentially shortened lifetime.
In all cases, however, it is clear that information from the application layer,
the operating system, i.e. knowledge about what else is running on the SoC, the
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Fig. 9 Using information of all abstraction layers to realize more reliable and efficient SoC
architectural layer, what resources are available, which resources are inoperable,
etc., as well as the device level, are all key to determine the optimal response. In the
specific example visualized in Fig. 9, we start at the application layer by assuming
reliability annotated source code. Using this source code, an appropriate mapping
for example with low-cost TMR onto the DRP can be determined. Additionally,
the OS might then go ahead to issue its execution without any special circuit-
level tuning, i.e. increasing supply voltage or forward bias to add timing margins.
Similarly, a mapping onto the CPU pipeline could be more suitable where the OS
then might opt for extra forward bias as some degradation has been previously
detected and the application is realizing important functionality. Not only does
such a cross-layer approach as visualized in Fig. 9 help to achieve the reliability
objectives, but it also is capable of more than what can be achieved on one layer at a
time [23]. In this concrete example, the incorporation of multiple layers and multiple
methods at specific layers allows to tailor reliability measures to requirements.
Device-level information enables the system to act proactively as many phenomena
can be detected at this layer in the build-up phase. Once the device layer degenerates,
actors such as body biasing allow a system to restore or prolong functionality in the
presence of faults.
6 Conclusion
Over a generous 6-year period in which this project was funded, the possibilities
to use DRPs for increased reliability were extensively studied and also tested in
prototype implementations at a functional level. This research revealed that DRPs
are not only well suited for tasks that require TMR like reliability, but they can
be used in numerous ways to improve the reliability of entire SoCs as well. Their
simple and efficient structure allowed to research new and efficient concepts such as
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dynamic remapping or body biasing for device-level sensing and countermeasures.
While DRPs are still undeservingly viewed as a kind of fringe architecture concept,
most of the insights gained through such architectures are easily transferable to
multi- or many-core SoCs. This project showed that far more can be done in regard
to reliability if multiple abstraction layers are considered in a cross-layer approach.
While common wisdom still is to use TMR whenever software people use terms
such as error-free or fault-tolerant, this project showed multiple options how to
incorporate more specific application requirements and how to translate this into
adequate reliability measures. Or in simpler terms, just-safe-enough responses to
the reliability threats.
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Dependable Software Generation and
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1 Overview
An overview of the chapter structure and the connection of the different sections is
illustrated in Fig. 1. Soft error mitigation techniques like [17, 29] have shown that
the software layer can be employed for enhancing the dependability of computing
systems. However, to effectively use them, their overhead (e.g., in terms of power
and performance) has to be considered. This also includes the option of adapting
to different output accuracy requirements and inherent resilience against faults of
different applications, for which appropriate metrics considering information from
multiple system layers are required. Therefore, we start with a short overview
of reliability and resilience modeling and estimation approaches, which not only
focus on the functional correctness (like application reliability and resilience) but
also consider the timeliness, i.e., determining the change of the timing behavior
according to the run-time dependability, and providing various timing guarantees
for real-time systems. They are used to evaluate the results of different dependable
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Fig. 2 Main abstraction layers of embedded systems and this chapter’s major (green, solid) and
minor (yellow, dashed) cross-layer contributions
code generation approaches, like dependability-driven software transformations and
selective instruction redundancy. This enables generation of multiple compiled code
versions of an application realizing different performance/energy vs. dependability
trade-offs. The evaluation results and the different versions are then used by a
dependability-driven adaptive run-time system. It considers offline and online
optimizations, for instance, for selecting appropriate application versions and
adapting to different workloads and conditions at run-time (like fault rate, aging,
and process variation). Thereby, it finally enables a dependable execution of the
applications on the target system.
As, however, not all systems are general-purpose, towards the end of the chapter
an example design of a video processing system is included, which illustrates
different approaches for application-specific dependability.
Embedding this chapter’s content in the scope of this book and the overall
projects [12, 14], the main contributions lie on the application, SW/OS, and
architectural layers as illustrated in Fig. 2.
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2 Dependability Modeling and Estimation
Modeling dependability at the software layer is a complex task as parameters and
effects of different systems layers have to be taken into account. For an accurate yet
fast evaluation of application dependability, information from lower system layers
has to be considered, while abstracting it in a reasonable way to also allow for a
fast estimation. For this purpose, different aspects have been separated into distinct
metrics focusing on individual phenomena, as discussed below.
• The Instruction Vulnerability Index (IVI) [19, 25] focuses on the error proba-
bility of each instruction when being executed on different components/pipeline
stages of a processor by analyzing their spatial and temporal vulnerabilities. This
requires an analysis of vulnerable bits as well as vulnerable time period, i.e.,
the residence times of instructions in different components, while considering
micro-architecture dependent information from the lower layers like the area
consumption of different components and the probability that an error is
observed at their output (see Fig. 1). The IVI of individual instructions can then
be combined to estimate the vulnerability at higher granularity (e.g., Function
Vulnerability Index—FVI). In this case, the susceptibility towards application
failures and incorrect application outputs can be considered as well, for instance
by classifying instructions into critical and non-critical ones, which is important
if deviations in the application output can be tolerated.
• As not all errors occurring during the execution of an application become
visible to the user due to data flow and control flow masking, the Instruction
Error Masking Index (IMI) [31] provides probabilistic estimates whether the
erroneous output of an instruction will be masked until the visible output of an
application.
• The Instruction Error Propagation Index (EPI) [31] captures the effects of
errors not being masked from the time of their generation until the final output of
an application. It analyzes the propagation effects at instruction granularity and
quantifies the impacts of the error propagation and how much it affects the final
output of an application.
• Based on the information theory principles, the Function Resilience model [24]
provides a probabilistic measure of the function’s correctness (i.e., its output
quality) in the presence of faults. In contrast to the IVI/FVI, it avoids exposing
the application details by adopting a black-box modeling technique.
• The Reliability-Timing Penalty (RTP) [23] model jointly accounts for the
functional correctness (i.e., generating the correct output) and the timing cor-
rectness (i.e., timely delivery of an output). In this work, we studied RTP as
a linear combination of functional reliability and timing reliability, where the
focus (functional or timing correctness) can be adjusted. However, it can also be
devised through a non-linear model depending upon the design requirements of
the target system.
• The (m,k) robustness constraint model [4, 35] quantifies the potential inherent
safety margins of control tasks. In this work, several error-handling approaches
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guarantee the minimal frequency of correctness over a static number of instances
while satisfying the hard real-time constraints in the worst-case scenario.
• The Deadline-Miss Probability [3, 9, 34] provides a statistical argument for
the probabilistic timing guarantees in soft real-time systems by assuming that
after a deadline miss the system either discards the job missing its deadline or
reboots itself. It is used to derive the Deadline-Miss Rate [7], which captures
the frequency of deadline misses by considering the backlog of overrun tasks
without the previous assumption of discarding jobs or rebooting the system.
A more detailed description of the different models as well as their corresponding
system layers are presented in chapter “Reliable CPS Design for Unreliable
Hardware Platforms”.
3 Dependability-Driven Compilation
Considering the models and therewith the main parameters affecting the depend-
ability of a system, several mitigation techniques are developed, which target to
improve the system dependability on the software layer. Three different approaches
are discussed in the following.
3.1 Dependability-Driven Software Transformations
Software transformations like loop unrolling have mainly been motivated by and
analyzed from the perspective of improving performance. Similarly, techniques for
improving dependability at the software level have mainly focused on error detec-
tion and mitigation, e.g., by using redundant instruction executions. Therefore, the
following dependability-driven compiler-based software transformations [19, 25]
can be used to generate different application versions, which are identical in terms
of their functionality but which provide different dependability-performance trade-
offs.
• Dependability-Driven Data Type Optimization: The idea is to implement the
same functionality with different data types, targeting to reduce the number
of memory load/store instructions (which are critical instructions due to their
potential of causing application failures) and their predecessor instructions in the
execution path. However, additional extraction/merging instructions for the data
type optimization have to be taken care of when applying this transformation.
• Dependability-Driven Loop Unrolling: The goal is to find an unrolling factor
(i.e., loop body replications), which minimizes the number of critical instruc-
tions/data (e.g., loop counters, branch instructions) that can lead to a significant
deviation in the control flow causing application failures. This reduction, how-
ever, needs to be balanced, e.g., with the increase in the code size.
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Appl. Ver. Description
B Baseline
HT V1 B+Common Expression 
Elimination
V2 V1+Loop Unrolling 
(Factor 2)
V3 V1+Complete Loop 
Unrolling (Factor 8)
IPred V1 B+Loop Unrolling (Factor 4)
V2 Data type optimization 
(32bit loads instead of 8bit)
V3 B+Loop Unrolling 
(Factor 16+4)





















V3 V1 V2 V3 V4
Correct OutputIncorrect OutputApplication Failure
V5 V6
Fig. 3 Fault injection results for two applications and the generated application versions (adapted
from [25])
• Reliability-Driven Common Expression Elimination and Operation Merging:
The idea of eliminating common expressions is to achieve performance improve-
ment due to less instructions being executed and therefore less faults being
able to affect an application execution. However, excessively applying this
transformation might lead to register spilling or longer residence times of data in
the registers. Therefore, it needs to be evaluated carefully whether eliminating a
common expression leads to a vulnerability reduction or whether the redundancy
implied by a re-execution provides a benefit.
• Reliability-Driven Online Table Value Computation: The goal of the online
table value computation is to avoid long residence times of pre-computed tables
in the memory, where the values can be affected by faults and can therefore
affect a large set of computations. This needs to be traded off against the
performance overhead (and therefore increased temporal vulnerability) of online
value computation.
As the transformations listed above also imply certain side effects (e.g., increased
code size, additional instructions), they need to be applied carefully. We evaluate the
above techniques using an instruction set simulator-based fault injection approach,
where faults can be injected in different processor components (e.g., register file,
PC, ALU, etc.) considering their area. It supports injecting a single or multiple
faults per experiment, where each fault can itself corrupt a single or multiple
bits. The results for two example applications from the MiBench benchmark
suite [13] are shown in Fig. 3. They illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed
transformations, e.g., for the “HT” application by the reduction of the application
failures and incorrect outputs generated when comparing the Baseline application
version and V3.
Finally, the dependability-driven software transformations are not only useful
as a standalone technique, but can also be combined with other error mitigation
techniques. For example, by reducing the number of instructions accessing the
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memory, they can help reduce the required checking instructions in [29], and thereby
lead to a performance improvement.
3.2 Dependability-Driven Instruction Scheduling
Instruction scheduling can significantly affect the temporal vulnerability of instruc-
tions and data, as it determines their residence time in different processor compo-
nents. To improve the dependability of an application, several problems have to be
addressed, which usually do not have to be considered for a performance-oriented
instruction scheduling:
1. Critical instructions should not be scheduled after multi-cycle instructions or
instructions potentially stalling the pipeline as this increases their temporal
vulnerability;
2. High residence time (and therefore temporal vulnerability) of data in registers/
memory;
3. High spatial vulnerability, e.g., as a consequence of using more registers in
parallel.
Therefore, the dependability-driven instruction scheduling in [21, 22] estimates
the vulnerabilities, and separates the instructions into critical and non-critical ones
statically at compile-time before performing the instruction scheduling. Afterwards,
it targets minimizing the application dependability by minimizing the spatial and
temporal vulnerabilities while avoiding scheduling critical instructions after multi-
cycle instructions to reduce their residence time in the pipeline. These parameters
are combined to an evaluation metric called instruction reliability weight, which
is employed by a lookahead-based heuristic for scheduling the instructions. The
scheduler operates at the basic block level and considers the reliability weight of
an instruction in conjunction with its dependent instructions to make a scheduling
decision. In order to satisfy a given performance overhead constraint, the scheduler
also considers the performance loss compared to a performance-oriented instruction
scheduling.
3.3 Dependability-Driven Selective Instruction Redundancy
While the dependability-driven software transformations and instruction scheduling
focus on reducing the vulnerability and critical instruction executions, certain
important instructions might still have to be protected in applications being highly
susceptible to faults. Therefore, it is beneficial to selectively protect important
instructions using error detection and recovery techniques [24, 31], while saving
the performance/power overhead of protecting every instruction.
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To find the most important instructions, the error masking and error propagation
properties as well as the instruction vulnerabilities have to be estimated. These
results are used afterwards to prioritize the instructions to be protected, considering
the performance overhead and the reliability improvement. For this, a reliability
profit function is used, which jointly considers the protection overhead, error
propagation and masking properties and the instruction vulnerabilities. The results
of this analysis are finally used to select individual or a group of instructions,
which maximize the total reliability profit considering a user-provided tolerable
performance overhead.
4 Dependability-Driven System Software
Based on the dependability modeling and estimation approaches and the
dependability-driven compilation techniques, multiple code versions are generated.
These code versions exhibit distinct performance and dependability properties
while providing the same functionality. They are then used by the run-time system
for exploring different reliability-performance trade-offs by selecting appropriate
application versions while adapting to changing run-time scenarios (e.g., different
fault rates and workloads) for single- and multi-core systems.
4.1 Joint Consideration of Functional and Timing
Dependability
The key requirement of many systems is producing correct results, where a (limited)
time-wise overhead is oftentimes acceptable. However, for real-time (embedded)
systems both the functional dependability (i.e., providing correct outputs even in
the presence of hardware-level faults) and the timing dependability (i.e., providing
the correct output before the deadline) play a central role and need to be considered
jointly trading-off one against the other [23, 27]. To enable this, multiple system
layers (i.e., compiler, offline system software, and run-time system software) need
to be leveraged in a cross-layer framework to find the most effective solution [15].
For an application with multiple functions, the problem is to compose and execute
it in way that jointly optimizes the functional and timing correctness. For this, the
RTP (see Sect. 2) is used as an evaluation metric.
Figure 4a presents an overview of our approach. It is based on multiple
function versions generated by employing the approaches described in Sect. 3,
where additionally even different algorithms might be considered. As an example,
a sorting application is illustrated in Fig. 4b, where the vulnerability of different
algorithms and implementations as well as their execution times are compared
showing different trade-offs. For generating the versions, a dependability-driven
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Fig. 4 (a) Overview of the design-time, compile-time, and run-time steps for generating different
function/application versions. (b) Different algorithms and implementations for sorting (adapted
from [23])
compilation process is used, given different implementations and a tolerable
performance overhead to limit the design space. Then, only a limited number of
versions from the pareto-frontier are selected, representing a wide spectrum of
solutions.
In the next step, a Dependability-Driven Offline System Software generates
schedule tables by minimizing the expected RTP. For the execution time, a
probability distribution is considered, since it is not constant for all functions. For
applications with only one function, the version minimizing the RTP (based on a
weighting parameter) can be found by analyzing its probability for deadline misses
and its reliability. For applications with multiple functions, it is required to consider
that the selected version of a function is dependent on the functions executed earlier,
e.g., if they finish early, a high-reliability version with a longer execution time
can be selected. Therefore, a dynamic version selection scheme is adopted, where
schedule tables are prepared offline and the scheduler selects appropriate function
versions depending on the run-time behavior. Selecting a version for a particular
function depends on both the functions executed earlier, and the functions executed
afterwards (i.e. the predecessor and the successor functions in the execution path).
The schedule tables are filled from the last function to be executed and remaining
entries are added successively later, where the properties of earlier functions have
to be explored and later functions can be captured by a lookup in the already filled
parts of the table.
At run-time, a Dependability-Driven Run-time System Software selects an appro-
priate function version from the schedule table depending on the RTP. To execute the
corresponding function, dynamic linking can be used. At the start of an application,
the RTP is zero and the remaining time is the complete time until the deadline, as
no function has been executed so far. With these parameters, the entry is looked
up in the schedule table and the corresponding function version is executed. When
one of the following functions need to be executed, the RTP observed so far is
accumulated and the remaining time until the deadline is calculated. Afterwards,
the corresponding table lookup is performed and a version is selected. To ensure
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the correctness of the schedule tables, they should be placed in a protected memory
part. As they, however, might become large, the size of the table can be reduced
by removing redundant entries and entries where the RTP difference is too small.
However, in this chapter, we assume that the system software is protected (for
instance, using the approaches described in the OS-oriented chapters) and does not
experience any failures.
In case the ordering of function executions is (partially) flexible, i.e., no/only
partial precedence constraints exist, this approach can be extended by a function
prioritization technique [27].
4.2 Adaptive Dependability Tuning in Multi-Core Systems
While Sect. 4.1 mainly focused on single-core systems and transient faults, the
following technique will extend the scope towards multi-core systems and reliability
threats having a permanent impact on the system (like process variation and aging).
Thereby, different workloads on the individual cores might further aggravate the
imbalance in core frequencies, which already preexists due to process variation.
Consequently, a joint consideration of soft errors, aging, and process variation
is required to optimize the dependability of the system. The goal is to achieve
resource-efficient dependable application execution in multi-core systems under
core-to-core frequency variation.
In a multi-core system, the software layer-based approaches can be comple-
mented by Redundant Multithreading (RMT), which is a hardware-based tech-
nique that executes redundant threads on different cores. An application can
be executed with either Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR) or Triple Modular
Redundancy (TMR). This broadens the mitigation solutions against the above-
mentioned dependability threats, but also demands for the following problems to
be solved [26].
1. The activation/deactivation of RMT has to be decided based on the properties
(i.e., vulnerability, masking, performance) of the concurrently executing applica-
tions, the allowed performance overhead, and the error rate.
2. Mapping of (potentially redundant) threads to cores at run-time needs to consider
the cores’ states.
3. A reliable code version needs to be selected based on the performance variations
of the underlying hardware and the application dependability requirements.
These problems are addressed by employing two key components: (1) a Hybrid
RMT-Tuning technique, and (2) a Dependability-Aware Application Version Tuning
and Core Assignment technique.
The Hybrid RMT-Tuning technique considers the performance requirements
and vulnerability of the upcoming applications in combination with the available
cores and history of encountered errors. It estimates the RTP of all applications,
activates RMT for the one with the highest RTP in order to maintain the history, and






















































































































Fig. 5 (a) RPF improvements of dTune, RTO, and CRT normalized to TO for different aging years
summarizing different chips and workloads. (b) RPF improvements detailing different workloads
(adapted from [28])
takes RMT activation decisions based on the available cores and recent error history.
For applications with RMT activated, the fastest compiled code version is selected.
After the RMT mode is decided for each application, the Dependability-
Aware Application Version Tuning and Core Assignment is performed. It starts
with an initial decision on the application version for applications where RMT
has not been activated, considering their vulnerability and deadline. Then, the
core allocation/mapping is performed, which takes the performance variations of
individual cores (caused by process variation and aging) into account. It starts with
the applications having the highest RTP and intends to allocate cores with similar
performance properties to all redundant copies while also considering their distance.
Finally, the application versions selected in the earlier step are tuned to improve the
RTP further. Since the allocated core is now known, the potential for improving the
dependability is evaluated considering the application’s deadline.
Figure 5 shows the results of this approach (dTune) for different number of
applications and different years. For the evaluation, a multi-core system with
10 × 10 ISA-compatible homogeneous RISC cores is used. These cores differ in
their performance characteristics due to aging, where we consider NBTI-induced
aging [1], and process variation, where the model of [18] is used. The comparison is
done against three approaches: (1) Chip-Level Redundant Threading (CRT) which
targets maximizing the reliability; (2) Reliability-Timing Optimizing Technique
(RTO) jointly optimizing functional and timing dependability, but not using RMT;
(3) Timing Optimizing Technique (TO) targeting to minimize the deadline misses.
The evaluation is performed taking TO as a reference against which dtune, CRT,
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Figure 5a shows an overview of the achieved improvements for different chip
maps with process variations, scenarios of application mixes and aging years. dTune
achieves better RPF-results compared to TO, CRT, and RTO for both aging years, as
it jointly considers functional and timing dependability as well as the performance
variation of the cores. For year 5, a wider spread of RPF-results is observed due to
the decrease in processing capabilities of the chips. Figure 5b details the application
workload, where it can be observed that CRT performs as good as dTune for a lower
number of applications, but does not deal well with a higher number of applications
due to focusing only on minimizing functional dependability.
The solution discussed above can further be enhanced by starting with a
preprocessing for application version selection, as demonstrated in [5]. First, the
version with the minimal reliability penalty achieving the tolerable miss rate
(for applications not being protected by RMT) and the best performance (for
applications protected with RMT) are selected. Afterwards, the application-to-core
mapping problem is solved for the applications protected with RMT by assigning
each of them the lowest-frequency group of cores possible. Then, the applications
that are not protected with RMT are mapped to cores by transforming the problem to
a minimum weight perfect bipartite matching problem, which is solved by applying
the Hungarian Algorithm [16]. The decision whether to activate RMT or not is
made by iteratively adapting the mode using a heuristic in combination with the
application mapping approaches.
Nevertheless, solely adopting CRT to maximize the reliability is not good
enough, since the utilization of the dedicated cores may be unnecessarily low due to
low utilization tasks. If the number of redundant cores is limited, the number of tasks
activating RMT is also limited. When the considered multi-core systems have multi-
tasking cores rather than single thread-per-core (but homogeneous performance),
the same studied problems, i.e., the activation of RMT, mapping of threads to cores,
and reliable code version selection, can be addressed more nicely while satisfying
the hard real-time constraints. The main idea is to use Simultaneous Redundant
Threading (SRT) and CRT at the same time or even a mixture of them called Mixed
Redundant Threading (MRT). There are six redundancy levels characterized as a set
of directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) in Fig. 6, where each node (sub-task) represents a
sequence of instructions and each edge represents execution dependencies between
nodes.
For determining the optimal selection of redundancy levels for all tasks, sev-
eral dynamic programming algorithms are proposed in [8] to provide coarse- or
fine-grained selection approaches while satisfying the feasibility under Federated
Scheduling. In extensive experiments, the proposed approaches can generally
outperform the greedy approach used in dTune when the number of available cores
is too limited to activate CRT for all tasks. Since the fine-grained approach has
more flexibility to harden tasks in stage-level, the decrease of the system reliability
penalty is at least as good as for the coarse-grained approach. When the resources
are more limited, e.g., less number of cores, the benefit of adopting the fine-grained
approach is more significant.





Fig. 6 DAG abstractions of the different redundancy levels, where the gray nodes are original
executions and the green nodes are replicas. The red nodes represent the workload due to the
necessary steps for forking the original executions and replicas, joining, and comparing the
delivered results from DMR/TMR at the end of redundant multithreading. The directed edges
represent the dependencies between nodes. Each block represents one core, i.e., the number of
cores differs depending on the redundancy level
5 Resilient Design for System Software
Considering the adoption of error detection and recovery mechanisms due to the
occurrence of soft errors from time to time, resilient designs for system software
can be developed. (1) Execution versions can be determined to handle soft errors
without over-provision while satisfying given robustness and timing constraints. (2)
Dynamic timing guarantees can be provided without any online adaptation after
a fault occurred. (3) Probabilistic analyses on deadline misses for soft real-time
system. The detailed designs are presented in the following.
5.1 Adaptive Soft Error Handling
To avoid catastrophic events like unrecoverable system failures, software-
based fault-tolerance techniques have the advantages in both the flexibility and
application-specific assignment of techniques as well as in the non-requirement for
specialized hardware. However, the main expenditure is the significant amount of
time due to the additional computation incurred by such methods, e.g., redundant
executions and majority voting, by which the designed system may not be feasible
due to the overloaded execution demand. Due to the potential inherent safety
margins and noise tolerance, control applications might be able to tolerate a
limited number of errors and only degrade its control performance. Therefore,
costly deploying full error detection and correction on each task instance might not
be necessary.
To satisfy the minimal requirement of functional correctness for such control
applications, (m, k) robustness constraint is proposed, which requires m out of any
k consecutive instances to be correct. For each task an individual (m, k) constraint
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Fig. 7 Overall utilization after applying different compensation approaches on Task Path, where
lower is better. Two horizontal and dashed bars represent the maximum (0.457) and the minimum
utilization (0.265)
is possible to be given by other means analytically or empirically [35]. Without
skipping any instances so likely achieving higher control performance, a static
pattern-based approach [4] can be used to comply the reliable executions on the
marked instances by following an (m, k)-pattern repeatedly to satisfy the given
minimal requirement. To validate the schedulability, the multi-frame task model can
then be applied to provide a hard real-time guarantee offline. A run-time adaptive
approach [4] can further decide the executing version on the fly by enhancing
the static pattern-based approach and monitoring the current tolerance status with
sporadic replenishment counters. It is worth noting that the resulting distribution
of execution jobs can still follow the (m, k) static patterns even in the worst case.
Hence, the schedulability test for the static pattern-based approach can be directly
used for the run-time adaptive approach as well.
Figure 7 shows the results for a self-balancing control application under different
(m, k) requirements and varying fault rates. When the fault rate increases, the overall
utilization of the run-time adaptive approach (DRE and DDR) also rises, since the
requirement of reliable executions is increased within the application execution.
Furthermore, the static pattern-based approaches (SRE and SDR) are always
constant for a fixed (m, k) requirement, as the overall utilization is deterministic
by the amount of job partitions. When the fault rate is as low as 10% and the (m, k)
requirement is loose as (3, 10), the probability of activating reliable executions is
rare, and, hence, the run-time adaptive approach can closely achieve the minimum
overall utilization. Overall, the results suggest that the proposed approaches can
be used to serve various applications with inherent fault-tolerance depending on
their perspectives, thus avoiding over-provision under robustness and hard real-time
constraints.
5.2 Dynamic Real-Time Guarantees
When soft errors are detected, the execution time of a real-time task can be increased
due to potential recovery operations. Such recovery routines may make the system
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very vulnerable with respect to meeting hard real-time deadlines. This problem is
often addressed by aborting not so important tasks to guarantee the response time
of the more important tasks. However, for most systems such faults occur rarely
and the results of not so important tasks might still be useful, even if they are a
bit late. This implicates to not abort these not so important tasks but keep them
running even if faults occur, provided that the more important tasks still meet their
hard real-time deadlines. To model this behavior, the idea of Systems with Dynamic
Real-Time Guarantees [33] is proposed, which determines if the system can provide
without any online adaptation after a fault occurred, either full timing guarantees or
limited timing guarantees. Please note that, this study is highly linked to the topic of
mixed-criticality systems [2]. We can imagine that the system is in the low-criticality
mode if full timing guarantees are needed, and in the high-criticality mode if only
limited timing guarantees are provided. However, in most of the related works, such
mode changes are assumed to be known, without identifying the mode change. The
system only switches from low-criticality to high-criticality mode once, without
ever returning to the low-criticality mode. Moreover, the low-criticality tasks are
considered to be either ignored, skipped, or run with best efforts as background
tasks. Such a model has received criticism as system engineers claim that it does not
match their expectations in Esper et al. [11], Ernst and Di Natale [10], and Burns
and Davis [2].
Suppose that a task set can be partitioned into two subsets for more important
and not so important tasks, and a fixed priority order is given. To test the
schedulability of a preemptive task set with constrained deadlines under a fixed
priority assignment, the typical Time Demand Analysis (TDA) as an exact test with
pseudo-polynomial run-time can be directly applied. To determine the schedulability
for a System with Dynamic Real-Time Guarantees, the following three conditions
must hold:
• Full timing guarantees hold, if the given task set can be scheduled according to
TDA when all tasks are executed in the normal mode.
• When the system runs with limited timing guarantees, all more important tasks
will meet their deadlines if they can be proven to be scheduled by TDA while all
tasks are executed in the abnormal mode.
• Each not so important task has bounded tardiness if the sum of utilization over
all tasks in the abnormal mode can be less than or equal to one.
To decide such a fixed priority ordering for a given task set, the Optimal Priority
Assignment (OPA) can be applied to find a feasible fixed priority assignment, since
the above schedulability test is OPA compatible. It is proven that a feasible priority
assignment for a System with Dynamic Real-Time Guarantees can be found if one
exists by using the priority assignment algorithm presented in [33], which has a
much better run-time than directly applying OPA.
As faulty-aware system design is desirable in the industrial practice, having an
online monitor to reflect the system status is also important. This monitor should
trigger warnings if the system can only provide limited timing guarantees, and
display the next time the system will return to full timing guarantees. To achieve
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Fig. 8 Percentage of Time where Full Timing Guarantees can be given for task sets with
utilization 70% in the normal mode under different fault rates. The median of the acceptance rates
over 40 task sets is colored in red. The blue box represents the interval around this median that
contains the inner 50% of those values while the whiskers display the range of the top/bottom 25%
of those values
this, an approximation is needed to detect the change from full timing guarantees
to limited timing guarantees, and for the calculation of an upper bound of the next
time instance the system will return to full timing guarantees. To realize the routine
of the online monitor, the system software has to ensure that the release pattern is
still correct when a task misses its deadline and there is a helper function to keep
tracking the number of postponed releases. How to enhance a real-time operating
system for the previous two requirements is further discussed in [6].
Figure 8 shows the results with the percentage of time that the system was
running with full timing guarantees. At a fault rate of 10−4 and 3×10−4 (faults/ms),
the system always provides full timing guarantees. When the fault rate is increased,
the average of the time where full timing guarantees are provided drops. For the
worst-case values, the drop is faster but even in this case full timing guarantees
are still provided ≈92.59% and ≈82.91% of the time for fault rates of 10−3 and
3×10−3, respectively. This shows that even for the higher fault rates under a difficult
setting, the system is still able to provide full timing guarantees for a reasonable
percentage of time.
5.3 Probabilistic Deadline-Miss Analyses
When applying software fault-tolerant techniques, one natural assumption is that
the system functions normally most of time. Therefore, it is meaningful to model the
occurrence of different execution of a task by probabilistic bounds on the worst-case
execution time (WCETs) due to potential recovery routines. This allows the system
designer to provide probabilistic arguments, e.g., Deadline-Miss Probability (DMP)
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Fig. 9 (a) Average run-time with respect to task set cardinality. (b) Approximation quality for
five task sets with Cardinality 15. (c) Detailed approximation quality for the convolution-based
approaches
and Deadline-Miss Rate, as the statistical quantification to evaluate the proposed
analyses scheduling algorithms, etc.
To derive the DMP, statistical approaches, i.e., Probabilistic response time anal-
ysis and Deadline-misses probability analysis, are usually taken into consideration.
The state of the art of the probabilistic response time analysis is based on task-level
convolution-based approaches [34]. Naturally, convolution-based approaches are
computationally expensive to be applied when the number of tasks or jobs is large.
Alternatively, Deadline-Misses probability analysis [3] is proposed, which can
utilize analytical bounds, e.g., Chernoff bounds [3, 9], Hoeffding’s and Bernstein’s
inequalities [34]. Please note that, the deadline-misses probability analysis is not
better than the probabilistic response time analysis in terms of accuracy of the DMP.
However, it is essentially much faster and has a better applicability in practice.
Figure 9 shows the results for randomly generated tasks sets with a normal-mode
utilization 70%, fault rate 0.025, and for all tasks the execution time of abnormal
mode is assumed to be two times of the normal mode. Three approaches based
on the task-level convolution-based approaches [34], i.e., Pruning, Unify, Approx,
result in similar values, roughly one order of magnitude better than Chernoff [3].
Although Bernstein [34] and Hoeffding [34] are orders of magnitude faster than
the other approaches which are compatible with respect to the related run-time, the
error of them is large compared to Chernoff by several orders of magnitude. The
results suggest that, if sufficiently low deadline-miss probability can be guaranteed
from analytical bounds, the task-level convolution-based approach then can be
considered.
DMP and Deadline-Miss Rate are both important performance indicators to
evaluate the extent of requirements compliance for soft real-time systems. However,
the aforementioned probabilistic approaches all focus on finding the probability of
the first deadline miss, and it is assumed that after a deadline miss the system either
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discards the job missing its deadline or reboots itself. Therefore, the probability of
one deadline miss directly relates to the deadline-miss rate since all jobs can be
considered individually. If this assumption do not hold, the additional workload due
to a deadline miss may trigger further deadline misses.
To derive a tight but safe estimation of the deadline-miss rate, an event-
driven simulator [7] with a fault injection module can be used, which can gather
deadline-miss rates empirically. However, the amount of time needed to per-
form the simulations is too large. Instead of simulating the targeted task set, an
analytical approach [7] can leverage on the above probabilistic approaches that
over-approximate the DMP of individual jobs to derive a safe upper bound on the
expected deadline-miss rate.
6 Application-Specific Dependability
In this section, we focus on application-specific aspects on dependability improve-
ment with the help of a case study on the Context Adaptive Variable Length Coding
(CAVLC) used in the H.264 video coding standard [20, 30, 32]. It summarizes how
application-specific knowledge can be leveraged to design a power-efficient fault-
tolerance technique for H.264 CAVLC.
CAVLC is an important part of the coding process and is susceptible to errors
due to its context adaptivity, multiple coding tables, and complex structure. It
transforms an input with a fixed length to flexible-length code consisting of
codeword/codelength tuples. The impact of a single error on the subjective video
quality is illustrated in Fig. 10a, which shows a significant distortion in a video
frame when the header of a macroblock (i.e., a 16 × 16 pixels block) is affected.
Faults during the CAVLC can also propagate to subsequent frames or even lead to
encoder/decoder crashes.
Consequently, it is required to address these problems during the CAVLC
execution. To reduce the overhead compared to generic solutions, application-






























Fig. 10 (a) Example of a corrupted frame showing the effects of a single-bit error. (b) Overview
of the contributions for the dependable CAVLC and the corresponding system layers (adapted
from [32])
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specific knowledge is considered. Specifically, Fig. 10b shows an overview of the
dependable CAVLC with contributions on the architecture and algorithm/software
layer, which are based on exploiting the video content properties and performing a
statistical analysis of CAVLC.
• Application-Specific Knowledge is considered by (1) an analysis of error
probabilities, (2) distribution of different syntax elements, (3) algorithmic prop-
erties, and (4) specifications defined by the standard. It includes an analysis
of different macroblock categories (homogeneous/textured, fast/slow motion).
The most important observations are that the total non-zero coefficients have a
significant influence on the error probabilities of different syntax elements. They
can be used to detect potential errors at the algorithm level if the macroblock
properties are known.
• Selective Data Redundancy: Based on the application-specific knowledge
obtained by the analysis, selected CAVLC data (e.g., quantized coefficients,
coefficient statistics, etc.) can be protected by storing redundant copies and parity
data in unused data structures. This is possible, e.g., for the quantized coefficients
as the quantization often leads to unused (“0”) entries, where redundant data can
be stored in a reflected fashion. Only the low-frequency coefficients are protected
in case the space is insufficient.
• Dependable CAVLC Hardware Architecture: The original and redundant
values are loaded by a hardware module, which performs error detection and
error recovery. In case of a mismatch, the parity is calculated and compared to
the stored one, so that the correct entry can be found. A recovery is even possible
if both entries are corrupted by reloading the original block and performing
the quantization step again. Additionally, the coding tables used by CAVLC
for obtaining the codeword and codelength need to be protected. For that,
the individual tables are split into different sub-tables, where the partitioning
decision is based on the distribution of the syntax elements. Sub-tables not
being accessed frequently can then be power-gated for leakage energy savings.
For each sub-table, a block parity-based protection approach is used for error
detection, trading-off the additional memory required and the protection offered.
Furthermore, entries not being accessed due to the algorithm properties and
zero-entries are not stored. Similarly, the data in tables containing mirrored
entries also has to be stored only once, thereby further reducing the memory
requirements and leakage energy.
• Run-Time Manager: The dependable CAVLC architecture is controlled by a
run-time manager which activates/deactivates the power-gating of the memory
parts storing the sub-tables, loads the requested data from the tables, and controls
error detection and reloading of data.
• Dependable CAVLC Processing Flow: The overall flow starts with a mac-
roblock characterization, which determines the power-gating decision. Then,
highly probable values for the syntax elements are predicted, which are used
later for the algorithm-guided error detection. Afterwards, the header elements
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are loaded by the hardware module performing error detection and error recovery.
Finally, the quantized coefficients are coded by CAVLC for each 4× 4 block.
This example architecture illustrates how application-specific knowledge can be
leveraged to improve the design decisions for enhancing the dependability of the
system and its power consumption. It achieves significant improvements in terms of
the resulting video quality compared to an unprotected scheme. Moreover, leakage
energy savings of 58% can be achieved by the application-guided fault-tolerance
and table partitioning.
7 Conclusion
Dependability has emerged as an important design constraint in modern com-
puting systems. For a cost-effective implementation, a cross-layer approach is
required, which enables each layer to contribute its advantages for dependability
enhancement. This chapter presented contributions focusing on the architecture,
SW/OS, and application layers. Those include modeling and estimation tech-
niques considering functional correctness and timeliness of applications as well
as approaches for generating dependable software (e.g., by dependability-aware
software transformations or selective instruction redundancy). Additionally, the
run-time system is employed for selecting appropriate dependable application
versions and adapting to different workloads and run-time conditions, enabling a
tradeoff between performance and dependability. It has furthermore been shown
how application-specific characteristics can be used to enhance the dependability of
a system, taking the example of a multimedia application.
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1 Introduction
Recent technological advancements in the field of transistor fabrication, such as
FinFETs and GAAFETs, have led to significant improvements in the performance
of next-generation multi-core processors but at the expense of an increased sus-
ceptibility to reliability threats such as soft errors [4, 37], aging [14], and process
variations [14]. These threats generate permanent and/or temporary faults that can
lead to unexpected system failures and can be disastrous to several safety-critical
applications such as automotive, healthcare, aerospace, etc., as well as high-
performance computing systems. Therefore, several techniques have been proposed
to detect, prevent, and mitigate these reliability threats across the computing stack
ranging from the transistor and circuit layer [27, 43] to the software/application
layer [2, 42, 44]. Oftentimes, (full-scale) redundancy is employed at the hardware
and the software layers, for example, at the software layer, by executing multiple
redundant thread versions of an application, either spatially or temporally, and at
the hardware layer, by duplicating or triplicating the pipeline, i.e., Double/Triple
Modular Redundancy (DMR/TMR) [28, 29, 32, 46]. However, these reliability
techniques exhibit several key limitations, as discussed below:
1. Ensuring temporal redundancy at the software layer, by executing multiple
redundant threads of a given application on the same core, would incur a
significant performance overhead.
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Fig. 1 Different configurations for mitigating dependability threats for traditional (homogeneous)
and heterogeneous multi-core systems, respectively
2. Executing multiple redundant threads in multiple cores concurrently, instead of a
single core, provides spatial redundancy and nullifies the performance overhead
caused by the temporal redundancy. However, due to the activation of multiple
cores, this technique incurs a significant power overhead.
3. Similarly, fabricating redundant hardware components to provide full-scale TMR
across the pipeline incurs additional area, power, and energy overheads including
additional on-chip resources for the data correction and control units.
4. Moreover, these techniques are not adaptive with respect to the dependability
requirements of the applications, as well as their inherent error tolerance, during
their execution.
To address these limitations, we proposed the reliability-heterogeneous archi-
tectures in [20, 21, 33, 34]. They offer different types of reliability modes in
different cores (i.e., the so-called reliability-heterogeneous cores), realized through
hardening of different pipeline components using different reliability mechanisms.
Hence, such processors provide a foundation for design- and run-time trade-offs in
terms of reliability, power/energy, and area. Their motivation arises from the fact
that different applications exhibit varying degrees of error tolerance and inherent
masking to soft errors due to data and control flow masking. Hence, depending
upon the executing applications, their tasks can be mapped to a set of reliability-
heterogeneous cores to mitigate soft errors, as shown in Fig. 1.
Although this solution significantly reduces the power/energy and performance
overheads, it requires a sophisticated run-time management system that performs an
appropriate code-to-core mapping of the applications, based on their requirements
and given power/performance constraints. This requires enabling certain features
across the hardware and software layers such as additional control logic, core
monitoring units at the hardware layer, and a run-time manager at the software
layer. Embedding this chapter’s content in the scope of this book and the overall
projects [11, 13], the focus of this chapter is limited to the design of such





















+- Deple tion R egion
High-Energy Particle 
(Neutron or Proton)


























































































Fig. 2 An overview of dependable computing with heterogeneous hardening modes (adapted
from [34]). Image sources: [16, 37]
hardware/software techniques that can enable heterogeneous dependable computing
(see Fig. 3).
Typically, the hardware solutions for dependable heterogeneous architectures
consist of the following three phases (see Fig. 2):
1. Reliability and Resilience Modeling: First, the effects of different reliability
threats (i.e., soft errors, aging, and process variations) on different components
of a given multi-core system and different applications are modeled and analyzed
based on mathematical analysis, simulation, and/or emulation.
2. Hardware Techniques: Based on the vulnerability analysis of the previous step,
multiple reliability-heterogeneous core variants are developed by hardening a
combination of the pipeline and/or memory components. Similarly, an analysis
of multi-level cache hierarchies has led to the design of multiple heterogeneous
reliability cache variants and reliability-aware reconfigurable caches.
3. Run-time System: Afterwards, appropriate task-to-core mapping as well as
reliable code version selection are performed, while satisfying the application’s
reliability requirement and minimizing the power/area overheads. These prob-
lems can also be formulated as constrained optimization problems.
























Fig. 3 Main abstraction layers of embedded systems and this chapter’s major (green, solid) and
minor (yellow, dashed) cross-layer contributions
2 Fault-Tolerant Heterogeneous Processors
Reliability threats not only affect the computing cores in the microprocessors,
but can also significantly affect the on-chip memory sub-systems, like multi-
level caches. This section provides an overview of our techniques for developing
reliability-heterogeneous in-order processors and multi-level cache hierarchies.
Unlike the traditional homogeneous dependable processors, the development of
reliability-heterogeneous processors not only requires design-time efforts to develop
multiple variable-reliability processor variants but also requires a run-time manage-
ment system that can efficiently cater the applications’ requirements (see Fig. 2).
Therefore, as illustrated in Fig. 4, developing these hardware techniques can be
divided into two phases, namely, design-time and run-time:
1. Design-Time: At design-time, first the overall vulnerability of a processor is
analyzed. Based on this analysis, we develop hardware techniques that can be
used to design reliability-heterogeneous processor cores (see Sect. 2.1). In the
next step, these hardened cores are integrated into an architectural-level simulator
to evaluate their effectiveness. Similarly, we evaluate the vulnerability of caches,
based on which hardware techniques are designed to mitigate the effects
of reliability threats in caches (see Sect. 2.2). These reliability-aware caches
and multiple reliability-heterogeneous cores are used to design a reliability-
heterogeneous processor, as depicted by Design-Time in Fig. 4.
2. Run-time: To effectively use the reliability-heterogeneous processor, an adap-
tive run-time manager for soft error resilience (ASER) is used to estimate the
reliability requirements of the applications (as well as their resilience properties),
and to efficiently map their threads to a set of hardened cores while adhering to
the user and performance constraints, as depicted by Run-Time in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4 The design- and run-time methodology to develop dependable heterogeneous processors
(adapted from [20, 34])
2.1 Hardening Embedded Processors
To design the hardened cores for reliability-heterogeneous architectures, first, we
analyze the vulnerability of these cores to different reliability threats. Based on
this vulnerability analysis, instead of enabling full-scale DMR/TMR, we design the
micro-architecture of different hardened (in-order) cores. These cores have distinct
reliability mechanisms in different pipeline components (ranging from unprotected
to fully-protected), but implement the same instruction set architecture (ISA); see
the core variant library in Fig. 4. Hence, these cores provide a trade-off between
reliability, area, and power/energy consumption. Since not all transistors on a chip
can be powered-on at the same time (i.e., the dark silicon problem [7, 31, 41]),
we leverage this fact to integrate many different hardened cores to develop a
reliability-heterogeneous ISO-ISA processor [20, 21], while adhering to hardware
and user-defined constraints (e.g., area, power) considering a target domain (i.e.,
given a particular set of target applications).
To cater for the application-specific requirements at run-time, an adaptive run-
time manager for soft error resilience (ASER) determines an efficient application-to-
core mapping considering the application’s vulnerability and deadline requirements,
system performance, thermal design power (TDP), and other user-defined con-
straints. For example, Fig. 5 depicts the varying reliability improvements of the
ASER run-time system approach in comparison with multiple state-of-the-art
reliability techniques such as TRO (timing dependability optimization aiming at
minimizing the deadline misses), RTO (optimizing functional as well as timing
dependability), Full-TMR (activating full TMR), and AdTMR (deactivating TMR
when the vulnerability lies below a pre-defined threshold). The reliability is
measured using the Reliability Profit Function (RPF) which is defined as follows:

































Fig. 5 Reliability Profit Function improvement over different state-of-the-art reliability tech-
niques, i.e., timing reliability optimization (TRO), functional and timing reliability (RTO), TMR,







where ∀t ∈ T , T is a set of run-time concurrently executing application tasks
(T = {T1, T2, . . . , TM)}), Z ∈ {T RO,RT O, T MR, adT MR}, and RT P is
the Reliability-Timing Penalty [38]. Note, a higher value of RPF translates to a
better reliability. The ASER approach achieves 58–96% overall system reliability
improvements when compared to these four state-of-the-art techniques.
2.2 Reliability Techniques for Multi-Level Caches
In any microprocessor, on-chip memories play a significant role to improve the
throughput and performance of an application. Moreover, memory elements (such
as caches) are even more susceptible to soft errors compared to the computing
elements (i.e., logic) as they occupy a significant portion of the total on-chip
area [9]. Therefore, for designing dependable multi/many-core processors, different
(individual) cache levels as well as the complete cache hierarchy (considering inter-
dependency between different cache levels) have to be analyzed and optimized for
mitigating reliability threats.
2.2.1 Improving the Reliability of Last-Level Caches
Dynamic reconfiguration of the caches with respect to the running applications
has a significant impact on the vulnerability of the on-chip last-level caches, as
shown in Fig. 6. It can be observed from the vulnerability analysis of a given cache
configuration (see Fig. 6) that due to different access patterns and occupancy of
last-level caches for the application, the vulnerability also varies depending on
the executing applications. This dynamic change in vulnerability at run-time can
be exploited to improve the reliability of the last-level cache. Therefore, dynamic
reconfiguration of the last-level cache is exploited to develop a reliability-aware
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Fig. 6 (a) Vulnerability analysis of different applications from the PARSEC benchmark for the
baseline case (L2 cache parameters—8MB, 8-way, 64B). (b) Vulnerabilities and cache misses
(MKPI) for the Ferret application for different cache configurations (adapted from [19])
reconfigurable cache architecture [19, 22]. Towards this, we aim at reducing the
vulnerability of concurrently executing applications by employing the following
features:
1. A methodology to quantify the cache vulnerability with respect to concurrently
executing applications.
2. A method for lightweight online prediction of the application vulnerability online
based on the cache utilization and performance data.
3. A methodology to dynamically reconfigure the last-level cache at run-time that
targets at minimizing the application vulnerability w.r.t. cache while keeping the
performance overhead low, or within a tolerable bound.
This reliability-aware cache reconfiguration [22] can also be applied in conjunction
with the error correcting codes (ECCs). For example, Single Error Correcting-
Double Error Detecting (SEC-DED) [6] can be combined with the reliability-aware
cache reconfiguration [22] to improve reliability in multi-bit error scenarios, or in
cases where only some of the cache partitions are ECC-protected due to the area
constraints.
2.2.2 Improving the Reliability of the Complete Cache Hierarchy
The application vulnerability towards soft errors is not only dependent on the
individual utilization or dynamic reconfiguration of the different individual cache
levels (e.g., L1 or L2). Rather, the vulnerability interdependencies across different
cache levels also have significant impact on the reliability of the system. There-
fore, the vulnerability of the concurrently executing applications with respect to
the corresponding cache configuration can further be improved by considering
these interdependencies across different cache levels. To achieve an efficient
design, we first performed an architectural design space exploration (DSE), while
considering multi-core processors with multiple cache levels executing different
multi-threaded applications. Our cache DSE methodology identifies the pareto-
optimal configurations with respect to constraints, performance overhead, and
targeted vulnerabilities [45]. Afterwards, these configurations are used at run time to
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Fig. 7 (a) and (b) Exploration time saving achieved by the proposed approach with respect to
exhaustive exploration, multi-level tuning approach (MCT-1) [47] and heuristic (MCT-2) [47].
(c) Vulnerability saving comparison of the proposed approach compared to non-reconfigurable
baseline cache with L1 Early WriteBack (EWB) [15] and reliability-aware last-level cache
partitioning (R2Cache) [22] schemes (adapted from [45])
perform reliability-aware cache reconfiguration for the complete cache hierarchy.
Figure 7 shows that more than 50% vulnerability saving is achieved by the proposed
solution as compared to non-reconfigurable baseline cache with L1 EarlyWriteBack
(EWB) [15] and Reliability-Aware Last-Level Cache Partitioning (R2Cache) while
exploring less than 2% of the entire exhaustive cache configuration design space.
3 Heterogeneous Reliability Modes of Out-of-Order
Superscalar Cores
Embedded processors, although important in a wide range of applications and
scenarios, cannot cater the high throughput and performance requirements of
personal computers or high-performance computing platforms such as cloud servers
or data-centers, which are also constrained in the amount of power that can
be consumed. Such high-throughput systems deploy multi-core out-of-order (O3)
superscalar processors, such as Intel Core i7 processors in PCs, and Intel Xeon or
AMD Opteron processors in servers and data-centers worldwide. An O3 processor
executes the instructions of a program out-of-order, instead of in-order as is the
case in embedded processors (e.g., LEON3), to utilize the instruction cycles that
would otherwise be wasted in pipeline stalls. A superscalar processor, on the
other hand, implements instruction-level parallelism to execute more than one
instruction in parallel by dispatching instructions to multiple different execution
units embedded in the processor core. Therefore, an O3 superscalar processor
offers a significantly higher throughput by combining the advantages of these two
individual techniques. However, enabling such high throughput comes at the cost of
implementing additional hardware units such as the Re-order Buffer (ROB), which
keeps track of the instructions executing out-of-order.
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Fig. 8 Experimental tool-flow for vulnerability analysis of out-of-order superscalar ALPHA cores
In this section, we analyze the vulnerability of the ALPHA 21264 [17] O3
superscalar processor and design multiple reliability-heterogeneous processor cores
from which an optimal configuration can be chosen at run-time based on the
applications’ reliability requirements.
3.1 Experimental Setup
Figure 8 presents an overview of the tool-flow used to obtain the results. We utilize
a modified version of the gem5 simulator [5] extended to support the following
functionality:
1. Determine the vulnerable time of all pipeline components, which in turn is used
to compute their Architectural Vulnerability Factors (AVFs) [30],
2. Full support for simulating reliability-heterogeneous cores obtained by triplicat-
ing key pipeline components (instead of implementing full-scale TMR), and
3. Checkpoint processor state compression using techniques like DMTCP [3],
HBICT [1], and GNU zip [8].
We evaluate our reliability-heterogeneous ALPHA 21264 four-issue superscalar
processor cores using the MiBench application benchmark suite [12].
3.2 Vulnerability Analysis of Out-of-Order Superscalar
Processors
The AVF of a component C over a period of N clock-cycles is defined as the
probability of a fault that is generated in C to propagate to the final output resulting
in an erroneous application output or intermittent termination of the program [30].
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Fig. 9 Differences in AVF of ALPHA core components during application execution (SHA and
Bit-counts) (adapted from [33])
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Fig. 10 Vulnerability analysis of ALPHA cores in single- and multi-core processors (adapted from
[33])
The AVF of each pipeline component is estimated using applications from the
MiBench and PARSEC application benchmark suites for single- and multi-core
ALPHA 21264 superscalar processors for key pipeline components such as: (1)
Re-order Buffer (ROB), (2) Instruction (IQ), (3) Load (LQ), (4) Store Queues
(SQ), (5) Integer Register Files (Int. RF), (6) Floating Point Register Files (FP
RF), (7) Rename Map (RM), (8) Integer ALUs (Int. ALU), (9) Floating Point
ALUs (FP ALU), (10) Integer Multiply/Divide (Int. MD), and (11) Floating Point
Multiply/Divide (FP MD). Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the results of the vulnerability
analysis experiments for both the single-core and multi-core processors.
We analyze the results obtained from the vulnerability analysis to make the
following key observations:
1. We have identified three key pipeline components (Integer ALU, Store Queue,
and Re-order Buffer) that are more vulnerable during the execution of SHA, when
compared to Bit-counts, as depicted by A in Fig. 9.
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2. The AVFs of the individual pipeline components vary for different application
workloads. For example, as shown in Fig. 10a the vulnerability of the Integer
ALU widely varies for the four application workloads evaluated (labeled B).
3. In case of multi-core processors, the size of the input data does not significantly
affect the AVF of the pipeline components, as shown by C in Fig. 10b.
The AVF of a component varies based on the type and number of instructions
present in the application and its properties such as its compute- or memory-
intensiveness, instruction-level parallelism, cache hit/miss rate, etc. For example,
components like the ROB and the SQ are more vulnerable in SHA because of higher
levels of instruction-level parallelism and more store instructions.
Therefore, based on this information, we can select certain key pipeline com-
ponents that can be hardened/triplicated to increase the reliability of the processor
for a given application workload. By hardening multiple key pipeline components
in different combinations, we design a wide range of reliability-heterogeneous
O3 superscalar ALPHA cores from which an optimal design configuration can
be selected at run-time based on an application’s reliability requirement while
minimizing the area and/or power overheads.
3.3 Methodology for Hardening Out-of-Order Superscalar
Processors
Our methodology for designing reliability-heterogeneous O3 superscalar processors
targets two key approaches: (1) Redundancy, and (2) Checkpointing. Redundancy at
the hardware layer is ensured by designing a wide range of reliability-heterogeneous
processor cores by hardening a combination of the vulnerable pipeline components,
depending on the reliability requirements of the target application. The vulnerable
components are selected based on the fault-injection experiments and the AVF
values of each component for different application workloads. Second, to further
enhance processor reliability, we investigate and analyze various compression
mechanisms that can be used to efficiently reduce the size of checkpointing data. An
overview of our methodology for hardening O3 superscalar processors is presented
in Fig. 11. First, we explain how we evaluate the vulnerability of the full processor
for a given application workload.
3.3.1 Full-Processor Vulnerability Factor
For evaluating the vulnerability of the full processor for a given application
workload, we propose to extend the AVF to estimate what we refer to as the Full-
Processor Vulnerability Factor (FPVF). It is defined as the ratio of the total
number of vulnerable bits (VulnerableBits) in the processor pipeline for the duration
they are vulnerable (VulnerableTime) to the total number of bits in the processor




















































Fig. 11 Methodology for hardening out-of-order superscalar processors (adapted from [33])
pipeline (TotalBits) for the total duration of application execution (TotalTime). For




∀i∈Components V ulnerableBitsi × V ulnerableT imei∑
∀i∈Components T otalBitsi × T otalT imei
(3)
3.3.2 Heterogeneous Reliability Modes for ALPHA Cores
Enabling full-scale TMR for all application workloads leads to 200% (or more)
area and power overheads, which might not be a feasible option in many real-
world systems. Considering the analysis presented in Sect. 3.2, which illustrates
that the AVF of the pipeline components varies based on the application workload,
we propose to enable fine-grained TMR at the component-level. This involves
hardening a combination of highly vulnerable pipeline components, instead of the
full-processor pipeline to increase processor reliability while reducing the power
and area overheads associated with TMR. Hardening involves instantiating three
instances of the component with the same set of inputs and a voter circuit that is
used to elect the majority output. We propose and analyze 10 different reliability
modes (RM) for heterogeneous processors, including the baseline unprotected (U)
core. The list of components hardened in these modes are presented in Table 1.
Next, we execute the four MiBench application benchmarks on our 10 proposed
RMs to estimate the FPVF of each reliability-heterogeneous processor. We also
evaluate the area and power overheads incurred by each reliability mode. The
results of the experiments are illustrated in Fig. 12. From these results, we make
the following key observations:
1. Our initial hypothesis, which stated that hardening different combinations of
pipeline components (RMs) can reduce the vulnerability to different extents
based on the application workload being executed, was correct. We demonstrate
this further by considering the applications SHA and Dijkstra. Typically, the
vulnerability of these two applications is similar to each other, except in the cases
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Table 1 Heterogeneous reliability modes and corresponding pareto-optimal reliability modes
for MiBench applications
Reliability mode Components hardened Application Pareto-optimal reliability modes
U Unprotected Bit-counts U, RM4, RM7
RM1 RF Dijkstra U, RM4, RM7, RM8
RM2 IQ, RM Patricia U, RM4, RM7
RM3 IQ, LQ, SQ SHA U, RM1, RM6, RM7, RM8
RM4 IQ, LQ, SQ, RM, ROB All U, RM4, RM7, RM8
RM5 RF, IQ, LQ, SQ
RM6 RF, RM
RM7 RF, RM, ROB
RM8 RM, ROB
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Fig. 12 Full-Processor Vulnerability Factor (FPVF) and power/area trade-off of the proposed
heterogeneous reliability modes for different MiBench applications (adapted from [33])
of RM2, RM6, and RM9. The full-processor vulnerability of these three RMs has
been reduced by more than 50% when executing SHA compared to Dijkstra.
2. Components such as the Rename Map and Reorder Buffer, when hardened, are
highly effective in reducing the FPVF for all four applications. This is illustrated
by the reliability modes RM4, RM7, and RM8, which have significantly lower
FPVFs compared to their counter-parts. However, these two components occupy
a significant percentage of the on-chip resources and hardening them leads
to significant area and power overheads as illustrated by Fig. 12. This leads
us to infer that hardening specific highly vulnerable pipeline components can
significantly reduce the overall processor vulnerability for a wide range of
application workloads based on their properties.
Furthermore, based on the data from these experiments, we perform an architec-
tural space exploration that trades-off FPVF, area, and power overheads to extract
the pareto-optimal reliability modes. The results of the experiments are illustrated
in Fig. 13, where the x-, y-, and z-axes depict the FPVF, area, and power overheads,
respectively. From these results, we make the following key observations:
























































Reliability Mode     
(a) Bit-counts (b) Dijkstra (c) Patricia






Unprotected core that is 
highly vulnerable to soft 
errors
Fig. 13 Architectural space exploration of our heterogeneous reliability modes for MiBench
applications (adapted from [33])
1. The design labeled U, i.e., the unprotected core, is pareto-optimal for all
application workloads. This is expected as this reliability mode incurs zero area
and power overheads and represents the least reliable processor design.
2. Although RM7 and RM8 significantly reduce the FPVF, due to their differences
in power and area overheads, RM7 lies on the pareto-front for all individual appli-
cation workloads, whereas RM8 is pareto-optimal only for SHA and Dijkstra.
Similarly, RM4 is pareto-optimal for three of the four application workloads.
3. RM4, RM7, and RM8, all lie on the pareto-front when all applications are
executed on the cores. This behavior is observed because of the varying levels
of vulnerability savings achieved by the RMs when compared to their area and
power overheads.
4. RM7 is pareto-optimal for four individual application workloads and reduces the
FPVF by 87%, on average, while incurring area and power overheads of 10%
and 43%, respectively.
3.3.3 State Compression Techniques
Reliability can also be improved at the software layer by inserting checkpoints in
the application code. When an application encounters a checkpoint, the complete
processor state, including all intermediate register and cache values, is stored in the
main memory. These checkpoint states can be used to re-initialize the processor,
which is referred to as rollback, in case a failure is detected and the next sequence
of instructions are re-executed.
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Fig. 14 Effectiveness of state compression techniques in reducing state size (adapted from [33])
The way checkpointing is implemented in gem5 leads to significant loss in
performance in case of frequent checkpoint restoration as the cache and pipeline
states are not preserved, which, in turn, leads to a higher number of instructions
being executed. Distributed Multi-Threaded Checkpointing (DMTCP) is a Linux
compatible checkpointing tool that is used to checkpoint Linux processes. The
back-end mechanism of DMTCP is accessible to programmers, via Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs), to insert checkpoints into their application code.
Inside gem5, these APIs can be used in combination with its pseudo-instructions
to offer the functionality of creating/recovering checkpoint states for the appli-
cations being simulated inside gem5. Furthermore, the size of data generated
by each checkpoint is typically large, especially in the case of O3 superscalar
processors with large multi-level cache hierarchies. Therefore, we explore various
compression strategies that can be used to efficiently compress and reduce the
checkpoint data using techniques like the Hash-Based Incremental Checkpointing
Tool (HBICT) and GNU zip (gzip). HBICT provides DMTCP support to enable
checkpoint compression using an approach called delta compression. This kind of
compression mechanism preserves only changed fragments of a program’s state,
thereby considerably reducing the size of checkpoint data. gzip is a file compression
technique based on the DEFLATE algorithm, which is a combination of lossless
data compression techniques such as LZ77 and Huffman coding. gzip can drastically
reduce the size of checkpoint data, as illustrated by the results presented in Fig. 14.
These techniques and compression algorithms are implemented in gem5, in different
combinations, to reduce the size of checkpoint data for the four aforementioned
MiBench applications, by executing them on an unprotected ALPHA processor. The
effectiveness of different combinations of compression algorithms is illustrated in
terms of checkpoint data size in Fig. 14. It can be observed that the combination of
DMTCP and gzip is highly successful in reducing the checkpoint size by ∼6×. On
the other hand, a combination of DMTCP, HBICT, and gzip techniques reduces the
checkpoint size by ∼5.7×.
4 Run-Time Systems for Heterogeneous Fault-Tolerance
The techniques discussed in Sects. 2 and 3 also require a run-time manager for
incorporating the application vulnerabilities with respect to several reliability threats
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such as soft errors, aging, and process variation, as well as considering constraints
like dark silicon and required performance (or tolerable performance overhead).
Most of the adaptive hardware techniques exploit the application vulnerability to
map applications on appropriate cores to reduce their vulnerability. Similarly, this
concept can be applied to modify the applications with respect to the available hard-
ened core or caches, which can also be combined with other hardware techniques to
further reduce the vulnerabilities of the heterogeneous multi/many-core processors.
Therefore, several techniques have been proposed to modify the execution patterns
of the application or partitioning the application to develop a run-time system for
reliability-heterogeneous multi/many-core processors.
1. Aging- and Process Variation-Aware Redundant Multithreading [18, 36]:
dTune leverages multiple reliable versions of an application and redundant
multithreading (RMT) simultaneously for achieving high soft error resilience
under aging and process variability [36]. Based on the reliability requirements
of the executing applications, dTune performs efficient core allocation for RMT
while considering the aging state of the processor as well as process variation.
It achieves up to 63% improvement in the reliability of a given application.
Similarly, another approach [18] utilizes different software versions and RMT
to improve the reliability of a system while considering the effects of soft errors
and aging on the processor cores, to achieve an improved aging balancing.
2. Variability-aware reliability-heterogeneous processor [21]: This work
leverages techniques at the hardware and run-time system layers to mitigate
the reliability threats. In particular, this work focuses on TMR-based solutions
to (partially) harden the cores for developing a many/multi-core reliability-
heterogeneous processor. It uses a run-time controller to handle multiple
cores with different reliability modes while considering the reliability
requirements of the applications. In addition, it also exploits the dark silicon
property in multi/many-core processors to offer a wide range of different
performance-reliability trade-offs by over-provisioning the processor with
reliability-heterogeneous cores.
3. Aging-aware reliability-heterogeneous processor [10]: This technique
exploits the dark silicon property of the multi/many-core processors to design a
run-time approach for balancing the application load to mitigate the reliability
threats, i.e., temperature-dependent aging while also considering variability and
current age of the cores in order to improve the overall system performance
for a given lifetime constraint. The analysis shows that this run-time solution
can improve the overall aging of the multi/many-core processor by 6 months to
5 years depending upon the provided design constraints and power overheads.
Furthermore, this work also developed a fast aging evaluation methodology
based on multi-granularity simulation epochs, as well as lightweight run-time
techniques for temperature and aging estimation that can be used for an early
estimation of temperature-dependent aging of multi/many-core processors.
There are other techniques which can exploit the functional and timing reliability
in real-time systems to improve the application by generating the reliable application
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versions or respective thread with different performance and reliability properties
[38]. These reliable applications or respective thread can jointly be used with
hardware techniques to improve the overall reliability of the multi/many-core
heterogeneous processor. Another solution is to exploit the dynamic voltage and
frequency scaling to generate the dynamic redundancy and voltage scaling with
respect to the effects of process variations, application vulnerability, performance
overhead, and design constraints [40]. This technique demonstrates up to 60%
power reductions while improving the reliability significantly. Similarly, in addition
to redundancy, multiple voltage-frequency levels are introduced while consider-
ing the effects of dark silicon in multi/many-core heterogeneous processor [39].
This technique also considers the effects of soft errors and process variations in
their reliability management system that provides up to 19% improved reliability
under different design constraints [35]. Most of the abovementioned approaches
are focused on general purpose microprocessors; however, in application-specific
instruction set processors (ASIPs), the hardware hardening and corresponding run-
time software assisted recovery techniques can be used to improve the soft error
vulnerabilities in ASIP-based multi/many-core systems. For example, dynamic core
adaptation and application specificity can be exploited to generate a processor
configuration which performs the error (caused by soft error) recovery for a
particular application under the given area, power, and performance constraints
[24–26]. Moreover, the baseline instruction set of the targeted ASIPs can also be
modified or extended to enable the error recovery functionality [23].
5 Conclusion
This chapter discusses the building blocks of computing systems (both embedded
and superscalar processors) with different heterogeneous fault-tolerant modes for
the memory components like caches as well as for the in-order and out-of-order
processor designs. We provide a comprehensive vulnerability analysis of different
components, i.e., embedded and superscalar, processors and caches, considering
the soft errors and aging issues. We also discuss the methodologies to improve
the performance and power of such systems by exploiting these vulnerabilities. In
addition, we briefly present that a reliability-aware compiler can be leveraged to
comprehend software-level heterogeneous fault-tolerance by generating different
reliable versions of the application with respective reliability and performance
properties. Further details on reliability-driven compilation can be found in Chap. 5.
Towards the end, we also analyze fault-tolerance techniques for application-specific
instruction set processors (ASIPs).
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Reliability Optimization in MPSoCs
Victor M. van Santen, Hussam Amrouch, Thomas Wild, Jörg Henkel,
and Andreas Herkersdorf
1 Overview
The VirTherm3D project is part of SPP1500, which has its origins in [10] and
[9]. The main cross-layer contributions of VirTherm3D are outlined in Fig. 1. The
green circles are our major contributions spanning from the physics to circuit layer
and from the architecture to application layer. These contributions include physical
modeling of thermal and aging effects considered at the circuit layer as well as
communication virtualization at architecture level to support task relocation as part
of thermal management at architecture level. Our minor contributions span from the
circuit to architecture layer and include reliability-aware logic synthesis as well as
studying the impact of reliability with figures of merit such as probability of failure.
2 Impact of Temperature on Reliability
Temperature is at the core of reliability. It has a direct short-term impact on
reliability, as the electrical properties of circuits (e.g., delay) are affected by
temperature. A higher temperature leads to circuits with higher delays and lower
noise margins. Additionally, temperature impacts circuits indirectly as it stimulates
or accelerates aging phenomena, which in turn, manifest themselves as degradations
in the electrical properties of circuits.
The direct impact of temperature in an SRAM memory cell can be seen in
Fig. 2. Increasing the temperature increases the read delay of the memory cell.
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Fig. 1 Main abstraction layers of embedded systems and this chapter’s major (green, solid) and



































Vdd = 1.2V , T = 80° C
Vdd = 1.2V , T = 125° C
Fig. 2 Shift in SRAM memory cell read delay as a direct impact of temperature. Taken (from [3])
This is because increased temperature degrades performance of transistors (e.g., a
reduction in carrier mobility μ), which affects the performance of the memory cell.
Therefore, increasing temperature directly worsens circuit performance and thus
negatively impacts the reliability of a circuit. If the circuit has a prolonged delay
due to the increased temperature, then timing violations might occur. If the circuit
has a degraded noise margin, then noise (e.g., voltage drops or radiation-induced
current spikes) might corrupt data.
Next to directly altering the circuit properties, temperature also has an indirect
impact, which is shown in Fig. 3. Temperature stimulates aging phenomena (e.g.,
Bias Temperature Instability (BTI)) degrading the performance of transistors (e.g.,
increasing the threshold voltage Vth) over time. Increasing the temperature accel-
erates the underlying physical processes of aging and thus increases aging-induced
degradations.
Because of the two-fold impact of temperature, i.e., by reducing circuit per-
formance directly and indirectly via aging, it is crucial to be considered when
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Fig. 3 Indirect impact of temperature stimulating aging. Taken (from [4])
estimating the reliability of a circuit. The temperature at an instant of time (estimated
either via measurement or simulation) governs the direct degradation of the circuit,
i.e., the short-term direct impact of temperature. Temperature over time governs the
long-term indirect impact, as aging depends on the thermal profile (i.e., the thermal
fluctuations over a long period). How to estimate temperature correctly both the
temperature at an instant as well as the thermal profile is discussed in Sect. 3.
After the temperature is determined via temperature estimation, the impact of
temperature on reliability must be evaluated. This is challenging, as the impact
of temperature occurs on physical level (e.g., movement of electrical carriers in a
semiconductor as well as defects in transistors for aging), while the figures of merit
are for entire computing systems (e.g., probability of failure, quality of service).
To overcome this challenge, Sect. 4 discusses how to connect the physical to the
system level with respect to thermal modeling. To obtain the ultimate impact of
the temperature, the figures of merit of a computing system are obtained with our
cross-layer (from physical to system level) temperature modeling (see Fig. 4).
Temperature can be controlled. Thermal management techniques reduce temper-
ature by limiting the amount of generated heat or making better use of existing
cooling (e.g., distribution of generated heat for easier cooling). Thus, to reduce the
deleterious impact of temperature on the figures of merit of systems, temperature
must be controlled at system level. For this purpose, Sect. 5 discusses system-
level thermal management techniques. These techniques limit temperature below
a specified critical temperature to ensure that employed safety margins (e.g., are not
violated time slack to tolerate thermally induced delay increases), thus ensuring the
reliability of a computing system.
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Fig. 4 Image signal-to-noise ratio as a figure of merit for an image processing system. At 25 ◦C
no timing violations occur, while (due to non-existent safety margins) at 28 and 30 ◦C timing
violations degrade PSNR
To support the system management in migrating tasks away from thermal
hotspots and thus reducing thermal stress, special virtualization features are pro-
posed to be implemented in the interconnect infrastructure. They allow for a fast
transfer of communication relations of tasks to be migrated and thus help to
limit downtimes. These mechanisms can then also be applied for generating task
replica to dynamically introduce redundancy during system runtime as a response
to imminent reliability concerns in parts of the SoC or if reliability requirements of
an application change.
As mentioned before, temperature estimation and modeling cross many abstrac-
tion layers. The effects of temperature originate from the physical level, where the
physical processes related to carriers and defects are altered by temperature. Yet the
final impact of temperature has to pass through the transistor level, gate level, circuit
level, architecture level all the way to the system level, where the figures of merit
of the system can be evaluated. The system designer has to maintain the figures
of merit for his end-user, therefore limiting temperature with thermal management
techniques and evaluating the impact of temperature on the various abstraction
layers. Therefore, Sect. 7 discusses thermal estimation, modeling, and management
techniques with a focus on how to cross these abstraction layers and how to connect
the physical to the system level. In practice, interdependencies between the low
abstraction layers and the management layer do exist. The running workload at
the system level increases the temperature of the cores. Hence, the probability of
error starts to gradually increase. In such a case the management layer estimates
the probability of error based on the information received from the lower layers and
then attempts to make the best decision. For instance, it might allow the increase in
the probability of error but at the cost of enabling the adaptive modular redundancy
(AMR) (details in Sect. 6.3) or maybe migrating the tasks to other cores that are
healthier (i.e., exhibit less probability of error).
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3 Temperature Estimation via Simulation or Measurement
Accurately estimating the temperature of a computing system is necessary to later
evaluate the impact of temperature. Two options exist: (1) Thermal simulation and
(2) Thermal measurement. Both options must estimate temperature with respect
to time and space. Figure 5 shows a simulated temporal thermal profile of a
microprocessor. Temperature fluctuates visibly over time and depends on the
applications which are run on the microprocessor.
Figure 9 shows a measured spatial thermal map of a microprocessor. Temperature
is spatially unequally distributed across the processor, i.e., certain components of
the microprocessors have to tolerate higher temperatures. However, the difference
in temperature is limited. This limit stems from thermal conductance across the chip
counteracting temperature differences. Thermal conductance is mainly via the chip
itself (e.g., wires in metal layers), its packaging (e.g., heat spreaders), and cooling
(e.g., heat sink).
3.1 Thermal Simulation
Thermal simulations are a software-based approach to estimate the temperature
of a computing system. Thermal simulations consist of three steps: (1) Activity
extraction, (2) Power estimation, (3) Temperature estimation. The first step extracts
the activity (e.g., transistor switching frequency, cache accesses) of the applica-
tions running on the computing system. Different applications result in different
temperatures (see Fig. 5). The underlying cause is a unique power profile for each
application (and its input data), originating from unique activities per application.
Once activities are extracted, the power profiles based on these activities are
estimated. Both steps can be performed on different abstraction layers. On the
transistor level, transistor switching consumes power, while on the architecture level
Fig. 5 Simulated thermal profile (temporal) of a microprocessor













Deriving the temperature/voltage-stress waveforms 


































Fig. 6 Flow of a thermal simulation (updated figure from [4]).













Fig. 7 Thermal map of an SRAM array (granularity: single SRAM cells) under different
applications
each cache access consumes a certain amount of power (depending on cache hit or
cache miss). Thus activity would be transistor switching/cache accesses and this
would result in a very fine-grained power profile (temporally as well as spatially)
for the transistor level. At the architecture level, a coarse-grained power profile is
obtained with a time granularity per access (potentially hundreds of cycles long)
and space granularity is per entire cache block.
With the power profiles known, the amount of generated heat (again spatially and
temporally) is known. A thermal simulator then uses a representation of thermal
conductances and capacitances with generated heat as an input heat flux and
dissipated heat (via cooling) as an output heat flux to determine the temperature
over time and across the circuit.
Our work in [4] exemplifies a thermal simulation flow in Fig. 6. In this example,
SRAM memory cell accesses are used to estimate transistor switching and thus
power profiles for the entire SRAM array. These power profiles are then used with
the microprocessor layout (called floorplan) and typical cooling settings in a thermal
simulator to get thermal maps in Fig. 7.
The work in [13] models temperature on the system level. Individual processor
cores of a many-core computing system are the spatial granularity with seconds as
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Fig. 8 Thermal estimation at the system level with cores as the spatial granularity (from [13])
the temporal granularity. Abstracted (faster, simpler) models are used to estimate the
temperature per processor core, as a transistor level granularity would be unfeasible
with respect to computational effort (i.e., simulation time).
While thermal simulations have the advantage of being able to perform thermal
estimations without physical access to the system (e.g., during early design phases),
they are very slow (hours of simulation per second of operation) and not accurate.
Estimating activities and power on fine-grained granularities is an almost impossible
task (layout-dependent parasitic resistances and capacitances, billions of transistors,
billions of operations per second), while coarse-grained granularities provide just
rough estimates of temperature due to the disregard of non-negligible details (e.g.,
parasitics) at these high abstraction levels (Fig. 8).
3.2 Thermal Measurement
If physical access to actual chips is an option, then thermal measurement is
preferable. Observing the actual thermal profiles (temporally) and thermal maps
(spatially) intrinsically includes all details (e.g., parasitics, billions of transistors,
layout). Thus, a measurement can be more accurate than a simulation. Equally as
important, measurements operate in real time (i.e., a second measured is also a
second operated) outperforming simulations.
The challenge of thermal measurements is the resolution. The sample frequency
of the measurement setup determines the temporal resolution and this is typically







core2 core1 core2 core1 core2 core1core2 core1
Time [s] 1 8 16 24





Voltage regulator to 
control the cooling
An in-house milled metal plate 
for the thermal conductivityRear-side-based cooling
Max ΔT 95 °K
V max 15.5 V




(A x B x H) 




Intel octa-core Processor 





Water heat sink 
cooling the hot side 
of the Peltier device
Water cooling  unit
 12V pump
 Triple-radiator






Fig. 10 High fidelity infrared thermal measurement setup (from [2])
in the order of milliseconds, while simulations can provide nano-second granularity
(e.g., individual transistor switching). However, since thermal capacitances prevent
abrupt changes of temperature as a reaction to abrupt changes in generated heat,
sample rates in milliseconds are sufficient. The spatial resolution is equally limited
by thermal conductance, which limits the thermal gradient (i.e., difference in
temperature between two neighboring component; see Figs. 7 and 9).
The actual obstacle for thermal measurements is accessibility. A chip sits below
a heat spreader and cooling, i.e., it is not directly observable. The manufacturers
include thermal diodes at a handful of locations (e.g., 1 per core), which measure
temperature in-situ, but these diodes are both inaccurate (due to their spatial
separation from the actual logic) and spatially very coarse due to their limited
number.
Our approach (Fig. 10) [2, 14] is to cool the chip through the PCB from the
bottom-side and measure the infrared radiation emitted from the chip directly. Other
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Fig. 11 Limited infrared image lucidity and fidelity due to oil cooling on top of the chip (from
[2])
approaches cool the chip with infrared-transparent oils to cool the chip from the top,
but this results in heat conductance limiting image fidelity and turbulence in the oil
limiting image resolution (see Fig. 11). Our approach does not suffer from these
issues and delivers crisp high-resolution infrared images from a camera capable of
sampling an image every 20ms with a spatial resolution of 50μm. Thus a lucid
thermal profile and thermal map are achieved including all implementation details
of the chip, as actual hardware is measured.
4 Modeling Impact of Temperature at System Level
Modeling the impact of temperature on a computing system is a challenging task.
Estimation of the figures of merit of a computing system can only be performed
on the system level, while the effects of temperature are on the physical level.
Thus, many abstraction layers have to be crossed while maintaining accuracy and
computational feasibility (i.e., keep simulation times at bay). In this section we
discuss how we tackle this challenge, starting with the selection of figures of merit,
followed by the modeling of the direct impact of temperature and finally aging as
the indirect impact of temperature.
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4.1 Figures of Merit
The main figures of merit at the system level with respect to reliability are
probability of failure Pf ail and quality of service (e.g., PSNR in image processing).
Probability of failure encompasses many failure types like timing violations, data
corruption and catastrophic failure of a component (e.g., short-circuit). A full
overview of abstraction of failures towards probability of failure is given in the
RAP (Resilience Articulation Point) chapter of this book. Typically, vendors or end-
users require the system designer to meet specific Pf ail criteria (e.g., Pf ail < 0.01).
Quality of service describes how well a system provides its functionality if a specific
amount of errors can be tolerated (e.g., if human perception is involved or for
classification problems).
For probability of failure, the individual failure types have to be estimated and
quantified without over-estimation due to common failures (as in our work [3],
where a circuit with timing violations might also corrupt data). In that work the
failure types such as timing violations, data corruption due to voltage noise, and data
corruption due to strikes of high-energy particles are covered. These are the main
causes of failure in digital logic circuits as a result of temperature changes (e.g.,
excluding mechanical stress from drops). The probability of failure is spatially and
temporarily distributed (see Figs. 12 and 13) and therefore has to be estimated for a
given system lifetime (temporally) and for total system failure (combined impact of
spatially distributed Pf ail (e.g., sum of failures or probability that only 1 component
out of 3 fail (modular redundancy)).
Quality of service means observing the final output of the computing system and
analyzing it. In our work [5, 7] we use the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) of
an output image from an image processing circuit (discrete cosine transformation
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Fig. 12 Spatial distribution of Pf ail across an SRAM array under two different applications (from
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(a) Degradation-Aware Cell Library (b) Timing Analysis (c) Analyzing the Impact of Degradation on Images
Fig. 14 Flow of the characterization of standard cells and the subsequent use of degradation-aware
cell libraries to obtain timing violations (from [12])
4.2 Direct Impact of Temperature
To model the direct impact of temperature, we start at the lowest abstraction layers.
Compact transistor models (e.g., BSIM) describe the current flow through the
channel of a transistor and the impact of temperature on that current flow. These
models are then used in circuit simulators to characterize standard cells (build
from transistors) in terms of power consumption and propagation delay [5, 21].
Characterizing the standard cells (see Fig. 14) under different temperatures (e.g.,
from 25 to 125 ◦C) captures the impact of temperature on the delay and power
consumption of these cells. This information is then gathered in a cell library (a
single file containing all delay and power information for these cells) and then circuit
and architecture level tools (e.g., static timing analysis tools, gate level simulators)
can be used to check individual failure types (e.g., timing violations in static timing
analysis) for computing systems (e.g., microprocessors) under various temperatures.
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4.3 Aging as Indirect Impact of Temperature
Aging is stimulated by temperature (see Fig. 3) and therefore temperature has an
indirect impact on reliability via aging-induced degradations. Aging lowers the
resiliency of circuits and systems, thus decreasing reliability (an increase in Pf ail)
as shown in Fig. 15.
For this purpose our work [6, 18, 20] models aging, i.e., Bias Temperature Insta-
bility (BTI), Hot-Carrier Injection (HCI), Time-Dependent Dielectric Breakdown
(TDDB) and the effects directly linked to aging like Random Telegraph Noise
(RTN). All these phenomena are modeled with physics-based models [18, 20],
which can accurately describe their temperature dependencies in the actual physical
processes (typically capture and emission of carriers in the defects in the gate
dielectric of transistors [4, 19]) of these phenomena.
Our work [6, 18] considers the interdependencies between these phenomena
(see Fig. 16) and then estimates the degradation of the transistors. Then the
transistor modelcards (transistor parameter lists) are adapted to incorporate the
estimated degradations and use these degraded transistor parameters in standard cell
characterization.
During cell characterization it is important to not abstract, as ignoring the
interactions between transistors (counteracting each other when switching) results
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Fig. 15 Link between aging (increasing susceptibility) and Pf ail (from [6])
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Fig. 16 Interdependencies between the aging phenomena (from [6])
(load capacitance, signal slew) of the cells [5, 20] misrepresents actual cell delay
and power consumption.
After all necessary information is gathered, cells are characterized under different
temperatures (like in the previous subsection) but not only with altered transistor
currents (modeling the direct impact of temperature) but with additionally degraded
transistors parameters (modeling the indirect impact of temperature via aging).
Thus we combine both the direct and indirect impact into a single standard cell
characterization to obtain delay and power information of standard cells under the
joint impact of temperature and temperature-stimulated aging.
5 System-Level Management
To limit the peak temperature of a computing system and distribute the tempera-
ture evenly, we can employ system-level thermal management techniques. These
techniques limit or distribute the amount of generated heat and thus ensure that the
temperature stays below a given critical temperature. The two techniques presented
in this section are task migration [13] and voltage scaling [17].
5.1 Voltage Scaling
Voltage scaling reduces the supply voltage of a chip or component (e.g., a processor
core) to lower the power consumption and thus lower the generated heat. As a
first-order approximation, lowering the voltage results in a quadratic reduction of
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the consumed (dynamic) power. Therefore lowering the voltage even slightly has a
considerable impact on the generated heat and thus exhibited temperature.
Voltage scaling has various side-effects. As the driving strength of transistors is
also reduced, when the supply voltage is reduced, voltage scaling always prolongs
circuit delays. Hence, voltage scaling has a performance overhead, which has to be
minimized, while at the same time the critical temperature should not be exceeded.
Another side-effect is that voltage governs the electric field, which also stim-
ulates aging [17]. When voltage increases, aging-induced degradation increases
and when voltage reduces aging recovers (decreasing degradation). In our work in
[17] we showed that voltage changes within a micro-second might induce transient
timing violations. During such ultra-fast voltage changes, the low resiliency of the
circuit (at the lower supply voltage) meets the high degradation of aging (exhibiting
from operation at the high voltage). This combination of high degradation with low
resiliency leads to timing violations if not accounted for. Continuing operation at
the lower voltage recovers aging, thus resolving the issue. However, during the brief
moment of high degradation violations occurred.
5.2 Task Migration
Task migration is the process of moving applications from one processor core to
another. This allows a hot processing core to cool down, while a colder processor
core takes over the computation of the task. Therefore, temperature is more equally
distributed across a multi- or many-core computing system.
A flow of our task migration approach is shown in Fig. 17. Sensors in each
core measure the current temperature (typically thermal diodes). As soon as the
temperature approaches the critical value, then a task is migrated to a different core.
The entire challenge is in the question “To which core is the task migrated?” If the
core to which the task is migrated is only barely below the critical temperature, then
the task is migrated again, which is costly since each migration stalls the processor
core for many cycles (caches are filled, data has to be fetched, etc.).
Therefore our work in [13] predicts the thermal profile and makes decisions
based on these predictions to optimize the task migration with as little migrations as
possible while still ensuring that the critical temperature is not exceeded.
Another objective which has to be managed by our thermal management
technique is to minimize thermal cycling. Each time a processor core cools down
and heats up again it experiences a thermal cycle. Materials shrink and expand under
temperature and thus thermal cycles put stress on bonding wires as well as soldering
joints between the chip and the PCB or even interconnects within the chip (when it
is partially cooled/heated).
Therefore, our approach is a multi-objective optimization strategy, which mini-
mizes thermal cycles per core, limits temperature below the critical temperature and
minimizes the number of task migrations (reducing performance overheads).
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Fig. 17 Flow of our task migration approach to bound temperature in a many-core computing
system (from [13])
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6 Architecture Support
To support the system-level thermal management in the migration of tasks that
communicate with each other the underlying hardware architecture provides specific
assistance functions in the communication infrastructure. This encompasses a
virtualization layer in the network on chip (NoC) and the application of protection
switching mechanisms for a fast switch-over of communication channels. Based
on these features an additional redundancy mechanism—called adaptive modular
redundancy (AMR)—is introduced, which allows to run tasks temporarily with a
second or third replica to either detect or correct errors.
6.1 NoC Virtualization
To support the system management layer in the transparent migration of tasks
between processor cores within the MPSoC an interconnect virtualization overlay
is introduced, which decouples physical and logical endpoints of communication
channels. Any message passing communication among sub-tasks of an application
or with the I/O tile is then done via logical communication endpoints. That is,
a sending task transmits its data from the logical endpoint on the source side of
the channel via the NoC to the logical endpoint at the destination side where the
receiving task is executed. Therefore, the application only communicates on the
logical layer and does not have to care about the actual physical location of sender
and receiver tasks within the MPSoC. This property allows dynamic remapping of a
logical to a different physical endpoint within the NoC and thus eases the transparent
migration of tasks by the system management. This is shown in Fig. 18, where a





















Fig. 18 Communication virtualization layer (from [8])
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Fig. 19 VNIC and VNA architectures
switched over to a different receiving compute tile/processor core. Depending on
the migration target of T1 the incoming data will be sent to the tile executing the
new T1’ [8]. In Sect. 6.2 specific protocols are described to reduce downtime of
tasks during migration.
To implement this helper function, both a virtualized NoC adapter (VNA)
and a virtualized network interface controller (VNIC) are introduced that can be
reconfigured in terms of logical communication endpoints when a task migration
has to be performed [15].
VNA and VNIC target a compromise between high throughput and support for
mixed-criticality application scenarios with high priority and best effort communi-
cation channels [11]. Both are based on a set of communicating finite state machines
(FSMs) dedicated to specific sub-functions to cope with these requirements, as
can be seen in Fig. 19. The partitioning into different FSMs enables the parallel
processing of concurrent transactions in a pipelined manner.
6.2 Advanced Communication Reconfiguration Using
Protection Switching
The common, straight-forward method for task relocation is Stop and Resume:
Here, first the incoming channels of the task to be migrated are suspended, then
channel state together with the task state are transferred, before the channels and task
are resumed at the destination. The key disadvantage is a long downtime. Therefore,
an advanced communication reconfiguration using protection switching in NoCs to
198 V. M. van Santen et al.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 20 Variants for communication migration. (a) Dualcast. (b) Forwarding. (c) Example
migration scenario
support reliable task migration is proposed [16, 22, 23], which is inspired by protec-
tion switching mechanisms from wide area transport networks. Two alternatives to
migrate communication relations of a relocated task are dualcast and forwarding as
shown in Fig. 20 for a migration of task B to a different location executing B’. The
procedure is to first establish an additional channel to the compute tile where the
task is migrated to (location of B’). This can be either done from A being the source
of the channel (dualcast, Fig. 20a) or from B the original location of the migrated
task (forwarding, Fig. 20b). Then it has to be ensured that the buffers at the source
and destination tiles of the migration are consistent. Finally, a seamless switch-over
(task and channels) takes place from the original source to the destination. This shall
avoid time-costly buffer copy and channel suspend/resume operations with a focus
on low-latency and reliable adaptions in the communication layer.
The different variants have been evaluated for an example migration scenario
as depicted in Fig. 20c: In a processing chain consisting of 7 tasks in total, the
FORK task, which receives data from a generator task and sends data to three
parallel processing tasks, is migrated to tile number 0. Figure 21 shows the latencies
of the depicted execution chain during the migration, which starts at 2.5 · 106
cycles assuming FORK is stateless. The results have been measured using an RTL
implementation of the MPSoC [16]. In Fig. 21a the situation is captured for a
pure software-based implementation of the migration, whereas Fig. 21b shows the
situation when all functions related to handling the migration are offloaded from
the processor core. In this case task execution is not inhibited by any migration
overhead, which corresponds to the situation when the VNA performs the associated
functionality in hardware.
As can be seen from Fig. 21b, offloading migration protocols helps to reduce
application processing latency significantly for all three variants. The dualcast and
forwarding variants enable a nearly unnoticeable migration of the tasks. However,
the investigations in [16] show that when migrating tasks with state, the handling of
the task migration itself becomes the dominant factor in the migration delays and
outweighs the benefits of the advanced switching techniques.
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Fig. 21 Results for task migration scenarios (from [16]). (a) Relocation without offload. (b)
Relocation with offload
6.3 Adaptive Modular Redundancy (AMR)
Adaptive modular redundancy (AMR) enables the dynamic establishment of a
redundancy mechanism (dual or triple modular redundancy, DMR/TMR) at run-
time for tasks that have a degree of criticality that may vary over time or if
the operating conditions of the platform have deteriorated so that the probability
of errors is too high. DMR will be used if re-execution is affordable, otherwise
TMR can be applied, e.g., in case realtime requirements could not be met. AMR
functionality builds upon the aforementioned services of the NoC. To establish
DMR the dualcast mechanism is used and the newly established task acts as replica
instead taking over the processing as in the case of migration. (For TMR two replica
are established and triple-cast is applied.) Based on the running task replica, the
standard mechanisms for error checking/correction and task re-execution if required
are applied.
The decision to execute one or two additional replica of tasks is possibly taken
as a consequence of an already impaired system reliability. On the one hand
this helps to make these tasks more safe. On the other hand it increases system
workload and the associated thermal load, which in turn may further aggravate
the dependability issues. Therefore, this measure should be accompanied with
an appropriate reliability-aware task mapping including a graceful degradation
for low-critical tasks like investigated in [1]. There, the applied scheme is the
following: After one of the cores exceeds a first temperature threshold T1 a graceful
degradation phase is entered. This means that tasks of high criticality are preferably
assigned to cores in an exclusive manner and low-critical tasks are migrated to a
“graceful degradation region” of the system. Thus, potential errors occurring in this
region would involve low-critical tasks only. In a next step, if peak temperature
is higher than a second threshold T2, low-critical tasks are removed also from the
graceful degradation region (NCT ejection) and are only resumed if the thermal
profile allows for it.
In [1] a simulation-based investigation of this approach has been done using
the Sniper simulator, McPAT and Hotspot for a 16-core Intel Xeon X5550 running
SPLASH-2 and PARSEC benchmarks. Tasks have been either classified as uncritical
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 22 Thermal profile during different phases (from [1]). The maximum system temperatures
are 363 K, 378 K, and 349 K, respectively. (a) Initial scheduling. (b) Graceful degradation. (c)
NCT ejection
Fig. 23 Number of propagated errors per task criticality (from [1])
(NCT) or high-critical (HCT) with permanently redundant execution. As a third
class, potentially critical tasks (PCT) are considered. Such tasks are dynamically
replicated if the temperature of the cores they run on exceeds T1. In the experiment,
financial analysis and computer vision applications from the benchmark sets are
treated as high-critical tasks (HCT). The FFT kernel as used in a wide range of
applications with different criticality levels is assumed to be PCT.
In a first experiment the thermal profile has been evaluated for normal operation
and the two escalating phases. As can be seen from Fig. 22 the initial thermal
hotspots are relaxed at the expense of new ones in the graceful degradation region.
In turn, when moving to the NCT ejection phase the chips significantly cool down.
In a further investigation, 10,000 bit-flips have been injected randomly into cache
memories independent of the criticality of the tasks running on the cores. This
has been done both for a system using the mechanisms described above and as a
reference for a fully unprotected system.
Figure 23 shows the resulting number of propagated errors for the different task
categories. In the protected system, all errors injected into cores running HCTs are
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corrected, as expected. For PCTs only those errors manifest themselves in a failure
that were injected when the task was not protected due to a too low temperature of
the processor core. In general, not all injected errors actually lead to a failure due to
masking effects in the architecture or the application memory access pattern. This
can be seen for the unprotected system where the overall sum of manifested failures
is less than the number of injected errors.
7 Cross-Layer
From Physics to System Level (Fig. 24) In our work, we start from the physics,
where degradation effects like aging and temperature do occur. Then we analyze
and investigate how these degradations alter the key transistor parameters such as
threshold voltage (Vth), carrier mobility (μ), sub-threshold slope (SS), and drain
current (ID). Then, we study how such drift in the electrical characteristics of the
transistor impacts the resilience of circuits to errors. In practice, the susceptibility to
noise effects as well as to timing violations increases. Finally, we develop models
for error probability that describe the ultimate impact of these degradations at the
system level.
Interaction between the System Level and the Lower Abstraction Levels
(Fig. 24) Running workloads at the system level induce different stress patterns for
transistors and, more importantly, generate different heat over time. Temperature
is one of the key stimuli when it comes to reliability degradations. Increase in
temperature accelerates the underlying aging mechanisms in transistors as well as
it increases the susceptibility of circuits to noise and timing violations. Such an
increase in the susceptibility manifests itself as failures at the system level due to
timing violations and data corruption. Therefore, different running workloads result
in different probabilities of error that can be later observed at the system level.
Key Role of Management Layer The developed probability of error models helps
the management layer to make proper decision. The management layer migrates the
running tasks/workload from a core that starts to have a relatively higher probability
of error to another “less-aged” core. Also the management layer switches this core
from a high-performance mode (where high voltage and high frequency are selected
leading to higher core temperatures) to a low-power mode (where low voltage and
low frequency are selected leading to lower core temperatures) when it is observed
that a core started to have an increase in the probability of error above an acceptable
level.
Scenarios of Cross-Layer Management and existing Interdependencies In the
following we demonstrate some examples of existing interdependencies between
the management layer and the lower abstraction layers.
202 V. M. van Santen et al.
Fig. 24 Overview of how our techniques span various abstraction layers
Scenario-1: Physical and System Layer The temperature of a core increases
and therefore the error probability starts to gradually rise. If a given threshold is
exceeded and the core has performance margins, the first management decision
would be to decrease voltage and frequency and thus limit power dissipation and
in consequence counteract the temperature increase of the core.
Scenario-2: Physical, Architecture, and System Layer If there is no headroom
on the core, the system management layer can now decide to migrate tasks away
from that core, especially if they have high reliability requirements. Targets for
migration would especially be colder, less-aged cores with a low probability of
errors. With such task migrations, temperature within a system should be balanced,
i.e., relieved cores can cool down, while target cores would get warmer. Further, on
cores that can cool down again some of the deleterious effects start to heal, leading
to a reduction in the probability of errors. In general, by continuously balancing load
and as a result also temperature among cores the management layer will take care
that error probabilities of cores become similar thus avoiding the situation that one
core fails earlier than others. During task migrations the described support functions
in the communication infrastructure (circuit layer) can be applied.
Scenario-3: Physical, Architecture, and System Layer If there is no possibility
to move critical tasks to a cold core with low error probability, the management
layer can employ adaptive modular redundancy (AMR) and replicate such tasks.
This allows to counter the more critical operating conditions and increase reliability
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by either error detection and task re-execution or by directly correcting errors
when otherwise realtime requirements would not be met. However, in these cases
the replica tasks will increase the overall workload of the system and thus also
contribute thermal stress. In this case, dropping tasks of low criticality is a measure
on system level to counter this effect.
In general, the described scenarios always form control loops starting on
physical level covering temperature sensors and estimates of error probabilities and
aging. They go either up to the circuit level or to the architecture/system level,
where countermeasures have to be taken to prevent the system from operating
under unreliable working conditions. Therefore, the mechanisms on the different
abstraction levels as shown in the previous sections interact with each other and can
be composed to enhance reliability in a cross-layer manner.
Further use cases tackling probabilistic fault and error modeling as well as space-
and time-dependent error abstraction across different levels of the hardware/soft-
ware stack of embedded systems IC components are also subject of the chapter
“RAP (Resilience Articulation Point) Model.”
8 Conclusion
Reliability modeling and optimization is one of the key challenges in advanced tech-
nology. With technology scaling, the susceptibility of transistors to various kinds of
degradation effects induced by aging increases. As a matter of fact, temperature is
the main stimulus behind aging and therefore controlling and mitigating aging can
be done through a proper thermal management. Additionally, temperature itself has
also a direct impact on the reliability of any circuit manifesting itself as an increase
in the probability of error. In order to sustain reliability, the system level must
become aware of the degradation effects occurring at the physical level and how
they then propagate to higher abstraction levels all the way up to the system level.
Our cross-layer approach provides the system level with accurate estimations of the
probability of errors, which allows the management layer to make proper decisions
to optimize the reliability. We demonstrated the existing interdependencies between
the system level and lower abstraction levels and the necessity of taking them into
account via cross-layer thermal management techniques.
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Irina Alam, Lara Dolecek, and Puneet Gupta
The key observation behind the techniques described in this chapter is that most
if not all error correction techniques and codes assume that all words stored in
the memory are equally likely and important. This obviously is not true due to
architectural or application context. This chapter devises new coding and correction
mechanisms which leverage software or architecture “side information” to dramat-
ically reduce the cost of error correction (Fig. 1). The methodology proposed in
Sect. 1 is for recovering from detected-but-uncorrectable (DUE) errors in main
memories while Sects. 2 and 3 focus on lightweight correction in on-chip caches
or embedded memories.
1 Software-Defined Error Correcting Codes (SDECC)
This section focuses on the concept of Software-Defined Error Correcting Codes
(SDECC), a general class of techniques spanning hardware, software, and coding
theory that improves the overall resilience of systems by enabling heuristic best-
effort recovery from detected-but-uncorrectable errors (DUE). The key idea is to
add software support to the hardware error correcting code (ECC) so that most
memory DUEs can be heuristically recovered based on available side information
(SI) from the corresponding un-corrupted cache line contents. SDECC does not
degrade memory performance or energy in the common cases when either no
errors or purely hardware-correctable errors occur. Yet it can significantly improve
resilience in the critical case when DUEs actually do occur.
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Fig. 1 Main abstraction
layers of embedded systems
and this chapter’s major





























Details of the concepts discussed in this section can be found in the works by
Gottscho et al. [11, 12].
1.1 SDECC Theory
Important terms and notation introduced here are summarized in Table 1.
A (t)SC(t + 1)SD code corrects up to t symbol errors and/or detects up to (t+1)
symbol errors. SDECC is based on the fundamental observation that when a (t+1)-
symbol DUE occurs in a (t)SC(t+1)SD code, there remains significant information
in the received string x. This information can be used to recover the original message
m with reasonable certainty.
It is not the case that the original message was completely lost, i.e., one need not







(q − 1)(t+1) (1)
ways that the (t + 1) DUE could have corrupted the original codeword, which is
less than qk . Though a (t)SC(t + 1)SD code can often detect more than (t + 1)
errors, a (t+1)error is usually much more likely than higher bit errors. But guessing
correctly out of N possibilities is still difficult. In practice, there are just a handful
of possibilities: they are referred to as (t + 1)DUE corrupted candidate codewords
(or candidate messages).
Consider Fig. 2, which depicts the relationships between codewords, correctable
errors (CEs), DUEs, and candidate codewords for individual DUEs for a Single-bit
Error Correcting, Double-bit Error Detecting (SECDED) code. If the hardware ECC
decoder registers a DUE, there can be several equidistant candidate codewords at the
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Table 1 Important SDECC-specific notation
Term Description
n Codeword length in symbols
k Message length in symbols
r Parity length in symbols
b Bits per symbol
q Symbol alphabet size
t Max. guaranteed correctable symbols in codeword
(t)SC(t + 1)SD (t)-symbol-correcting, (t + 1)-symbol-detecting
N Number of ways to have a DUE
μ Mean no. of candidate codewords ∀ possible DUEs
PG Prob. of choosing correct codeword for a given DUE
PG Avg. prob. of choosing correct codeword ∀ possible DUEs
dmin Minimum symbol distance of code
linesz Total cache line size in symbols (message content)




ChipKill-correct ECC construction and mem. organization that either corrects up to 1 DRAM
chip failure or detects 2 chip failures
Fig. 2 Illustration of
candidate codewords for 2-bit
DUEs in the imaginary
2D-represented Hamming
space of a binary SECDED
code
(t = 1, q = 2, dmin = 4). The
actual Hamming space has n
dimensions
q-ary Hamming distance of exactly (t + 1) from the received string x. Without any
side information (SI) about message probabilities, under conventional principles,
each candidate codeword is assumed to be equally likely. However, in the specific
case of DUEs, not all messages are equally likely to occur: this allows to leverage
SI about memory contents to help choose the right candidate codeword in the event
of a given DUE.
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1.1.1 Computing the List of Candidates
The number of candidate codewords for any given (t + 1) DUE e has a linear
upper bound that makes DUE recovery tractable to implement in practice [12].
The candidate codewords for any (t + 1)-symbol DUE received string x is simply
the set of equidistant codewords that are exactly (t + 1) symbols away from x.
This list depends on the error e and original codeword c, but only the received
string x is known. Fortunately, there is a simple and intuitive algorithm to find
the list of candidate codewords with runtime complexity O(nq/t). The detailed
algorithm can be found in [12]. The essential idea is to try every possible single
symbol perturbation p on the received string. Each perturbed string y = x + p
is run through a simple software implementation of the ECC decoder, which only
requires knowledge of the parity-check matrix H (O(rnlogq) bits of storage). Any
y characterized as a CE produces a candidate codeword from the decoder output and
added to the list (if not already present in the list).
1.1.2 SDECC Analysis of Existing ECCs
Code constructions exhibit structural properties that affect the number of candi-
date codewords. In fact, distinct code constructions with the same [n, k, dmin]q
parameters can have different values of μ and distributions of the number of




The SDECC theory is applied to seven code constructions of interest: SECDED,
DECTED, and SSCDSD (ChipKill-Correct) constructions with typical message
lengths of 64, and 128 bits. Table 2 lists properties that have been derived for each of
them. Most importantly, the final column lists PG—the average (random baseline)
probability of choosing correct codeword without SI for all possible DUEs. These
probabilities are far higher than the naïve approaches of guessing randomly from qk
possible messages or from the N possible ways to have a DUE. Thus, SDECC can
handle DUEs in a more optimistic way than conventional ECC approaches.
Table 2 Summary of code properties—PG is most important for SDECC
Code params. Class of DUE Avg. # Cand. Prob. Rcov.
Class of code [n, k, dmin]q Type of code (t + 1) μ PG
32-bit SECDED [39, 32, 4]2 Hsiao [16] 2-bit 12.04 8.50%
32-bit SECDED [39, 32, 4]2 Davydov [7] 2-bit 9.67 11.70%
64-bit SECDED [72, 64, 4]2 Hsiao [16] 2-bit 20.73 4.97%
64-bit SECDED [72, 64, 4]2 Davydov [7] 2-bit 16.62 6.85%
32-bit DECTED [45, 32, 6]2 – 3-bit 4.12 28.20%
64-bit DECTED [79, 64, 6]2 – 3-bit 5.40 20.53%
128-bit SSCDSD [36, 32, 4]16 Kaneda [17] 2-sym. 3.38 39.88%
Lightweight Software-Defined Error Correction for Memories 211
1.2 SDECC Architecture
SDECC consists of both hardware and software components to enable recovery
from DUEs in main memory DRAM. A simple hardware/software architecture
whose block diagram is depicted in Fig. 3 can be used. Although the software flow
includes an instruction recovery policy, it is not presented in this chapter because
DUEs on instruction fetches are likely to affect clean pages that can be remedied
using a page fault (as shown in the figure).
The key addition to hardware is the Penalty Box: a small buffer in the memory
controller that can store each codeword from a cache line (shown on the left-hand
side of Fig. 3). When a memory DUE occurs, hardware stores information about the
error in the Penalty Box and raises an error-reporting interrupt to system software.
System software then reads the Penalty Box, derives additional context about the
error—and using basic coding theory and knowledge of the ECC implementation—
quickly computes a list of all possible candidate messages, one of which is
guaranteed to match the original information that was corrupted by the DUE. A
software-defined data recovery policy heuristically recovers the DUE in a best-
effort manner by choosing the most likely remaining candidate based on available
side information (SI) from the corresponding un-corrupted cache line contents;
if confidence is low, the policy instead forces a panic to minimize the risk of
accidentally induced mis-corrected errors (MCEs) that result in intolerable non-
silent data corruption (NSDC). Finally, system software writes back the recovery
target message to the Penalty Box, which allows hardware to complete the afflicted
memory read operation.
Fig. 3 Block diagram of a general hardware and software implementation of SDECC. The figure
depicts a typical DDRx-based main memory subsystem with 64-byte cache lines, x8 DRAM chips,
and a [72, 64, 4]2 SECDED ECC code. Hardware support necessary to enable SDECC is shaded
in gray. The instruction recovery policy is outside the scope of this work [12]
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Overheads The area and power overhead of the essential SDECC hardware
support is negligible. The area required per Penalty Box is approximately 736μm2
when synthesized with 15 nm Nangate technology—this is approximately one
millionth of the total die area for a 14 nm Intel Broadwell-EP server processor [9].
The SDECC design incurs no latency or bandwidth overheads for the vast majority
of memory accesses where no DUEs occur. This is because the Penalty Box and
error-reporting interrupt are not on the critical path of memory accesses. When a
DUE occurs, the latency of the handler and recovery policy is negligible compared
to the expected mean time between DUEs or typical checkpoint interval of several
hours.
1.3 Data Recovery Policy
In this section, recovery of DUEs in data (i.e., memory reads due to processor
loads) is discussed because they are more vulnerable than DUEs in instructions
as mentioned before. Possible recovery policies for instruction memory have been
discussed in [11]. There are potentially many sources of SI for recovering DUEs
in data. Based on the notion of data similarity, a simple but effective data recovery
policy called Entropy-Z is discussed here that chooses the candidate that minimizes
overall cache line Shannon entropy.
1.3.1 Observations on Data Similarity
Entropy is one of the most powerful metrics to measure data similarity. Two general
observations can be made about the prevalence of low data entropy in memory.
• Observation 1. There are only a few primitive data types supported by hardware
(e.g., integers, floating-point, and addresses), which typically come in multiple
widths (e.g., byte, halfword, word, or quadword) and are often laid out in regular
fashion (e.g., arrays and structs).
• Observation 2. In addition to spatial and temporal locality in their memory
access patterns, applications have inherent value locality in their data, regardless
of their hardware representation. For example, an image-processing program is
likely to work on regions of pixels that exhibit similar color and brightness, while
a natural language processing application will see certain characters and words
more often than others.
Similar observations have been made to compress memory [2, 18, 24, 26, 28, 35]
and to predict [20] or approximate processor load values [22, 23, 36]. Low
byte-granularity intra-cache line entropy is observed throughout the integer and
floating-point benchmarks in the SPEC CPU2006 suite. Let P(X) be the normalized
relative frequency distribution of a linesz×b-bit cache line that has been carved
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into equal-sized Z-bit symbols, where each symbol χi can take 2Z possible values.1





The average intra-cacheline byte-level entropy of the SPEC CPU2006 suite was
found to be 2.98 bits (roughly half of maximum).
These observations can be leveraged using the data recovery policy Entropy-Z
Policy. With this policy, SDECC first computes the list of candidate messages using
the algorithm described in Sect. 1.1.1 and extracts the cache line side information.
Each candidate message is then inserted into appropriate position in the affected
cache line and the entropy is computed using Eq. 2. The policy then chooses the
candidate message that minimizes overall cache line entropy. The chance that the
policy chooses the wrong candidate message is significantly reduced by deliberately
forcing a panic whenever there is a tie for minimum entropy or if the mean cache
line entropy is above a specified threshold PanicThreshold. The downside to
this approach is that some forced panics will be false positives, i.e., they would have
otherwise recovered correctly.
In the rest of the chapter, unless otherwise specified, Z = 8 bits, linesz×b =
512 bits and PanicThreshold = 4.5 bits (75% of maximum entropy) are used,
which were determine to work well across a range of applications. Additionally, the
Entropy-8 policy performs very well compared to several alternatives.
1.4 Reliability Evaluation
The impact of SDECC is evaluated on system-level reliability through a compre-
hensive error injection study on memory access traces. The objective is to estimate
the fraction of DUEs in memory that can be recovered correctly using the SDECC
architecture and policies while ensuring a minimal risk of MCEs.
1.4.1 Methodology
The SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks are compiled against GNU/Linux for the open-
source 64-bit RISC-V (RV64G) instruction set v2.0 [34] using the official tools
[25]. Each benchmark is executed on top of the RISC-V proxy kernel [32] using the
Spike simulator [33] that was modified to produce representative memory access
1Entropy symbols are not to be confused with the codeword symbols, which can also be a different
size.
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traces. Each trace consists of randomly sampled 64-byte demand read cache lines,
with an average interval between samples of one million accesses.
Each trace is analyzed offline using a MATLAB model of SDECC. For each
benchmark and ECC code, 1000 q-ary messages from the trace were chosen
randomly and encoded, and were injected with min(1000, N) randomly sampled
(t + 1)-symbol DUEs. N here is the number of ways to have a DUE. For each
codeword/error pattern combination, the list of candidate codewords was computed
and the data recovery policy was applied. A successful recovery occurs when the
policy selects a candidate message that matches the original; otherwise, the policy
either causes a forced panic or recovery fails by accidentally inducing an MCE.
Variability in the reported results is negligible over many millions of individual
experiments.
Note that the absolute error magnitudes for DUEs and SDECC’s impact on
overall reliability should not be compared directly between codes with distinct
[n, k, dmin]q (e.g., a double-bit error for SECDED is very different from a double-
chip DUE for ChipKill). Rather, what matters most is the relative fraction of DUEs
that can be saved using SDECC for a given ECC code.
Entropy-8 is exclusively used as the data recovery policy in all the evaluations.
This is because when the raw successful recovery rates of six different policies
for three ECCs without including any forced panics were compared, Entropy-8
performed the best [12]. Few examples of alternate policies include Entropy-Z
policy variants with Z = 4 and Z = 16 and Hamming which chooses the candidate
that minimizes the average binary Hamming distance to the neighboring words in
the cacheline. The 8-bit entropy symbol size performs best because its alphabet
size (28 = 256 values) matches well with the number of entropy symbols per
cacheline (64) and with the byte-addressable memory organization. For instance,
both Entropy-4 and Entropy-16 do worse than Entropy-8 because the entropy
symbol size results in too many aliases at the cacheline level and because the larger
symbol size is less efficient, respectively.
1.4.2 Recovery Breakdown
SDECC is evaluated next for each ECC using its conventional form, to understand
the impact of the recovery policy’s (Entropy-8) forced panics on the successful
recovery rate and the MCE rate. The overall results with forced panics taken (main
results, gray cell shading) and not taken are shown in Table 3.
There are two baseline DUE recovery policies: conventional (always panic for
every DUE) and random (choose a candidate randomly, i.e., PG). It is observed
that when panics are taken the MCE rate drops significantly by a factor of up
to 7.3× without significantly reducing the success rate. This indicates that the
PanicThreshold mechanism appropriately judges when SDECC is unlikely to
correctly recover the original information.
These results also show the impact of code construction on successes, panics, and
MCEs. When there are fewer average candidates μ then the chances of successfully
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Table 3 Percent Breakdown of SDECC Entropy-8 Policy (M = MCE, P = forced panic, S =
success) [12]
Panics taken Panics not taken Random baseline
M P S M P S M P S
Conv. baseline – 100 –
[39, 32, 4]2 Hsiao 5.3 25.6 69.1 27.3 – 72.7 91.5 – 8.5
[39, 32, 4]2 Davydov 4.5 25.2 70.3 24.0 – 76.0 88.3 – 11.7
[72, 64, 4]2 Hsiao 4.7 23.7 71.6 24.7 – 75.3 95.0 – 5.0
[72, 64, 4]2 Davydov 4.1 21.9 74.0 22.3 – 77.7 93.2 – 6.9
[45, 32, 6]2 DECTED 2.2 20.3 77.5 14.5 – 85.5 71.8 – 28.2
[79, 64, 6]2 DECTED 1.5 14.5 84.0 11.0 – 89.0 79.5 – 20.5
[36, 32, 4]16 SSCDSD 1.5 12.8 85.7 8.5 – 91.5 60.1 – 39.9
recovering are much higher than that of inducing MCEs. The [72, 64, 4]2 SECDED
constructions perform similarly to their [39, 32, 4]2 variants even though the former
have lower baseline PG. This is a consequence of the Entropy-8 policy: larger n
combined with lower μ provides the greatest opportunity to differentiate candidates
with respect to overall intra-cacheline entropy. For the same n, however, the effect of
SECDED construction is more apparent. The Davydov codes recover about 3–4%
more frequently than their Hsiao counterparts when panics are not taken (similar to
the baseline improvement in PG). When panics are taken, however, the differences
in construction are less apparent because the policy PanicThreshold does not
take into account Davydov’s typically lower number of candidates.
The breakdown between successes, panics, and MCEs is examined in more
detail. Figure 4 depicts the DUE recovery breakdowns for each ECC construction
and SPEC CPU2006 benchmark when forced panics are taken. Figure 4a shows the
fraction of DUEs that result in success (black), panics (gray), and MCEs (white).
Figure 4b further breaks down the forced panics (gray from Fig. 4a) into a fraction
that are false positive (light purple, and would have otherwise been correct) and
others that are true positive (dark blue, and managed to avoid an MCE). Each cluster
of seven stacked bars corresponds to the seven ECC constructions.
It can be seen that much lower MCE rates are achieved than the random baseline
yet also panic much less often than the conventional baseline for all benchmarks, as
shown in Fig. 4a. This policy performs best on integer benchmarks due to their lower
average intra-cacheline entropy. For certain floating-point benchmarks, however,
there are many forced panics because they frequently have high data entropy above
PanicThreshold. A PanicThreshold of 4.5 bits for these cases errs on the
side of caution as indicated by the false positive panic rate, which can be up to 50%.
Without more side information, for high-entropy benchmarks, it would be difficult
for any alternative policy to frequently recover the original information with a low
MCE rate and few false positive panics.
With almost no hardware overheads, SDECC used with SSCDSD ChipKill can
recover correctly from up to 85.7% of double-chip DUEs while eliminating 87.2%
of would-be panics; this could improve system availability considerably. However,
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Fig. 4 Detailed breakdown of DUE recovery results when forced panics are taken. Results are
shown for all seven ECC constructions, listed left to right within each cluster: [39, 32, 4]2 Hsiao
SECDED—[39, 32, 4]2 Davydov SECDED—[72, 64, 4]2 Hsiao SECDED—[72, 64, 4]2 Davy-
dov SECDED—[45, 32, 6]2 DECTED—[79, 64, 6]2 DECTED—[36, 32, 4]16 SSCDSD ChipKill-
Correct. (a) Recovery breakdown for the Entropy-8 policy, where each DUE can result in an
unsuccessful recovery causing anMCE (white), forced panic (gray), or successful recovery (black).
(b) Breakdown of forced panics (gray bars in (a)). A true positive panic (dark blue) successfully
mitigated a MCE, while a false positive panic (light purple) was too conservative and thwarted an
otherwise-successful recovery [12]
SDECC with ChipKill introduces a 1% risk of converting a DUE to an MCE.
Without further action taken to mitigate MCEs, this small risk may be unacceptable
when application correctness is of paramount importance.
2 Software-Defined Error-Localizing Codes (SDELC):
Lightweight Recovery from Soft Faults at Runtime
For embedded memories, it is always challenging to address reliability concerns
as additional area, power, and latency overheads of reliability techniques need
to be minimized as much as possible. Software-Defined Error-Localizing Codes
(SDELC) is a hybrid hardware/software technique that deals with single-bit soft
faults at runtime using novel Ultra-Lightweight Error-Localizing Codes (UL-ELC)
with a software-defined error handler that knows about the UL-ELC construction
and implements a heuristic recovery policy. UL-ELC codes are stronger than basic
single-error detecting (SED) parity, yet they have lower storage overheads than
a single-error-correcting (SEC) Hamming code. Like SED, UL-ELC codes can
detect single-bit errors, yet they can additionally localize them to a chunk of the
erroneous codeword. UL-ELC codes can be explicitly designed such that chunks
align with meaningful message context, such as the fields of an encoded instruction.
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SDELC then relies on side information (SI) about application memory contents to
heuristically recover from the single-bit fault. Unlike the general-purpose Software-
Defined ECC (SDECC), SDELC focuses on heuristic error recovery that is suitable
for microcontroller-class IoT devices.
Details of the concepts discussed in this section can be found in the work by
Gottscho et al. [13].
2.1 Ultra-Lightweight Error-Localizing Codes (UL-ELC)
In today’s systems, either basic SED parity is used to detect random single-bit errors
or a Hamming SEC code is used to correct them. Unfortunately, Hamming codes are
expensive for small embedded memories: they require six bits of parity per memory
word size of 32 bits (an 18.75% storage overhead). On the other hand, basic parity
only adds one bit per word (3.125% storage overhead), but without assistance by
other techniques it cannot correct any errors.
Localizing an error is more useful than simply detecting it. If the error is localized
to a chunk of length  bits, there are only  candidate codewords for which a single-
bit error could have produced the received (corrupted) codeword. A naïve way of
localizing a single-bit error to a particular chunk is to use a trivial segmented parity
code, i.e., assign a dedicated parity bit to each chunk. However, this method is very
inefficient because to create C chunks C parity bits are needed: essentially, split up
the memory words into smaller pieces.
Instead Ultra-Lightweight ELCs (UL-ELCs) is simple and customizable—given
r redundant parity bits—it can localize any single-bit error to one of C = 2r − 1
possible chunks. This is because there are 2r − 1 distinct non-zero columns that can
be used to form the parity-check matrix H for the UL-ELC (for single-bit errors,
the error syndrome is simply one of the columns of H). To create a UL-ELC code,
a distinct non-zero binary column vector of length r bits is assigned to each chunk.
Then each column of H is simply filled in with the corresponding chunk vector. Note
that r of the chunks will also contain the associated parity bit within the chunk itself
and are called shared chunks, and they are precisely the chunks whose columns in
H have a Hamming weight of 1. Since there are r shared chunks, there must be
2r − r−1 unshared chunks, which each consist of only data bits. Shared chunks are
unavoidable because the parity bits must also be protected against faults, just like
the message bits.
An UL-ELC code has a minimum distance of two bits by construction to support
detection and localization of single-bit errors. Thus, the set of candidate codewords
must also be separated from each other by a Hamming distance of exactly two bits.
(A minimum codeword distance of two bits is required for SED, while three bits are
needed for SEC, etc.)
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For an example of an UL-ELC construction, consider the following Hexample
parity-check matrix with nine message bits and r = 3 parity bits:
Hexample =
S1 S2 S3 S4 S4 S5 S6 S6 S7 S5 S6 S7
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 p1 p2 p3[ ]
c1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
c2 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
c3 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
,
where di represents the ith data bit, pj is the j th redundant parity bit, ck is the kth
parity-check equation, and Sl enumerates the distinct error-localizing chunk that a
given bit belongs to. Because r = 3, there are N = 7 chunks. Bits d1, d2, and d3
each have the SEC property because no other bits are in their respective chunks.
Bits d4 and d5 make up an unshared chunk S4 because no parity bits are included
in S4. The remaining data bits belong to shared chunks because each of them also
includes at least one parity bit. Notice that any data or parity bits that belong to the
same chunk Sl have identical columns of H, e.g., d7, d8, and p2 all belong to S6 and
have the column [0; 1; 0].
The two key properties of UL-ELC (that do not apply to generalized ELC codes)
are: (1) the length of the data message is independent of r and (2) each chunk can
be an arbitrary length. The freedom to choose the length of the code and chunk sizes
allows the UL-ELC design to be highly adaptable. Additionally, UL-ELC codes can
offer SEC protection on up to 2r−r−1 selected message bits by having the unshared
chunks each correspond to a single data bit.
2.2 Recovering SEUs in Instruction Memory
This section focuses on an UL-ELC construction and recovery policy for dealing
with single-bit soft faults in instruction memory. The code and policy are jointly
crafted to exploit SI about the ISA itself. This SDELC implementation example
targets the open-source and free 64-bit RISC-V (RV64G) ISA [34], but the approach
is general and could apply to any other fixed-length or variable-length RISC or CISC
ISA. Note that although RISC-V is actually a little-endian architecture, for sake of
clarity big-endian is used in this example.
The UL-ELC construction for instruction memory has seven chunks that align
to the finest-grain boundaries of the different fields in the RISC-V codecs. These
codecs, the chunk assignments, and the complete parity-check matrix H are shown
in Table 4. The opcode, rd, funct3, and rs1 fields are the most commonly
used—and potentially the most critical—among the possible instruction encodings,
so each of them is assigned a dedicated chunk that is unshared with the parity bits.
The fields which vary more among encodings are assigned to the remaining three
shared chunks, as shown in the figure. The recovery policy can thus distinguish
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the impact of an error in different parts of the instruction. For example, when a fault
affects shared chunk C1, the fault is either in one of the five MSBs of the instruction,
or in the last parity bit. Conversely, when a fault is localized to unshared chunk C7
in Table 4, the UL-ELC decoder can be certain that the opcode field has been
corrupted.
The instruction recovery policy consists of three steps.
• Step 1. A software-implemented instruction decoder is applied to filter out any
candidate messages that are illegal instructions. Most bit patterns decode to
illegal instructions in three RISC ISAs that were characterized: 92.33% for RISC-
V, 72.44% for MIPS, and 66.87% for Alpha. This can be used to dramatically
improve the chances of a successful SDELC recovery.
• Step 2. Next, the probability of each valid message is estimated using a small pre-
computed lookup table that contains the relative frequency that each instruction
appears. The relative frequencies of legal instructions in most applications follow
power-law distribution [13]. This is used to favor more common instructions.
• Step 3. The instruction that is most common according to the SI lookup table
is chosen. In the event of a tie, the instruction with the longest leading-pad of
0s or 1s is chosen. This is because in many instructions, the MSBs represent
immediate values (as shown in Table 4). These MSBs are usually low-magnitude
signed integers or they represent 0-dominant function codes.
If the SI is strong, then there is normally a higher chance of correcting the error by
choosing the right candidate.
2.3 Recovering SEUs in Data Memory
In general-purpose embedded applications, data may come in many different types
and structures. Because there is no single common data type and layout in memory,
evenly spaced UL-ELC constructions can be used and the software trap handler can
be granted additional control about how to recover from errors, similar to the general
idea from SuperGlue [31].
The SDELC recovery support can be built into the embedded application as a
small C library. The application can push and pop custom SDELC error handler
functions onto a registration stack. The handlers are defined within the scope of
a subroutine and optionally any of its callees and can define specific recovery
behaviors depending on the context at the time of error. Applications can also enable
and disable recovery at will.
When the application does not disable recovery nor specify a custom behavior,
all data memory errors are recovered using a default error handler implemented
by the library. The default handler computes the average Hamming distance to
nearby data in the same 64-byte chunk of memory (similar to taking the intra-cache
line distance in cache-based systems). The candidate with the minimum average
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Hamming distance is selected. This policy is based on the observation that spatially
local and/or temporally local data tends to also be correlated, i.e., it exhibits value
locality [20].
The application-defined error handler can specify recovery rules for individual
variables within the scope of the registered subroutine. They include globals,
heap, and stack-allocated data. This is implemented by taking the runtime address
of each variable requiring special handling. For instance, an application may
wish critical data structures to never be recovered heuristically; for these, the
application can choose to force a crash whenever a soft error impacts their memory
addresses. The SDELC library support can increase system reliability, but the
programmer is required to spend effort annotating source code for error recovery.
This is similar to annotation-based approaches taken by others for various purposes
[4, 5, 10, 21, 29, 37].
2.4 SDELC Architecture
The SDELC architecture is illustrated in Fig. 5 for a system with split on-chip
instruction and data scratchpad memories (SPMs) (each with its own UL-ELC code)
and a single-issue core that has an in-order pipeline.
Fig. 5 Architectural support for SDELC on an microcontroller-class embedded system
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When a codeword containing a single-bit soft fault is read, the UL-ELC decoder
detects and localizes the error to a specific chunk of the codeword and places error
information in a Penalty Box register (shaded in gray in the figure). A precise
exception is then generated, and software traps to a handler that implements the
appropriate SDELC recovery policy for instructions or data.
Once the trap handler has decided on a candidate codeword for recovery, it must
correctly commit the state in the system such that it appears as if there was no
memory control flow disruption. For instruction errors, because the error occurred
during a fetch, the program counter (pc) has not yet advanced. To complete the
trap handler, the candidate codeword is written back to instruction memory. If it is
not accessible by the load/store unit, one could use hardware debug support such as
JTAG. The previously trapped instruction is re-executed after returning from the trap
handler, which will then cause the pc to advance and re-fetch the instruction that had
been corrupted by the soft error. On the other hand, data errors are triggered from
the memory pipeline stage by executing a load instruction. The chosen candidate
codeword is written back to data memory to scrub the error, the register file is
updated appropriately, and pc is manually advanced before returning from the trap
handler.
2.5 Soft Fault Recovery Using SDELC
To evaluate SDELC, Spike was modified to produce representative memory access
traces of 11 benchmarks as they run to completion. Five benchmarks are blowfish
and sha from the MiBench suite [14] as well as dhrystone, matmulti,
and whetstone. The remaining six benchmarks were added from the AxBench
approximate computing C/C++ suite [37]: blackscholes, fft, inversek2j,
jmeint, jpeg, and sobel. Each trace was analyzed offline using a MATLAB
model of SDELC. For each workload, 1000 instruction fetches and 1000 data reads
were randomly selected from the trace and exhaustively all possible single-bit faults
were applied to each of them.
SDELC recovery of the random soft faults was evaluated using three different
UL-ELC codes (r = 1, 2, 3). Recall that the r = 1 code is simply a single parity
bit, resulting in 33 candidate codewords. (For basic parity, there are 32 message bits
and one parity bit, so there are 33 ways to have had a single-bit error.) For the data
memory, the UL-ELC codes were designed with the chunks being equally sized:
for r = 2, there are either 11 or 12 candidates depending on the fault position (34
bits divided into three chunks), while for r = 3 there are always five candidates
(35 bits divided into seven chunks). For the instruction memory, chunks are aligned
to important field divisions in the RV64G ISA. Chunks for the r = 2 UL-ELC
construction match the fields of the Type-U instruction codecs (the opcode being
the unshared chunk). Chunks for the r = 3 UL-ELC code align with fields in the
Type-R4 codec (as presented in Table 4). A successful recovery for SDELC occurs
when the policy corrects the error; otherwise, it fails by accidentally mis-correcting.
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Fig. 6 Average rate of recovery using SDELC from single-bit soft faults in instruction and data
memory. r is the number of parity bits in the UL-ELC construction
2.5.1 Overall Results
The overall SDELC results are presented in Fig. 6. The recovery rates are relatively
consistent over each benchmark, especially for instruction memory faults, providing
evidence of the general efficacy of SDELC. One important distinction between the
memory types is the sensitivity to the number r of redundant parity bits per message.
For the data memory, the simple r = 1 parity yielded surprisingly high rates of
recovery using our policy (an average of 68.2%). Setting r to three parity bits
increases the average recovery rate to 79.2% thanks to fewer and more localized
candidates to choose from. On the other hand, for the instruction memory, the
average rate of recovery increased from 31.3% with a single parity bit to 69.0%
with three bits.
These results are a significant improvement over a guaranteed system crash as
is traditionally done upon error detection using single-bit parity. Moreover, these
results are achieved using no more than half the overhead of a Hamming SEC code,
which can be a significant cost savings for small IoT devices. Based on these results,
using r = 1 parity for data seems reasonable, while r = 3 UL-ELC constructions
can be used to achieve 70% recovery for both memories with minimal overhead.
3 Parity++ : Lightweight Error Correction for Last Level
Caches and Embedded Memories
This section focuses on another novel lightweight error correcting code—Parity++:
a novel lightweight unequal message protection scheme for last level caches or
embedded memories that preferentially provides stronger error protection to certain
“special messages.” As the name suggests, this coding scheme requires one extra bit
above a simple parity Single-bit Error Detection (SED) code while providing SED
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for all messages and Single-bit Error Correction (SEC) for a subset of messages.
Thus, it is stronger than just basic SED parity and has much lower parity storage
overhead (3.5× and 4× lower for 32-bit and 64-bit memories, respectively) than
a traditional Single-bit Error Correcting, Double-bit Error Detecting (SECDED)
code. Error detection circuitry often lies on the critical path and is generally more
critical than error correction circuitry as error occurrences are rare even with an
increasing soft error rate. This coding scheme has a much simpler error detection
circuitry that incurs lower energy and latency costs than the traditional SECDED
code. Thus, Parity++ is a lightweight ECC code that is ideal for large capacity last
level caches or lightweight embedded memories. Parity++ is also evaluated with
a memory speculation procedure [8] that can be generally applied to any ECC
protected cache to hide the decoding latency while reading messages when there
are no errors.
Details of the concepts discussed in this section can be found in the work by
Alam et al. [1] and Schoeny et al. [30].
3.1 Application Characteristics
As mentioned in Sects. 1.3 and 2.2, data in applications is generally very structured
and instructions mostly follow power-law distribution. This means most instructions
in the memory would have the same opcode. Similarly, the data in the memory is
usually low-magnitude signed data of a certain data type. However, these values get
represented inefficiently, for e.g., 4-byte integer type used to represent values that
usually need only 1-byte. Thus, in most cases, the MSBs would be a leading-pad of
0s or 1s. The approach of utilizing these characteristics in applications complements
recent research on data compression in cache and main memory systems such as
frequent value/pattern compression [3, 35], base-delta-immediate compression [27],
and bit-plane compression [19]. However, the main goal here is to provide stronger
error protection to these special messages that are chosen based on the knowledge
of data patterns in context.
3.2 Parity++ Theory
Parity++ is a type of unequal message protection code, in that specific messages are
designated a priori to have extra protection against errors as shown in Fig. 7. As in
[30], there are two classes of messages, normal and special, and they are mapped
to normal and special codewords, respectively. When dealing with the importance
or frequency of the underlying data, it is referred to as messages; when discussing
error detection/correction capabilities it is referred to as codewords.
Codewords in Parity++ have the following error protection guarantees: normal
codewords have single-error detection; special codewords have single-error cor-
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Fig. 7 Conceptual
illustration of Parity++ for
1-bit error (CE = Correctable
Error, DUE = Detected but
Uncorrectable Error)
rection. Let us partition the codewords in the code C into two sets, N and S,
representing the normal and special codewords, respectively. The minimum distance




dH (u, v) ≥ 2, (3)
min
u∈N,v∈S
dH (u, v) ≥ 3, (4)
min
u,v∈S,u =v
dH (u, v) ≥ 3. (5)
A second defining characteristic of the Parity++ code is that the length of a
codeword is only two bits longer than a message, i.e., n = k + 2. Thus, Parity++
requires only two bits of redundancy.
For the context of this work, let us assume that Parity++ always has message
length k as a power of 2. The overall approach to constructing the code is to create
a Hamming subcode of a SED code [15]; when an error is detected, it is decoded
to the neighboring special codeword. The overall code has dmin = 2, but a block in
G, corresponding to the special messages, has dmin ≥ 3. For the sake of notational
convenience, let us go through the steps of constructing the (34, 32) Parity++ code
(as opposed to the generic (k + 2, k) Parity++ code).
The first step is to create the generating matrix for the Hamming code whose
message length is at least as large as the message length in the desired Parity++
code; in this case, the (63, 57) Hamming code is used. Let α be a primitive element
of GF(26) such that 1+x+x6 = 0, then the generator polynomial is simply gS(x) =
1 + x + x6 (and the generator matrix is constructed using the usual polynomial
coding methods). The next step is to shorten this code to (32, 26) by expurgating
and puncturing (i.e., deleting) the right and bottom 31 columns and rows. Then add
a column of 1s to the end, resulting in a generator matrix, which is denoted as GS ,
for a (33, 26) code with dmin = 4.
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For the next step in the construction of the generating matrix of the (34, 32)
Parity++ code, GN is added on top of GS , where GN is the first 6 rows of the
generator matrix using the generator polynomial gN(x) = 1+ x, with an appended
row of 0s at the end. Note that GN is the generator polynomial of a simple parity-
check code. By using this polynomial subcode construction, a generator matrix is
built with overall dmin = 2, with the submatrix GS having dmin = 4. At this point,
notice that messages that begin with 6 0s only interact with GS ; these messages
will be the special messages. Note that Conditions 3 and 5 are satisfied; however,
Condition 4 is not satisfied. To meet the requirement, a single non-linear parity bit
is added that is a NOR of the bits corresponding to GN, in this case, the first 6 bits.
The final step is to convert GS to systematic form via elementary row operations.
Note that these row operations preserve all 3 of the required minimum distance
properties of Parity++. As a result, the special codewords (with the exception of the
known prefix) are in systematic form. For example, in the (34, 32) Parity++ code,
the first 26 bits of a special codeword are simply the 26 bits in the message (not
including the leading run of 6 0s).
At the encoding stage of the process, when the message is multiplied by G,
the messages denoted as special must begin with a leading run of log2(k) + 1 0’s.
However, the original messages that are deemed to be special do not have to follow
this pattern as one can simply apply a pre-mapping before the encoding step, and a
post-mapping after the decoding step.
In the (34, 32) Parity++ code, observe that there are 226 special messages.
Generalizing, it is easy to see that for a (k + 2, k) Parity++ code, there are
2k−log2(k)−1 special messages.
Similar unequal message protection scheme can be used for providing DECTED
protection to special messages, while non-special messages get SECDED protec-
tion. The code construction has been explained in detail in [30].
3.3 Error Detection and Correction
The received—possibly erroneous—vector y is divided into two parts, c̄ and η, with
c̄ being the first k+1 bits of the codeword and η the additional non-linear redundancy
bit (η = 0 for special messages and η = 1 for normal messages). There are three
possible scenarios at the decoder: no (detectable) error, correctable error, or detected
but uncorrectable error.
First, due to the Parity++ construction, every valid codeword has even weight.
Thus, if c̄ has even weight, then the decoder concludes no error has occurred, i.e.,
c̄ was the original codeword. Second, if c̄ has odd weight and η = 0, the decoder
attempts to correct the error. Since GS is in systematic form, HS , its corresponding
parity-check matrix can be easily retrieved. The decoder calculates the syndrome
s1 = HTS c̄. If s1 is equal to a column in HS , then that corresponding bit in c̄ is
flipped. Third, if c̄ has odd weight and either s1 does not correspond to any column
in HS or η = 1, then the decoder declares a DUE.
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The decoding process described above guarantees that any single-bit error in a
special codeword will be corrected, and any single-bit error in a normal codeword
will be detected (even if the bit in error is η).
Let us take a look at two concrete examples for the (10, 8) Parity++ code.
Without any pre-mapping, a special message begins with log2(3)+1 = 4 zeros. Let
the original message be m = (00001011), which is encoded to c = (1011010110).
Note that the first 4 bits of c is the systematic part of the special codeword. After
passing through the channel, let the received vector be y = (1001010110), divided
into c̄ = (1001010110) and η = 0. Since the weight of c is odd and η = 0, the
decoder attempts to correct the error. The syndrome is equal to the 3rd column in
HS , thus the decoder correctly flips the 3rd bit of c̄.
For the second example, let us begin with m = (11010011), which is encoded
to (0011111101). After passing through the channel, the received vector is y =
(0011011101). Since the weight of c̄ is odd and η = 1, the decoder declares a DUE.
Note that for both normal and special codewords, if the only bit in error is η itself,
then it is implicitly corrected since c̄ has even weight and will be correctly mapped
back to m without any error detection or correction required.
3.4 Architecture
In an ECC protected cache, every time a cache access is initiated, the target block
is sent through the ECC decoder/error detection engine. If no error is detected, the
cache access is completed and the cache block is sent to the requester. If an error
is detected, the block is sent through the ECC correction engine and the corrected
block is eventually sent to the requester. Due to the protection mechanism, there is
additional error detection/correction latency. Error detection latency is more critical
than error correction as occurrence of an error is a rare event when compared to the
processor cycle time and does not fall in the critical path. However, a block goes
through the detection engine every time a cache access is initiated.
When using Parity++, the flow almost remains the same. Parity++ can detect all
single-bit errors but has correction capability for “special messages.” When a single-
bit flip occurs on a message, the error detection engine first detects the error and
stalls the pipeline. If the non-linear bit says it is a “special message” (non-linear bit is
‘0’), the received message goes through the Parity++ error correction engine which
outputs the corrected message. This marks the completion of the cache access. If the
non-linear bit says it is a non-special message (non-linear bit is “1”), it is checked
if the cache line is clean. If so, the cache line is simply read back from the lower
level cache or the memory and the cache access is completed. However, if the cache
line is dirty and there are no other copies of that particular cache line, it leads to a
crash or a roll back to checkpoint. Note that both Parity++ and SECDED have equal
decoding latency of one cycle that is incurred during every read operation from an
ECC protected cache. The encoding latency during write operation does not fall in
the critical path and hence is not considered in the analyses.
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The encoding energy overhead is almost similar for both Parity++ and SECDED.
The decoding energy overheads are slightly different. For SECDED, the original
message can be retrieved from the received codeword by simply truncating the
additional ECC redundant bits. However, all received codewords need to be
multiplied with the H-matrix to detect if any errors have occurred. For Parity++, all
messages go through the chain of XOR gates for error detection and only the non-
systematic non-special messages need to be multiplied with the decoder matrix to
retrieve the original message. Since the error detection in Parity++ is much cheaper
in terms of energy overhead than SECDED and the non-special messages only
constitute about 20–25% of the total messages, the overall read energy in Parity++
turns out to be much lesser than SECDED.
3.5 Experimental Methodology
Parity++ was evaluated over applications from the SPEC 2006 benchmark suite.
Two sets of core micro-architectural parameters (provided in Table 5) were chosen
to understand the performance benefits in both a lightweight in-order (InO) proces-
sor and a larger out-of-order (OoO) core. Performance simulations were run using
Gem5 [6], fast forwarding for one billion instructions and executing for two billion
instructions.
The first processor was a lightweight single in-order core architecture with a
32kB L1 cache for instruction and 64kB L1 cache for data. Both the instruction and
data caches were 4-way associative. The LLC was a unified 1MB 8-way associative
L2 cache. The second processor was a dual core out-of-order architecture. The L1
instruction and data caches had the same configuration as the previous processor.
The LLC comprises of both L2 and L3 caches. The L2 was a shared 512KB cache
while the L3 was a shared 2MB 16-way associative cache. For both the baseline
processors it was assumed that the LLCs (L2 for the InO processor and L2 and L3
for the OoO processor) have SECDED ECC protection.
Table 5 Core micro-architectural parameters
Processor-1 Processor-2
Cores 1 (@ 2GHz) 2 (@ 2GHz)
Core type InO (@ 2GHz) OoO (@ 2GHz)
Cache line size 64B 64B
L1 Cache per core 32KB I$, 64KB D$ 32KB I$, 64 kB D$
L2 Cache 1MB (unified) 512KB (shared, unified)
8-way 8-way
L3 Cache – 2MB 16-way (shared)
Memory configuration 4GB of 2133MHz DDR3 8GB of 2133MHz DDR3
Nominal voltage 1V 1V
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The performance evaluation was done only for cases where there are no errors.
Thus, latency due to error detection was taken into consideration but not error
correction as correction is rare when compared to the processor cycle time and does
not fall in the critical path. In order to compare the performance of the systems
with Parity++ against the baseline cases with SECDED ECC protection, the size
of the LLCs was increased by ∼9% due to the lower storage overhead of Parity++
compared to SECDED. This is the iso-area case since the additional area coming
from reduction in redundancy is used to increase the total capacity of the last level
caches.
3.6 Results and Discussion
In this section the performance results obtained from the Gem5 simulations (as
mentioned in Sect. 3.5) are discussed. Figures 8 and 9 show the comparative results
for the two different sets of core micro-architectures across a variety of benchmarks
from the SPEC2006 suite when using memory speculation. In both the evaluations,
performance of the system with Parity++ was compared against that with SECDED.
Fig. 8 Comparing normalized execution time of Processor-I with SECDED and Parity++
Fig. 9 Comparing normalized execution time of Processor-II with SECDED and Parity++
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For both the core configurations, the observations are almost similar. It was
considered that both Parity++ and SECDED protected caches have additional
cache hit latency of one cycle (due to ECC decoding) for all read operations.
The results show that with the exact same hit latency, Parity++ has up to 7%
lower execution time than SECDED due to the additional memory capacity. The
applications showing higher performance benefits are mostly memory intensive.
Hence, additional cache capacity with Parity++ reduces overall cache miss rate. For
most of these applications, this performance gap widens as the LLC size increases
for Processor-II. The applications showing roughly similar performances on both
the systems are the ones which already have a considerably lower LLC miss rate.
As a result, increase in LLC capacity due to Parity++ does not lead to a significant
improvement in performance.
On the other hand, if the cache capacity is kept constant (iso-capacity), Parity++
helps to save ∼5–9% of last level cache area (cache tag area taken into consider-
ation) as compared to SECDED. Since the LLCs constitute more than 30% of the
processor chip area, the cache area savings translate to a considerable amount of
reduction in the chip size. This additional area benefit can either be utilized to make
an overall smaller sized chip or it can be used to pack in more compute tiles to
increase the overall performance of the system.
The results also imply that Parity++ can be used in SRAM based scratchpad
memories used in embedded systems at the edge of the Internet-of-Things (IoT)
where hardware design is driven by the need for low area, cost, and energy
consumption. Since Parity++ helps in reducing area (in turn reducing SRAM
leakage energy) and also has lower error detection energy [1], it provides a better
protection mechanism than SECDED in such devices.
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1 Introduction
This section presents the concepts and models associated with soft-error reliability
and lifetime reliability, and reviews the related work on these topics.
1.1 Background
Modern multi-processor systems on a chip (MPSoCs) may contain both multicore
processors and integrated GPUs, which are especially suitable for real-time embed-
ded applications requiring massively parallel processing capabilities. SinceMPSoCs
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Fig. 1 Illustration of transient and permanent faults
offer good performance and power consumption, they have been widely used in
many real-time applications such as consumer electronics, automotive electronics,
industrial automation, and avionics [1]. For these applications, the MPSoC needs
to satisfy deadline, quality-of-service (e.g., resolution of video playback), and relia-
bility requirements. The reliability requirements include both soft-error reliability
(SER), influenced by transient faults, and lifetime reliability (LTR), influenced
by permanent faults. This chapter presents approaches to improving SER and/or
LTR while satisfying deadline and quality-of-service requirements for real-time
embedded systems.
Transient faults are mainly caused by high-energy particle strikes, e.g., resulting
from spallation from cosmic rays striking atoms in the upper atmosphere [2] (see
Fig. 1a). Transient faults may lead to errors that appear for a short time and then
disappear without damaging the device or shortening its lifetime; these are called
soft errors. They may prevent tasks from completing successfully. SER is used to
quantify the probability that tasks will complete successfully without errors due to
transient faults. SER can be increased by using reliability-aware techniques such
as replication, rollback recovery, and frequency elevation, which either tolerate
transient faults or decrease their rates.
Permanent faults are caused by wear in integrated circuits. An example is
illustrated in Fig. 1b. Permanent faults can lead to errors that persist until the faulty
hardware is repaired or replaced. Multiple wear-out effects such as electromigration
(EM), stress migration (SM), time-dependent dielectric breakdown (TDDB), and
thermal cycling (TC) can lead to permanent faults. The rates of these effect
depend exponentially on temperature. In addition, thermal cycling depends on the



























Fig. 2 Main abstraction layers of embedded systems and this chapter’s major (green, solid) and
minor (yellow, dashed) cross-layer contributions
temperature range, maximum temperature, and cycle frequency. To improve LTR,
temperature peaks and variation must be limited.
To reduce the cost of repairing/replacing an MPSoC system and maintain some
desired level of quality-of-service, improving SER due to transient faults and LTR
due to permanent faults become an imperative design concern. In this chapter we
present two techniques that optimize SER and LTR separately and show how to
make appropriate trade-offs between them for improving overall system reliability.
Figure 2 illustrates the abstraction layers representing the main contribution of this
chapter.
1.2 Related Work
Considerable research has been done on improving SER. Haque et al. [3] present
an energy-efficient task replication method to achieve a high SER target for
periodic real-time applications running on a multicore system with minimum energy
consumption. Salehi et al. [4] propose a low-overhead checkpointing-based rollback
recovery scheme to increase system SER and reduce the number of checkpoints for
fault-tolerant real-time systems. Zhou et al. [5] improve system SER by judiciously
determining proper replication and speedup of tasks. Zhou and Wei [6] describe
a stochastic fault-tolerant task scheduling algorithm that specifically considers
uncertainty in task execution caused by transient fault occurrences to increase SER
under task deadline constraints. These work increase SER but do not consider
permanent faults.
Many studies have focused on increasing LTR. Huang et al. [7] describe an
analytical model to derive the LTR of multicore systems and a simulated annealing
algorithm to reduce core temperature and temperature variation to improve system
LTR. Chantem et al. [8] present a dynamic task assignment and scheduling scheme
to maximize system LTR by mitigating core wear due to thermal cycling. Ma et
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al. [1] optimize system LTR by establishing an online framework that dynamically
controls cores’ utilization. Das et al. [9, 10] improve the LTR of network-on-
chips (NoCs) and also solve the energy–reliability trade-off problem for multimedia
MPSoCs. However, these approaches neglect transient faults.
There is research on handling SER and LTR together. Zhou et al. [5] propose
a task frequency and replication selection strategy that balances SER and LTR
to maximize system availability. Ma et al. [11] establish an online framework
for increasing SER and LTR of real-time systems running on “big–little” type
MPSoCs. A genetic algorithm based approach [12] that determines task mappings
and frequencies is developed to jointly improve SER and LTR. Aliee et al. [13]
adopt mean time to failure (MTTF) as the common metric to evaluate SER and
LTR and design a success tree based scheme for reliability analysis for embedded
systems. Unlike work [5, 11–13] that ignore the variations in performance, power
consumption, and reliability parameters, Gupta et al. [14] explore the possibility of
constructing reliable systems to compensate for the variability effects in hardware
through software controls. These efforts consider CPU reliability but ignore the
reliability effects of GPUs.
1.3 Soft-Error Reliability Model
SER is the probability that no soft errors occur in a particular time interval [5], i.e.,
r = e−λ(f )×U×|Δt |, (1)
where f is the core frequency, |Δt | is the length of the time interval, U is the
core’s utilization within |Δt |, and λ(f ) is the average fault rate depending on f [5].
Specifically, we have
λ(f ) = λ0 × 10
d(fmax−f )
fmax−fmin , (2)
where λ0 is the average fault rate at the maximum core frequency. fmin and fmax are
the minimum and maximum core frequency, and d (d > 0) is a hardware-specific
constant indicating the sensitivity of fault rate to frequency scaling. Reducing
frequency leads to an exponential increase in fault rate because frequency is a
roughly linear function of supply voltage. As frequency reduces, supply voltage
decreases, decreasing the critical charge (i.e., the minimum amount of charge that
must be collected by a circuit to change its state) and exponentially increasing fault
rate [15].
Since CPU and GPU fabrication processes are similar, the device-level SER
model above applies to both. Let rG and ri (i = 1, 2, . . . , m) represent the SER
of the GPU and the ith CPU core, respectively. As the correct operation of an
MPSoC system-level depends on the successful execution of GPU and CPU cores,
the system-level SER is calculated as the product of reliabilities of all individual
cores, i.e.,
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1.4 Lifetime Reliability Model
MTTF is commonly used to quantify LTR. We focus on four main failure mech-
anisms: EM, TDDB, SM, and TC. EM refers to the dislocation of metal atoms
caused by momentum imparted by electrical current in wires and vias [16]. TDDB
refers to the deterioration of the gate oxide layer [17]. SM is caused by the
directionally biased motion of atoms in metal wires due to mechanical stress caused
by thermal mismatch between metal and dielectric materials [18]. TC is wear due to
thermal stress induced by mismatched coefficients of thermal expansion for adjacent
material layers [19].
The system-level MTTF modeling tool introduced by Xiang et al. [20] can be
used to estimate LTR when considering the above four failure mechanisms. This
tool integrates three levels of models, i.e., device-, component-, and system-level
models. At the device level, wear due to the above four mechanisms is modeled.
The modeling tool accounts for the effect of using multiple devices in a component
upon fault distributions, e.g., the effects of EM are most appropriately modeled
using a lognormal distribution at the device level, but with a Weibull distribution for
components containing many devices. Based on the device-level reliability models
and temporal failure distributions, component-level MTTF is calculated [20]. Then,
based on component-level reliability, the system-level MTTF is obtained by Monte
Carlo simulation.
2 LTR and SER Optimization
This section introduces two approaches for LTR and SER optimization, and
discusses the trade-off between them.
2.1 LTR Optimization
EM, SM, and TDDB wear rates depend exponentially on temperature. However,
wear due to thermal cycling depends on the amplitude (i.e., the difference between
the proximal peak and valley temperature), period, and maximum temperature of
thermal cycles. Figure 3 summarizes some system MTTF data obtained from the
system-level LTR modeling tool with default settings [20]. Figure 3a–c depicts
the MTTF of an example system as a function of the amplitude, period, and peak
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Fig. 3 SystemMTTF due to: (a) amplitude of thermal cycle; (b) period of thermal cycles; (c) peak
temperature of thermal cycles; and (d) temperature without thermal cycles
temperature of thermal cycles, respectively. As a comparison, Fig. 3d shows the
system MTTF due to temperature alone without thermal cycles. As can be seen
from Fig. 3, system MTTF generally increases for lower temperatures and smaller
thermal cycles.
A system’s LTR is determined by its operating temperature and thermal cycles.
Given that lower frequencies and voltages lead to higher utilization but lower
temperatures, one method to improve system MTTF is to control core utilization.
For example, we have developed a framework called Reliability-Aware Utilization
Control (RUC) [21] to mitigate the effects of both operating temperature and
thermal cycling. RUC consists of two controllers. The first controller reduces
the peak temperature by periodically reducing core frequencies subject to task
deadline requirements. Although frequent changes in core frequency helps to reduce
peak temperature, they may increase the frequency of thermal cycling and reduce
lifetime reliability. Hence, the second controller minimizes thermal cycling wear by
dynamically adjusting the period of the first controller to achieve longer thermal
cycles as well as lower peak temperature.
2.2 SER Optimization
Recovery allocation strategies and task execution orders can affect system-level
soft-error reliability (as shown in Fig. 4). In this example, there are four tasks that
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τ1 2 3 4
0 3 6 9 12 15
(a) No recovery.
τ1 2 3 4
0 3 6 9 12 15
r2 r3
(b) Allocate recovery to specific tasks, regardless of whether these tasks fail.
τ1 2 3 4
0 3 6 9 12 15
for one task
(c) Recovery is only allocated to the first failed task.
τ1 2 3 4
0 3 6 9 12 15
for any task
(d) A failed task or more can be recovered if the slack is adequate enough.
τ1234
0 3 6 9 12 15
for any task
(e) A new execution order.
Fig. 4 Motivating examples illustrate different recovery allocation strategies and task execution
order affect system-level SER. (a) No recovery. (b) Statically allocate recovery to specific tasks,
regardless of whether these tasks fail. (c) Recovery is only allocated to the first failed task. (d) A
failed task or more can be recovered if the slack is adequate. (e) A new task execution order
share a common period of 15 s. We further suppose the worst-case execution times
of the tasks are 1, 2, 3, and 4 s. All tasks in the set execute at the highest core
frequency. As indicated by the reliability model presented in Sect. 1, the SERs of
the tasks are 0.904, 0.819, 0.741, and 0.670.
If no recovery is allowed as shown in Fig. 4a, the system-level SER, i.e., the
probability that all tasks can complete successfully, is 0.368. Allowing recovery
of some tasks increases SER. One method is to allocate recoveries to tasks offline
[5]. Figure 4b represents a better solution for maximizing the system-level SER, in
which tasks τ2 and τ3 have recoveries r2 and r3. In this case, the system-level SER is
0.547. Another approach allocates recovery online [22]. Figure 4c shows a scenario
where the first failed task has a recovery [22]. The system-level SER is 0.686, which
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is higher than that in Fig. 4b. However, although the slack is dynamically used in
Fig. 4c, only one task can be recovered.
In the above online recovery allocation example, a failed task is recovered if the
remaining slack is adequate, and tasks consume slack on a first-come, first-served
basis (see Fig. 4d). For example, task τ2 can recover even if τ1 fails. However, task
τ3 cannot recover if both τ1 and τ2 fail because the remaining slack for τ3 is only
2 s. Task τ4 can recover only when all tasks succeed or only τ1 fails. Hence, the
probabilities of recovering τ3 and τ4 are 0.983 and 0.607, and the system-level SER
is 0.716. Now, consider the impact of task scheduling on the system-level SER.
Figure 4e represents a new schedule where the task’s priority is the inverse of its
execution time. In this case, the probabilities of recovering τ1, τ2, τ3, and τ4 are
0.792, 0.670, 0.670, and 1.000. In contrast with Fig. 4d, the task with the lowest
SER, τ4, can always be recovered, but the system-level SER is 0.692. Hence, a
scheduling algorithm that simply improves the probability of recovery for some
specific tasks may not be a good solution.
Based on these observations, we design an SER improvement framework [23]
that statically schedules tasks and dynamically allocates recoveries. The framework
is composed of a simple and fast scheduling algorithm for special task sets and a
powerful scheduling algorithm for general task sets. For more details of the two
scheduling algorithms, readers can refer to [23].
3 Trade-Off Between LTR and SER
Certain design decisions (e.g., task mapping and voltage scaling) may increase LTR
but decrease SER, and vice versa. In other words, improving overall reliability
requires trade-offs between LTR and SER. Recently, several efforts have focused
on these trade-offs. Below, we describe two case studies in LTR and SER trade-off:
(1) “big–little” type MPSoCs and (2) CPU–GPU integrated MPSoCs.
3.1 “Big–Little” MPSoCs
To address power/energy concerns, various heterogeneous MPSoCs have been
introduced. A popular MPSoC architecture often used in power/energy-conscious
real-time embedded applications is composed of pairs of high-performance (HP)
cores and low-power (LP) cores. Such HP and LP cores present unique performance,
power/energy, and reliability trade-offs. Following the terminology introduced by
ARM, we refer to this as the “big–little” architecture. Nvidia’s variable symmetric
multiprocessing architecture is such an example [24].
Executing tasks on an LP core improves LTR by reducing temperature and
improves SER through a higher core frequency. Although the primary goal of “big–
little” MPSoCs is to reduce power consumption by executing a light workload on
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Fig. 5 The measured power consumptions of HP (Denver) core and LP (ARM) core on Nvidia’s
TX2 chip as functions of utilization and frequency
the LP cores, there are circumstances in which an LP core consumes more power
than an HP core. Carefully characterizing the power consumption behavior of HP
and LP cores is necessary. For example, the power consumption of the HP core and
LP core on Nvidia’s TX21 is shown in Fig. 5. The LP core consumes less power
than the HP core only when the core frequency is low and the workload is light.
One possible reason for this phenomenon is that the HP and LP cores have different
microarchitectures, as is the case with the TX2. Another possible reason is that the
transistors in the HP core and LP core have different threshold voltages. The LP core
has low leakage power but requires high voltage to operate at higher frequencies. On
the other hand, the HP core can work at high frequency with a low voltage.
The above observations reveal that in order to reduce power consumption of
MPSoCs and improve reliability, it is necessary to fully account for the power
1Note that TX2 is composed of ARM Cortex A57 cores that support multithreading, and Nvidia’
Denver cores for high single-thread performance with dynamic code optimization. Denver cores
can be treated as HP cores and ARM cores can be treated as LP cores when running single-threaded
applications.
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features of heterogeneous cores and carefully map tasks to the most appropriate
cores. A good guideline is to run tasks having short execution times on LP cores
with low frequencies and tasks having long execution times on HP cores with high
frequencies. The execution models of HP and LP cores must also be considered.
For example, HP and LP cores on Nvidia’s TK1 cannot execute at the same time.
However, on Nvidia’s TX2, HP and LP cores can work simultaneously. Although an
HP core and an LP core can execute at different frequencies, all HP cores must share
one frequency, as must LP cores. Hence, a strategy to improve reliability should
migrate tasks dynamically and consider both the power features and execution
models of HP and LP cores. Using this guideline, we have developed frameworks
for different hardware platforms to improve soft-error reliability under lifetime
reliability, power consumption, and deadline constraints [1, 11].
3.2 CPU–GPU Integrated MPSoCs
Thanks to the massively parallel computing capability offered by GPUs and the
general computing capability of CPUs, MPSoCs with integrated GPUs and CPUs
have been widely used in many soft real-time embedded applications, including
mobile devices [25] and intelligent video analytics. For many such applications,
SER due to transient faults and LTR due to permanent faults are major design
concerns. A common reliability improvement objective is to maximize SER under
an LTR constraint.
An application task set is used to illustrate how a task’s execution time depends
on whether it executes on the same core as the operating system. The varying
execution times of tasks change the overall workload and operating temperature,
influencing LTR and SER. Experiments were performed on Nvidia’s TK1 chip (with
CUDA 6.5) with default settings to measure task execution times. Six tasks from
different benchmark suites were executed (see Table 1). Each task’s increase in
CPU time resulting from executing on a different core than the operating system
is shown in Fig. 6 and the averages of additional GPU times are shown in Table 2.
For all tasks, the additional CPU times can be significant and are input dependent.
In contrast to the additional CPU time, the additional GPU time is negligible: the
additional GPU times of all measured application tasks are less than 1% of the tasks’
execution times. This increase can be ignored in most soft real-time applications.
Similar phenomena can be observed for other platforms. On Nvidia’s TX2 chip, the
additional CPU times of application tasks are illustrated in Fig. 7.
The above observations imply that a task’s CPU time increases if executed on
a different core than the operating system, but its GPU time does not change.
Since both LTR and SER increase with a lighter workloads, this observation reveals
that we should consider what resources tasks use when assigning them to cores.
Generally, the primary core, on which the operating system runs, should be reserved
for application tasks that require GPU resources to complete.
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Table 1 Application tasks used to measure additional execution times
Name Description Source
VectorAdd Vector addition CUDA samples [26]
SimpleTexture Texture use
MatrixMul Matrix multiplication
Gaussian Gaussian elimination Rodinia [27]
BFS Breadth-first search
Backprop Back propagation
Fig. 6 Measured additional CPU times on TK1 for tasks executing on non-OS CPU cores









244 Y. Ma et al.
Fig. 7 Measured additional CPU times on TX2 for tasks executing on CPU cores that are different
from the core where the operating system runs
4 Conclusion
Real-time embedded system soft-error and lifetime reliabilities are important.
Generally, increasing a core’s frequency, allocating recoveries and allowing replica-
tions improve soft-error reliability, but may increase operating temperature thereby
reducing lifetime reliability. MPSoCs used in many applications are heterogeneous
and integrate high-performance cores, low-power cores, and even GPUs. System
designers should model the task-dependent power consumptions and execution
times of the cores available to them, and use these models to solve the SER and
LTR trade-off problem.
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Part III
Cross-Layer Resilience: Bridging the Gap
Between Circuit and Architectural Layer
Daniel Mueller-Gritschneder
Today’s design teams, as their forerunners in the past, struggle to master the
ever-increasing complexity in chip design driven by new applications such as
autonomous driving, complex robotics or embedded machine learning, which
demand higher performance under strict power, area, and energy constraints. While
Moore’s law was providing improvements on all these objectives regularly by
moving to the next technology node, a slow-down in scaling is observed nowadays.
Yet, design teams came up with intelligent new design principles to provide further
performance gains, most famously multi-core and many-core CPUs as well as GPUs
combined with complex memory organizations with several level of hierarchy.
Additionally, new computing principles moved into the focus of research and
industry including near-threshold computing (NTC) for ultra-low-energy operations
or the use of runtime-reconfigurable architectures based on field-programmable
gate arrays (FPGAs), which flexibly provide specialized compute kernels to boost
performance at low power costs.
One major design challenge in these new computing platforms is dependability
whenever high system availability is demanded (always on) or, even more strict,
in safety-critical applications. Dependable computing requires resilience against a
whole range of error sources such as radiation-induced soft errors, aging effects,
e.g., caused by Bias Temperature Instability (BTI) or Hot Carrier Injection (HCI),
harsh environmental conditions, process variations or supply voltage noise. Depend-
ing on the chosen computing principle, new dependability challenges arise, e.g.,
configuration bits need to be made resilient against errors in FPGAs while NTC-
based systems are more sensitive to process variations.
Resilience can be achieved at different layers of the design stack (SW, Compiler,
Architecture, Circuit, Device). Traditionally, different parts of the design team look
at different layers individually. Hence, resilience can lead to high design overheads
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as counter-measures on every layer are stacked on top of each other. This leads to the
idea of cross-layer resilience. This design method looks for a resilience scheme, in
which protection mechanisms work in a cooperative fashion across different layers
of the design stack in order to reduce overheads, and, hence, cost. For hardware
design, this cross-layer approach can be applied successfully across the architectural
and circuit layer. This is demonstrated within the following three chapters.
The chapter titled Cross-Layer Resilience against Soft Errors: Key Insights
focuses on the analysis and cross-layer protection against soft errors for different
system components ranging from embedded processors to SRAM memories and
accelerators. While Moore’s law is driven mainly by high performance systems,
many safety-critical systems are still designed at much older technology nodes to
avoid reliability challenges. Yet, due to rising demand of processing power, e.g.,
for autonomous driving, newer technology nodes become mandatory. This makes it
more costly to assure protection against soft errors as their chance of occurrence
increases. Soft errors need to be detected and handled in any safety-critical
application because they may cause malfunction of the system due to corruption
of data or flow of control. Systems deploy protection techniques such as hardening
and redundancy at different layers of the system stack (circuit, logic, architecture,
OS/schedule, compiler, software, algorithm). Here, cross-layer resilience techniques
aim at finding lower cost solutions by providing accurate estimation of soft error
resilience combined with a systematic exploration of protection techniques that
work collaboratively across the system stack. This chapter provides key insights
on applying the cross-layer resilience principle in a lessons-learned fashion.
The chapter Online Test Strategies and Optimizations for Reliable Reconfig-
urable Architectures discusses cross-layer dependability of runtime-reconfigurable
architectures based on FPGAs. Such FPGAs are often using the newest technology
nodes. Hence, resilience is a major concern as newer nodes experience aging effects
earlier and may suffer from higher susceptibility to environmental stress. Device
aging can lead to malfunction of the system before its end-of-life, and hence, is a
major dependability concern. Incorrect functionality can be detected by executing
online built-in self-tests regularly on the device. Two orthogonal online tests are
presented in this chapter. These tests can ensure the correctness of the configuration
bits of the reconfigurable fabric as well as of the functional parts. Additionally, a
design method called module diversification is presented, which enables to recover
from faults by providing a self-repair feature. Finally, a design method is presented
that implements a stress-aware FPGA placement method. It allows to slow down
system degradation due to aging effects and prolongs system lifetime.
The final chapter Reliability Analysis and Mitigation of Near-Threshold Voltage
(NTC) Caches targets NTC low-energy design and the related reliability concerns.
This includes impact of soft error, aging, and process variation while operating at
near-threshold voltage with special focus on on-chip caches. The idea is to save
energy by scaling supply voltage of the cache blocks. The presented methods guide
the designer to optimized NTC cache organizations using a cross-layer reliability
analysis approach covering 6T and 8T SRAM cells. Overall, the three chapters
bridge the architecture and circuit layer gap while also expanding to adjacent layers
of the design stack.
Cross-Layer Resilience Against Soft
Errors: Key Insights
Daniel Mueller-Gritschneder, Eric Cheng, Uzair Sharif, Veit Kleeberger,
Pradip Bose, Subhasish Mitra, and Ulf Schlichtmann
1 Introduction
Two tasks need to be solved when designing systems for safety-critical appli-
cation domains: firstly, the safety of the intended functionality (SoiF) must be
guaranteed. SoiF focuses on the ability of the system to sense its environment and
act safely. Achieving SoiF becomes a highly challenging task due to the rising
complexity of various safety-critical applications such as autonomous driving or
close robot–human interaction, which may require complex sensor data processing
and interpretation. Secondly, and no less important, the system must also always
remain or transit into a safe state given the occurrence of random hardware faults.
To achieve this requirement, the system must be capable of detecting as well as
handling or correcting possible errors. Safety standards such as ISO26262 for
road vehicles define thresholds on detection rates for different automotive safety
integration levels (ASIL) depending on the severity of a possible system failure,
the controllability by the driver, and the nominal usage time of the system. It
is commonly understood that safety-critical systems must be designed from the
beginning with the required error protection in mind [39] and that for general-
purpose computing systems, error protection is required to achieve dependable
computing [19, 21].
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Fig. 1 Main abstraction
layers of embedded systems
and this chapter’s major





























This requirement is becoming increasingly challenging as integrated systems—
following the continuous trend of Dennard scaling—become more susceptible to
fault sources due to smaller transistor dimensions and lower supply voltages. As
transistor dimensions scale down the charge stored in memory cells such as SRAM
or flip-flops decreases. Soft errors occur due to charge transfers when primary or
secondary particles from cosmic radiation hit the silicon [11]. This charge transfer
may lead to the corruption of the value stored in the cell. This is referred to as
a “soft error” as it does not permanently damage the cell. The vulnerability of
cells increases even further with shrinking supply voltage levels or sub-threshold
operation. Thus, for the design of safety-critical digital systems, the protection
against radiation-induced soft errors is a crucial factor to avoid unacceptable risks
to life or property.
This reality motivates methods that aim to increase the resilience of safety-
critical systems against radiation-induced soft errors in digital hardware. Common
protection techniques against soft errors either harden the memory elements to
reduce the probability of soft errors occurring or add redundancy at different layers
of the design (circuit, logic, architecture, OS/schedule, compiler, software, algo-
rithm) to detect data corruptions, which can subsequently be handled or corrected
by appropriate error handlers or recovery methods. Each protection technique adds
overheads and, hence, additional costs. Especially, adding protection techniques
on top of each other at all layers—not considering combined effects—may lead
to inefficient protection and non-required redundancy. The idea of cross-layer
resiliency is to systematically combine protection techniques that work collabo-
ratively across the layers of the system stack. The target is to find more efficient
protection schemes with the same soft error resilience at a lower cost than can be
reached by ignoring cross-layer effects. For this, cross-layer techniques combine
accurate evaluation of the soft error resilience with a broad cross-layer exploration
of different combinations of protection techniques. This work demonstrates how
to apply the cross-layer resilience principle on custom processors, fixed-hardware
processors, accelerators, and SRAM memories with a focus on soft errors. Its main
focus spans from application to circuit layer as illustrated in Fig 1. These works lead
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to a range of key insights, important for realizing cross-layer soft error resilience for
a wide range of system components:
• accurate resilience evaluation is key, e.g., simulation-based fault injection at the
flip-flop level is required to accurately evaluate soft errors in logic,
• multi-level/mixed-mode simulation enables very efficient resilience evaluation
using fault injection,
• cross-layer resilience exploration must be customized for the component under
consideration such as a custom processor, uncore components, third-party pro-
cessor, accelerator, or SRAM,
• embedded applications such as control algorithms have inherent fault resilience
that can be exploited,
• circuit-level techniques are crucial for cost-effective error resilience solutions,
and
• existing architecture- and software-level techniques for hardware error resilience
are generally expensive or provide too little resilience when implemented using
their low-cost variants.
The chapter is structured as follows: first, evaluation methods using fault injection
are covered, followed by cross-layer resilience exploration. Finally, experimental
results are provided.
2 Evaluation of Soft Error Resilience Using Fault Injection
Fault injection is commonly used to evaluate soft error resilience. Radiation-induced
soft errors can be modeled as bit flips [23], which are injected into the system’s
memory cells such as flip-flops and SRAM cells. There exists a wide range of fault
injection methods, which will briefly be discussed in the following.
2.1 Overview on Fault Injection Methods
Hardware-based fault injection injects the fault in a hardware prototype of the
system. For example, a radiation beam experiment can be used to provoke faults
in an ASIC. This is a very expensive experimental setup, e.g., requiring a radiation
source such as used in [1]. The chip hardware can also be synthesized to an FPGA,
which is instrumented with additional logic to change bit values in the memory,
flip-flops, or combinational paths of the logic to inject a fault using emulation-
based fault injection [10, 13]. Embedded processors have a debug port to read out
their internal states such as architectural registers. These debug ports often also
enable the ability to change the internal states. This can be used to inject a fault
in the processor using debug-based fault injection [15, 41]. Software running on the
system can be used to mimic faults in software-implemented fault injection, e.g., as
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presented in [26, 30, 44]. The compiler can be used to instrument the binary with
fault injection code, for compiler-based fault injection, e.g., implemented in [18].
Simulation-based fault injection injects faults in a simulation model of the system.
It is commonly applied to investigate the error resilience of the system and, hence,
is the primary focus of this work.
2.2 Simulation-Based Fault Injection
Simulation-based fault injection provides very good properties in terms of par-
allelism, observability, and early availability during the design. Simulation-based
fault injection can be realized at different levels of abstraction. For gate-level fault
injection, the fault is injected into the gate Netlist of the system obtained after
logic synthesis. For flip-flop-level fault injection, the fault is injected into the RTL
implementation of the system. The fault impact is simulated using logic simulation,
e.g., as used in [12, 46]. In architectural-level fault injection, the fault is injected
either in a micro-architectural simulator or Instruction Set Simulator (ISS). Micro-
architectural simulators such as Gem5 [3] simulate all architectural and some micro-
architectural states such as pipeline registers of the processor, e.g., as presented
in [25], but usually do not accurately model the processor’s control logic. An ISS
usually only simulates the architectural registers, but not any micro-architectural
registers. ISSs are used for fault injection in [14, 24, 35]. In software-level fault
injection, the fault is directly injected into a variable of the executing program. The
software can then be executed to determine the impact of the corrupted variable on
the program outputs.
A key insight of previous work was that the evaluation of the soft error resilience
of logic circuits such as processor pipelines requires flip-flop-level fault injection,
e.g., using the RTL model [9, 38]. Architectural-level and software-level fault
injection may not yield accurate results as they do not include all details of the
logic implementation as will also be shown in the results in Sect. 4.1. In contrast,
soft errors in memories such as SRAM may be investigated at architectural level,
which models memory arrays in a bit-accurate fashion.
2.3 Fast Fault Injection for Processor Cores
A good estimation of soft error resilience requires simulating a large amount of
fault injection scenarios. This may become computationally infeasible when long-
running workloads are evaluated, e.g., for embedded applications. Such long test
cases arise in many applications. For example, in order to evaluate the impact
of a soft error on a robotic control application, the control behavior needs to
simulate several seconds real time, possibly simulating several billion cycles of the
digital hardware. An efficient analysis method called ETISS-ML for evaluating the
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resilience against soft errors in the logic of a processor sub-system is presented
in [37, 38]. A typical processor sub-system of a micro-controller consists of the
pipeline, control path, exception unit, timer, and interrupt controller. ETISS-ML is
especially efficient for evaluating the impact of soft errors for long software test
cases.
2.3.1 Multi-Level Fault Injection
ETISS-ML reduces the computational cost of each fault injection run by applying
a multi-level simulation approach, which was also applied in other fault injection
environments such as [16, 31, 45]. The key idea is to switch abstraction of the
processor model during the fault injection run and to minimize the number of cycles
simulated at flip-flop level. For this, an ISS is used in addition to the RTL model of
the processor at flip-flop level.
The proposed multi-level flow is illustrated in Fig. 2. First the system is booted
in ISS mode. This allows to quickly simulate close to the point of the fault injection,
at which point, the simulation switches to flip-flop-level. During the RTL warmup
phase, instructions are executed to fill the unknown micro-architectural states of the
processor sub-system. This is required as the architectural registers are not visible to
the ISS simulation. After this RTL warmup, the fault is injected as a bit flip. During
the following RTL cool-down phase, the propagation of the fault is tracked. Once
the initial impact of the fault propagates out of the processor’s micro-architecture or
is masked, the simulation can switch back to ISS mode. ETISS-ML reaches between
40x-100x speedup for embedded applications compared to pure flip-flop-level fault
injection while providing the same accuracy [37, 38].
Both the switch from ISS mode to RTL mode as well as the switch from RTL
to ISS mode require careful consideration. If a simulation artifact (wrong behavior)
is produced by the switching process, it may be wrongly classified as fault impact.
Fig. 2 Multi-level simulation flow of ETISS-ML
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Next, we will detail the state of the art approach used by ETISS-ML to solve these
challenges.
2.3.2 Switch from ISS Mode to Flip-Flop-Level Simulation
As shown in Fig. 2, a checkpoint is taken from the ISS to initialize the state in
the RTL processor model. This checkpoint only includes the architectural states,
the micro-architectural states such as pipeline registers are unknown. In the RTL
warmup phase instructions are executed to fill up these micro-architectural states.
In order to verify the RTL warmup phase, a (0, 1, X) logic simulation can be
applied [37]. All micro-architectural states are initialized to X (unknown), while
the values of architectural states are copied from the checkpoint. Additionally, the
inputs loaded from external devices such as instruction and data memories as well
as peripheral devices are also known from ISS simulation. Naturally, one expects
that the micro-architectural states take known values after a certain number of
instructions are executed. A key insight here was that this is not the case. Several
state machines in the control path and bus interfaces of the processor would start
from an unknown state. Hence, all following states remain unknown. One must
assume initial states for the RTL state machines, e.g., the reset state. Then one can
observe the removal of X values in the RTL model to derive a suitable RTL warmup
length for a given processor architecture.
2.3.3 Switch from Flip-Flop-Level Simulation Back to ISS Mode
After the fault has been injected into the RTL model, the flip-flop level simulation is
continued during the RTL cool-down phase. When switching back to ISS mode, all
micro-architectural states are lost, as only the architectural states are copied over.
Hence, one must ensure that one does not lose information about the impact of
the fault as this would result in an incorrect estimation. One can take a fixed, very
long cool-down phase as proposed in [45]. Yet, this leads to inefficient simulation
as many cycles need to be evaluated at flip-flop level. Additionally, one does not
gain information as to whether or not the soft error impact is still present in the
micro-architectural states. This can be improved by simulating two copies of the
RTL model, a faulty processor model and a tracking model [38]. The external state
of memories, peripherals, or the environment is not duplicated. The soft error is only
injected into the faulty model. In contrast, the tracking model simulates without the
error. Writes to the external devices (memories, peripherals) are only committed
from the faulty model. Reads from those devices are supplied to both models.
Hence, when the soft error is not masked, it may propagate from the faulty model to
the architectural state, external memories and devices and, then, be read back to the
faulty and tracking model. Whenever both models have the same micro-architectural
state, one can be sure that the error either has been masked or has propagated fully to
the architectural state or external devices and memories. At this point the simulation
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can switch to ISS mode as the architectural state and external devices and memories
are also modeled at ISS level. It turns out that some errors never propagate out of
the micro-architectural states, e.g., because a configuration is corrupted that is never
rewritten by the software. In this case the switch back to ISS mode is not possible
as it would cause inaccuracies, e.g., as would be observed with a fixed cool-down
length.
2.4 Fast Fault Injection in Uncore Components
In addition to errors impacting processor cores, it is equally important to consider
the impact of errors in uncore components, such as cache, memory, and I/O
controllers, as well. In SoCs, uncore components are comparable to processor cores
in terms of overall chip area and power [33], and can have significant impact on the
overall system reliability [8].
Mixed-mode simulation platforms are effective for studying the system-level
impact and behavior of soft errors in uncore components as well. As presented in [8],
such a platform would achieve a 20,000× speedup over RTL-only injection while
ensuring accurate modeling of soft errors. Full-length applications benchmarks
can be analyzed by simulating processor cores and uncore components using an
instruction-set simulator in an accelerated mode. At the time of injection, the
simulation platform would then enter a co-simulation mode, where the target
uncore component is simulated using accurate RTL simulation. Once co-simulation
is no longer needed (i.e., all states can be mapped back to high-level models),
the accelerated mode can resume, allowing application benchmarks to be run to
completion.
2.5 Fast Fault Injection for SRAM Memories Using Mixture
Importance Sampling
Memories such as on-chip SRAM or caches are already modeled bit-accurately at
micro-architectural and instruction-level. Hence, for the evaluation of soft errors
in memories, fault injection into faster instruction-level models is possible. Yet,
modern SRAMs are very dense such that the probability of multi-bit upsets (MBUs)
due to soft errors is not negligible. For MBU fault models, straightforward Monte
Carlo simulation requires a large sample size in the range of millions of sample
elements to obtain sufficient confidence bounds.
To address this challenge one can apply mixture importance sampling to connect
a technology-level fault model with a system-level fault simulation [29]. This
propagation of low-level information to the system level is motivated by the
Resilience Articulation Point (RAP) approach proposed in [23]. The key idea behind
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RAP is that errors in the system should be modeled by probabilistic functions
describing MBU’s bit flip probabilities including spatial and temporal correlations.
Thus, the impact of errors in the system can be evaluated, while maintaining a
direct connection to their root causes at the technology level. The sample size to
estimate the resilience of the system to soft errors in SRAMs can be massively
reduced by guiding the Monte Carlo simulation to important areas. As an illustrative
example, we assume that the SRAM is used to realize a data cache with 1-bit parity
protection. MBUs that alter an odd number of bits in a cache line are detected by
the parity checks and may be corrected by loading the correct value from the next
level of memory. MBUs that alter an even number of bits in a cache line remain
undetected and may cause silent data corruption. Additionally, MBUs may perturb
several neighboring cache lines due to different MBU mechanisms. This can lead to
mixed cases of recoverable errors and silent data corruption. For a cache with one
bit parity protection, MBUs with even number (2, 4, . . .) of bits in one cache line
are critical as they may provoke silent data corruption (SDC). The sampling strategy
can be biased towards these MBUs by mixture important sampling, which speeds up
the resilience evaluation significantly. It is shown that results with high confidence
can be obtained with sample sizes in the thousands instead of millions [29]. The
resulting fast evaluation enables the efficient exploration of the most efficient cross-
layer protection mechanisms for the SRAM memory for an overall optimized
reliable system.
3 Cross-Layer Exploration of Soft Error Resilience
Techniques
Most safety-critical systems already employ protection techniques against soft
errors at different layers. Yet often, possible combinations are not systematically
explored and evaluated to identify a low-cost solution. This may result in inefficient
redundancy and hardening, e.g., that certain types of faults are detected by multiple
techniques at different layers, or certain redundancy is not required, as the circuit is
adequately protected (e.g., by circuit-hardening techniques).
In this section several approaches are outlined that focus on cross-layer explo-
ration for finding low-cost soft error protection:
• the CLEAR approach can generate resilience solutions for custom processors
with selective hardening in combination with architectural and software-level
protection schemes.
• Using a similar approach, on-chip SRAM can be protected with a combination
of hardening and error detection codes.
• For third-party processors, hardening and hardware redundancy are not an option.
Hence, we show how application resilience can be used in combination with
software-level protection to achieve cross-layer resilience.
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Fig. 3 CLEAR framework: (a) BEE3 emulation cluster/Stampede supercomputer injects over
9 million errors into two diverse processor architectures running 18 full-length application
benchmarks. (b) Accurate physical design evaluation accounts for resilience overheads. (c)
Comprehensive resilience library consisting of ten error detection/correction techniques + four
hardware error recovery techniques. (d) Example illustrating thorough exploration of 586 cross-
layer combinations with varying energy costs vs. percentage of SDC-causing errors protected
• Finally, we also discuss how accelerators can be protected with cross-layer
resilience techniques.
3.1 CLEAR: Cross-Layer Resilience for Custom Processors
CLEAR (Cross-Layer Exploration for Architecting Resilience) is a first of its kind
framework to address the challenge of designing robust digital systems: given a
set of resilience techniques at various abstraction layers (circuit, logic, architecture,
software, algorithm), how does one protect a given design from radiation-induced
soft errors using (perhaps) a combination of these techniques, across multiple
abstraction layers, such that overall soft error resilience targets are met at minimal
costs (energy, power, execution time, area)?
CLEAR has broad applicability and is effective across a wide range of diverse
hardware designs ranging from in-order (InO-core) and out-of-order (OoO-core)
processor cores to uncore components such as cache controllers and memory
controllers to domain-specific hardware accelerators. CLEAR provides the ability
to perform extensive explorations of cross-layer combinations across a rich library
of resilience techniques and error sources.
Figure 3 gives an overview of the CLEAR framework. Individual components
are described briefly in the following:
3.1.1 Reliability Analysis
While the CLEAR framework provides the ability to analyze the reliability of
designs, this component does not comprise the entirety of the framework. The
modularity of the CLEAR framework enables one to make use of any number of
the accurate fault-injection simulation components described in detail in Sect. 2.2
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to perform reliability analysis. The analysis considered in this chapter encompasses
both Silent Data Corruption (SDC) and Detected but Uncorrected Errors (DUE).
3.1.2 Execution Time Evaluation
Execution time is measured using FPGA emulation and RTL simulation. Appli-
cations are run to completion to accurately capture the execution time of an
unprotected design. For resilience techniques at the circuit and logic levels, CLEAR
ensures that modifications incorporating such resilience techniques will maintain
the same clock speed as the unprotected design. For resilience techniques at the
architecture, software, and algorithm levels, the error-free execution time impact is
also reported.
3.1.3 Physical Design Evaluation
To accurately capture overheads associated with implementing resilience tech-
niques, it is crucial to have a means for running an entire physical design flow
to properly evaluate the resulting designs. To that end, the Synopsys design tools
(Design Compiler, IC compiler, PrimeTime, and PrimePower) with a commercial
28nm technology library (with corresponding SRAM compiler) are used to perform
synthesis, place-and-route, and power analysis. Synthesis and place-and-route
(SP&R) is run for all configurations of the design (before and after adding resilience
techniques) to ensure all constraints of the original design (e.g., timing and physical
design) are met for the resilient designs as well.
3.1.4 Resilience Library
For processor cores, ten error detection and correction techniques together with four
hardware error recovery techniques are carefully chosen for analysis. In the context
of soft error resilience, error detection and correction techniques include: Algorithm
Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) correction, ABFT detection, Software assertions,
Control Flow Checking by Software Signatures (CFCSS), Error Detection by
Duplicated Instructions (EDDI), Data Flow Checking (DFC), Monitor cores, Parity
checking, flip-flop hardening using LEAP-DICE, and Error Detection Sequential
(EDS). These techniques largely cover the space of existing soft error resilience
techniques. The characteristics (e.g., costs, resilience improvement, etc.) of each
technique when used as a standalone solution (e.g., an error detection/correction
technique by itself or, optionally, in conjunction with a recovery technique) are
presented in Table 1. Additionally, four micro-architectural recovery techniques are
included: Instruction Replay (IR), Extended IR (EIR), flush, and Reorder Buffer
(RoB) recovery. Refer to [7] for an in-depth discussion of specific techniques and
their optimizations, including a detailed discussion of Table 1.
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3.1.5 Exploration
CLEAR approaches cross-layer exploration using a top-down approach: resilience
techniques from upper layers of the resilience stack (e.g., algorithm-level tech-
niques) are applied before incrementally moving to lower layers (e.g., circuit-
level techniques). This approach helps generate cost-effective solutions that lever-
age effective interactions between techniques across layers. In particular, while
resilience techniques from the algorithm, software, and architecture layers of the
stack generally protect multiple flip-flops, a designer typically has little control
over the specific subset of flip-flops that will be protected. Using multiple tech-
niques from these layers can lead to a situation where a given flip-flop may be
protected (sometimes unnecessarily) by multiple techniques. Conversely, resilience
techniques at the logic and circuit layers offer fine-grained protection since these
techniques can be applied selectively to individual flip-flops (i.e., flip-flops not
(sufficiently) protected by higher-level techniques).
3.2 Resilience Exploration for Custom Accelerators
Domain-specific hardware accelerators will increasingly be integrated into digital
systems due to their ability to provide more energy-efficient computation for specific
kernels. As a result of their application-specific nature, hardware accelerators have
the opportunity to leverage application space constraints when exploring cross-layer
resilience (i.e., resilience improvement targets only need to hold over a limited
subset of applications). Accelerators also benefit from the ability to create natural
checkpoints for recovery by protecting the memory storing the accelerator inputs
(e.g., using ECC), allowing for a simple means for re-execution on error detection.
Therefore, the cross-layer solutions that provide cost-effective resilience may differ
from those of processor cores and warrant further exploration.
3.3 Cross-Layer Resilience for Exploration for SRAM
Memories
In [28], a cross-layer approach for soft error resilience was applied to SRAM data
caches. Again, a systematic exploration requires having a good evaluation of the
cost and efficiency of the applied protection mechanisms. In this study, the available
protection mechanisms were the following: at circuit level, either (1) the supply
voltage could be raised by 10% or (2) the SRAM cells could be hardened by
doubling the area. At the architectural level, (3) 1-bit parity could be introduced
in the cache lines. The circuit-level hardening techniques require parameterizing
the statistical MBU fault model introduced in Sect. 2.5 considering cell area, supply
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voltage and temperature. For each configuration, the fault probabilities for MBU
patterns need to be evaluated to obtain a good estimate of soft error probabilities.
Additionally, the architecture and workload play a key role in the evaluation as not
all soft errors are read from the cache. Here again, architectural-level simulation
can be used to simulate the workload using fault injection into a bit-accurate cache
model.
3.4 Towards Cross-Layer Resiliency for Cyber-Physical
Systems (CPS)
In benchmark-type workloads, silent data corruption in a single program output
commonly leads to a failure, e.g., an encryption algorithm fails if its encrypted data
is corrupted such that it cannot be decrypted. Hence, cross-layer resiliency often
targets reducing the rate of silent data corruption.
For cyber-physical systems (CPS), however, many workloads can tolerate devi-
ations from the fault-free outcome, e.g., in an embedded control algorithm, noise,
e.g., in sensors, is present and considered in the control design. It will treat silent
data corruption as yet another noise source, that can, possibly, be tolerated for
minor deviations from the correct value. Another effect is that CPS workloads
are commonly scheduled as periodic tasks. Often, the outputs of one instance of a
certain task are overwritten by the next instance of a task. Hence, a corruption of the
output of a single task has an effect only for a certain duration in time. Subsequent
task executions might mitigate the effect of silent data corruption before the system
behavior becomes critical. For example for control applications, the sampling rate of
the controller is often higher than demanded, such that a single corrupted actuation
command will not lead to a failure within one control period. Following sensor
readouts will show a deviation from the desired control behavior that is corrected
by the controller in subsequent control periods.
In order to consider the inherent resilience of CPS workloads, a full system
simulation is required. CPS usually form a closed loop with their environment,
e.g., actuation will change the physical system behavior, which determines future
sensor readouts. Extensive fault injection for obtaining a good resiliency evaluation
is enabled by the fast simulation speed of ETISS-ML [38], while RTL level fault
injection would be prohibitively slow to evaluate system behavior over a long
system-level simulation scenario. ETISS-ML can be integrated into a full-system
virtual prototype (VP) that models the system and its physical environment such that
error impacts can be classified considering the inherent resilience of CPS workloads.
For this, the physical behavior is traced to determine the impact of the error. A
major question to be investigated is how this inherent application resilience can be
exploited in an efficient way to reduce cost of protection techniques towards cross-
layer resilience of CPS.
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4 Experimental Results
This section presents results for cross-layer exploration. First, we show results that
support our claim that flip-flop level fault injection is required for soft errors in logic.
Then we provide the results for cross-layer exploration with CLEAR and ETISS-
ML for processors. Finally, we show the results for the cross-layer exploration of
protection techniques for the data cache of a control system for a self-balancing
robot.
4.1 Accuracy of FI at Different Abstraction Levels
For radiation-induced soft errors, flip-flop soft error injection is considered to be
highly accurate. Radiation test results confirm that injection of single bit flips into
flip-flops closely models soft error behaviors in actual systems [4, 43]. On the
other hand, [9] has shown that naïve high-level error injections (e.g., injection
of a single-bit error into an architecture register, software-visible register-file, or
program variable) can be highly inaccurate.
Accurate fault-injection is crucial for cost-effective application of cross-layer
resilience. Inaccurate reliability characterization may lead to over- or underprotec-
tion of the system. Overprotection results in wasted cost (e.g., area, power, energy,
price) and underprotection may result in unmitigated system failures.
In order to observe the impact of soft errors in the data and control path of a
OR1K processor sub-system, the error propagation was tracked to the architectural-
visible states in [38] for four test cases. In total 70k fault injection scenarios were
run on each test case. The injection points were micro-architectural FFs in the RTL
implementation such as pipeline and control path registers, that are not visible at
the architectural level. First all soft errors were identified that had no impact on the
architectural state since they were either being masked or latent. On average these
were 67.51%.
On architectural level, we inject single bit flip fault scenarios as it is unclear what
multi-bit fault scenarios could really happen in HW. These scenarios will cover all
single bit flip soft errors in an architectural state as well as any soft error in a micro-
architectural state that propagates and corrupts just a single bit of an architectural
state. In this case it makes no difference whether we inject the single bit flip in
the micro-architectural state or architectural state. Yet, the distribution could be
different. We now observe the experimental results as given in Table 2: 25.09%
of the micro-architectural faults corrupted a single bit in the architectural state for a
single cycle. These faults would be covered by fault injection at architectural level.
But 7.40% of the soft errors corrupted several bits of the architectural state or lead to
several bit flips in subsequent cycles. Injecting single bit soft errors in architectural
states at architecture- or software level will not cover these micro-architectural fault
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Table 2 Impact of single bit flip in micro-arch FFs on architectural processor state
Test case Masked or latent [%] Single bit corruption [%] Multi-bit corruption [%]
JDCT 66.77 25.68 7.55
AES 66.36 26.13 7.51
IIR 68.88 23.83 7.29
EDGE 68.02 24.73 7.25
Average 67.51 25.09 7.40
Table 3 General-purpose processor core designs studied
Design Description Clk. freq. Error injections Instructions per cycle




2.0GHz 5.9 million 0.4





600MHz 3.5 million 1.3
scenarios. Hence, one needs to look into RTL fault injection to obtain accurate
results for these faults.
4.2 Cross-Layer Resilience Exploration with CLEAR
The CLEAR framework is first used to explore a total of 586 cross-layer combina-
tions in the context of general-purpose processor cores. In particular, this extensive
exploration consists of over 9 million flip-flop soft error injections into two diverse
processor core architectures (Table 3): a simple, in-order SPARC LEON3 core
(InO-core) and a complex superscalar out-of-order Alpha IVM core (OoO-core).
Evaluation is performed across 18 application benchmarks from the SPECINT2000
[22] and DARPA PERFECT [2] suites.
Several insights resulted from this extensive exploration: accurate flip-flop level
injection and layout (i.e., physical design) evaluation reveal many individual tech-
niques provide minimal (less than 1.5×) SDC/DUE improvement (contrary to con-
clusions reported in the literature that were derived using inaccurate architecture- or
software-level injection [20, 36]), have high costs, or both. The consequence of this
revelation is that most cross-layer combinations have high cost.
Among the 586 cross-layer combinations explored using CLEAR, a highly
promising approach combines selective circuit-level hardening using LEAP-DICE,
logic parity, and micro-architectural recovery (flush recovery for InO-cores, reorder
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buffer (RoB) recovery for OoO-cores). Thorough error injection using application
benchmarks plays a critical role in selecting the flip-flops protected using these
techniques.
From Table 4, to achieve a 50× SDC improvement, the combination of LEAP-
DICE, logic parity, and micro-architectural recovery provides 1.5× and 1.2× energy
savings for the OoO- and InO-cores, respectively, compared to selective circuit
hardening using LEAP-DICE. This scenario is shown under “bounded latency
recovery.” The relative benefits are consistent across benchmarks and over the range
of SDC/DUE improvements.
If recovery hardware is not needed (i.e., there exist no recovery latency con-
straints and errors can be recovered using an external means once detected), minimal
(<0.2% energy) savings can be achieved when targeting SDC improvement. This
scenario is shown under “unconstrained recovery.” However, without recovery
hardware, DUEs increase since detected errors are now uncorrectable; thus, no DUE
improvement is achievable.
Additional cross-layer combinations spanning circuit, logic, architecture, and
software layers are presented in Table 4. In general, most cross-layer combinations
are not cost-effective. For general-purpose processors, a cross-layer combination of
LEAP-DICE, logic parity, and micro-architectural recovery provides the lowest cost
solution for InO- and OoO-cores for all improvements.
4.3 Resilience Exploration for Custom Accelerators
Utilizing a high-level synthesis (HLS) engine from UIUC [5], 12 accelerator
designs derived from the PolyBench benchmark suite [42] were evaluated with
protection using LEAP-DICE (circuit), logic parity (logic), modulo-3 shadow
datapaths (architecture), EDDI (software), and ABFT (algorithm) techniques. Note
that, software and algorithm techniques are converted into hardware checkers during
high-level synthesis.
Consistent with processor core results, cost-effective resilience solutions for
domain-specific hardware accelerators (Table 5) required the use of circuit-level
techniques (e.g., a 50× SDC improvement was achieved at less than 6% energy cost
using a combination of application-guided selective LEAP-DICE and logic parity).
However, even given the application-constrained context of accelerators, software-
level (and algorithm-level) resilience techniques were unable to provide additional
benefits.
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Table 5 Costs (area/energy) and improvements for resilience in 12 domain-specific accelerators
SDC improvement
Resilience technique(s) 2× 5× 50× 500×
Selective LEAP-DICE 0.9%/3.3% 1.2%/5% 1.7%/7% 2.2%/8.8%
Selective parity checking 1.4%/4.4% 2.2%/6.4% 3.1%/8.7% 3.4%/10.6%
LEAP-DICE + parity 0.6%/2.7% 1%/3.9% 1.3%/5.7% 1.7%/7.4%
Mod-3 + LEAP-DICE + parity 0.7%/3.6% 2.3%/4.7% 2.9%/6.5% 3.3%/8.1%
EDDI + LEAP-DICE + parity 27.6%/33% 27.6%/33.2% 27.6%/33.4% 28.3%/34%
ABFT + LEAP-DICE + parity 11.9%/23.8% 12.2%/24.1% 12.3%/24.2% 12.3%/24.8%
Table 6 Micro-controller (μC) design studied
Design Description Clk. freq. Error injections
μC OpenRISC [40] Simple, in-order (no caches), (1440
flip-flops) with timer and interrupt
controller
100MHz 500,000
4.4 Resilience Exploration for Fixed-hardware
Micro-Controller
The multi-level simulation was implemented for a fixed-hardware micro-controller
(μC) as shown in Table 6. The RTL implementation uses only the pipeline,
programmable interrupt controller, and timer but no caches in order to have a μC-
type processor similar to ARM’s CortexM family. We study a full system simulation
setup based on a SystemC VP, which models an μC used in a simplified adaptive
cruise control (ACC) system. Its goal is to maintain a constant distance between
two moving vehicles by controlling the speed of the rear vehicle via the throttle
value of the motor (actuator). The processor of the μC periodically executes a PI
control algorithm. The PI control algorithm’s inputs are sensor values measuring
the distance to the front vehicle and speed of the rear vehicle. Figure 4 shows the
SystemC/TLM model structure of the system with μC, actuator and sensors. The
sensor values are dynamically generated by a physics simulation of the two vehicles
based on the commands sent to the actuator. The system boots and then starts
execution from time zero. We define a simple safety specification to demonstrate
the evaluation. The desired distance between the vehicles is set to 40m. A fault
is classified to cause a system-level failure when the distance leaves the corridor
between 20m and 60m within a given driving scenario. For this scenario, both
vehicles have same speed and a distance of 50m at time zero.
Figure 5 shows the simulation results for four fault injection (FI) simulations.
The green curve shows a soft error that has no influence on the system outputs,
which results in the same curve visible in the fault-free run. The blue curve shows
the inherent fault tolerance of control algorithms. Even though the actuator output
is corrupted by the soft error, the control algorithm is able to recover from the
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Fig. 4 SystemC VP of control system



















Fig. 5 Distance plotted for different FIs
disturbance. The distance does not leave the specified corridor. Finally, the pink
and red curves show faults leading to a system failure.
In order to test cross-layer resiliency, we apply the following error detection
and handling mechanisms. We concentrate on methods supported by fixed-hardware
μCs, for which we would not be able to modify the logic or circuit implementation.
Watchdog Timer (WDT) The control algorithm has to write a value to the actuator
every 10ms. If no actuator write is detected, the system is reset by the WDT.
Task Duplication The control task is executed twice and the results are compared
before the actuation.
EDDI EDDI is applied by the compiler to protect the data flow of the control
application.
CFCSS CFCSS is applied by the compiler to protect the control flow of the control
application.
The compiler can only apply EDDI and CFCSS on the software functions of the
PI control task, not on software functions coming from the pre-compiled OR1K C-
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Table 7 Comparison of resilience techniques for μC with watchdog timer (WDT) and external
recovery by system reset
Resilience WDT SW SDC Failure rate Exec. time
technique(s) Det. rate Det. rate rate due to SDC impact
WDT 8.562% 0% 0.674% 0.061% 0%
Task duplic.+WDT 11.429% 1.284% 0.026% 0.002% 146.21%
EDDI+WDT 11.926% 1.706% 0.014% 0.002% 155.86%
CFCSS+WDT 8.929% 2.028% 0.542% 0.047% 0.249%
EDDI+CFCSS+WDT 13.370% 2.169% 0.017% 0.001% 156.857%
libraries. When task duplication, EDDI or CFCSS detect a fault, the SW triggers a
reset.
Each method comes with a certain overhead and improvement in SDC rate as
shown in Table 7. The column “WDT Det. Rate” shows the percentage of faults
detected by the watchdog timer. The column “SW Det Rate” shows the percentage
of faults detected by EDDI, CFCSS and the comparison for Task Duplication
(depending on which protection is used). The SDC rate shows the percentage of
faults that lead to a corrupt actuation value without being detected by a protection
technique. Finally, the failure rate due to SDC shows the percentage of SDCs that
lead to a failure of the control algorithm. Exec. Time Impact shows the overhead due
to software redundancy inserted by the protection mechanisms. A WDT requires
additional area, which is usually available on modern μCs, hence, this is ignored.
The following conclusions can be derived from the results: overall, the WDT
detection rate is very high as it detects most DUEs, that result in incorrect timing
of the application. EDDI and task duplication increases the execution time of the
control task significantly at the cost of idle time of the processor. Yet, they also
lead to significant SDC reduction. EDDI is slightly better, as it works on the
intermediate representation (IR) and has a smaller vulnerability window. CFCSS
also increases the software detection rate. Upon closer inspection, CFCSS does not
lead to a significant reduction in SDC rate for both cases with and without EDDI.
The application has a simple control flow, hence, control flow errors are rare. Most
of the errors detected by CFCSS are due to errors during execution of the CFCSS
check codes themselves. Hence, they would not lead to SDC of the functional code,
yet, many errors are reported.
4.5 Resilience Exploration for SRAM Cache of Self-Balancing
Robot
The cross-layer exploration was applied to a self-balancing robot system in [28]
as shown in Fig. 6. The results are shown in Fig. 7. The figure shows the results
for nominal SRAM design (N), increased supply voltage (V), increased area (A)
and parity protection (P). The blue bar shows the rate of silent data corruption






















Fig. 6 Full simulation setup for self-balancing robot
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Fig. 7 Resilience exploration for cache of self-balancing robot
caused when a faulty cache line is read. The red bar shows those cases of silent data
corruption that significantly affect the system behavior, which we classify as failure.
The difference between the blue and red bar denotes the inherent resilience of the
system. For hardening the system, increasing the supply voltage (V) decreases the
silent data corruption rate (blue) and failure rate (red) but also increases the required
power per written cache bit (green). Increasing the area (A) decreases the silent data
corruption rate and failure rate more effectively compared to increasing the supply
voltage but at the cost of a larger increase in power. In contrast, the parity protection
(P) behaves differently to the hardening solutions. While parity also decreases the
rate of silent data corruption (blue), we see that those remaining errors that are read
from the cache (caused by an even number of upsets in the cache line) relatively
often influence the system behavior (red), which is classified as failure. In the case
of 1-bit parity protection the system is effectively protected from an odd number of
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errors in each cache line. Yet, compared to the nominal case the failure probability
of the system is only slightly reduced. The even number of upsets (mostly two bit
upsets) are causing more often a failure than the detected single bit upsets. Upsets
with three and more bits are not as relevant as they are very rare events. The key
insight is that decreasing silent data corruptions thus does not necessarily result in a
similar improvement in failure rate when considering the inherent resilience of the
CPS application.
5 Conclusions
This chapter covered the fast evaluation of resilience against radiation-induced
soft errors with multi-level/mixed-mode fault injection approaches as well as the
systematic exploration of protection techniques that collaborate in a cross-layer
fashion across the system stack. The methods were shown for case studies on custom
processors, accelerators, third-party micro-controllers, and an SRAM-based cache.
Although this chapter has focused on radiation-induced soft errors, our cross-
layer methodology and framework are equally effective at protecting against
additional error sources such as supply voltage variations, early-life failures, circuit
aging, and their combinations. For example, [6] demonstrates that cost-effective
protection against supply voltage variation is achieved using Critical Path Monitor
(CPM) circuit failure prediction and instruction throttling at 2.5% energy cost for a
64 in-order core design.
For error sources (such as early-life failures and circuit aging) that result from
system degradation over longer duration of time (days to years), periodic on-line
self-test and diagnostic are particularly effective at generating signatures to observe
such degradation [27, 32, 34]. Since many of the resilience techniques considered in
this chapter operate independently of the underlying error source, our conclusions
regarding these particular techniques are broadly applicable.
Finally, an open question that remains is how to efficiently exploit the inherent
resilience of CPS workloads. Full system simulation can help in a fast evaluation,
but it remains to be seen in future research how the cost of resilience can be reduced
by fully exploiting this potential in a cross-layer fashion.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
Runtime/reconfigurable architectures based on Field-Programmable Gate Arrays
(FPGAs) are a promising augment to conventional processor architectures such as
Central Processing Units (CPUs) and Graphic Processing Units (GPUs). Since the
reconfigurable parts are typically manufactured in the latest technology, they may
suffer from aging and environmentally induced dependability threats. In this chapter,
strategic online test methods for dependable runtime-reconfigurable architectures
as well as cross-layer optimizations for high reliability and lifetime are developed.
Firstly, two orthogonal online tests are proposed that ensure reliable configuration
of the reconfigurable fabric and aid fault detection. Secondly, a novel design method
called module diversification is presented that enables self-repair of the system
in case of faults caused by degradation effects as well as single-event upsets in
the configuration. Thirdly, a novel stress-aware placement method is proposed that
aims for slowing down system degradation by aging effects. The combined methods
ensure reliable operation across architectural and gate level and allow to prolong the
lifetime of dependable runtime-reconfigurable architectures.
The dependable operation of VLSI circuits is not only threatened by test escapes,
intermittent or transient errors, but also by emerging hardware defects due to aging
[11–13]. In nano-scale CMOS circuits, aging is related to stress which is defined
as the condition under which a circuit structure experiences electrical and physical
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Fig. 1 Main abstraction
layers of embedded systems
and this chapter’s major





















































Fig. 2 Threshold voltage increase due to HCI-related stress (based on [22])
degradations. Two types of stress are distinguished: static stress and dynamic stress.
Dynamic stress is typically characterized by the toggle rate of a transistor during
which high currents flow between drain and source. A transistor is under static
stress when an electric field is exerted across its gate oxide to induce a conducting
channel. The stress is characterized by the duty cycle, i.e., the fraction of operation
time the transistor is conducting. Dynamic stress leads to aging effects like Hot
Carrier Injection (HCI), while static stress can lead to Bias Temperature Instability
(BTI). Both are dominating aging mechanisms in nano-CMOS technologies [8, 16]
and cause shifts in the threshold voltage Vth of a transistor, which ultimately
impacts the device performance over time. In this chapter, strategic online test
methods for dependable runtime-reconfigurable architectures as well as cross-layer
optimizations for high reliability and lifetime are developed (see Fig. 1).
The Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) of a transistor is defined as the time until
its threshold voltage exceeds a certain critical value at which the transistor cannot
deliver the required performance anymore. As shown in Fig. 2, the MTTF can be
greatly increased if the transistor stress and consequently the threshold voltage shift
are reduced.
Different aging models exist [2, 8], which indicate that both dynamic and static
stress are generally additive through accumulation of the degradation effects. As a
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result, this additive stress accumulation causes a monotonic increase in the transistor
degradation over long terms. Although BTI degradation may experience a recovery
effect, the recovery requires complex conditions or long relaxation periods [10] and
will thus hardly affect the additive property. The monotonic and additive properties
allow to consider stress during runtime (e.g., for resource management) with limited
computational resources.
1.1 Application Model
In this work, a general application model is considered, as shown in Fig. 3. An
application (Fig. 3a) consists of a mixture of normal operations, e.g., memory
allocation and data preparation, and one or multiple computationally intensive parts,
the so-called kernels. A kernel (Fig. 3b) corresponds to an outer loop that iterates
through the whole data set and that contains one or multiple inner loops that work
on small data parts, specified by the current iteration of the outer loop. For example,
in a stencil operation of an image, the outer loop iterates over each output pixel
and the inner loop computes the output value based on multiple neighboring input
pixel values. Such an inner loop is a good candidate to be implemented as a Special
Instruction (SI) that is composed of one or multiple accelerators of potentially
different types. An SI (Fig. 3c) is represented by a data-flow graph (DFG) where
each node corresponds to an accelerator and the edges correspond to data-flow
between the accelerators [4]. Before the execution of an SI, all required accelerators
need to be configured into the reconfigurable fabric, or otherwise the SI has to be
emulated in software on the GPP. A sophisticated H.264 video encoder is the main
application used for evaluation. The encoder consists of three kernels that require






















Fig. 3 This generic application model considers applications that consist of one or multiple
kernels that may use Special Instructions (SIs) that are implemented by accelerators (based on
[23])














































Fig. 4 Target reconfigurable architecture (based on [7])
1.2 Runtime-Reconfigurable Architectures
Runtime reconfiguration enables dynamic hardware customization to adapt to
changing application requirements or environmental constraints, which maximizes
performance at very low energy consumption. A reconfigurable architecture consists
of a general-purpose processor and a reconfigurable fabric, partitioned into multiple
reconfigurable regions (used to implement application-specific accelerators on-
demand) that are interconnected via a communication infrastructure.
This chapter presents Online Test Strategies for Reliable Reconfigurable Archi-
tectures (OTERA), which targets FPGA-based fine-grained reconfigurable architec-
tures as shown in Fig. 4. While transient faults due to single-event upsets are also
addressed by OTERA (more details in [7]), this chapter focuses on aging-related
challenges. To support dependable operation by online testing, stress balancing,
and resource management for reliability and graceful degradation, a reconfigurable
baseline architecture is extended by the following components:
• a test manager including a test-pattern generator (TPG) and an output response
analyzer (ORA) to perform structural tests on the reconfigurable fabric and
functional tests on the reconfigured accelerators;
• a workload monitor to track when a region is reconfigured and how often the
currently configured accelerator is executed, which is used for stress estimation;
• a configuration memory scrubber to detect and correct errors in the configuration
memory by periodical read-back and check of the configuration;
• a runtime system for dynamic dependability management by environmental
monitoring, online test, reliability management, and aging mitigation.
The architecture is implemented using a LEON processor [9] and a parameteriz-
able number of reconfigurable regions. A SystemC-based cycle-accurate simulator
is used to evaluate the architecture and its runtime system. A hardware prototype is
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developed on a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA and operates at a clock frequency of 100MHz
with a reconfiguration bandwidth of 50MB/s.
FPGA hardware is composed of a two-dimensional array of reconfigurable
primitive logic elements and routing structures that logic functions are mapped
to. The two essential components are Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) and
Programmable Switching Matrices (PSMs). The CLBs are the basic reconfigurable
resources for implementing combinatorial and sequential logic functions. The
interconnection between the components is configured using the PSMs. The logic
function in a reconfigurable region is determined by configuration bits, called its
bitstream, stored in SRAM-based configuration memory. Modern FPGAs support
partial reconfiguration and allow to change the logic function without interrupting
the operation in other parts of the chip [19].
An FPGA-based reconfigurable fabric, manufactured in latest technology nodes
(e.g., 16 nm for Xilinx’ UltraScale+ family), may suffer from degradation due
to aging [10, 18]. Due to the increasing susceptibility of ever-shrinking nano-
CMOS devices, these effects cannot be ignored anymore [11–13]. The resilience
of the reconfigurable fabric is essential to the dependability of reconfigurable
architectures, since most of the application’s computations are offloaded to the
fabric. The dependable operation of a hardware accelerator in the reconfigurable
fabric relies on both the structural integrity of the fabric and the accelerator’s
functional correctness. While structural integrity of the reconfigurable fabric is a
prerequisite for functional correctness of accelerators, the latter requires the correct
completion of the reconfiguration process and correctness of the configuration data.
However, the functionality of accelerators can be impacted during operation, for
instance by SEUs that corrupt configuration data [7] as well as degradation of
the hardware. To increase the dependability of the reconfigurable architecture, the
structural integrity and functional correctness need to be addressed at different
layers.
2 Fault Detection Through Strategic Online Testing
As latent defects and aging threaten the structural integrity of nano-CMOS devices,
conventional manufacturing and burn-in tests are no longer sufficient to guar-
antee dependable operation over the whole lifetime. Therefore, online tests are
required to check the system functionality. This task is particularly challenging
for runtime-reconfigurable architectures, since the hardware organization changes
during runtime as part of the normal operation [4]. This chapter presents two
complementing types of online tests that are scheduled concurrently by the runtime
system: pre-configuration online tests (PRET) and post-configuration online tests
(PORT).
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2.1 Generation and Runtime Scheduling of Online Tests
PRET is designed to exhaustively test the underlying hardware structure in the
reconfigurable fabric (e.g., logic resources in CLBs) periodically or on-demand. For
PRET, an array-based structural test approach is used to generate test configurations
for the exhaustive test of all logic resources in a reconfigurable region [1, 5]. Addi-
tional PRET test configurations are generated to target the application-dependent
interconnects [6].
Since errors may also occur during the loading of bitstreams (e.g., due to faults
in the configuration logic or transient events like SEUs), the configured function
of the targeted region may be wrong or the configuration in other parts of the
reconfigurable fabric may be adversely altered. For this reason, PORT is designed
to perform at-speed functional tests on accelerators after their instantiation to ensure
that they were configured correctly. At runtime, PORT also periodically checks the
accelerators for malfunctions due to emergent permanent faults or soft errors in
the configuration memory. An Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) tool is
used to generate accelerator-specific test patterns to target the LUTs, combinational
functions, and sequential elements in CLBs, as well as interconnects. The stuck-
at fault model is used for components for which sufficient structural information
is available to derive the faults and for the interconnects. For the remaining
components, structural and cell faults are targeted during test generation resulting
in a hybrid fault model [6].
Figure 5 shows the proposed online test flow for a reconfigurable fabric with three
regions. In the first step (Fig. 5a), the runtime system decides that an accelerator
shall be reconfigured into a particular region, which triggers the demand to test the
hardware structures in that region before the actual configuration of accelerators
(the so-called on-demand PRET). To exhaustively test all reconfigurable resources
in the region, multiple test configurations (TCs) are required. The runtime system
can choose to execute PRET incrementally to reduce the delay, applying only a
subset of TCs (possibly none) prior to an accelerator reconfiguration. In practice,
on-demand PRET-TCs are only scheduled after a certain number of accelerator
configurations (ACs) have been configured. To reduce the impact on the application
performance due to unavailable regions, PRET is only executed at times when the
system needs to be reconfigured anyway. The runtime system tracks which TCs were
applied to a region in the past and how much time passed since the last exhaustive
PRET. Depending on this history, it activates PRET prior to an AC, reconfigures
the selected TCs into the region, and uses TPG and ORA of the Test Manager to
exercise the region (Fig. 5b).
In addition to on-demand PRETs, the runtime system also schedules periodic
PRETs to ensure that seldom-reconfigured regions are properly tested. Note that
PRET also needs to be executed regularly for regions that the application only
reconfigures once and then never again (e.g., if the application only consists of
one kernel; see Sect. 1.1). The reason is that PORT—despite its generally high
fault coverage (see [6])—cannot always identify all faults. For instance, when an
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Fig. 5 Test flow with PRET and PORT (based on [6])
accelerator contains internal state, it is not always possible to apply an input value
that propagates a possibly faulty value to an observable output. The periodic PRET
is implemented using a timer interrupt and a handler that consists of two phases:
(1) triggering the reconfiguration of a TC for a particular region and (2) executing
PRET after the TC is reconfigured.
If no structural fault is found by PRET, the runtime system reconfigures the
desired accelerator into the region (Fig. 5c). Before the accelerator is used by
the application, the runtime system triggers an on-demand PORT (Fig. 5d) to test
whether the reconfiguration process has completed without error. Additionally,
accelerators instantiated in other regions are tested as well to check that they
were not adversely affected by the reconfiguration. As PORT does not require
any reconfiguration of TCs, it operates significantly faster than PRET and is also
scheduled periodically during normal operation.
2.2 Online Test Integration
The test manager, TPG, and ORA are integrated into the reconfigurable architecture
and coupled to the interconnect for the reconfigurable fabric such that commu-
nication channels between the regions and the test manager can be established.
PRET and PORT are implemented as dedicated test-SI. In the base architecture,
all SIs implicitly configure the interconnect infrastructure for the required data-flow
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among accelerators and the system. The test-SIs reuse this mechanism to establish
the connections between the test manager and the regions under test.
When the runtime system initiates a test-SI, the test parameters such as the target
region or selection of test patterns are sent as the SI input data from the register file
of the processor to the test manager. The test manager then generates the patterns by
the TPG or sends stored patterns to the regions. While the PRET responses are sent
back to the test manager for comparison, the PORT responses are compacted locally
in space and time using a 32-bit multiple input signature register (MISR). The MISR
is integrated into the interconnect infrastructure such that the outputs and the bus
interface of a region are tested as well. After the test, the locally stored signatures are
transferred to the test manager and compared with the expected signatures that are
specific for each accelerator. At the end of PRET, the pass/fail information is written
back to the register file of the processor. On-demand PORT is executed directly after
an accelerator configuration to assure that the reconfiguration process completed
without error and that the configured accelerator delivers the expected functionality.
As PORT tests all configured accelerators in one test session, errors in the other
accelerators, e.g., due to address decoder faults, are detected as well.
2.3 Experimental Evaluation
The effectiveness of PRET and PORT as well as the impact on the system
performance is evaluated for the targeted platform. A test session consists of
multiple test configurations (TCs) as shown in Table 1. In total nine TCs are required
to test all logic primitives in the CLBs [1], and another nine TCs are required to test
the interconnects of the accelerators of the H.264 application [6]. Each TC tests
a subset of the logic primitives in the CLBs of a region or a set of interconnects
used by the accelerator to be configured (Column 2). Columns 3 and 4 give the area
overhead of PRET and the size of the generated partial bitstreams. The total area
overhead introduced by PRET for all TCs is 17 CLBs. That is a one-time overhead
to implement the test-pattern generator (TPG) and output response analyzer (ORA)
for PRET, independent of which reconfigurable region is to be tested, whereas the
other numbers in the table are per reconfigurable region. Note that the configuration
time with tens of thousands of cycles dominates the actual application of the test
patterns (Column 6).
The PRET overhead for the interconnect TCs is not applicable as the determin-
istic patterns are not generated by a TPG but stored similar to PORT patterns. The
responses are compacted in the MISR introduced for PORT. In total 3780 bytes
are required to store the test patterns of all interconnect TCs together with their
signatures. The interconnect test reaches a fault coverage of up to 100% with the
lowest being 98.28% [6].
The application performance loss introduced by PRET depends on the test
frequency and number of reconfigurable regions. In this experiment, architectures
Online Test Strategies and Optimizations for Reliable Reconfigurable Architectures 285
Table 1 Test configurations for CLBs and interconnects for reconfigurable regions of 4 × 20
CLBs (based on [6])
PRET over- Bitstream Freq. Test length
TC Tested primitives head [CLBs] size [KB] [MHz] [Patterns]
1 LUT conf. as XOR, connected to
FF
2 24.0 207 64
2 LUT conf. as XNOR, connected to
FF
2 24.0 207 64
3 Carry MUX, interleaved with
MUX and latch
1 28.6 168 6
4 Carry MUX, interleaved with
MUX and latch
1 26.1 154 6
5 Carry XOR, interleaved with MUX
and FF
1 28.0 168 6
6 Carry XOR, interleaved with MUX
and FF
1 28.2 154 6
7 Carry-in/-out with multiplexed
scan chain
1 27.1 183 6
8 LUT conf. as SR with slice MUX 1 22.9 157 6
9 LUT conf. as RAM with slice
output
7 22.3 225 320
10–18 Interconnect and PIPs of 9
accelerators
n.a. 29.6 78.8–191.9 13–123
with 5 and up to 14 reconfigurable regions are considered. The PRET handler is
triggered every 1ms and performs PRET if a region has not been tested for 500ms.
The observed test latencies until a region is completely tested ranged from 3.8 to
8.1 s, i.e., emergent faults do not remain undetected in the system for longer than 1.9
to 4.05 s on average. Table 2 reports the PORT performance impact and test latency.
The upper part of the table shows the performance impact for PORT frequencies
from 143 to 1000Hz, i.e., test intervals from 1 to 7ms. For each PORT frequency,
the table shows the minimum and maximum performance loss of ten reconfigurable
systems with different number of regions (5–14). The performance overhead due to
PORT is very low (between 0.51% and 3.73%) and scales well with higher PORT
frequencies. The observed worst case test latency, which corresponds to the longest
untested time period of a region, is shown in the lower part of Table 2.
With PRET and PORT both enabled, the system is able to defend the configured
accelerators against structural faults induced by aging effects or latent faults and
transient events such as radiation [6]. For a PORT frequency of less than 100Hz,
the performance loss was dominated by the configuration frequency. After that
point, the PORT frequency dominates the performance loss. The highest observed
performance loss of only 4.4% occurs for a PORT frequency of 1000Hz and a
configuration frequency of 41Hz.
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Table 2 Performance loss and worst case test latency under PORT (based on [6])
PORT application frequency [Hz]
143 167 200 250 333 500 1000
Performance loss min.a [%] 0.51 0.59 0.72 0.89 1.20 1.81 3.68
max.a [%] 0.56 0.63 0.75 0.92 1.23 1.85 3.73
Worst case test latencyb min.a [ms] 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.1 3.3 2.3 1.7
max.a [ms] 7.8 6.8 5.8 4.8 3.8 2.8 1.8
aSummarizing ten reconfigurable systems with 5–14 regions
bCorresponds to the longest time period in the whole runtime in which a configured accelerator
remains untested
3 Self-Repair by Module Diversification
Using PRET and PORT we can detect faults in the reconfigurable fabric. We now
present a design method called module diversification [21] that generates a set of
diversified configurations for each module/accelerator to tolerate any single-CLB
fault and part of multi-CLB faults. The diversified configurations of an accelerator
provide all the same functionality, but they vary in their CLB usage. They are
reconfigured into the region at runtime without performance degradation. If a faulty
CLB is detected, it is isolated from the system (i.e., a configuration is chosen that
does not use it) to avoid any errors.
3.1 Diversified Configurations
A module defines the logic functions to be implemented in a region which consists
of CLBs that are arranged regularly in a 2-dimensional array in the FPGA fabric.
The CLB usage of a configuration is described by a configuration matrix as shown
in Eq. (1) whose dimensions X × Y match the width X and height Y of a region
in CLBs. If a configuration uses a certain CLB, the corresponding element in
the matrix is 1, otherwise 0. For each module, a set C = {A1, · · · , Aw} of
configurations matrices with different CLB usage is generated. To be able to tolerate
any single-CLB fault, this set of configurations must satisfy the completeness
condition (Eq. (2)), which ensures that for any CLB in a region at least one
diversified configuration Ai exists where the CLB is not used. Given that all
diversified configurations implemented in a X × Y region occupy the same amount
U(< X · Y ) of CLBs (with at least one free CLB) a minimum number of wmin
configurations (Eq. (3)) is required for the completeness condition [21].
A =
⎡
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Two configurations Ai , Aj ∈ C are said to be maximally diversified if their
difference in the CLB usage is maximized. The max diversification condition [21]
states that for every configuration Ai ∈ C there exists a maximally diversified
configuration Aj ∈ C with a common number of CLBs:
















Algorithm 1 allows to generate maximally diversified configurations that satisfy the
completeness condition [21]. Starting from an initial configuration A1 (Line 1) of a
module, it incrementally generates diversified versions. A score matrix G stores
Algorithm 1 Generation of diversified configurations C
1. C := {A1} // A1 is the initial configuration (X × Y )
2. G := A1 // Score matrix G stores swapping priority of CLBs (X × Y )
3. Anew := A1
4. while |C| = desired number of config. ∧ |C| = (XYU ) do
5. zero_elem_list := {(x, y) | [Anew]xy = 0} // unused CLBs
6. cand_list := {(x, y) | [Anew]xy = 1} // candidate list
7. sort cand_list in descending order according to the score in Gxy
8. for all (x, y) in zero_elem_list do
9. swap_candidates := {(p, q) | (p, q) ∈ cand_list and Gpq = Gcand_list[0]} //
all CLBs with the highest score
10. farthest_swap_candidate := (p, q) ∈ swap_candidates with max.
Manhattan distance between (x, y) and (p, q)
11. swap([Anew]xy, [Anew]farthest_swap_candidate)
12. cand_list.pop(farthest_swap_candidate)




17. while Anew ∈ C do
18. swap a random zero- with random one-element in Anew
19. end while
20. G := G+ Anew // update CLB score
21. C := C ∪ {Anew}
22. end while
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for each CLB the number of available diversified configurations in C that use
the respective CLB resources. The new configuration matrix Anew is initialized
by A1 and modified in the inner loop (Lines 8–16) by swapping zero- and
one-elements. The loop iterates over each element in Anew and swaps all zero-
elements with one-elements in an order given by the score matrix (Line 7). If a
CLB has a higher score, it is used more often in the diversified configurations.
Thus the corresponding one-element in Anew will be swapped first. If CLBs have
the same score, the distance-wise farthest one from the current zero-element is
swapped first (Lines 9–11) so that the used CLBs are located near each other in
the resulting configuration. The first wmin generated configurations correspond to
the minimal set of configurations [21]. More configurations can be generated to
achieve higher reliability or more alternatives during stress balancing (see Sect. 4).
Random swapping in Line 18 allows to shuffle CLBs with different stress profiles.
The algorithm terminates when either the desired number of configurations or all
possible configurations have been generated.
3.3 Experimental Evaluation
To evaluate the reliability improvement and timing costs, the presented method is
applied to a set of functional modules from the MCNC benchmark suite [20] and
OpenCores.1 The dimensions of the reconfigurable regions were chosen as 20 CLBs
in height (80 CLBs for large modules) and 3–13 CLBs in width, which provides
different degrees of CLB redundancy. For each module and region size the minimal
set of configurations is generated using the proposed module diversification method.
Since the design method applies additional constraints to prohibit certain CLB
placements (PROHIBIT commands in Xilinx tools), additional routing effort is
introduced that can affect the maximum clock frequency. To assess the impact on the
system performance, the maximum frequency of diversified modules was compared
to the original configuration. Initially, the clock frequencies of the modules ranged
from 122.4MHz (apex2) to 150.8MHz (pdc). Experiments show that the timing
penalty of the diversified configurations ranges from 0.04% (aes_core) to 9.7%
(misex3). While the maximal frequency is given by the slowest configuration of
a module, the original implementation also belongs to the configuration set and can
be used when full performance is required. Also, if the system frequency is lower
than the maximal frequency of the diversified modules, there are no timing penalties
at all. Thus, module diversification is a promising approach to obtain fault tolerance
without additional area overhead and little to no cost in system performance.
The reliability of an entity is the probability that the entity can operate without
failure over a time period t . Without any fault-tolerance techniques applied, the
overall reliability of a module with U CLBs depends on the reliability RCLB(t) of
each individual CLB (Eq. (5)). With module diversification, the reliability of the
1https://www.opencores.org.
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module changes, as shown in Eq. (6). The first term states the probability that all
CLBs are fault free. The second term aggregates all possible scenarios of multiple
fault occurrences until all CLBs become faulty. The fault coverage Cf ∈ [0, 1] is
the fraction of f -CLB faults which are detected by an online test or concurrent error
detection scheme such that reconfiguration with a diversified configuration allows
to continue the operation. The fraction of f -CLB faults which can be tolerated with
the set of available configurations is denoted by αf ∈ [0, 1].
RNo_FT (t) = (RCLB (t))U (5)









Probability that f -fold CLB failures can be tolerated
(6)
We use the module apex4 for the reliability analysis. Without fault-tolerance
measures, the module has a very low reliability (≈0.91). Figure 6 shows the
module reliability for a varying number of configurations and region sizes with
CLB reliability RCLB(t) = 0.999 and Cf = 1.0. The region size varies from
20 × 6 to 20 × 9 CLBs and corresponds to CLB redundancies from 22.4% to
111.8%. Larger region sizes reduce the overall module reliability since they have
increased probability of a faulty CLB. By using diversified configurations, the
module reliability increases dramatically. As shown, the tolerance of f -CLB faults



































Fig. 6 Module reliability of apex4 for different ratios of CLB redundancy and number of
configurations with CLB reliability 0.999 (based on [21])






































Fig. 7 Reliability improvement factor after module diversification (based on [21])
To estimate the effectiveness of the module diversification, the reliability
improvement factor (RIF) is used [15]. The RIF is the ratio of the failure probability
of the original system and the failure probability of the fault tolerant system using
diversified module configurations (Eq. (7)). Figure 7 plots the RIF for the five
investigated modules and CLB reliabilities ranging from 0.9990 to 0.9999. As
shown, the proposed design method achieves reliability improvement factors of up
to 330×.
RIF := 1− RNo FT
1− RDiv (7)
4 Prolonging Lifetime via Stress Balancing
In addition to reacting on detected faulty CLBs (e.g., by using diversified modules as
in Sect. 3), it is of crucial importance to proactively delay the occurrence of perma-
nent faults (or increasing transistor switching delay) by aging mitigation via stress
balancing. Different aging mechanisms have been reported for the current genera-
tion of CMOS designs, as discussed in Sect. 1. The main causes of these effects are
environmental and electrical stress. Stress can be induced in different ways, e.g.,
through the presence of strong electrical fields or high current density [17, 18].
We propose the novel STRess-Aware Placement method STRAP that reduces
the peak stress by aging mitigation. It combines complex offline optimizations
at synthesis time with situation-dependent adaptation at runtime to optimize the
intra- and inter-region stress distribution simultaneously. At runtime, STRAP places
accelerators to different reconfigurable regions (i.e., it decides to which region they
shall be reconfigured) while considering the induced intra- and inter-region stress
distribution simultaneously. At synthesis time, STRAP diversifies stress during
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place-and-route by preventing overlapping of high stress CLBs from different
accelerators, which further improves the intra-region stress distribution at runtime.
4.1 Overview of the Stress-Aware Placement Method STRAP
The MTTF of a system is constrained by the component with the highest stress
[17]. In order to prolong the MTTF of a reconfigurable fabric, stress accumulation
on individual resources need to be avoid to reduce the peak stress. Figure 8a shows
a typical reconfigurable fabric with 8 reconfigurable regions and 4 × 20 CLBs per
region. The figure visualizes the distribution of HCI stress after running an H.264
video encoder. Higher HCI stress corresponds to more toggles per second of a
transistor (see Sect. 1). For each CLB, the highest toggle rate of any transistor is
identified and plotted in a color-scale from 0 (low stress, bright gray) to 20 million
toggles per second (high stress, dark red). It is noticeable that several CLBs are
not used (e.g., most parts of region 5), whereas some CLBs in region 1 contain
transistors that are highly stressed. The latter represent stress hotspots where high
stress accumulates in some of the components in the fabric which have a higher
chance to fail much earlier than others, hence reducing the MTTF of the system.
The basic idea of STRAP is to place accelerators such that the maximal stress
is minimized. Our method abstracts stress to the granularity of CLBs, whereas the
evaluation of our method in Sect. 4.6 considers stress at transistor granularity. If the
stress from a stress hotspot can be distributed to less stressed CLBs (like in region 5
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Fig. 8 Transistor stress distribution in a reconf. fabric with eight regions; each region consists of
4 × 20 CLBs with 8 LUTs each (same setup as for evaluation); the color of a CLB corresponds
to the highest toggle rate of any of its transistors; the symbol “filled triangle right” on the scale
denotes the maximum stress over all regions (based on [22]). (a) Conventional execution without
stress balancing. (b) Stress-aware placement in STRAP




























Fig. 9 Overview of the stress-aware placement method (based on [23])
in Fig. 8a), then the maximum stress in the reconfigurable regions is reduced (like
in Fig. 8b), leading to increased MTTF.
Figure 9 provides an overview of the stress-aware placement method STRAP,
showing the synthesis time techniques, the runtime techniques, and how they
interact with the hardware architecture of a reconfigurable system. For logic
placement at synthesis time, the challenge is to place-and-route accelerators in a way
that supports stress balancing at runtime, but without having runtime information.
STRAP first performs an offline application profiling of each application kernel to
obtain estimates on (1) how often accelerators will be executed relative to each
other and (2) how long each accelerator executes to finish its task. This information
is used to steer runtime accelerator placement (Sect. 4.3) and synthesis time logic
placement (Sect. 4.4).
Based on the accelerator configuration after place-and-route, the stress estimation
process in Fig. 9 analyzes the signal activities in all CLBs used by the accelerator
to obtain the information how much stress it induces to a reconfigurable region.
Accelerator execution and stress profiles are stored together with the accelerator
bitstreams in main memory for runtime decision making.
At runtime, STRAP decides into which reconfigurable region an accelerator shall
be reconfigured, whenever the application demands different accelerators. It per-
forms online monitoring of each region to track when the region was reconfigured
last and how often the currently reconfigured accelerator was executed. Whenever
a region is reconfigured, the execution counter and reconfiguration timestamp are
read and reset. Together with the accelerator stress profile created at synthesis
time, STRAP then calculates the exact stress state for all CLBs of the region. This
information is used to decide the runtime accelerator placement.
Online Test Strategies and Optimizations for Reliable Reconfigurable Architectures 293
4.2 Representation of Stress
Stress Granularity In order to handle the transistor stress in an algorithmic way,
it needs to be represented compactly to allow an efficient runtime computation for
the stress states of regions and the placement decision making. The transistors of
a reconfigurable region are stressed by the reconfigured accelerator in a way that
is determined by its logic functionality and input signal patterns. As the number of
transistors in a region may be huge, the stress experienced by individual transistors
is lumped to CLB granularity for the stress-aware placement method. CLB stress is
defined as the sum of the stress experienced by all transistors in a CLB. With this
definition, CLB stress preserves the additive property of transistor stress, i.e., the
total stress a CLB experienced from different accelerators is the sum of the induced
stress from individual accelerators.
Stress Accumulation With the established stress properties (see Sect. 1), the stress
in the reconfigurable fabric can be described in a formal way. The stress state of
a reconfigurable region (as it is visualized in Fig. 8) is denoted as matrix S, where
each entry represents the stress experienced by the corresponding CLB in the region.
The stress that a particular accelerator induces per clock cycle is obtained from
offline stress estimation and called unit stress, denoted by a matrix of the same
size as S. In general, the stress increase due to the work done by an accelerator
is shown in Eq. (8). Matrices sunitexec and s
unit
idle denote the unit stress induced by the
accelerator during execution or idle time and Sect. 4.6 explains how we use aging
models to obtain these values by power/temperature analysis of placed-and-routed
accelerators. Scalars τexec and τidle denote the number of clock cycles when the
accelerator is executing or idle.
s := τexecsunitexec + τidlesunitidle (8)
The values for τexec and τidle are obtained from offline application profiling to
construct the stress matrices (Eq. (8)) for every accelerator. The runtime system
uses them to determine how much stress an accelerator would induce to a region
before actually placing it. It also uses online monitoring (see Sect. 4.1) that provides
the actual number of accelerator executions and idle times for each region after
a computational kernel finished execution. This allows to keep track of the actual
stress that a region experienced, which is the starting point for the next placement
decision.
4.3 Runtime Accelerator Placement
The reconfigurable fabric consists of N equally sized rectangular regions. During
runtime, the application requests to configure M ≤ N accelerators to speed up
its computational kernels. The runtime system has to decide to which regions the
M accelerators shall be configured, by first deciding which N −M regions shall
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not be reconfigured, e.g., by using a least recently used replacement policy. The
decision to which of the remaining regions an accelerator is placed does not affect
the application performance, but it affects the stress applied to the regions.
Each region contains X × Y CLBs with an (x, y) coordinate. The stress
experienced so far by the CLBs in region k is denoted as [Sk]xy and the stress that
will be induced by an accelerator j is denoted as [sj]xy (see Eq. (8)). It depends on
how often the accelerator will be executed, as determined by offline profiling (see
Sect. 4.1). If an accelerator j is placed into region k, then the accelerator executions
increase the stress state of the region to S′k = Sk + sj. The challenge is to place
each accelerator to a region, such that upon completion of the application kernel
the maximum CLB stress over the N regions is minimized, i.e., maxk,x,y [S′k]xy is
minimized. It can be easily seen that the strict lower bound of the maximum CLB
stress is given by Eq. (9), which is reached if and only if the stress is uniformly
distributed over all CLBs. To achieve this at runtime, we propose a heuristic that
follows these two rules: (1) maximal utilization of under-stressed CLBs within one
region, i.e., the stress shall be evenly distributed among different CLBs within the
region (intra-region distribution) and (2) avoid placing high stress accelerators into
highly stressed regions, i.e. the stress shall be evenly distributed among different
regions (inter-region distribution). The heuristic uses a profit function (Eq. (10)) for
placing accelerator j into region k that considers the stress distribution within one



















Profitjk = Profitintrajk + Profitinterjk (10)
To calculate Profitintrajk , the average CLB stress in region k is determined as
AvgStressk and then used to calculate the absolute deviation of the stress of CLBxy
in region k from AvgStressk . The sum over all CLBs in region k denotes the
intra-region stress imbalance. It is calculated (1) before placing accelerator j to
region k and (2) after hypothetically placing it. The difference of these two values
corresponds to the degree of increased stress imbalance if placing accelerator j to
region k and is used as Profitintrajk . The idea for Profit
inter
jk is very similar. There, the
stress of region k is compared with the average stress of all regions before and after
hypothetically placing accelerator j to region k [22].
The stress-aware runtime accelerator placement iterates over all required accel-
erators. In each iteration, it calculates the profits of placing the accelerator into all
available regions and then places the accelerator into the region that provides the




. If the application
does not reconfigure a region for a longer time, then this region would be constantly
stressed by one accelerator without stress redistribution. As a solution, the runtime
accelerator placement forces that region to be reconfigured after a user-defined time
period that should not be too short to prevent increased reconfiguration overhead
Online Test Strategies and Optimizations for Reliable Reconfigurable Architectures 295
and also not too long to avoid stress accumulation. For instance, a time period of
100 million cycles (1 s at 100MHz) is short enough to avoid aging accumulation
and the induced application performance degradation is only 0.21%.
4.4 Synthesis Time Logic Placement
Our runtime accelerator placement uniformly distributes the stress over all reconfig-
urable regions, compared to the stress-unaware placement. The maximal transistor
toggle rate is reduced by more than 73% from 18.8 million toggles/s (see Fig. 8a)
down to 5.0. However, when high stress CLBs of different accelerators overlap
at the same relative (x, y) location, the runtime accelerator placement cannot
achieve intra-region stress distribution. STRAP addresses this problem by applying
placement constraints at synthesis time to diversify (similar to Sect. 3.1) the CLB
usage among different accelerators, which reduces the overlapping of high stress
CLBs. To minimize the timing impact on accelerators, STRAP only constrains
which CLBs shall be used and leaves everything else to the vendor place-and-route
algorithm.
The logic placement algorithm (Algorithm 2) diversifies the high stress CLBs of
different accelerators to different CLB locations in the regions. First, unconstrained
configurations of all accelerators are generated (Lines 1–5). For each accelerator
Algorithm 2 Stress-diversifying logic placement
Input: List of accelerators Acc.
1. for j := 1 to len(Acc) do
2. Place-and-route Acc[j] without any placement constraints
3. sj := get_stress(Acc[j])
4. Acc[j].max_freq := get_max_freq(Acc[j])
5. end for
6. Acc := sort_ascending(Acc, key=max_freq)
7. R := s1
8. for j := 2 to len(Acc) do
9. prohibit_xy := ∅
10. for x := 1 to Acc[j].n_cols do
11. for y := 1 to Acc[j].n_rows do





17. Place-and-route Acc[j] with prohibited CLB locations listed in prohibit_xy









20. goto Line 17
21. end if
22. R := R + get_stress(Acc[j])
23. end for
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configuration the CLB stress is estimated (see Sect. 4.2), and the maximal achievable
frequency is extracted from the place-and-route log files (Lines 3–4). The generated
initial configurations are then sorted in ascending order of their maximal achievable
frequencies (Line 6). The fabric typically runs at the frequency of the slowest
accelerator fmin. In order to minimize the impact on system performance, it is
placed and routed without stress-diversifying placement constraints. Its CLB stress
distribution is taken as the initial reference distribution (Line 7). As long as the
proposed logic placement does not reduce the frequency of an accelerator below
fmin, there is no performance impact/penalty for the whole system. During the
generation of other accelerator configurations, R keeps track of the sum of the stress
distribution of all j−1 previously generated accelerators, i.e., R =∑j−1i=1 si.
The remaining accelerators will be placed-and-routed again in ascending order
of their maximal frequencies (Lines 8–23). To avoid that high stress CLBs of
the currently placed accelerator Acc[j] overlap with those in previously placed
accelerators Acc[1],...,Acc[j-1], we prohibit the placement to specific
CLB locations for Acc[j] (Lines 9–17) if Eq. (11) is satisfied, where Lj is the
number of used CLBs by the currently place-and-routed accelerator Acc[j]. R̂
and ŝj are normalized stress matrices of R and sj. In earlier iterations, the reference
distribution is less even, which implies that few CLB locations in the reference
distribution have much higher values than the others, and therefore it is less likely
that the condition in Eq. (11) is satisfied. In turn, fewer locations are prohibited
for placement in earlier iterations, which implies less timing impact on slower
accelerators. If place-and-route fails due to too many prohibited CLB locations,
the locations xy where the stress overlapping [R̂ + ŝj]xy is lowest are removed












with R̂ = R
maxuv [R]uv







With synthesis time stress diversification, high stress CLBs from different
accelerators are placed to different CLB locations, and thus better intra-region
stress distribution can be achieved during runtime placement. After applying both
stress-aware runtime placement and synthesis time stress diversification for dynamic
stress, the maximal transistor toggle rate is further reduced by additional 44% from
5.0 million toggles/s down to 2.8 (see Fig. 8b).
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4.5 Extended Accelerator Placement with Module
Diversification
The module diversification method (see Sect. 3) generates a set of configurations for
each accelerator that are diversified in terms of CLB usage. This not only allows to
tolerate any single-CLB fault in a region but can also improve the stress distribution
with the extra CLB diversity. When faults are detected in the reconfigurable fabric,
the placement freedom of accelerators is reduced. The placement freedom of an
accelerator corresponds to the number of regions for which the accelerator has
at least one diversified configuration that can be placed into that region (i.e., that
tolerates the permanent faults in that region). Such a region is called a compatible
region. If the available regions (i.e., those into which no accelerators are placed by
the placement algorithm so far) have rather many permanent faults, it can happen
that no configuration of the accelerator can be placed into any of them. If an
accelerator cannot be placed, then its hardware functionality has to be emulated in
software on the processor pipeline, which comes at a significant performance loss.
To avoid such situations, the runtime accelerator placement (see Sect. 4.3) is
modified to place the accelerators one after the other in ascending order of their
number of compatible regions. If it comes to the situation that some accelerator
cannot be placed into the available regions, then the algorithm re-evaluates some
of its previous placement decisions (note that the actual reconfigurations are just
started after all placements are finally decided). It tries whether it can swap one
of the already placed accelerators into one of the still available regions such that
accelerator can be placed into the region that became free due to swapping. When
calculating the placement profit (see Eq. (10)), the algorithm also iterates through all
diversified configurations to find out which configuration of the accelerator produces
the highest placement profits.
4.6 Experimental Evaluation
For prototyping purposes, we have integrated STRAP into the Xilinx tool-chain
and the runtime system of the target reconfigurable architecture. In our evaluation
platform, each region consists of 4 × 20 CLBs with eight 6-input LUTs per CLB.
STRAP performs optimizations on CLB granularity. To evaluate the actual stress
for each transistor, a transistor-level model of LUTs using NMOS pass transistors
for multiplexers is used [22]. To evaluate the threshold voltage shift due to stress,
state-of-the-art aging models are employed (detailed equations and used parameters
are given in [22]). The resource usage of each accelerator within one region for the
H.264 application ranges from 8.8% to 66.3%. Our architectural simulator is used to
evaluate the STRAP method for systems that differ in the number of reconfigurable
regions and runtime strategies, and to compare it with related work.
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Evaluation Flow The placed-and-routed accelerators are fed to Xilinx XPower
analyzer to obtain the signal activities and power consumption of logic elements and
nets. The power consumption is then aggregated to CLB granularity by summing
up the power consumed by LUTs and their fan-in nets in one CLB. The leakage
power of a region is proportional to its size. Architectural simulation produces the
accelerator execution trace, i.e., the complete execution and idle history of each
accelerator in each region. Together with the power profile of each accelerator, we
obtain the power trace of each CLB. The power trace and the fabric floorplan of the
FPGA2 are then fed into Hotspot3 [14] to obtain the temperature trace of each CLB,
which will be used to evaluate the threshold voltage shift. The accelerator execution
trace and the LUT signal activities of each accelerator are combined to calculate
the LUT signal activities for the regions. This is then used to evaluate the stress of
individual transistors by using the before-mentioned LUT transistor model.
The number of regions is varied from 5 to 12 and separate evaluation is performed
for dynamic and static stress mitigation, since STRAP optimizes either for dynamic
or for static stress. The baseline system does not use any stress distribution
method. For comparison, two state-of-the-art stress distribution methods [3, 21]
were implemented. Zhang et al. [21] use three different configurations for each
accelerator and switch between them to migrate stress, whereas Angermeier et al.
[3] consider the peak stress of regions to place an accelerator. As proposed for
STRAP, Angermeier et al. [3] and Zhang et al. [21] were extended to replace an
accelerator if its reconfigurable region has not been reconfigured for 100 million
cycles (see Sect. 4.3). This improvement reduces the peak stress of [3, 21] and
thus makes the comparison with state-of-the-art more competitive. Regarding
temperature variation, a conservative comparison is performed. To calculate the
threshold voltage shift for [3, 21], the lowest temperature that was observed for
any CLB at any time in the obtained temperature trace is used as the constant
temperature for all CLBs, while the highest observed temperature is applied for
STRAP. Thus, the threshold voltage shift reported for [3, 21] is a lower limit,
whereas the one for STRAP is a conservative upper limit.
Timing Overhead STRAP’s stress-diversifying logic placement at synthesis time
may affect the accelerator frequency. The place-and-route tool is given a target
frequency of 250MHz as timing constraint to obtain the maximum operating
frequency of each accelerator. On average, the maximum accelerator frequency
decreases by 7%. Since accelerators with longer critical path (lower maximum
frequency) are imposed with fewer constraints (see Sect. 4.4), their maximum
frequencies are less affected. The maximum system frequency is however limited by
the accelerator with the longest critical path (in our case the PointFilter accelerator,
which runs at fmin = 89MHz). Therefore, STRAP has no negative timing impact
on the system.
2Based on a high-resolution die image acquired from https://chipworks.com (now https://
techinsights.com).
3Smallest possible heat spreader and heat sink with 10 µm thickness, ambient temperature 50 ◦C.
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Fig. 10 The dynamic stress in systems with different number of reconfigurable regions when using
our STRAP approach compared to the baseline, Angermeier et al. [3] and Zhang et al. [21] (based
on [22])
Stress Reduction and MTTF Improvement Figure 10 shows the maximal (lighter
color) and average (darker color; arithmetic mean) dynamic transistor stress,
measured in million toggles/s, in the whole reconfigurable fabric for systems with
different number of regions. It shows that all methods reduce the average stress
compared to the baseline because they all distribute the stress to more transistors.
While the reduction of the average stress is similar for all three methods, the
reduction of the maximal stress (i.e., the critical part for system mean time to
failure (MTTF)) differs significantly and requires both runtime and synthesis time
optimization. The reason is that Angermeier et al. [3] perform only runtime inter-
region stress distribution, while Zhang et al. [21] perform only synthesis time
intra-region stress distribution for individual accelerators. In contrast, STRAP
performs cross-layer stress-aware placement at runtime and synthesis time, which
leads to the highest reduction of maximal stress in all evaluated cases. The reduction
of the maximum stress by STRAP is up to 64% and 35% higher than the closest
competitors w.r.t. dynamic and static stress, respectively. Table 3 summarizes the
stress reduction.
Although during optimization only one type of stress is considered, actually both
types of stress are reduced simultaneously. With STRAP targeting the static stress
distribution, a reduction of 52% in dynamic and 38% in static stress is observed.
When targeting dynamic stress, STRAP delivers 82% reduction in dynamic stress
and 21% reduction in static stress. The reason behind the reduction of both stress
types is that STRAP implicitly distributes the transistor usage as well, which reduces
the individual static and dynamic transistor stress.
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Table 3 Reduction of avg./max. stress and MTTF increase of STRAP and state-of-the-art [3, 21]




stress [%] MTTF improvement [%]
Strategy Dyn. Stat. Dyn. Stat. HCI BTI
Angermeier et
al. [3]
60.6 47.4 61.2 0.02 157.7 0.0
Zhang et al.
[21]
62.6 49.6 39.9 4.5 66.4 2.3
STRAP 67.9 59.6 80.5 33.1 413.0 13.4
The MTTF improvement due to the stress reduction is calculated by assuming
that a device fails when Vth of any transistor exceeds 50% of its original value
(Vth0). The MTTF improvement due to dynamic and static stress reduction is
shown in the last two columns in Table 3. With the STRAP method, the MTTF
improvement relative to the baseline is 413% and 13% in average for HCI and BTI
aging, respectively. Relative to the closest competitors, STRAP achieves up to 177%
and 14% MTTF improvement w.r.t. HCI and BTI aging, respectively.
5 Conclusion
The dependable operation of runtime-reconfigurable architectures is threatened by
aging. This chapter presented novel methods to ensure reliable reconfiguration,
mitigate aging, and tolerate emerging faults in the reconfigurable fabric. The pre-
configuration online tests (PRET) and post-configuration online tests (PORT) check
with minor application performance loss, if the reconfigurable fabric is faulty
and if the reconfiguration process completed without errors during runtime. The
module diversification design method generates the minimal number of diversified
configurations required to tolerate at least any single CLB-fault in a reconfigurable
region. The cross-layer stress-aware placement method STRAP mitigates aging
by balancing stress both within a reconfigurable region as well as across all
reconfigurable regions in the system. Relative to the closest competitors, STRAP
achieves up to 177% and 14% MTTF improvement w.r.t. HCI and BTI aging. This
shows that intelligently considering and managing aging threats during runtime can
significantly improve the system dependability at limited overheads.
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Reliability Analysis and Mitigation
of Near-Threshold Voltage (NTC) Caches
Anteneh Gebregiorgis, Rajendra Bishnoi, and Mehdi B. Tahoori
1 Introduction
SRAM based memory elements have been the prominent limiting factor in the near-
threshold voltage domain as the supply voltage of SRAM cells does not easily
downscale, as it is done for combinational logic. The supply voltage downscaling
limitation is due to the significant increase in the failure rate of SRAM cells
operating at lower supply voltage values, which in turn severely affects the yield.
Various state-of-the-art solutions have been proposed to address this issue. These
solutions include variation tolerant SRAM cell design [3, 13, 29] and heterogeneous
cache design [31], improve the robustness of cache memories. However, the
improvement comes at the cost of increased area and power overheads. Moreover,
these approaches mostly ignore the impact of runtime failure mechanisms, such as
aging and soft error, on the reliability of memory components. Therefore, design-
time reliability failure analysis and mitigation schemes are crucial for the reliable
operation of near-threshold caches.
Analyzing failures based on a particular reliability failure mechanism is insuf-
ficient for estimating the system-level reliability, as the interdependence among
different failure mechanisms has a considerable impact on the overall system
reliability. Moreover, the running workload affects the aging and SER of memory
components as it determines the SP and AVF of the memory elements. Therefore,
performing a combined analysis on the reliability failure mechanisms across
different layers of abstraction (as shown in Fig. 1) is crucial, and it helps designers
to choose the most reliable components at each abstraction layer, and tackle the
reliability challenges of NTC operation.
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Fig. 1 Cross-layer impact of memory system and workload application on system-level reliability
(Failure In-Time (FIT rate)) of NTC memory components, and their interdependence
For this purpose, a comprehensive cross-layer reliability analysis framework
addressing the combined effect of aging, process variation, and soft error on the
reliability of NTC cache designs is presented in this chapter. Moreover, the chapter
presents the advantages and limitations of two different NTC SRAM cell designs
(namely, 6T and 8T cells) in terms of reliability (SER and SNM) improvement, area,
and energy overheads. The framework presented in this chapter helps to explore
the cross-layer impact of different reliability failure mechanisms, and it is useful
to study the combined effect of workload and cache organization on the SER and
SNM of cache memories. The framework is also helpful to understand how the
reliability issues change from super-threshold to the near-threshold voltage domain.
Furthermore, it is important for architectural-level design space exploration to find
the best cache organization for better reliability and performance trade-offs of NTC
caches. Based on the comprehensive analysis using the framework, a memory failure
mitigation scheme is developed to improve the energy efficiency of NTC caches.
2 Functional Failure and Reliability Issues of NTC Memory
Components
The increase in sensitivity to process variation of NTC circuits affects not only the
performance but also functionality. Notably, the mismatch in device strength due to
process variation affects the state of positive feedback loop based storage elements
(SRAM cells) [3, 10, 14]. The mismatch in the transistors makes SRAM cells to
incline for one state over the other, a characteristic that leads to hard functional
failure or soft timing failure [17, 20]. The variation-induced functional failure rate of
SRAM cells is more pronounced in the nanoscale era as highly miniaturized devices
are used to satisfy the density requirements [1]. SRAM cells mainly suffer from
three main unreliability sources: (1) aging effects, (2) radiation-induced soft error,
and (3) variation-induced functional failures [19]. The SRAM cell susceptibility to
these issues increases with supply voltage downscaling.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2 Schematic diagram of 6T and 8T SRAM cell, where WL = word-line, BL = bit-line and
RL = read-line. (a) 6T cell design. (b) 8T cell design
2.1 Aging Effects in SRAM Cells
Accelerated transistor aging is one of the main reliability concerns in CMOS
devices. Among various mechanisms, Bias Temperature Instability (BTI) is the
primary aging mechanism in nanoscale devices [18]. BTI gradually increases the
threshold voltage of a transistor over a long period, which in turn increases the gate
delay [18]. BTI-induced threshold voltage shift is a strong function of temperature as
it has an exponential dependency. Hence, BTI-induced aging rate is higher at high
operating voltage and temperature values. In SRAM cells, BTI reduces the Static
Noise Margin (SNM)1 of an SRAM cell, and makes it more susceptible to failures.
BTI-induced SNM degradation is higher when the cell stores the same value for a
longer period (e.g., storing “0” at node “A” of the SRAM cell shown in Fig. 2a).
Hence, the effect of BTI on an SRAM cell is a strong function of the cell’s Signal
Probability (SP).2
2.2 Process Variation in SRAM Cells
Variation in transistor parameters such as channel length, channel width, and
threshold voltage results in a mismatch in the strength of the transistors in an SRAM
cell, and in extreme cases it makes the cell to fail [15]. The variation-induced
memory failure rate increases significantly with supply voltage downscaling, for
instance, SRAM cells operating at NTC (0.5V) have 5× higher failure rate than the
cells operating at a nominal voltage [15]. Process variation affects several aspects
of SRAM cells, and the main variation-induced SRAM cell failures are:
1SNM is the minimum amount of DC noise that leads to a loss of the stored value.
2Probability of storing logic “1” in the SRAM cell.
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Read Failure Read failure/disturb is a phenomenon where the stored value is
distorted during read operation. For example, when reading the value of the cell
shown in Fig. 2a, (VL = “1” and VR = “0”), due to the voltage difference between
the access transistor NR and pull-down transistor N2, the voltage at node VR
increases [21, 39]. If this voltage is higher than the trip voltage (Vtrip) of the left
inverter, then the stored value of the cell is changed. Hence, the condition for read
failure is expressed as [33]:
read failure =
{
1, if VR > Vtrip
0, otherwise
where Vtrip = VP1 − VN1 (here VP1 and VN1 indicate the voltages of the PMOS
and NMOS transistors of the left inverter shown in Fig. 2a where P1 and N1 are the
corresponding PMOS and NMOS transistors of the inverter).
Write Failure Write failure occurs when the cell is not able to write/change its
state with the applied write voltage. For example, during a write operation (e.g.,
writing “0” to the SRAM cell shown in Fig. 2a), the node VL is discharged through
the bit-line BL. Write failure occurs when the node VL is not reduced to be lower
than Vtrip of the right inverter (VR) [21, 33]. In the standard 6T SRAM cell, write
failure is a challenging issue as the cell cannot be optimized without reducing its
read margin [21, 33, 39]. However, this is improved with the help of read/write
assist circuitries or differential read/write access as it is done in the 7T, 8T, and
10T SRAM cell designs [3, 8, 10]. In order to illustrate the write failure issue, the
write margin behaviors of 6T and 8T NTC SRAM cells are studied and compared






































Fig. 3 Write margin (in terms of write latency) comparison of 6T and 8T SRAM cell operating in
near-threshold voltage domain (0.5V)
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has longer write latency. On the other hand, the short write latency of the 8T design
enables it to have a relatively larger write margin. The improvement in the write
margin is because the 8T cell is optimized to improve the write operation without
affecting its read operation, as the write and read operations are decoupled.
Hold Failure Hold failure commonly known as metastability issue is a reliability
issue that occurs when the SRAM cell is not able to store the value for a longer
period [20, 33]. This problem happens during a standby mode if the voltage at
nodes VL or VR is smaller (smaller SNM value), then the stored value is easily
destroyed by a noise voltage due to various sources such as particle strike and
leakage current [20, 33].
2.3 Soft Error Rate in SRAM Cells
In SRAM cells, soft error is a transient phenomenon that occurs when charged
particles penetrate the cell’s cross junction creating an aberrant charge that changes
the state of the cell [27]. The primary source of soft errors is related to cosmic ray
events such as neutrons and alpha particles. Atmospheric neutrons are one of the
higher flux components, and their reaction has a high energy transfer. Thus, neutrons
are the most likely cosmic radiations to cause soft errors [16, 19]. Neutrons do not
generate electron-hole pairs directly. However, their interaction with the Si-atoms
generates secondary particles. These secondary particles produce charges/electron-
hole pairs [16]. If the generated charges are larger than the critical charge3 of
an SRAM cell, then the internal value of the cell is inverted, this phenomenon is
commonly referred to as soft error.
Radiation-induced Soft Error Rate (SER) of an SRAM cell increases significantly
with decrease in the supply voltage. Previous experiments have shown that the
radiation-induced SER increases by 50% for just 20% decrease in the supply
voltage [40]. Moreover, the SER of NTC designs is affected by variation and aging-
induced SNM degradation.
2.4 Interdependence and Combined Effects
Analyzing failures based on a particular reliability failure mechanism is insufficient
for estimating the system-level reliability as the interdependence among different
failure mechanisms (such as aging, soft error, and process variation) has a consid-
erable impact on the overall system reliability [4, 19, 20]. Figure 4 shows how the
interdependence between different reliability mechanisms (aging, SER, and process
3Minimum amount of charge required to upset the stored value, of an SRAM cell.









Fig. 4 Interdependence of reliability failure mechanisms and their impact on the system Failure
In-Time (FIT) rate in NTC
variation) affects the overall system reliability of memory components in terms
of Failure In-Time (FIT rate). As shown in the figure, variation-induced threshold
voltage shift increases both aging and SER by reducing the SNM and critical charge
of the cell. Similarly, aging-induced SNM degradation increases the sensitivity of
SRAM cell to soft errors. The problem is more pronounced when the SRAM cell is
operating at NTC domain due to the wide variation extent and higher sensitivity to
aging effects [19]. It has been observed that aging has≈5% SNM and critical charge
degradation at NTC while process variation-induced SNM degradation reaches as
high as 60% [19]. In the super-threshold voltage domain (1.0V), however, the aging
effect increases by 3× to be 15% while variation effect is reduced significantly.
Moreover, the running workload affects the aging rate and SER of memory
components, as it determines the signal probability and the Architectural Vulner-
ability Factor (AVF)4 of the memory elements [19]. Therefore, to overcome these
reliability challenges and improve the overall system reliability, combined analysis
of the reliability failure mechanisms at different levels of abstraction is imperative.
Besides, the cross-layer analysis should consider the impact of workload on signal
probability as well as architectural vulnerability factor of memory components, and
their circuit-level consequences on critical charge and SNM degradation.
2.5 Technology Scaling Effects on SRAM Reliability
Reliability has been an essential issue with the miniaturization of CMOS technol-
ogy, as different design-time and runtime failures are among the limiting factors of
technology scaling [24]. At smaller technology nodes, process variation increases
the permanent and transient failures of memory components significantly [11, 15].
4AVF is the probability that an error in memory structure propagates to the data path. AVF =
vulnerable period/total program execution period.
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The authors in [15] show that SRAM cell failure rate increases by more than 2×
with downscaling from 90 to 65 nm technology node. Similarly, the authors in [26]
demonstrated that technology downscaling increases the radiation-induced soft error
rate of SRAM cells significantly.
3 Cross-Layer Reliability Analysis Framework for NTC
Caches
The comprehensive cross-layer reliability estimation framework that abstracts the
impact of workload, cache organization, and reliability failure mechanisms at
different levels of abstraction is illustrated in Fig. 5. The reliability analysis and
simulation conducted in this work use the symmetric six-transistor (6T) and 8T
SRAM cells shown in Fig. 2a and b. In this work, the device-level critical charge
characterization is modeled according to the analytical model presented in [27].
This section presents the cross-layer reliability estimation framework in a top-
down manner. The system-level Failure In-Time (FIT) rate and SNM extraction
are described in Sect. 3.1 followed by the cross-layer SNM and SER estimation
in Sect. 3.2.
3.1 System FIT Rate Extraction
The system-level FIT rate of a cache memory is the sum of the FIT rate of
each row (cache line). The row FIT rate is calculated as the product of the
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Fig. 5 Holistic cross-layer reliability estimation framework to analyze the impact of aging and
process variation effects on soft error rate
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Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF). Cache AVF is a metrics used to determine
the probability that an error in a cache memory propagates to the datapath, and
results in a visible error in a program’s final output [38]. Equation (1) shows the




AVFi × SERi (1)
where N is the total number of rows in the cache.
3.1.1 Architecture-Level AVF Analysis
One step of determining the failure rate of memory (cache) due to soft errors is to
determine the AVF value of the memory. AVF of a memory array is measured by the
ratio of vulnerable periods, time interval in which the memory content is exposed
to particle strike, to the total program execution period, and the probability of the
erroneous value being propagated [38]. Hence, the vulnerability factor of a memory
array is computed based on the liveness analysis commonly known as Architectural
Correct Execution (ACE) analysis which is the ratio of ACE (vulnerable) cycles to
the total number of operational cycles [42]. Therefore, the AVF value of a memory





where T is the total number of cycles.
3.1.2 Architecture-Level SNM Analysis
Aging-induced SNM degradation of an SRAM cell strongly depends on the Signal
Probability (SP) of the cell. Thus, BTI-induced SNM degradation is minimized
when the signal probability of the cell is balanced (close to 0.5) [18]. In order to
determine the aging-induced SNM degradation, the worst-case SP of the memory
row is obtained as the maximum SP distance from 0.5 (D = |SP− 0.5|) as shown in
Eq. (3). Then, the worst-case SP is used by the SNM estimation tool given in Fig. 5
to determine the corresponding aging-induced SNM degradation.
SPworst-case = MAXZi=1Di (3)
where Di = |SPi − 0.5| and Z is the total number of cells in the memory row.
In order to extract the AVF and SNM of a cache unit, first, it is necessary to
extract the trace of the data stored in the cache, read-write accesses, and the duration
(number of cycles) of the running workload. Once the information is available, the
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reliability analysis tool uses it along with the cache organization to determine the
AVF and SP of the cache memory according to Eqs. (2) and (3), and generates the
SNM LUT for different signal probability values.
The cache organization (size and associativity) has significant impact on the SER
and SNM of the cache, as it determines the hit ratio and the duration data is stored
in a cache entry. Hence, different cache size and associativity combinations result
in different SER and SNM values for the same workload application. Additionally,
SER and SNM are highly dependent on the running workload. In order to explore
the impact of cache organization and workload, various organizations and workload
applications are investigated.
3.2 Cross-Layer SNM and SER Estimation
3.2.1 SNM Degradation Estimation
Device-Level Aging Analysis
BTI-induced aging degrades the carrier mobility of CMOS transistors, and leads
to transistor threshold voltage (Vth) shift. In an SRAM cell, the Vth shift reduces
the noise tolerance margin of the cell, and makes it more susceptible to failures. In
the reliability analysis framework, the BTI-induced threshold voltage shift of the
transistors in an SRAM cell is evaluated at device-level using a Reaction-Diffusion
(RD) model [28]. Then, the device-level Vth shift results are used to estimate the
corresponding SNM degradation of an SRAM cell at the circuit-level.
Circuit-Level SNM Estimation
The SNM of an SRAM cell is extracted by conducting a circuit-level SPICE
simulation. The SPICE simulation uses device-level aging and architecture-level
SP results to determine the SNM of the SRAM cell. Finally, the SNM degradation
of a particular SP value is obtained according to Eq. (4).
DEGSP = SNMSP − SNMfresh
SNMfresh
× 100% (4)
where SNMSP is the SNM of the SRAM cell for a particular signal probability value
and SNMfresh is the SNM of a fresh (new) SRAM cell.
Aging and Process Variation-Induced SNM Degradation Analysis
BTI-induced SNM degradation of an SRAM cell depends not only on the cell
signal probability but also on process parameters, such as channel length and





















Fig. 6 SNM degradation in the presence of process variation and aging after 3 years of operation,
aging+PV-induced SNM degradation at NTC is 2.5× higher than the super-threshold domain
oxide thickness, which are highly affected by manufacturing variabilities. Due to
low operating temperature at NTC, aging has relatively less impact on the SNM
degradation of near-threshold voltage SRAM cells. However, in combination with
variation-induced threshold voltage shift, aging degrades the SNM of SRAM cells
significantly.
Figure 6 shows the worst-case aging (SP = 0.0) and variation-induced SNM
degradation of 6T and 8T SRAM cells after 3 years of operation for wide supply
voltage range. The obtained SNM degradation confirms the analytical expectation
as the SNM degradation in NTC is 2.5× higher than the degradation in the super-
threshold voltage domain (as shown by the gray boxes). While the use of 8T instead
of 6T SRAM cells in super-threshold voltage domain has limited improvement in
SNM degradation (only 7.7%), it achieves more than 14% reduction in the SNM
degradation in the near-threshold voltage domain.
3.2.2 SER Estimation
The SER of an SRAM cell depends on two main factors, the critical charge of the
cell and the flux rate of the strike. To determine SRAM cell SER, first, the critical
charge of an SRAM cell is obtained from a circuit-level model. Then, the SER
value is calculated by combining the critical charge, flux distribution, and the area
sensitive to strike.
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Device-Level Critical Charge Characterization
The sensitivity of an SRAM cell to radiation-induced soft errors is determined by
the critical charge (Qcritical) of the cell, as it determines the minimum amount of
charge required to alter the state of the cell. The Qcritical of an SRAM cell depends
on several factors such as supply voltage, threshold voltage, and strength of the
transistors of the SRAM cell [9]. The critical charge of an SRAM cell is computed
using analytical models or circuit simulators. An analytical model developed in [27]
is used to determine the Qcritical.
As shown in Fig. 5, the SPICE model of an SRAM cell along with the BTI model
is employed to evaluate the impact of BTI on the threshold voltage (Vth) of the
transistors of an SRAM cell. The BTI analysis uses the SP values of the memory
array from higher (architecture-level) analysis to determine the BTI-induced Vth
shift of the running workload. In this way, the aging effect of the workload is
incorporated into the framework. Once the fresh and aged Vth values are available,
the impact of process variation is incorporated as a normal distribution (μ ± 3σ )
of the transistor threshold voltage where μ is the mean Vth value and the standard
deviation (σ ) which is obtained using an industrial standard, measurement based,
model (the “Pelgrom model”) given in Eq. (5) [30]. Finally, all these parameters are
used by the model given in [27] to extract the Qcritical.
σVth = AV T√
L×W (5)
where L and W are the length and width of transistors, and AV T is process specific
parameter (the “Pelgrom coefficient”).
Circuit-Level SER Analysis
The circuit-level SER analysis is conducted using the SER extraction module of the
framework given in Fig. 5. First, the critical charge of the SRAM cell is extracted
using the device-level model [27]. Afterward, the critical charge along with the
neutron-induced flux distribution is used to determine the SER of the cell using an
experimentally verified empirical model given in Eq. (6) [23]. As shown in Eq. (6),
the SER of an SRAM cell has an inverse exponential relation with its critical charge






where F is the flux in particles/cm2-s with energy higher than 1MeV [6]; A is the
area sensitive to a strike in cm2, and QS is the charge collection efficiency.
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The main observations from Eq. (6) are:
• The SER of an SRAM cell has an inverse exponential relation to its critical
charge. Hence, a small decrease in the Qcritical leads to an exponential increase in
the cell SER.
• For the same atmospheric neutrons, a small drift in Qcritical leads to a significant
increase in the SER. Furthermore, transistor up-sizing increases the area which
is sensitive to particle strike and hence, higher SER.
SER of 6T and 8T SRAM Cells
In the conventional 6T SRAM cell, the cell must maintain the stored value and it
should be stable during read/write accesses. SRAM cell stability is a challenging
task when the cell is operating in the near-threshold voltage domain, as the cell
mainly suffers from read-disturb. To address this issue, either a read-write assist
circuitry should be employed or the pull-down (NMOS) transistors of the SRAM
cell should be strengthened by transistor up-sizing [35]. However, the up-sizing also
increases the area of the cell that is sensitive to soft errors. Since the read-disturb of
the 6T SRAM cell is worst when it operates at lower voltage values, transistor up-
sizing cannot adequately mitigate the read-disturb issue which makes the 6T design
less desirable for near-threshold voltage operation.
This issue is addressed by using alternative SRAM cell designs (such as 8T [32]
and 10T [8] SRAM cells). For example, the read failure issue is solved in the 8T
design by decoupling the read and write lines using two additional NMOS access
transistors. The decoupling allows to downsize the pull-down NMOS transistors,
and reduce the area sensitive to soft errors. Therefore, alternative SRAM designs
(e.g., 8T) are recommended for NTC operation, which is verified by studying the
reliability and energy efficiency improvement of the 8T SRAM design over the
conventional 6T design. The transistor sizing specified in [32] is used for the design
of the 6T and 8T SRAM cells used in this study.
Figure 7 shows the fresh and aged SER of the 6T and 8T SRAM designs for
different supply voltage values. In the super-threshold voltage domain, (0.9–1.1V)
the 6T and 8T designs have negligible differences in their SER. In NTC, however,
the 6T design has higher SER than the 8T design due to the effects of transistor up-
sizing which increases the area sensitive to radiation. The combined effect of aging
and process variation on 6T and 8T SRAM cells is shown in Fig. 8. Figure 8 shows
variation effect has severe impact at NTC, as the SER of the 6T and 8T SRAM cell
designs in the near-threshold voltage domain is 4× higher than their SER in the
super-threshold voltage domain.















Fig. 7 SER rate of fresh and aged 6T and 8T SRAM cells for various Vdd values
Fig. 8 SER of 6T and 8T SRAM cells in the presence of process variation and aging effects after
3 years of operation
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3.3 Experimental Evaluation and Trade-Off Analysis
3.3.1 Experimental Setup
The reliability analysis is conducted using an ALPHA implementation of an embed-
ded in-order core on the Gem5 architectural simulator [7]. Since cache memories are
the main focus, various cache sizes (4–16KB) and wide associativity range from
simple directly mapped to 4-way set associative caches are assessed to perform a
reliability and performance trade-off analysis. The evaluation is conducted using
several workload applications from the SPEC2000 CPU benchmark suite [25]. The
workload applications were executed for five million cycles by fast-forwarding to
the memory intensive phases. The experimental setup used in this work is presented
in Table 1.
The BTI-induced Vth shift is extracted by assuming 10% BTI-induced aging
after 3 years of operation [37]. First, the 45 nm 6T and 8T SRAM cells are
modeled using the PTM model. Afterward, the BTI-induced Vth shift LUT and
the corresponding SNM degradation for various SP values (0.0–1.0) are obtained
using a SPICE simulation. The impact of process variation is considered as a normal
distribution of the transistor threshold voltage with a mean (μ = Vth, 300mV) and
standard deviation (σ ) obtained using the Pelgrom model given in Eq. (5).
To demonstrate the effect of soft error, neutron-induced soft errors are considered
as they are the dominant soft error mechanisms at terrestrial altitudes. In order to
ensure the proper functionality of both 6T and 8T SRAM cells in the near-threshold
voltage domain, their transistors are sized according to the transistor sizing used
to model and fabricate near-threshold 6T and 8T SRAM cells specified in [32]. It
should be noted that L1 cache is used for illustration purpose only as most embedded
Table 1 Experimental setup, configuration, and evaluated benchmark applications
Gem5
Simulation environment Near-threshold Super-threshold
Core configuration
Processor model Embedded Embedded
Architecture Single in-order core Single in-order core
ISA ALPHA ALPHA
Supply voltage 0.5V 1.1V
Frequency 100MHz 1GHz
Technology node 45 nm PTM 45 nm PTM
Cache configuration
L1 Cache Sizes = 4, 8, and 16KB Sizes = 4, 8, and 16KB
Associativity = 1, 2, and 4 way Associativity = 1, 2, and 4 way
Replacement policy = LRU Replacement policy = LRU
SRAM cells = 6T and 8T SRAM cell = 6T
Benchmark SPEC2000 SPEC2000
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NTC processors have limited cache hierarchy. However, the framework is generic,
and it is applicable to any cache levels such as L2 and L3.
3.3.2 Workload Effect Analysis
As discussed in Sect. 3.2, BTI-induced SNM degradation of SRAM cell highly
depends on the cell’s signal probability and the residency time of valid data which
varies from one workload application to another. Similarly, the SER of memory
components is dependent on the data residency period which is commonly measured
using AVF. Hence, for SER analysis, the AVF of different workloads is obtained
based on the workload application’s data residency period. In order to show the
effect of workload variation on SER and SNM degradation, the AVF and signal
probabilities of the cache memory are extracted by running different workload
applications from the SPEC2000 benchmark suite. Then, the corresponding SNM
and SER of the cache memory are obtained using the SER and SNM models
presented in Sect. 3.2.
3.3.3 Aging and Variation-Induced SNM Degradation
SNM degradation affects the metastability of SRAM cells. Metastability of SRAM
cell determines the stability of the stored value, and it is highly dependent on the
worst-case SNM degradation [18]. Therefore, for any workload application, the
aging-induced SNM degradation should be evaluated based on the first cell to fail
(worst-case SNM degradation).
The impact of workload on the SNM degradation of 6T and 8T based caches
across wide supply voltage range is shown in Fig. 9a and b, respectively. For
both cases, the SNM degradation increases significantly with supply voltage
downscaling. Although the aging rate is slower at lower supply voltage values due
to the lower temperature, the wide variation extent in NTC leads to higher aging
sensitivity. Hence, in NTC the impact of process variation on SNM is more severe
and leads to a significant increase in the aging sensitivity of SRAM cells.
3.3.4 Soft Error Rate Analysis
In order to analyze the impact of workload variation on the soft error rate of cache
memories, the architectural vulnerability factor of each workload is extracted and
combined with the circuit-level information. Figure 10 shows the contribution of
the SPEC2000 workload applications on the SER of the 6T SRAM based cache. As
shown in the figure, for all workload applications the SER increases significantly
with supply voltage downscaling. For example, the SER of all workload applications
increases by five orders of magnitude when the supply voltage is downscaled from
the super-threshold voltage (1.1V) to the near-threshold voltage domain (0.5V).



















































Fig. 9 Workload effects on aging-induced SNM degradation in the presence of process variation
for 6T and 8T SRAM cell based cache after 3 years of operation (a) 6T SRAM based cache (b) 8T
SRAM based cache
Additionally, the workload variation has a considerable impact on the soft error
rate. For example, the SER of Bzip2 is almost two orders of magnitude higher
than the SER of Mesa and Parser workload applications. The workload variation
impact is observed because Bzip2 application has higher locality and hit rate
which increases the data residency period when compared to the other workload
applications. Although the higher hit rate of Bzip2 leads to a better performance
measured in Instructions Per Cycle (IPC), it has a significant impact on the soft
error rate of the cache. Hence, it is essential to exploit the workload variation in
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Fig. 10 Workload effect on SER rate of 6T SRAM cell based cache memory for wide supply
voltage range
order to downscale the supply voltage of the cache memory in per-application bases
for a given target error rate. For a given target FIT rate (e.g., 10−2) the cache has
to operate at 0.6V for Mesa and Parser workload applications. However, for Bzip2
the cache has to operate at a higher voltage (0.7V) for the same target error rate.
3.3.5 Cache Organization Impact on System FIT Rate
Cache organization has a significant impact on the performance of embedded
processors [34]. Similarly, the organization has an impact on the reliability of
cache units. In NTC, the reliability impact of cache organization is even more
pronounced. Hence, a proper cache size and associativity selection should consider
both performance and reliability as target metrics. The system failure probability
(FIT rate and SNM) of a cache unit is highly dependent on the architectural
vulnerability factor and the values stored in the cache as well as their residency
time intervals, which is in turn is a strong function of the read-write accesses of the
cache. Hence, these parameters are influenced by cache size and associativity.
The performance and reliability impacts of different cache organizations in the
near and super-threshold voltage domains are evaluated using the configurations
described in Table 1. For near-threshold voltage (0.5V) the processor core frequency
is set to 100MHz, and the cache latency is set to 1 cycle as gate delay is the dominant
factor in the near-threshold voltage domain [12]. In the super-threshold voltage
domain, however, the cache latency and interconnect delay have a significant impact
on the overall delay. Thus, the cache hit latency is set to 2 cycles for 4 and 8K cache
sizes and 3 cycles for the 16K cache size [41].


















Fig. 11 Impact of cache organization on SNM degradation in near-threshold (NTC) and super-
threshold (ST) in the presence of process variation and aging effect after 3 years of operation
3.3.6 Cache Organization and SNM Degradation
Since cache organization determines the data residency period, it has a direct impact
on the SNM degradation. Figure 11 illustrates the impact of cache organization on
the SNM degradation of near and super-threshold voltage 6T and 8T SRAM cell
based memory arrays in the presence of process variation and aging effects after 3
years of operation. The figure shows smaller cache size with higher associativity
(4 k-4w) has less impact on SNM degradation as the data resides in the cache for a
smaller duration.
3.3.7 Cache Organization and SER FIT Rate
The cache size and associativity also affect the ACE cycles of cache lines and their
failure probabilities. The impact of the cache organization on the FIT rate and per-
formance (IPC) varies along various supply voltage domains. In the super-threshold
voltage, an increase in cache size and associativity improves the performance.
However, from a FIT rate point of view, an increase in the cache size has a negative
impact on FIT rate as it increases the FIT of the cache. Smaller cache sizes, however,
have lower performance and better FIT rate. Figure 12 shows the design space
of FIT rate and performance (IPC) impact of various cache organizations in the
super-threshold voltage domain. In the figure, the FIT rate and performance optimal
configuration is (8 k-4w) as indicated by the blue italic font in Fig. 12.
In the near-threshold voltage domain, the performance is mainly dominated
by the delay of the logic unit and the memory failure rate is significantly high.
Therefore, it is essential to select a cache organization that gives better reliability































Fig. 12 FIT rate and performance design space of various cache configurations in the super-































Fig. 13 FIT rate and performance design space of 6T and 8T designs for various cache
configurations in the near-threshold voltage domain by considering average workload effect (the
blue italic font indicates optimal configuration)
(FIT rate and SNM) than performance. Hence, in NTC a smaller cache size with
higher associativity gives the best reliability and performance trade-off. Figure 13
shows the design space for the FIT rate and performance trade-off for 6T and 8T
designs in NTC.
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Fig. 14 FIT rate and performance trade-off analysis of near-threshold 6T and 8T caches for
various cache configurations and average workload effect in the presence of process variation and
aging effects. (a) Near-threshold 6T. (b) Near-threshold 8T
3.3.8 Reliability-Aware Optimal Cache Organization
The experimental results reported in Figs. 11, 12, 13, and 14 show an increase in
the cache associativity improves the performance and reliability (both FIT rate and
SNM). Hence, in the super-threshold voltage domain, medium cache size (e.g.,
8KB) with higher associativity has a better reliability and performance trade-off.
In NTC, however, smaller cache sizes with higher associativity are preferable for
two main reasons: (1) The performance is mainly dominated by the processor core,
not by the cache units and hence, cache latency is not an important issue. (2) The
soft error rate and SNM degradation are higher in NTC than in the super-threshold
voltage domain. Hence, the cache size is reduced by half to obtain a better reliability
and performance trade-off in NTC.
In the NTC domain, the selection of an optimal cache organization for the 6T
SRAM cell based caches is different from the 8T based caches, depending on the
FIT rate and performance requirement. For example, for a target tolerable FIT rate
of 350 at NTC (as shown by the dotted line in Fig. 14a and b), only 4KB 4-way
associative cache organization is within the acceptable zone for the 6T-based cache.
In the 8T-based cache, however, three additional cache organizations (4K-dm, 4 k-
2w, and 8 k-4w) are within the acceptable zone. Hence, the 8 k-4w cache is used
in the 8T-based cache to get ≈10% performance improvement without violating the
reliability constraint.
To implement the suggested cache organizations for a specific supply voltage
value (only near-threshold or super-threshold) is straightforward. For caches that are
expected to operate in both super and near-threshold voltage domains, the reliability-
performance optimum cache organization in the super-threshold voltage (e.g., 4-way
8KB in this case) is preferable. Then, when switching to the near-threshold voltage
domain, some portion of the cache is disabled (power gated) in order to maintain
the reliability-performance trade-off at NTC.
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Fig. 15 Energy consumption profile of 6T and 8T based 4K 4-way cache for wide supply voltage
value ranges averaged over the selected workloads from SPEC2000 benchmarks
3.3.9 Overall Energy-Saving Analysis of 6T and 8T Caches
The energy-saving potential of supply voltage downscaling is evaluated by extract-
ing the average energy consumption profile of the 4K-Byte 4-way set associative
cache (i.e., the reliability-performance optimal cache configuration) using 6T and
8T implementations. The energy consumption of the cache memory consists of
three different components. These components are peripheries, row and column
decoders, and bit-cell array energy consumptions. Since the energy consumption of
the periphery and row/column decoder is independent of the bit-cell used, they are
assumed to be uniform for both 6T and 8T based caches. Hence, the energy-saving
comparison is done based only on the energy consumption of the bit-cell array.
Figure 15 compares the total energy consumption of the 6T and 8T based cache
memories for a wide supply voltage range. As shown in the figure, the 8T based
cache has slightly higher energy consumption in the super-threshold voltage domain
(0.7–1.1V) than the 6T based cache. The slightly higher energy consumption is
because of the additional transistors used for read/write decoupling. However, due
to the increase in the failure rate in the near-threshold domain, the 6T based
cache consumes more energy than the corresponding 8T based implementation. The
energy cost of the higher failure rate is considered as an increase in the read/write
latency of the cache. This shows addressing the failures of the 6T cache in NTC
results in additional energy cost which makes it less attractive for operating at lower
supply voltage values (e.g., below 0.6V).
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3.3.10 Reliability Improvement and Area Overhead Analysis
of 8T Based Caches
In a near-threshold voltage SRAM design, the 8T cell improves the soft error rate
in the presence of aging and variation effects by up to 25%. Similarly, the SNM is
improved by ≈15% using 8T SRAM cells in NTC caches. However, it is expected
that the 8T SRAM design has 30% area overhead than the 6T design due to the two
additional access transistors. In practice, however, the overhead is much less. Since
the 6T SRAM has to be up-sized to increase its read stability, the up-sizing increases
the cell area of the 6T design to the extent of being larger than the area of 8T design,
as experimentally demonstrated in [32].
4 Voltage Scalable Memory Failure Mitigation Scheme
As shown in the analysis presented in Sect. 3, process variation has a significant
impact on the failure rate of memory components operating in the near-threshold
voltage domain. Hence, addressing variation-induced memory failures plays an
essential role in harnessing NTC benefits. One way of mitigating variation-induced
memory failures is by determining the voltage downscaling potential of cache
memories without surpassing the tolerable/correctable error margins. For this
purpose, the operating voltage of caches should be gracefully reduced so that the
number of failing bits due to permanent and transient failures remains tolerable.
This section presents a BIST based voltage scalable mitigation technique to
determine an error-free supply voltage downscaling potential of caches at runtime.
In order to reduce the runtime configuration complexities, the cache organizations
such as size, associativity, and block size are determined during design time. In this
work, the block size is considered as the smallest unit used to transfer data to and
from the cache. Then, a BIST based runtime cache operating voltage downscaling
analysis is performed for a given cache organization. To illustrate the impact of
block size selection, the voltage downscaling potential of two block sizes is studied.
4.1 Motivation and Idea
Due to the wide variation extent in NTC, different memory cells have different SNM
values; as a result, their minimum operating voltages for a proper functionality vary
significantly. The cells with smaller SNM values need to operate at a higher supply
voltage than the cells with larger SNM values. Therefore, the supply voltage of some
cells (cells with smaller SNM value) should be scaled down more conservatively
than the cells with larger SNM in order to maintain the overall reliability. This idea
is exploited in order to minimize the effect of process variation and determine error
tolerant/error-free voltage downscaling potential of near-threshold caches. Since
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(a) (b)
Fig. 16 Error-free minimum operating voltage distribution of 8 MB cache, Set size = 128 Byte
(a) block size= 32 Bytes (4 blocks per set) and (b) block size= 64 Bytes (two blocks per set), the
cache is modeled as 45 nm node in CACTI
cache memories are divided into several blocks, block size selection has a significant
impact on the supply voltage downscaling potential of cache memories. Hence, one
needs to analyze the impact of process variation and supply voltage downscaling
potential of cache memories in a per block bases.
Cache block size has a substantial impact on the miss rate and miss penalty of
caches at the same time. In order to reduce the cache miss rate and its associated
penalty, a larger block size is preferable as it improves locality and reduces the miss
rate. From a reliability point of view, however, larger block sizes have wide variation
extent, and as a result more failing cells in NTC, which makes the entire block fail.
These failures force the cache memory to operate at a much higher voltage (i.e.,
more conservative scaling) leading to a significant reduction in the energy efficiency.
However, this is addressed by decreasing the cache block size in order to reduce
cache operating voltage as the variation extent is minimal in comparison to larger
block sizes.
To exploit this fact, the impact of block size selection on the supply voltage
downscaling potential of a near-threshold voltage 8KB cache is evaluated as shown
in Fig. 16. The cache is modeled in CACTI [36] with 128 Byte set size and two
different block sizes, and the impact of process variation is modeled using the
threshold voltage variation model given in Eq. (5). As shown in the figure, the
smaller block size (Fig. 16a) has narrow variation extent, and hence, it has more
supply voltage downscaling potential than its larger block size counterpart (Fig. 16b)
at design time. During operation time, the supply voltage downscaling potential of
the larger block size cache is reduced further due to various runtime factors such
as aging-induced SNM degradation and SER. Moreover, smaller block sizes have
lower multiple bit failure rates, and hence, simpler ECC schemes are adopted at a
minimum cost [2]. Table 2 shows the ECC overhead comparison for 64 and 32 Byte
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Table 2 ECC overhead analysis of different block sizes and correction capabilities















SECDED 13k gates 11 bits 2 cycle ≈4k gates 10 bits 1 cycle
DECTED >50k gates 21 bits 4 cycles ≈10k gates 19 bits 2 cycle
4EC5ED ≈60k gates 41 bits 15 cycles ≈50k gates 37 bits 9 cycle
block sizes according to [2]. The table shows dividing the cache into smaller blocks
has an advantage in terms of ECC overhead. Therefore, appropriate cache block
size selection should consider both performance and reliability effects at the same
time in order to achieve maximum performance while operating within the tolerable
reliability margin. Once the cache block size is determined, the cache supply voltage
should be tuned at runtime to incorporate the runtime reliability effects such as
aging. For this purpose, a BIST based supply voltage tuning is used, and its concept
is discussed in the following subsection.
4.2 Built-In Self-Test (BIST) Based Runtime Operating
Voltage Adjustment
Built-In Self-Test (BIST) is a widely used technique to test VLSI system on
chip [22]. Since memory components occupy majority of the chip area, BIST plays a
significant role in testing large and complex memory arrays easily [5, 22]. In order to
determine the runtime supply voltage downscaling potential of caches, it is essential
to assume a cache memory is equipped with BIST infrastructure to test the entire
memory.
In a conventional BIST, the BIST controller generates the test addresses and test
patterns (finite number of read/write operations). Then, the test is performed, and the
test result is compared with the expected response to determine the failing cells [5].
In this case, however, since the BISTmodule has to determine the minimum scalable
voltage of each block, the test controller has to be modified in order to iteratively
test and generate the minimum scalable voltages of each block. The goal is first to
determine the error-free minimum scalable voltage of each cache block with/without
error correction hardware. Then, the cache operating voltage is determined based on
the block with higher operational voltage as shown in Eq. (7), such that the runtime
memory failure is minimized.
Vcachedd = max0≤i≤N−1 V
Bi
dd (7)
where N is the total number of cache blocks, and VBidd is the runtime minimum
scalable voltage of block Bi obtained using the iterative BIST.
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Algorithm 1 Runtime cache operating voltage adjustment
1: function CACHE-Vdd -SCALING (Cs, Vdd , Bs , Fm ){Cs=cache size, Vdd= operating voltage, Bs=block size,
Fm=tolerable margin of failing bits}
2: Bt ← CsBs ;{ Bt=total number of cache blocks}
3: for block i←1 to Bt do
4: Fc ←0; {Fc=failing cells counter}
5: Vnew
dd
← Vdd ; { Vnewdd =voltage used to perform BIST}
6: while Fc ≤Fm do
7: Perform BIST using Vnew
dd
;
















new operating voltage of blocki}
Algorithm 1 presents the iterative BIST technique used to determine the min-
imum scalable voltage of cache memory by considering permanent and runtime
memory failures. The algorithm takes cache size (Cs), operating voltage (Vdd ),
block size (Bs), and tolerance margin (Fm) as its input. Then, the number of
cache blocks is determined by dividing the cache size by the block size (Step 2).
Afterward, the minimum scalable voltage of each block is obtained by gradually
reducing the operating voltage, and conducting block-level BIST to determine the
total number of failing bits at each operating voltage level (Steps 3–10). It should
be noted that, the supply voltage is reduced as long as the number of failing bits per
block is within the tolerable/correction capability of the adopted error correction
scheme. For example, a cache memory equipped with a Single Error Correction
Double Error Detection (SECDED) infrastructure tolerates two failing bits per block
(hence Fm = 2) as SECDED corrects only one bit and detects two erroneous bits
at a time. Hence, whenever two failing bits are detected the error-free version is
loaded from the lower-level memory which makes SECDED sufficient solution for
tolerating two failing bits per block. Finally, the algorithm determines the operating
voltage of the cache based on the block with the highest voltage as shown in Step 12.
The overall flow of the cache access control logic along with the BIST infras-
tructure as well as mapping logic is presented in Fig. 17. The cache controller first
decodes the address and identifies the requested block. Then, it determines if the
requested block is functional or failing block for the specified operating voltage. If
the requested block is functional, then a conventional block access is performed. In
case the requested block is a failing one, the error tolerant block mapping scheme is
employed to redirect the access request.
Since this approach considers the effect of permanent and transient failure
mechanisms, it is orthogonal with different dynamic cache mitigation schemes such
as block disabling [1, 43] and strong ECC schemes [2]. For energy-critical systems,
block disabling technique is applied in combination with this approach to downscale
the cache operating voltage aggressively by disabling the failing blocks at lower
operating voltages at the cost of performance reduction (increase in miss rate).















Address decoder/ block identification
Mapped marginal block
Yes
Fig. 17 Cache access control flowchart equipped with BIST and block mapping logic
4.3 Error Tolerant Block Mapping
Once the minimum scalable voltages of the cache blocks are determined, the
next task is to disable the failing blocks, and map their read/write accesses to
the corresponding non-failing blocks in order to ensure reliable cache operation.
Additionally, in order to reduce the vulnerability to runtime failures (such as noise
and soft errors), the non-failing blocks are stored in a stack frame sorted by their
minimum scalable voltage values. Since the marginal blocks (blocks with less
voltage downscaling potential) are more sensitive to runtime failures, they are stored
at the top of the stack. Then, access to a disabled block is mapped to the marginal
blocks in the stack. The mapping enables to reduce soft error vulnerability of the
marginal blocks by reducing their data residency period. Since a stack is a linear
data structure in which the insertion and deletion operations are performed at only
one end commonly known as “top,” the marginal blocks need to be at the top (upper
half) of the stack to ensure their fast replacement.
The mapping process is illustrated in Fig. 18 by using an illustrative example.
As shown in the figure, the cache blocks are divided into three categories: (1) red
blocks are failing blocks. (2) yellow blocks are marginal blocks (non-failing but with
limited supply voltage downscaling potential). (3) blue blocks are robust blocks (i.e.,
non-failing with higher supply voltage downscaling potential). Hence, the marginal
blocks are stored at the top of the stack frame. Then, when a disabled (failing) block
is requested (e.g., B5) its access request is mapped to a marginal block at the top
of the stack frame (e.g., B4), and the stack pointer is updated to point to the next
element in the stack. This process continues until all the disabled blocks are mapped.
It should be noted that once a block is mapped, it is removed from the mapping stack
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Fig. 18 Error tolerant cache block mapping scheme (mapping failing blocks to marginal blocks)
Table 3 Minimum scalable voltage analysis for different ECC schemes
Minimum scalable voltage in [V]
ECC-Scheme Block size = 16Byte Block size = 32Byte Block size = 64Byte
No-ECC 0.50 0.53 0.54
Parity 0.47 0.51 0.53
SECDED 0.43 0.48 0.50
when updating the stack pointer. For example, when block B5 is mapped to block
B4, then, block B4 is removed from the stack as shown by the empty slot in Fig. 18.
4.4 Evaluation of Voltage Scalable Mitigation Scheme
4.4.1 Variation-Aware Voltage Scaling Analysis
The supply voltage scalability of three different block sizes (16, 32, and 64
Byte) with different error correction schemes is compared in order to analyze
the impact of block size selection on the supply voltage downscaling potential
of cache memories with and without error correction schemes. The error-free
(correctable error) minimum voltage of three block sizes is studied for 8KB cache
memory without ECC, parity, and Single Error Correction Double Error Detection
(SECDED) configurations. Table 3 shows the supply voltage downscaling potential
of the studied block sizes. For all ECC schemes (given in Table 3), the cache
operating voltage has to be downscaled more conservatively when the block size is
larger (64 Bytes). However, larger block sizes help to reduce the cache miss rate that
results in a better cache performance. Therefore, for an aggressive supply voltage
downscaling, the block size should be selected as small as possible by making
performance and energy-saving trade-off analysis.
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Fig. 19 Comparison of
voltage downscaling in the
presence of block disabling
and ECC induce overheads












4.4.2 Energy and Performance Evaluation of Voltage Scalable Cache
Different ECC Schemes
The average energy reduction and performance comparison of voltage scaled cache
memory with and without ECC are given in Fig. 19a and b by running selected
workloads (gzip, parser, and mcf ) from the SPEC2000 benchmark. The energy
results in Fig. 19a are extracted from CACTI by considering block disabling, and
ECC induced delay and energy overheads. As shown in the figure, supply voltage
downscaling improves the energy efficiency significantly. However, the overheads of
this scheme, namely ECC energy overhead, block disabling induced cash miss rate,
and ECC encoding/decoding delay overhead outweigh the energy gain of supply
voltage downscaling when the cache operating voltage is below 0.7V. Therefore,
the energy per access of Double Error Correction Triple Error Detection (DECTED)
is higher than SECDED when the supply voltage is scaled down to 0.7V or below.
Similarly, Fig. 19b shows the cache performance (IPC) is reduced significantly with
the supply voltage downscaling as more blocks are disabled for reliable operation.
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5 Conclusion
Embedded microprocessors, particularly for battery-powered mobile applications,
and energy-harvested Internet of Things (IoT) are expected to meet stringent
energy budgets. In this regard, operating in the near-threshold voltage domain
provides better performance and energy efficiency trade-offs. However, NTC faces
various challenges among which increase in functional failure rate of memory
components is the dominant issue. This chapter analyzed the combined effect of
aging, process variation, and soft error on the reliability of cache memories in
super and near-threshold voltage domains. It is observed that the combined effect
of process variation and aging has a massive impact on the soft error rate and
SNM degradation of NTC memories. Experimental results show process variation
and aging-induced SNM degradation is 2.5× higher in NTC than in the super-
threshold voltage domain while SER is 8× higher. The use of 8T instead of 6T
SRAM cells reduces the system-level SNM and SER by 14% and 22%, respectively.
Additionally, workload and cache organization have a significant impact on the FIT
rate and SNM degradation of memory components. This chapter demonstrated that
the reliability and performance optimal cache organization changes when going
from the super-threshold voltage to the near-threshold voltage domain.
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Part IV
Cross-Layer from Physics to Gate- and
Circuit- Levels
Mehdi Tahoori
The rapid shrinking of device geometries in the nanometer regime has led to the
need for new system-on-chip (SoC) design methodologies at various levels of
abstraction. Improvements in chip manufacturing technology and system integration
have propelled an astonishing growth of computing systems which are integrated
into almost all aspects of our daily lives. However, this trend is facing serious
challenges, both at device and system levels. At the device level, as the minimum
feature size continues to shrink, a host of vulnerabilities influence the robustness
and reliability of computing systems. Some of these factors are caused by the
stochastic nature of the nanoscale manufacturing process (e.g., process variability,
sub-wavelength lithographic inaccuracies), while other factors appear because of
high operating frequencies and intrinsic nanoscale features (e.g., RLC noise, on-
chip temperature variation, increased sensitivity to radiation and device aging).
Therefore, the reliability of systems on chip is not only limited to the technology
parameters and hardware design, it is highly influenced by the runtime environment
and executed workload, which can aggravate hardware stress and cause failures.
The chapters presented in this section are looking at the reliability issues from
the circuit, logic, and physical design perspective, while linking the issues to the
technology from one side and higher abstraction level (architecture, system, and
workload) from the other end, therefore they represent a cross-layer angle on these
reliability challenges.
The first chapter in this section addressed transistor aging in system bistables,
mainly flip-flops. It presents various methods to improve the reliability of gate-level
digital circuits by addressing the timing degradation of flip-flops under severe aging
and voltage-drop. This is achieved through selective flip-flop optimization. The idea
presented in this chapter is to find timing-critical flip-flops under high aging and/or
voltage-drop impact, and selectively re-optimize them for operating under such
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stress by appropriately sizing their transistors. Therefore, instead of replacing all
flip-flops in the netlist with the hardened versioned, only the ones which are subject
to extreme stress are replaced by hardened version. This is achieved by a cross-
layer analysis which based on the architecture and analyzing the running workload,
the flip-flops under severe aging and voltage fluctuation stress are identified. This
effectively improves the reliability and lifetime of circuits without imposing much
overhead, because these flip-flops constitute a small portion of all flip-flops.
The second chapter in this section focuses on electromigration (EM) which
is the major interconnect aging effect in advanced technology nodes. It provides
techniques for power grid network sizing while considering electromigration relia-
bility. This chapter starts with an overview power grid network and electromigration
fundamentals. The main issue addressed in this chapter is EM immortality and aging
effects, used as EM constraints when formulating the optimization problems. When
an interconnect line is below a critical stress, the void nucleation cannot occur and
hence the metal wires become immortal and will not fail. The chapter first shows
that the new Power/ground (P/G) optimization problem, subject to the voltage IR
drop and new EM constraints, can still be formulated as an efficient sequence of
linear programming (SLP) problem. The new optimization will ensure that none of
the wires fail if all the constraints are satisfied. However, requiring all the wires to be
EM immortal can be over-constrained. To mitigate this problem, the improvement
is to consider the aging effects of interconnect wires in P/G networks.
The third chapter is devoted to various monitoring circuitry for improving cross-
layer resiliency. The role of monitor circuits is to establish a bridge between
the hardware and other layers by providing information about the devices and
the operating environment in runtime. This chapter explores delay-based monitor
circuits for design automation with the existing cell-based design methodology.
The chapter reviews several design techniques to monitor parameters of threshold
voltage, temperature, leakage current, critical delay, and aging. The chapter then
demonstrates a reconfigurable architecture to monitor multiple parameters with
small area footprint. Finally, an extraction methodology of physical parameters is
discussed for model-hardware correlation.
The last chapter discusses yield and aging in scaled technologies. For the
robustness of VLSI design methodology and cycles, reliability and yield need to
be accurately modeled, systematically optimized, and seamlessly integrated into the
existing design flow. This chapter will survey critical aging and yield issues, and
then review the state-of-the-art techniques to tackle them, including both modeling
and optimization strategies which reside across the Physics and Circuit/Gate layers
as part of the overall dependability scheme. The strategies often involve synergistic
cross-layer optimization due to the complicated VLSI design procedures nowadays.
Novel modeling techniques leveraging machine learning are analyzed along with
analytical optimization approaches.
Selective Flip-Flop Optimization for
Circuit Reliability
Mohammad Saber Golanbari, Mojtaba Ebrahimi, Saman Kiamehr,
and Mehdi B. Tahoori
1 Introduction, Motivation, and Contributions
VLSI circuits are influenced by several sources of process and runtime variabilities
[16]. Among them, supply voltage fluctuation and transistor aging due to BTI are the
most important factors [2, 30, 36]. They degrade the performance of VLSI circuits
by increasing the delay, and consequently deteriorate lifetime.
The impacts of both voltage-drop and aging are significant on sequential ele-
ments such as flip-flops and latches. Due to particular aspects of flip-flops, such as
the internal feedback structure, degradation of the transistors of a flip-flop as well as
supply voltage fluctuation may lead to serious timing degradation or even functional
failure (inability to capture the input independent of timing) [24]. Furthermore,
many flip-flops are on the critical paths of a circuit because logic synthesis tools
balance the delays of circuit paths to achieve the best performance, area, and power.
Therefore, it is necessary to employ design-time mitigation techniques to consider
and control such gradual degradation, e.g. by adding appropriate timing margins
(aging and voltage-drop guardband) [20, 28].
Our analysis shows that in a typical digital design such as a microprocessor,
based on the functionality of different components, some flip-flops operate under
static or near-static BTI stress, irrespective of the workload. These flip-flops expe-
rience large timing degradation because the flip-flop input Signal Probability (SP)
is very close to 0.0 or 1.0. Being subject to severe BTI stress, the aforementioned
flip-flops degrade faster, imposing a large aging guardband to the entire circuit.
Flip-flops also experience a large temporally localized voltage-drop, because they
are synchronized with the clock edge and supposedly operate at the same time (at
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clock edge), hence, drawing substantial current leading to a significant voltage-drop
over Power Delivery Network (PDN) [22]. Moreover, recent studies have shown
that the voltage-drop impact gets more severe by technology scaling [2, 21, 38].
Therefore, in a conventional design flow, costly voltage-drop timing guardband is
considered for reliable circuit operation [22].
In this chapter, we explore methods to improve circuit reliability by addressing
the timing degradation of flip-flops under severe aging1 and voltage-drop, i.e. selec-
tive flip-flop optimization. The idea is to find timing-critical flip-flops under high
aging and/or voltage-drop impact, and selectively re-optimize them for operating
under such stress by appropriately sizing their transistors. This effectively improves
the reliability and lifetime of circuits without imposing much overhead, because
these flip-flops constitute a small portion of all flip-flops.
Simulation results obtained by applying the proposed method to a processor
show that the flip-flops optimized with the proposed method exhibit much less
delay degradation, while imposing less than 0.1% leakage power overhead to the
processor. As a result, the required timing guardband of the processor using the
proposed method is significantly less compared to the original processor. Therefore,
given a specific clock period, the optimized processor design with the proposed
method has 36.9% longer lifetime and better reliability compared to the original
processor design.
2 Variability Impact on Flip-Flops
2.1 Flip-Flop Timing
Flip-flop timing metrics such as setup-time (U ), hold-time (H ), clock-to-q (DCQ),
and data-to-q (DDQ) are well discussed in [31, 34]. When the setup-time is large
enough, the clock-to-q value is almost constant, but further reduction of the setup-
time will increase the clock-to-q value monotonously until a value after which the
flip-flop is unable to capture and latch the input [31]. Based on this, the optimum
setup-time is defined as the setup-time value which causes the clock-to-q value to
increase by 10% from its minimum value [32]. Moreover, each flip-flop has two
internal paths; one for transferring the input state “zero” to the output i.e. High-to-
Low (HL) input transition, and the other for transferring the input state “one” to the
output i.e. Low-to-High (LH) input transition. Basically, the timing parameters for
these two internal paths can be different [24] as shown in Fig. 1, meaning that there
are two sets of timing parameters for internal LH and HL paths of a flip-flop:
{ULH ,DCQLH ,DDQLH } for LH transition,
1We consider the impact of Negative Bias Temperature Instability (NBTI) on PMOS transistors,
and Positive Bias Temperature Instability (PBTI) on NMOS transistors.























Fig. 1 Different flip-flop timing parameters. The correct functionality is guaranteed by consider-
ing the flip-flop delay as illustrated
{UHL,DCQHL,DDQHL} for HL transition.
Flip-flop delay should be defined such that the correct functionality of the flip-flop
will be guaranteed, disregard of the transition. Therefore, we define the flip-flop
delay as the summation of the worst setup-time and the worst clock-to-q of both
transitions as shown in Fig. 1.
delay = max{ULH ,UHL} +max{DCQLH ,DCQHL}. (1)
This guarantees that in both transitions the input signal is correctly captured and
propagated to the flip-flop output.
2.2 Runtime Variation Impacts on Flip-Flops
Several parameters such as supply voltage, workload, and temperature affect the
performance of flip-flops in a circuit. Parameters such as temperature and supply
voltage affect all the transistors of a flip-flop in the same way, whereas the impact
of the input SP is different for the transistors of a flip-flop [23]. This results in an
asymmetric aging of transistors according to their stress duty cycles. Therefore, the
delay degradation of internal LH and HL paths inside an aged flip-flop depends on
the input SP [24].
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Fig. 2 Separate internal LH (red)/HL (blue) paths of a C2MOS flip-flop [31] (a), and delay of
internal LH/HL paths of an aged C2MOS flip-flop after 5 years (optimized for Power Delay Product
(PDP) in the fresh state) for different input SPs (b)
In the C2MOS flip-flop2 depicted in Fig. 2a, the internal LH and HL paths consist
of two separate groups of transistors, which makes the aging of these two paths
independent according to the input SP. Figure 2b illustrates the delay of LH and
HL transitions of an aged C2MOS flip-flop [31] for different input SPs. When the
flip-flop is aged under input SP = 0.0 (SP0), the worst delay degradation happens
on the flip-flop HL path; however, the delay of the flip-flop LH path is only slightly
affected. On the other hand, an aging under input SP = 1.0 (SP1) greatly degrades
the delay of the flip-flop LH path while slightly affecting the delay of the flip-flop
HL path. For moderate aging condition, i.e. 0.1 < SP < 0.9, the delay degradation
of both LH and HL paths is moderate. The reason is that under SP0 and SP1
conditions, Static BTI (S-BTI) asymmetrically alters the threshold voltages leading
to unbalanced aging of LH and HL paths of the flip-flop as the stress duty cycle of
some transistors is 1.0, i.e., always under BTI stress. However, in moderate aging
condition, the transistors can partially recover as the stress duty cycle is less than
1.0.
The impact of supply voltage fluctuation on the flip-flops of a circuit depends on
the workload variation and dynamic power consumption of the circuit. Therefore,
each flip-flop may experience a specific amount of voltage-drop. A voltage-drop
causes performance degradation of the flip-flops, which is typically larger than the
degradation of simpler combinational gates in the standard cell library. Figure 3
compares the impact of a voltage-drop up to 10% on the delay of an aged flip-flop
and an aged inverter. Compared to a no-voltage-drop condition, the delay of the
flip-flop increases by 23.6% whereas the delay of the inverter is increased by 15%.
Moreover, the flip-flops of a circuit generally experience higher amount of
voltage-drop compared to combinational gates [37]. As a result of temporally
2A C2MOS flip-flop design is a master–slave flip-flop built of two connected C2MOS latches. It is
one of the commonly used flip-flops in modern processor designs [31].






















Fig. 3 Comparison between the voltage-drop induced delay degradation of a flip-flop and an
inverter, which are aged under same condition (Aging under SP1 for 5 years)
localized switching of flip-flops at the positive (or negative) edge of clock signal,
the instantaneous current drawn from PDN at the synchronized clock edge is
comparatively high. This leads to high voltage-drop at the clock edge, when the flip-
flops are processing their input signals. This peak current consumption is damped
over the rest of the clock period, when the combinational cells are active. Therefore,
in this work we focus on dealing with the impact of voltage fluctuation on the flip-
flops.
Temporal and spatial temperature variations can also affect the circuit per-
formance. The temporal temperature change could be rather high and has been
the subject of research since it affects the reliability of the VLSI circuits. It
is demonstrated in [17] that the circuit performance can be changed by up to
10% for 110 ◦C temperature variation. Therefore, in order to meet the reliability
constraints, the circuit timing should be adjusted according to the worst temperature
corner, which is typically at high temperature. On-chip spatial temperature gradient
puts different stress on circuit components across a chip. The amount of on-chip
spatial temperature difference (only on cores) based on simulation [3, 7], sensor
measurements [33], and thermal camera [3] is reported to be up to∼30◦C. Since the
delay change is approximately 4% for every 40 ◦C [17, 29], the overall difference
between the delay degradation of core flip-flops due to such spatial temperature
gradient is expected to be less than 3%, and hence, much smaller compared to
voltage-drop variation [11].
The combined impact of voltage-drop and aging significantly degrades the
performance of flip-flops. As an example, the delay of a fresh flip-flop optimized
with balanced HL/LH delay increases from 98.5 ps to 165.7 ps due to the combined
impact of voltage-drop (10%) and S-BTI (5-years under SP0). This is equivalent to
68% delay increase. If such a flip-flop is in a critical path of the circuit, a large timing
guardband is required for timing closure considering the reliability constraints.
Therefore, it is necessary to find such flip-flops at design-time and optimize them
for operating under such conditions.
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Fig. 4 (a) Input signal probabilities and (b) voltage-drop analysis of Leon3 flip-flops executing
MiBench Workloads
2.3 Significance of Flip-Flops in Circuit Reliability
In a properly designed circuit, the timing of circuit paths are balanced during the
synthesis process. Therefore, many flip-flops are timing-critical as they lie on the
circuit critical paths. Studies [12, 37] have shown that in VLSI circuits, some flip-
flops are under severe static BTI leading to a large timing degradation over time.
Furthermore, the impact of voltage-drop on flip-flops could be very high as a result
of localized power consumption at a specific time (e.g. positive clock edge) or at a
specific location on the circuit layout.
The large impact of S-BTI and voltage-drop on flip-flops has a significant impact
on the reliability of a circuit when such flip-flops are timing-critical. In order to
investigate the likelihood of having such a scenario in a typical digital design, we
use the flow presented in Sect. 4 to extract the voltage-drop and the aging of the
Leon3 flip-flops by executing six MiBench workloads [15] namely stringsearch,
qsort, basicmath, bitcount, fft, and crc32 on Leon3 processor [10]. In order to be
fair, we excluded the flip-flops belonging to the parts which are not exercised by
the employed workloads such as interrupt handler, timers, and UART controller.
The synthesized netlist of the Leon3 processor has 2352 flip-flops, but the results
demonstrated in this section contain only 1686 flip-flops belonging to the parts
which are exercised by all employed workloads.
Figure 4a demonstrates the input SP distribution of the aforementioned 1686 flip-
flops. The results show that 181 flip-flops always experience input SP0, whereas
29 flip-flops are under input SP1. Our analysis shows that the flip-flops with
such behavior typically belong to either the error checking and exception handling
registers or higher bits of address registers which are constant due to temporal
and spatial locality of the executed instructions. Besides, the SP of a considerable
number of flip-flops is very close to either 0.0 or 1.0. Please note that the results
reported in Fig. 4a are the average of six employed workloads, and hence, the flip-
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flops with SP= 0 or SP= 1 have such SP across all executed workloads. Similar
experiment has been carried out in [18] to study the impact of workload in real
systems, which shows that some flip-flops are always under S-BTI across different
workloads.
Figure 4b shows the distribution of the maximum voltage-drop impacting the flip-
flops of Leon3 processor compared to the peak voltage-drop across all the executed
workloads. Please note that it is necessary to consider the maximum voltage-drop
over the execution of all workloads, because it eventually impacts the flip-flop
characteristics. A significant portion of flip-flops experience on average 41% of the
maximum amount of voltage-drop; however, there are flip-flops at the right side tail
of the distribution which experience large voltage-drop comparable to the maximum
voltage-drop in the circuit.
According to the observations in Fig. 4, there are flip-flops experiencing both S-
BTI and high voltage-drop which leads to high-degradation. If such flip-flops are on
a critical path of the processor (i.e. timing-critical flip-flops), the degradation of the
flip-flops should be reflected in the timing guardband of the circuit. Timing-critical
flip-flops can be categorized into different groups based on the impact of voltage-
drop and aging as follows:
• low voltage-drop and low aging,
• low voltage-drop but S-BTI aging (SP0/SP1)*
• high voltage-drop but typical aging*
• high voltage-drop and S-BTI aging (SP0/SP1)*
Therefore, we propose to generate flip-flops specifically optimized for such high-
degradation conditions (marked by *) and add them to the standard cell library.
Using the proposed flow in Sect. 4, we determine such high-degradation and timing-
critical flip-flops and replace themwith the optimized versions to improve the timing
and reliability of the circuit.
3 Reliability-Aware Flip-Flop Design
In a typical reliability-aware circuit design, one should consider the delay of the
elements under variation impacts to ensure the correct functionality of the circuit
during the expected lifetime. Therefore, higher delay degradation of timing-critical
flip-flops imposes a large timing guardband. In our proposed methodology, we
create optimized versions of the flip-flops for different stress conditions based on
aging and voltage fluctuations, and use these optimized versions only when a flip-
flop is timing-critical and subject to such stress conditions to avoid unnecessary over
design. This means that in the cell library, we add the following resilient versions of
the flip-flops:
• Aging-resilient flip-flops, optimized for different aging corners (SP0 and SP1),














































Fig. 5 Delay of a C2MOS flip-flop which is aged under SP= 0 over 5 years for LH/HL transitions,
compared to the flip-flop optimized for SP= 0 showing how the unbalanced aging of internal
LH/HL paths worsens the degradation in original flip-flop
• Voltage-drop resilient flip-flops, optimized to have lower performance degrada-
tion under voltage fluctuation,
• Aging and voltage-drop resilient flip-flops.
3.1 Aging-Resilient Flip-Flop Design
When the fresh delays of internal paths of a flip-flop (i.e., LH and HL paths) are
designed to be similar (depicted as solid lines in Fig. 5), the internal path with higher
degradation rate eventually becomes dominant and determines the total delay of
the flip-flop. In this case, a significant aging in flip-flop characteristics is observed
over time (corresponding to the internal path with higher degradation). On the
other hand, if the internal path with higher degradation rate is initially faster (by
design) than the internal path with lower degradation rate, the dominant internal
path would be the slower one, and hence the higher degradation rate of the faster
internal path is masked. Consequently, the overall aging of the flip-flop would
be rather small. The delay of the optimized flip-flop, shown in Fig. 5 by dashed
lines, exhibits such characteristics. The post-aging delay of the optimized flip-
flop would increase by ∼10 ps, which is much lower than ∼40 ps increase in the
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delay of the original flip-flop. We exploit this method for designing aging-resilient
flip-flops.
In order to decrease the overall BTI-induced aging inflicted to a flip-flop, our
proposed method balances the delay of internal HL and LH paths of the flip-flop
for post-aging state of the flip-flop, by resizing the transistors of internal HL and
LH paths. In other words, the proposed method increases the fresh delay (t = 0) of
the flip-flop internal path which has lower degradation rate in order to compensate
the overall degradation of the flip-flop after aging. Although the fresh delay of
the optimized flip-flop might be slightly larger compared to the fresh delay of the
original flip-flop, the overall delay of the optimized flip-flop considering the aging-
induced timing margin would be smaller than those of the original flip-flop since the
aging rate is much smaller.
Please note that this method reduces the degradation for a given SP, but inevitably
worsens the aging at the other corners of SP. For example, if we optimize the
flip-flop for SP0, the degradation would be much higher if the optimized flip-
flop operates at SP1. Nevertheless, these flip-flops under S-BTI will not operate
at other SP corners, because their SP is determined by the circuit structure and
functionality. Therefore, we only optimize for the given SP corner. This means
that we intentionally sacrifice other corners, which never occur due to the specific
functionality of the circuit, to gain a larger improvement.
3.2 Voltage-Drop Resilient Flip-Flop Design
Other than aging, which affects each flip-flop transistor based on the input signal
probability, a drop in the supply voltage of the flip-flop slows down all flip-flop
transistors in the same way. However, a slight upsizing of specific transistors can
compensate the degradation in the flip-flop timing. Therefore, we evaluate the delay
of the flip-flop when operating under the impact of voltage-drop, and optimize the
flip-flop with the goal of improving the delay. Consequently, the optimized flip-flop
would have better timing at the cost of higher power consumption.
3.3 Aging and Voltage-Drop Resilient Flip-Flop Design
The degradation in the flip-flop timing due to both S-BTI and voltage-drop is very
large. Such timing degradation may not be effectively compensated by resizing the
transistors within a flip-flop area without upsizing the entire flip-flop. Therefore, in
addition to targeting for better timing under the impact of the aging and voltage-
drop, we allow the optimization algorithm to increase the area of the flip-flop by a
small percentage. Please note that an extra Engineering Change Order (ECO) might
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be needed to replace the original flip-flop with the optimized version in this case.
However, since there exist only a few flip-flops under such degradation it would not
be an issue to perform an ECO on placement.
3.4 Problem Formulation for Flip-Flop Resiliency
Optimization
The delay of a flip-flop under a specific working condition (including temperature,
voltage, and input SP) can be presented as a function of the transistors’ widths:
delay = f (W) , W = [wi], (2)
where [wi] is a vector containing the width of flip-flop transistors. Here, delay is
the delay (Data-to-q) of the flip-flop, according to Eq. (1), under variation impact,
which could be S-BTI stress, voltage-drop, or both depending on the optimization
approach.
The delay function f is a complicated function of transistors’ widths. Our
experimental results for flip-flops with different sizing show that f cannot be
presented with any general linear function. Therefore, we use Sequential Quadratic
Programming (SQP) which is a non-linear programming technique [19]. In SQP,
the problem is converted into quadratic sub-problems and solved in order to find a
better sizing in each iteration. For this purpose, we follow an iterative approach in
order to minimize the delay of Eq. (2). Given an initial sizing, the delay function f
is approximated with a quadratic function:
f (W) ≈ f (W0)+ f (W0)T · (W −W0)+ 1
2
(W −W0)T ·Hf (W0) · (W −W0),
(3)
where  f (W) and Hf (W) are the gradient and the Hessian of the delay function
f , respectively. Minimizing the quadratic approximation of Eq. (3), with respect to
some constraints, which will be discussed later in this section, yields an optimized
transistor sizing. Thereafter, the obtained sizing is used as the initial sizing, and
a new iteration is launched. This cycle continues until the optimization reaches
the required precision, i.e. the difference between the optimized delays of two
consecutive iterations becomes smaller than a predefined threshold εdelay. Therefore,
the solver continues by checking the precision of the resulting delay:
∣∣delayi−1 − delayi∣∣ < εdelay (4)
where delayi represents the delay of ith iteration.
Another reason to use the quadratic approximation is that the optimum result
of a linear problem always lies on the boundaries, while the optimum result of a




Parameters W = (w1, . . . , wn)
Initial guess W0= optimized W for PDP (fresh)
Constraints wi ≥ wmin∑n
1 wi ≤ (1+ λ)
∑
W0
power(W) ≤ (1+ β) power(W0)
Target minimize: delay = f (W)
Constants wmin Minimum size
λ Acceptable excessive area
β Acceptable excessive leakage
quadratic problem can be any point within the boundaries as well as the boundaries
themselves. In Sect. 5, we demonstrate that the optimum result does not necessarily
lie on the boundaries, and hence a non-linear programming technique is needed to
find a better result. Table 1 summarizes the optimization problem.
Several constraints are applied to the optimization problem, relating to transistors
size, flip-flop area, and leakage. The first constraint shown in Table 1 limits the
minimum size of transistors. The second constraint limits the area of the optimized
flip-flop. In case of optimizing for S-BTI or voltage-drop, we consider λ = 0 to
keep the flip-flop area within the area of the original flip-flop which also facilitates
keeping the aspect ratio almost equal to the aspect ratio of the original flip-flop.
This way, the optimized flip-flop can easily replace the original flip-flop without any
layout modifications at the circuit-level. This is achieved by limiting the summation
of transistor widths wi . However, for flip-flops under S-BTI and voltage-drop,
we assume a λ > 0 value to compensate the delay degradation better. The third
constraint sets an upper limit for the excessive leakage of the flip-flop by parameter
β. This constraint is applied to the optimization problem to limit the leakage
power of the optimized flip-flops within an acceptable range. The initial guess of
optimization W0 is the optimum sizing for minimum PDP in the fresh state.
3.5 Reliability-Aware Flip-Flop Optimization Flow
Figure 6 presents our proposed reliability-aware optimization flow. For a given
input SP, the SP of all transistors are once calculated using SPICE simulations.
Afterwards, based on the extracted SP for transistors and the operating corner of the
flip-flop (temperature, supply voltage, etc.), the BTI-induced threshold voltage shifts
of all transistors (Vth) are obtained. Then, the Vth values are back-annotated
into the original flip-flop SPICE netlist, and the SPICE netlist of aged flip-flop is
generated.
In each SQP iteration, the quadratic sub-problems are created and solved to
generate further improved flip-flop sizing. Subsequently, the new sizing is back-
annotated into the aged flip-flop netlist extracted before, and a new aged flip-flop
with the given sizing is generated. Then, Cadence Virtuoso Liberate [6] is used












































Fig. 6 Overall flow to find the optimum flip-flop sizing for under S-BTI stress and voltage-drop
at a specific working corner (voltage, temperature)
to characterize the new flip-flop and extract its delay and power consumption.
When the improvement is small enough and the condition in Eq. (4) is met, the
SQP method terminates and returns the last sizing as the optimum solution for the
problem.
As the process is executed at a specific supply voltage (Vdd ), it can inherently be
used to optimize for a voltage-drop as well, when the given supply voltage includes
the impact of the voltage-drop. We can also create voltage-drop resilient version of
a flip-flop for typical aging, by considering input SP of 0.5. Therefore, we execute
the flow presented in Fig. 6 for these conditions in order to create variation-resilient
versions of the flip-flop, assuming a supply voltage of Vdd and a maximum voltage-
drop of R%:
Supply voltage (V ) Aging condition
Aging Vdd S-BTI (SP0, SP1)
Voltage-drop (1− R100 )Vdd Typical aging (SP= 0.5)
Aging and voltage-drop (1− R100 )Vdd S-BTI (SP0, SP1)
After optimization process, it is necessary to re-characterize the flip-flops for
different supply voltage ((1 − R100 )Vdd to Vdd ) and aging conditions (0 ≤ SP ≤
1). The characterization results are then used to obtain overall circuit timing under
supply voltage fluctuation and aging impacts.
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4 Selective Flip-Flop Optimization
This section explains how the optimized flip-flops in Sect. 3 can be employed to
improve the reliability of a circuit. The idea is to find the flip-flops affected by
S-BTI and/or voltage-drop impacts which are also influential on circuit reliability,
i.e. the timing-critical flip-flops, and replace them with the optimized versions. The
reason for this selective flip-flop optimization is that the reliability-aware flip-flop
optimization is costly in terms of leakage overhead per flip-flop. Therefore, flip-flop
replacement should be done only for the timing-critical flip-flops which experience
S-BTI and/or large voltage-drop to be cost-effective. Since they constitute a small
subset of the all flip-flops in the design, the proposed method is able to reduce the
overall timing guardband in a cost-effective way.
The overall flow of the proposed selective flip-flop optimization methodology
is presented in Fig. 7. The flow uses the results of the Synthesis and Place & Route
steps of a VLSI design flow and is composed of (I) Aging and Voltage-Drop Analysis
and (II) Selective Flip-flop Replacement steps. The optimization flow updates the
gate-level netlist and the circuit layout to improve the reliability of the circuit under
voltage-drop and aging impacts. The outputs of the optimization method can be
further used in the rest of the VLSI design flow. Therefore, the proposed method is
transparent to the VLSI design flow and can be easily integrated into it.
4.1 Aging and Voltage-Drop Analysis
In this step, the results of Synthesis and Place & Route steps of the VLSI design flow
are used to discover the flip-flops which are aging-critical, voltage-drop critical, and
timing-critical.
Aging-critical flip-flops are those flip-flops which experience large impact of
aging, i.e. flip-flops under S-BTI. To find the aging-critical flip-flops we need
to extract the SP of the flip-flops. Therefore, we perform a gate-level simulation
running some representative workloads. The representative workloads are pieces of
workloads which are typically executed on the circuit. The result of the gate-level
simulation is the Voltage Change Dump (VCD) of all nets inside the circuit. Based
on this information we can collect SP of all flip-flops and determine the aging-
critical flip-flops.
Dynamic power profiles of circuit components can be extracted from the VCD
reports. We estimate the dynamic voltage-drop in the circuit based on the power
profiles and the layout and packaging of the circuit. This accounts for the resistive
and inductive components of the voltage fluctuation. We generate a voltage-drop
map of the circuit by evaluating the maximum voltage-drop of each cell (gates,
flip-flops, etc.) over the time and over different workloads. As a result, we find
the maximum amount of voltage-drop that each flip-flop experiences over time.











































































Fig. 7 Circuit optimization flow using the proposed selective flip-flop optimization method
Accordingly, the flip-flops which experience a large amount of voltage-drop are
extracted.
Furthermore, the gate-level simulation results are used to perform a voltage-
drop and aging-aware timing analysis which obtains the delay of circuit paths
under variability impacts. We extended the aging-aware timing analysis in [8] by
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considering voltage-drop related information. This is done by characterizing the
cells at two different supply voltages: the nominal Vdd and the supply voltage
considering the maximum drop (1 − R100 )Vdd . Then, for each gate/flip-flop in the
gate-level netlist, based on the amount of voltage-drop on the gate, we perform a
linear interpolation among the standard cell library entries for two supply voltages
and find the corresponding timing information. The linear interpolation is a valid
method under the assumption of limited change in the supply voltage, as shown
in Fig. 3. For a more aggressive voltage fluctuation, it could be necessary to
characterize the standard cell libraries for a few intermediate supply voltage values
and employ a PCHIP method. Accordingly, we find the timing-critical flip-flops,
which are parts of the critical and near-critical paths of the circuit considering the
impact of variations.
4.2 Selective Flip-Flop Replacement
In the selective flip-flop replacement step, we replace the flip-flops which are timing-
critical, aging-critical, or voltage-drop-critical with their optimized counterparts for
such aging and/or voltage-drop conditions. Although a small portion of the flip-
flops are replaced during the flip-flop replacement process, the circuit layout, timing,
and power properties change since the replaced flip-flops are timing-critical and
may have different area and power characteristics. Therefore, the proposed flip-flop
replacement is an iterative process which replaces a number of flip-flops with the
optimized versions in each iteration. The iterative process continues until no flip-
flop needs to be replaced by an optimized version anymore.
In iteration i of the method, we assume that the circuit delay is Di based on
timing analysis results, and dij is the maximum delay of the paths terminating at flip-
flop j (including the delay of the flip-flop as well). Therefore, in each iteration:
1. We choose the timing-critical flip-flops with a timing slack value of less than k%






Di, j : index of flip-flops.
2. Among these flip-flops, those which are also included in the aging-critical and/or
voltage-drop-critical flip-flops, are replaced with the optimized versions.
3. A trial voltage-drop and aging-aware timing analysis is performed and the circuit
delay (Di++) is determined considering the replaced flip-flops.
4. We keep the optimized flip-flops only when the corresponding path delay of the
flip-flops before optimization is larger than a percentage of the evaluated circuit
delay (Di++):
dij > r ×Di++ "⇒ FFj → FFj,opt . (5)
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The rest of the updated flip-flops in this iteration are rolled back to the original
versions. Please note that we also consider a ratio r < 1 into Eq. (5) to
compensate for the calculation errors due to simulation.
5. The layout and gate-level netlist of the circuit are updated. The layout is only
updated if a cell with larger area is used (particularly applicable to the flip-flops
under both aging and voltage-drop as explained in Sect. 3).
6. In case any flip-flop is replaced by an optimized version during this iteration,
we need to start a new iteration because the timing and power specification of
the circuit are modified. This is done by re-executing the aging and voltage-drop
analysis, as explained in Sect. 4.1. The gate-level simulation, which is a time
consuming process, does not need to be repeated as its results are not affected by
the flip-flop replacement.
The above flow replaces minimum number of flip-flops with the optimized versions
and impose minimum amount of overhead to the circuit. In our simulations the flow
is terminated within a few iterations, since the changes in the circuit layout, power,
and timing are not extensive.
5 Results and Discussions
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of the proposed selective flip-flop
optimization based on simulation results.
5.1 Simulation Setup
We applied the method to several flip-flop topologies, namely C2MOS latch,
Dynamic/Static Single Transistor Clocked latch (DSTC/SSTC), and Semi-Dynamic
flip-flop (SDFF) [31]. The flip-flops are implemented using 45 nm Bulk CMOS
Predictive Technology Model (PTM) transistors [39]. All flip-flops are initially
optimized for the minimum PDP in the fresh state (original design). The aging
parameters of the model proposed in [4] are tuned so that the post-aging delay of a
Fan-Out 4 (FO4) inverter increases by 10% at SP= 0.5 over 5 years. For delay and
leakage measurements, the output load of flip-flops is set to FO4, and the cells are
characterized at room temperature and at different supply voltages, ranging from 80
to 100% of the nominal supply voltage of the technology node.
We used Leon3 processor as a case study for our proposed method. We used
Nangate 45 nm open cell library for combinational logic, and aging assumptions are
the same as described at the beginning of this section. The processor is synthesized
using Synopsys Design Compiler and placement and routing is done using Cadence
EDI [5].
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We executed various MiBench workloads on the synthesized Leon3 processor
and extracted the VCD files. Based on the VCD files, the SP of each node of the
synthesized circuit is calculated and the power consumption of the gates and flip-
flops is calculated using Synopsys Power Compiler. The voltage-drop map of the
processor is also extracted using VoltSpot tool [38], which is able to extract the
voltage-drop caused by both resistive and inductive components.
Please note that the proposed technique is not restricted to a specific working
condition or flip-flop topology. We proceed with presenting detailed results and
analysis for a C2MOS flip-flop. Then, we discuss the results for other types of flip-
flops concisely. Afterwards, the dependency of the improvement achieved by the
proposed method to the excessive leakage will be investigated. At the end of this
section, the impact of using optimized flip-flops on a Leon3 processor lifetime will
be demonstrated.
5.2 Detailed Optimization Results of C2MOS Flip-Flop
We apply the proposed optimization flow presented in Sect. 3.5 (see Fig. 6) to
C2MOS flip-flop design to create optimized flip-flops for aging and voltage-drop
resilience. In order to create the aging-resilient versions of the C2MOS flip-flop, we
let the optimizer to consider designs with up to 25% more leakage compared to the
original flip-flop by setting the coefficient β in Table 1 to 0.25. At this point, we
limit the area of the flip-flop to the area of the original flip-flop, i.e. λ = 0. Please
note that the total overhead of the leakage power for the entire circuit would be
negligible since the number of optimized flip-flops in the design would be limited.
For example, if according to Sect. 2.3, 12.45% of flip-flops are working under S-
BTI, and the leakage overhead of an optimized flip-flop would be less than 25%,
the leakage overhead imposed on the flip-flops would be at most 3.11% (much less
overhead when considering the entire processor design). The aging and voltage-drop
resilient version of the C2MOS flip-flop can be created by assuming an extra area
up to 20% and more leakage overhead. For this, we assume λ = 0.2, β = 1. Using
the extra area, the optimizer is able to find a better design for those flip-flops which
are timing-critical and are under large impact of aging and voltage-drop. Since these
flip-flops are very rare, but have significant impact on the overall processor lifetime
and reliability, it is effective to spend more area for large reliability and lifetime
gains.
Table 2 compares the characteristics of an original and optimized C2MOS
flip-flop (such as setup-time (U ), clock-to-q (DCQ), data-to-q (DDQ), delay, and
leakage) in three different optimization scenarios:
Scenario 1 post-aging PDP, optimized for PDP in post-aging.
Scenario 2 The proposed method (optimized for aging), in which the flip-flop
is optimized for aging resiliency, by minimizing its delay for post-
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aging. The acceptable excessive area and leakage are 0% and 25%,
respectively (β = 0.25, λ = 0).
Scenario 3 The proposed method (optimized for aging+ vdrop), in which the flip-
flop is optimized for aging and voltage-drop resiliency, by minimizing
its delay for post-aging and under voltage-drop impact. The acceptable
excessive area and leakage are 20 and 100%, respectively (β = 1, λ =
0.2).
The optimization results in Table 2 are reported for “fresh” state (no aging
or voltage-drop), for “aged” state (under S-BTI aging SP0 for 5 years), and for
“aging+ vdrop” state (when the flip-flop is aged under S-BTI for 5 years, and
when the supply voltage is dropped by 10%). Setup-time, clock-to-q, and data-to-q
values are presented for LH/HL transitions and the delay is calculated according to
Sect. 2.1. The delay degradation is the relative post-aging delay increase of a design
compared to the fresh delay of the original design (marked as bold in the table):
delay degradation = delayopt.,aged − delayorig.,fresh
delayorig.,fresh
. (6)
Since the optimized flip-flop will replace the corresponding flip-flop in the design,
the delay degradation is compared to the fresh delay of the original flip-flop in order
to give a better understanding of how close the aged delay of the optimized flip-flop
is to the fresh delay of the original design.
Basically, scenario 1 is similar to the methods proposed in many flip-flop
optimization methods such as [1, 13] in the sense that they consider a multiplication
of energy and delay (e.g., the PDP or the Energy Delay Product (EDP)) as the
optimization target. Scenario 1 is able to effectively reduce the PDP by increasing
the delay and reducing the leakage, but this may result in an unacceptable timing
for S-BTI corners. Table 2 shows that due to not considering the flip-flop delay as
the optimization target, the PDP methods cannot find the optimum aging-resilient
sizing for S-BTI corners.
As presented, for the original flip-flop, the fresh delay of LH and HL paths is
almost identical (see DDQ,LH and DDQ,HL), but after aging HL path is much
slower than LH path. This leads to 35% delay degradation due to only aging and
about 68% when aging and voltage-drop affect the flip-flop. When this flip-flop is
optimized for scenario 1, the delay is not reduced well enough because the main
concern is PDP not delay. On the other hand, in scenario 2 (proposed method,
only for aging), the optimizer alters the sizing to equalize the post-aging delay of
the LH/HL paths to achieve the smallest possible post-aging delay with respect to
the constraints (119.4 ps). In this case, the post-aging delay is increased by 21%
compared to the fresh delay of the original flip-flop. Also the leakage overhead is
limited to 4.7%. Since the flip-flop operates in S-BTI zone, the switching rate of
the flip-flop is very small. This means that its dynamic power is almost negligible.
Therefore, the total power in of flip-flops under S-BTI is determined by the leakage
power.













































Fig. 8 Performance of the original flip-flop vs. the flip-flop optimized by the proposed method at
SP0 and SP1, before and after aging (5 years)
Even though scenario 2’s design is much better for flip-flops which are only
under the aging impact compared to the original and the state-of-the-art [1] flip-
flop designs, the impact of 10% voltage-drop is significant on the delay, i.e. 49%
delay degradation. The flip-flop optimization results for scenario 3 show that such
flip-flops are more resilient against both aging and voltage-drop impacts. These flip-
flops consume about 53%more leakage; however, the delay degradation is only 32%
under both aging and voltage-drop. Please note that the number of flip-flops under
such condition is very small. Therefore, using flip-flops optimized by scenario 3 has
negligible impact on the overall processor power consumption.
5.3 Optimization Results for Other Flip-Flops
Figure 8 provides the optimization results for a set of representative flip-flops. It
compares the delay and the leakage of the original and optimized flip-flops, for both
fresh and post-aging states. All delay values are normalized to the fresh delay of the
corresponding original flip-flops (which are 114.8 ps for C2MOS, 28.5 ps for SDFF,
and 71.0 ps for SSTC).
For C2MOS flip-flop, the proposed method reduces the delay degradation in
Eq. (6) to 21%, while the delay degradation of the original design is 35% (14%
improvement). This flip-flop has a symmetric structure, which means it can have
balanced timing for LH/HL transitions (shown in Fig. 2b), while some flip-flop
topologies such as SDFF, always have an unbalanced timing for LH/HL transitions
due to their internal structure. For example, in an SDFF, the delay of HL transition is










Fig. 9 Delay of C2MOS flip-flops optimized for SP0 aging using extra leakage (scenario 2). Delay
degradation saturates as β increases (after β = 0.25)
always smaller than the LH transition. The reason is that, an intermediate precharged
node in this flip-flop should be discharged in LH transition in order to transfer
the input “one” to the output, while for the HL transition no such discharging is
required. Hence, the slower path is always the LH path. This may worsen the aging
if it is coupled with unbalanced aging. For these flip-flops, the optimizer minimizes
the delay of the slower path by taking as much area as it can from the faster path, and
giving the area to the slower path. For SDFF, this is attained with 15.8% additional
leakage at SP0, but it leads to better S-BTI resiliency.
5.4 Delay-Leakage Trade-Off
In order to understand the trade-off between additional leakage and delay, we
optimized a C2MOS flip-flop with several excessive leakage amounts ranging
from 0 to 50% (i.e. β ∈ {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.5}). As shown by Fig. 9, lower delay
degradation can be achieved by allowing the optimization method to design flip-
flops with higher leakage. However, the improvement saturates as β increases.
Hence, providing extra leakage to the optimizer is only beneficial until about 25%,
because the improvement in the delay is not significant. Please note that the designed
flip-flops with looser leakage constraints, i.e. higher β, do not necessarily have very
high leakage. As shown in Table 2, the optimized flip-flop in scenario 2 (only aging)
has only 4.7% extra leakage while providing much better resiliency against S-BTI
aging compared to the original flip-flop and scenario 1 (state-of-the-art work).
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Fig. 10 Comparison of the aging-induced delay degradation under impact of voltage-drop, for
original flip-flop, optimized flip-flop with 0% extra area allowance (scenario 2), and optimized
flip-flop with 20% extra area allowance (scenario 3). The voltage-drop induced delay increase may
be compensated by 20% upsizing of the flip-flop cell during the optimization
5.5 Delay-Area Trade-Off
The impact of a small amount of extra area on the resiliency of the flip-flops
against both aging and voltage-drop impacts is studied by changing parameter
excessive area overhead λ (see Table 1). We run the optimization flow in Sect. 3
for λ ∈ {0, 0.2} values and compare the results to the original flip-flop design.
Based on the results shown in Fig. 10, the flip-flop designs with no extra area, i.e.
scenario 2, exhibit good resiliency against aging; however, under the impact of 10%
voltage-drop it has up to 49% delay degradation. Under the impact of voltage-drop,
the flip-flop designed with 20% extra area exhibits much better characteristics with
maximum 32% delay degradation. This observation confirms that using flip-flops
with 20% extra area can be beneficial for the cases when both aging and voltage-
drop impacts are severe.
5.6 Circuit-Level Results
The proposed selective flip-flop optimization method presented in Sect. 4 is applied
to Leon3 processor with the setup presented in Sect. 5.1 to evaluate the overall
impact on the processor timing and reliability. The “original flip-flop” designs are
optimized for different output loads for minimum PDP in the fresh state, while
the “optimized flip-flop” designs for “aging” and “aging+ vdrop” are obtained by
applying the proposed method. Therefore, per each original flip-flop design for a






















Fig. 11 The layout map of the Leon3 flip-flops during the execution of some MiBench workloads
on Leon3, showing relative voltage-drop criticality, timing criticality, and aging-criticality of
different flip-flops. Values close to “1” correspond to higher criticality, and values closer to “0”
represent the non-critical parts. The top-left part of the processor layout is filled by combinational
gates. (a) Relative voltage-drop criticality of flip-flops. (b) Relative timing criticality of flip-flops.
(c) Relative aging-criticality of flip-flops
specific output load, there are different optimized designs for S-BTI corners SP0
and SP1 as well as no-vdrop and max-vdrop conditions (according to Sect. 3.5).
The timing of Leon3 processor is evaluated using the “aging and voltage-drop
analysis” step of the proposed flow (see Fig. 7). This incorporates using an improved
version of an aging-aware timing analysis tool [8] which also considers the impact
of supply voltage variation as explained in Sect. 4.1. This timing analysis determines
the processor delay under runtime variation impacts.
Figure 11 illustrates the timing of Leon3 flip-flops on the processor layout as well
as the calculated impacts of voltage-drop and aging on the processor timing. The
presented plots are all normalized to the maximum values (maximum voltage-drop,
maximum delay, maximum aging) for better visualization. Therefore, higher values
(darker colors) represent a critical situation. Figure 11a presents voltage-drop of the
flip-flops extracted using the “aging and voltage-drop analysis” step. The voltage-
drop values are normalized to the maximum voltage-drop value extracted during the
simulations. As shown, many flip-flops experience at least a moderate voltage-drop
during the workload execution. However, the flip-flops on the top-left corner of the
layout experience heavy voltage-drop. The timing criticality of the flip-flops is also
shown in Fig. 11b. The flip-flops with lower timing slack have values closer to 1.0
in this figure (darker). Interestingly, some of the flip-flops on the top-left corner are
also timing-critical. Additionally, the aging-criticality of the flip-flops is presented
in Fig. 11c. It is shown that many flip-flops which are under S-BTI are also timing-
critical. Most importantly, a few timing-critical flip-flops are affected by both aging
and voltage-drop impacts.
Table 3 presents processor delays obtained in fresh state, i.e. no aging or voltage-
drop, and when under aging and voltage-drop impacts. We compare the delay of
original processor (before applying the proposed method) with the delay of the
optimized processors, under runtime variation impacts (aging and voltage-drop)
after 7 years. The results are reported for:
360 M. S. Golanbari et al.
















flip-flops 1389.6 ps 1528.2 ps 9.97% – –
Proposed (only
aging) 1391.3 ps 1494.8 ps 7.44% 33.4 ps 30.8%
Proposed
(aging+ voltage-
drop) 1379.7 ps 1486.7 ps 7.75% 41.5 ps 36.9%
1. “Original processor”: using only original flip-flops,
2. “Optimized processor for aging”: when only the impact of aging is considered
during optimization,
3. “Optimized processor for aging and voltage-drop”: when the impacts of aging
and voltage-drop are considered during optimization.
The “original processor” is synthesized using the original flip-flops designs in
Table 2. Then, we apply the proposed selective flip-flop optimization in two modes:
(I) when only aging is considered, and (II) when both aging and voltage-drop are
considered. This obtains two versions of the optimized processor, i.e. “Optimized
processor for aging” and “Optimized processor for aging and voltage-drop.” In
the optimization flow presented in Sect. 4.2, we assume k = 0.15. Therefore, all
flip-flops with a slack value less than 15% of the processor delay are assumed as
timing-critical flip-flops. Additionally, we assume r = 0.95, which means up to 5%
calculation error guardband in the timing analysis method is acceptable. In fact, r
value depends on the accuracy of the timing analysis method. After replacing the
critical flip-flops according to the proposed method, the processor delay is obtained
again using the “aging and voltage-drop analysis” step.
According to the table, delay of the “original processor” is increased by 9.97%
after 7 years. This translates into 138.6 ps timing guardband for 7 years of circuit
operation, i.e. Tclk ≥ 1528.2 ps. The “optimized processor for aging” has better
delay 1494.8 ps under the impacts of aging and voltage-drop which reduces the
required timing guardband by 33.4 ps for 7 years of operation, hence optimizing
the performance. Therefore, the degradation rate of this optimized processor is such
that it can operate for 9.2 years (30.8% lifetime improvement), if it is used with
the timing margins of Tclk = 1528.2 ps. Finally, the required timing guardband
of “Optimized processor for aging and voltage-drop” is further reduced by 41.5 ps
compared to the original processor. Therefore, the lifetime of the processor is
improved by 36.9% (9.6 years).
The reason for the achieved improvements in Table 3 is explained by Fig. 12.
Here, we only plotted the delay of timing-critical flip-flops with a slack smaller
Selective Flip-Flop Optimization for Circuit Reliability 361

























Fig. 12 Fresh delay (no aging, no voltage-drop) vs. increased delay (aged and 10% voltage-drop)
of critical paths of Leon3 processor. The proposed selective flip-flop optimization method replaces
the original flip-flops under S-BTI (red) with the optimized flip-flops (green) and suppresses the
aging and voltage-drop degradation of the most critical paths
than 15% of the processor delay (under aging and voltage-drop impacts). With this
assumption, there are 261 timing-critical flip-flops. Among the timing-critical flip-
flops, 92 flip-flops are under S-BTI impact (i.e. 0 ≤ SP < 0.01 or 0.99 < SP ≤
1), 235 flip-flops experience at least 33% relative voltage-drop. After applying the
selective flip-flop optimization method, 96 flip-flops are replaced with optimized
versions, from which 39 flip-flops are upsized (due to both aging and voltage-drop
impact).
As the optimized flip-flops constitute about 4% of all flip-flops in Leon3, the
overall leakage overhead with this method is 0.22% according to power analysis
results using Synopsys Design Compiler. Moreover, there is virtually no dynamic
power overhead because the replaced flip-flops are mostly under S-BTI impact and
they rarely switch. The additional area overhead is also very negligible because only
39 flip-flops are replaced by the upsized versions (less than 0.1% area overhead).
The ECO process easily fits these flip-flops into the existing layout by slightly
moving other cells. Please note that the impact of the voltage-drop and aging on
the driving logic paths is much less compared to the flip-flops. Therefore, these
paths are degraded at a much lower rate.
6 Comparison with the Related Work
Various methods have been proposed to address the impact of aging and voltage-
drop on flip-flops [1, 13, 23, 25]. For example, [1] proposes a method to improve
flip-flop reliability for a set of corners with different working conditions such as
temperatures and voltages by altering the sizing of transistors. These studies mostly
optimize flip-flops for dynamic BTI stress condition, and flip-flops under static BTI
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are mostly overlooked. As explained, the traditional optimization techniques such
as optimization for the PDP, or EDP cannot effectively address the delay increase
of flip-flops under such stress. There are techniques to reduce the overall impact
of voltage-drop on VLSI circuits by skewing the clock input of the flip-flops at
design-time in order to reduce the peak current at clock edge [9, 35]. However,
these methods are not applicable to flip-flops with zero (or close to zero) timing
slack on the critical paths. The techniques at high abstraction level by software-
guided thread scheduling [27] or by voltage emergency prediction [26] also impose
additional overhead at another abstraction level than circuit-level, in order to address
a circuit-level problem.
7 Summary
In many cases, NTC circuits are required to operate over a wide voltage range in
order to achieve energy efficiency and satisfy performance constraints as needed.
Therefore, an NTC circuit may be exposed to reliability issues such as aging and
voltage-drop which are significant in the super-threshold region.
In this chapter, we discussed that a non-negligible portion of circuit flip-flops
may be under severe aging or large voltage-drop impact, which leads to timing
and functional failures. Therefore, these flip-flops need to be treated separately and
specific stress-tolerant designs should be used in order to improve the reliability and
lifetime. Accordingly, we propose a method to selectively optimize the flip-flops
operating under severe aging stress and/or voltage-drop conditions. The proposed
optimization flow resizes the flip-flop transistors to obtain the variability-resilient
cells. Then, flip-flops which are under the impact of aging and/or voltage-drop are
determined using a variation-aware static timing analysis tool, and are replaced by
the optimized flip-flops which can withstand aging and voltage-drop impacts much
better. Simulation results show that the proposed selective flip-flop optimization
method can reduce Leon3 processor timing guardband, and improve the lifetime
of the processor by 36.9%, with negligible power and area overhead.
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EM Lifetime Constrained Optimization
for Multi-Segment Power Grid Networks
Han Zhou, Zeyu Sun, Sheriff Sadiqbatcha, and Sheldon X.-D. Tan
1 Introduction
On-chip power supply or power-ground (P/G) networks provide power to the circuit
modules in a chip from external power supplies. Since power grid wires experience
the largest current flows on a chip, they are more susceptible to long-term reliability
issues and functional failures. These reliability issues and failures typically come
from metal electromigration (EM), excessive IR drops, and I (Ldi/dt) noise
along with recently emerging back end of line time-dependent dielectric breakdown
(TDDB) [2, 3, 6].
As technology scales into smaller features with increasing current densities, EM-
induced reliability deteriorates, the EM lifetime was projected to be reduced by half
for each new technology node by ITRS 2015 [19]. As a result, EM still remains one
of the top killers of copper based damascene interconnects for technologies in the
sub-10 nm realm. This introduces additional challenges for designing robust power
supply networks to satisfy the demanding design requirements.
An important step for power supply synthesis in the typical EDA design flow
is sizing the wire width of the power grid stripes, after the topology of the power
supply network has been determined, so that the minimum amount of chip area
will be used while avoiding potential reliability failures due to electromigration
and excessive IR drops. Numerous works have been proposed for the power supply
network optimization in the past, primarily based on nonlinear or sequence of linear
programming (SLP) methods [8–10, 13, 26, 27, 31].
To satisfy the EM reliability, all the existing methods use the current density
of individual wires as the constraint, which is mainly based on the Black’s EM
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model. However, this constraint is too conservative for modern power grid networks.
Furthermore, all existing power supply optimization methods fail to consider the
aging effects. With recent advancements in physics-based EMmodels and numerical
analysis techniques such as three-phase EM model [12, 24, 28, 33], it is possible
to provide more accurate time to failure (TTF) estimation for multi-segment
interconnects.
In this chapter, we present two new P/G network sizing and optimization
techniques, which were first introduced in [35, 36]. We will summarize the key
contributions and major computing steps from the P/G optimization technique
considering the new physics-based EMmodels. The chapter is organized as follows:
Sect. 2 describes the power grid network and its models. Section 3 presents the fun-
damentals of EM and the voltage-based EM immortality check method for general
multi-segment interconnect wires. Section 4 outlines a physics-based three-phase
EM model and a fast EM lifetime estimation method. Section 5 introduces the EM
immortality constrained P/G network optimization problem and its programming-
based solution. Section 6 presents the EM lifetime constrained P/G optimization
method, which deals with the EM-induced aging effect. Section 7 summarizes this
chapter.
2 Power Grid Modeling
Practical VLSI interconnects (especially the global networks such as power supply
and clock networks) have many multi-segment wires as shown in Fig. 1. A multi-
segment interconnect wire consists of continuously connected high-conductivity
metal within one layer of metallization.
Figure 2 shows a typical mesh-structured P/G network with multi-layer power
grids. The modeling assumptions for later optimization are listed as follows. Firstly,
because of the concern with the long-term average effects of the current, we focus
on the steady state (DC) problem, which means we are only interested in the
resistance of the power grid networks. Secondly, the P/G network is composed of
an orthogonal mesh of wires and contains multiple segments/branches, which is the
typical P/G structure. Lastly, to simplify the problem, the circuits are modeled with
shorted vias, which means the via resistance is ignored and vias will not be sized.
Figure 3 shows the equivalent circuit of the power grid network in Fig. 2.
As a result, the power grid systems are linear and driven by the DC effective
currents [17]. For a power grid network with n nodes,
G× V = I (1)
Fig. 1 Example of a multi-segment wire
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Fig. 2 A small portion of a typical power supply network [22]
Fig. 3 Equivalent circuit of a small portion of a typical power grid
where G is a n × n conductance matrix; I is the current source vector; V is the
corresponding vector of nodal voltages.
3 Electromigration Fundamentals
3.1 Electromigration Introduction
EM is a physical phenomenon of material migration caused by an electrical field.
Wind force, which is produced by current flowing through a conductor, acts in
the direction of the current flow and is the primary cause of EM [21]. During
the migration process, hydrostatic stress is generated inside the metal wire due to
momentum transfer between lattice atoms. Void and hillock formation are caused
by conducting electrons at the opposite ends of the wire. The void may lead to early
failure or late failure of the wire [1].
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Fig. 4 Side-view of void formation: (a) void in a via-above line (early failure mode); (b) void in
a via-below line (later failure mode)
Early failure typically happens in a via-to-via structure as shown in Fig. 4a. When
the void forms in a via-above line and reaches critical size [16, 34], which equals
the via’s diameter, the via will be blocked by the void and thus the connection to
the upper layer will also be blocked. This is because the capping layer is fabricated
with dielectrics such as Si3N4 which will block the current flow. On the contrary,
late failure typically happens in a via-below structure as shown in Fig. 4b. Since the
barrier layer is fabricated with Ta whose resistivity is much higher than Cu, when the
void reaches critical size, current can still go through the barrier layer. Sometimes
early failure can happen in a via-below structure and late failure can happen in a
via-above structure. Although the void can grow at these positions, the possibility is
very low.
When the compressive stress at the anode continues to be built up, hillocks
or extrusion may be formed, which will lead to a resistance decrease [30] and
can potentially cause short-circuit failure. However, the void nucleation is still the
dominant EM failure effect [15].
3.2 Steady State EM-Induced Stress Modeling
Steady state EM-induced stress modeling helps find the immortality information
of the interconnect wire quickly as no complex calculations are required. For
these kinds of models, stress on the cathode at steady state (σsteady), which is the
maximum stress the node experiences, is compared with critical stress (σcrit). If
σsteady is lower than σcrit, the wire is considered as immortal. One of the well-
known steady state analysis method is Blech product [4], but it is only suitable for a
single (i.e., one-segment) wire. Recently, a voltage-based EM immortality analysis
method for multi-segment interconnect structures has been proposed [23, 24]. In this
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Fig. 5 Interconnect example for EM analysis for straight 3-terminal wire
where Vk is the normal nodal voltage (with respect to cathode node cat) at node
k, ak is the total area of branches connected to node k, and A is the total area of
the wire. With voltage of node i (Vi), steady state stress at that node (σi) can be
calculated as σi = β(VE−Vi), where β = eZ , e is elementary charge, Z is effective




(σcrit − σinit) (3)
where σinit is the initial stress. In order to check whether the interconnect wire is
immortal, we need to check the following condition
Vcrit,EM > VE − Vi (4)
Note that VE − Vi is proportional to the stress at cathode node (σcat).
If this condition is met for all the nodes, EM failure will not happen. Since
generally the cathode node has the lowest voltage within an interconnect wire, we
may just check the cathode node instead of all the nodes, which means
Vcrit,EM > VE − Vcat (5)
where Vcat is the voltage at the cathode. Note that inequality (5) can be applied to
both power and ground networks.
The method can be illustrated using the following example. Figure 5 shows a
3-terminal wire. In this wire, node 0 is treated as the ground node. Current densities
in two segments are ja and jb which may not be the same because they will be
determined by the rest of the circuit. The EM voltage become
VE = a0V0 + a1V1 + a2V2
2A
= a1V1 + a2V2
2A
(6)
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where
V0 = 0, a0 = lawa, σ0 = βVE
V1 = jalaρ, a1 = lawa + lbwb, σ1 = β(VE − V1)
V2 = jblbρ + jalaρ, a2 = lbwb, σ2 = β(VE − V2)
(7)
A = a0 + a1 + a2
2
(8)
We can compare VE and Vcrit,EM to see if this wire is immortal.
4 Transient EM-Induced Stress Estimation
In general, the failure process of an interconnect is divided into nucleation phase,
incubation phase and growth phase. In the nucleation phase, the stress at the cathode
keeps increasing. When it reaches critical stress, a void will be nucleated. The time
to reach the critical stress is called nucleation time (tnuc). After the nucleation phase,
the void starts to grow (tinc) and eventually leads to wire failure after a period of time
(tgrowth). The TTF or lifetime of the wire can be described as
T T F = tlife = tnuc + tinc + tgrowth (9)
4.1 Transient EM-Induced Stress Modeling
4.1.1 Nucleation Phase Modeling















where κ = DaB
kBT
, Da = D0exp(− EakBT ), and 
 = eZ ρwj . B is effective bulk
elasticity modulus,  is atomic lattice volume, kB is Boltzmann constant, T is
temperature, Z is effective charge number, ρw is the wire electrical resistivity, x
is coordinate along the line, t is time, and j is current density.
Korhonen’s equation describes the stress distribution accurately; this PDE-based
model is hard to solve directly using numerical methods and has very low efficiency
for tree-based EM assessment. Recently a few numerical methods have been
proposed such as finite difference methods [5, 11] and analytical expressions based
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approaches [7, 32]. In this work, an integral transformation method for straight
multi-segment wires [32] is employed. Suppose we have a multi-segment wire, after
discretizing Korhonen’s equation, the stress can be expressed as





σ̄ (λm, t) (11)





and the transformed solution of stress σ̄ (λm, t) is
























Eigenvalues λm and eigenfunctions ψ(x) are the solutions of the Sturm–Liouville




, ψm(x) = cos x
L
mπ (14)
With Eq. (11), given critical stress σcrit, the nucleation time tnuc can be obtained
quickly by using nonlinear equation solving methods such as Newton’s method or
bisection method.
4.1.2 Incubation Phase Modeling
After the void is nucleated, the incubation phase starts. In this phase, resistance of
the interconnect remains almost unchanged since the cross section of the via is not
covered by the void and the current can still flow through the copper.
In power grid networks, the interconnect trees are generally multi-segment
wires. All segments connected with the void can contribute to the void growth
since electron wind at each segment can accelerate or slow down the void growth
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where ji and Wi are the current density and width of the ith segment, respectively.
Wm is the width of the main segment where the void is formed.




where Lcrit is the critical void length.
4.1.3 Growth Phase Modeling
After the incubation phase, the void fully covers the via, initiating the growth phase.
In this phase the resistance starts increasing. It is important to note that, early failure
and late failure have different failure mechanisms.
For early failure, the wire fails once the void covers the via, which means the
wire fails at the end of incubation phase and there is no growth phase (tgrowth = 0).
Hence the failure time is the sum of tnuc and tinc.
For late failure, after the void size reaches the critical size, there will be no open
circuit because the current can still flow through the barrier layer. In this case, the
void growth will lead to resistance increase. When the resistance increases to the










where ρT a and ρCu are the resistivity of tantalum (the barrier liner material) and
copper, respectively. W is the line width, H is the copper thickness, and hT a is the
liner layer thickness.
However, the void may saturate before reaching the critical void length. The
saturation length is expressed in [18] as








where Lss is the void saturated length, Lline is the total length of the wire, and σT
is thermal stress. Void growth may stop before the calculated tgrowth because of the
saturated void. If it happens, we treat the wire as immortal or its lifetime is larger
than the target lifetime.
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Fig. 6 The electrical impact of different failure mechanisms on the interconnect wires: (a) early
failure mode; (b) late failure mode
4.2 Transient EM Analysis for a Multi-Segment Interconnect
Wire
One important aspect of transient EM analysis is calculating the lifetime of a given
wire and its electrical conditions. If the increased resistance of the nucleated branch
exceeds a threshold, the interconnect tree is marked as failed.
To compute the lifetime tlife of a given wire, we need to make sure that the wire
is mortal and Eq. (5) is not satisfied. If a target lifetime ttarget is given, the analysis
method will give the resistance change R at the target lifetime.
For those mortal wires, we start with time t = 1000 years and use bisection
method to find tnuc. The transient hydrostatic stress will be computed by Eq. (11).
Once the stress of one segment hits the critical stress, the wire is deemed as
nucleated.
Then we need to determine if the wire is void incubation phase immortal. If the
saturated void length is less than the critical length, the incubation time (eventually
the lifetime) becomes infinite and the resistance remains unchanged.
Otherwise, the failure mode of the wire should be determined by looking at the
current direction in the cathode node based on the patterns in Fig. 4.
If the wire is in the early failure mode, then the wire will become an open circuit:
the whole interconnect tree will be disconnected from another interconnect wire as
shown in Fig. 6a. For the wire in the late failure mode, we have another solution.
The wire resistance change will be incurred and the growth time will be computed
when the resistance change reaches the threshold as shown in Fig. 6b. If the target
lifetime is given, then the wire resistance change R will be computed at the target
lifetime.
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5 EM Immortality Constrained Optimization for
Multi-Segment Interconnects
Study and experimental data show that the current-induced stress developed in the
individual segments within an interconnect tree is not independent [14, 29]. In other
words, if we just look at the current density for each segment individually, it may
appear as if all wire segments are immortal, but the whole interconnect tree could
still be mortal. The reason is that the stress in one segment of an interconnect tree
depends on other segments [28]. As discussed before, this issue has been resolved by
the recently proposed fast EM immortality check method for general multi-segment
interconnect wires [23].
In this section, we introduce the EM immortality constrained power grid wire-
sizing optimization method considering multi-segment interconnect wires. It can be
noticed that the new EM constraint will ensure that all the wires are EM immortal,
so we call this method EM immortal power supply optimization.
5.1 Problem Formulation
Let G = {N,B} be a P/G network with n nodes N = {1, . . . , n} and b branches
B = {1, . . . , b}. Each branch i in B connects two nodes i1 and i2 with current
flowing from i1 to i2. li and wi are the length and width of branch i, respectively. ρ
is the sheet resistivity. The resistance ri of branch i is






The total routing area of a power grid network in terms of voltages, currents, and
lengths of branches can be expressed as follows









Vi1 − Vi2 (20)
We notice that the objective function is linear for branch current variables I and
nonlinear for node voltage variables V .
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5.1.2 Constraints
The constraints that need to be satisfied for a reliable, working P/G network are
shown as follows.
Voltage IR Drop Constraints
In order to ensure proper logic operation, the IR drop from the P/G pads to the nodes
should be restricted. For each node, we must specify a threshold voltage
Vj > Vmin for power network (21)
where Vj is the nodal voltage and Vmin is the minimum required voltage for the
power nodes.
Minimum Width Constraints
The widths of the P/G segments are technologically limited to the minimum width
allowed for the layer where the segment lies in
wi = ρ liIi
Vi1 − Vi2 ≥ wi,min (22)
New Electromigration Constraints for Multi-Segment Interconnects
As described before, for a multi-segment interconnect m, the EM constraint should
be satisfied
Vcrit,EM > VE,m − Vcat,m (23)
where VE,m is the EM voltage for the mth interconnect tree, which is computed
using Eq. (2). Vcat,m is the cathode nodal voltage of that tree. Unlike previous
methods whose branch currents are monitored and used as constants, in our new
method, voltages are used as constraints. Thus, only the cathode node voltage for
a whole interconnect tree needs to be monitored and no other complex calculations
are required.
We remark that VE,m, which is defined in (2), is a function of both nodal voltage
and total area of wires. As a result, it is a nonlinear function of the nodal voltage (as
the area of a wire segment is a function of both nodal voltage and branch current as
defined in the cost function (20)). But if we have the equal width constrains as shown
below, then constraint (23) actually becomes a linear function of nodal voltage
again. For many practical P/G networks, most wire segments in an interconnect
tree indeed have the same width.
Equal Width Constraints
For typical chip layout designs, certain tree branches should have the same width.
The constraint is wi = wk , which can be written as
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Vi1 − Vi2
liIi
= Vk1 − Vk2
lkIk
(24)
Kirchhoff’s Current Law (KCL)
For each node j , we have
∑
k∈B(j)
Ik = 0 (25)
where B(j) is the set of branches incident on node j .
5.2 New EM Immortality Constrained P/G Optimization
The power grid optimization aims to minimize objective function (20) subjected to
constraints (21)–(25). It will be referred as problem P. Problem P is a constrained
nonlinear optimization problem.
5.2.1 Relaxed Two-Step Sequence of Linear Programming Solution
In the aforementioned optimization problem, we notice that the newly added EM
constraint (23) is still linear in terms of nodal voltage. As a result, we can follow
the relaxed two-phase iterative optimization process [8, 27] and apply the sequence
of linear programming technique [27] to solve the relaxed problem. Specifically,
we have two phases: the voltage solving phase (P-V phase) and the current solving
phase (P-I phase).
P-V Optimization Phase
In this phase, we assume that all branch currents are fixed, then the objective
function can be rewritten as




Vi1 − Vi2 (26)
where αi = ρIi l2i , subject to constraints (21)–(24). We further restrict the changes





Problem P-V is nonlinear; however, it can be converted to a sequence of linear
programming problem. By taking the first-order Taylor’s expansion of Eq. (26)
around the initial solution V 0, the linearized objective function can be written as
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V 0i1 − V 0i2
)2 (Vi1 − Vi2) (28)
Besides, an additional constraint will be added [27]
ξsign(Ii)
(
V 0i1 − V 0i2
)
≤ sign((Ii) (Vi1 − Vi2) (29)
where ξ ∈ (0, 1) is a restriction factor, which will be selected by some trials and
experience and sign(x) is the sign function.
Now, the procedure for solving problem P-V is transformed to the problem of
repeatedly choosing ξ and minimizing g (V ) until the optimal solution is found.
Theoretically, given g (Vm) < g (Vm−1), there always exists a ξ such that f (Vm) <
f (Vm−1); however, one-dimensional line search method is a more efficient way to
find the solution point. Specifically, given Vm and Vm−1, the search direction can be
defined as dm = Vm − Vm−1. Line search finds an α ∈ [0, 1] such that
f (αdm + Vm−1) < f (Vm−1) (30)
αdm + Vm−1 becomes new Vm for the next iteration.
P-I Optimization Phase






where βi = ρl
2
i
Vi1 − Vi2 , subject to constraints (22), (24), and (25). Similarly, we
restrict the changes of current directions during the optimization process
Ii
Vi1 − Vi2 ≥ 0 (32)
As can be seen, problem P-I is a linear programming problem.
5.2.2 New EM Immortality Constrained P/G Optimization Algorithm
The new EM immortality constrained P/G optimization starts with an initial
feasible solution. We iteratively solve P-V and P-I. The global minimum of convex
problem P-V will be achieved by performing several linear programming processes
iteratively. The entire EM immortality constrained power grid network optimization
procedure is summarized as Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 New EM immortality constrained P/G wire-sizing algorithm
Input: Spice netlist GI containing a P/G network.
Output: Optimized P/G network parameters.
1: /*Problem Setup*/
2: k := 0.
3: Compute the initial V k , I k from GI .
4: repeat
5: /*P-V Phase*/
6: Construct constraints (22), (23), (24), (27) and (29) with I k .
7: m := 1.














10: Determine the search direction dm := V km−1 − V km.
11: Choose step size α for line search.
12: V km+1 := V km + αdm.
13: m := m+ 1.
14: end while
15: V k+1 := V km.
16: /*P-I Phase*/
17: Construct constraints (22), (24) and (32) with V k+1.
18: Compute I k+1 := argmin f (I k) subject to (22), (24), (25), and (32) constraints.
19: k := k + 1.
20: until
∣∣f (V k, I k)− f (V k−1, I k−1)∣∣ < ε
21: Return f (V, I ).
In practice, only a few linear programmings are needed to reach the optimum
solution. Thus the time complexity of our method is proportional to the complexity
of linear programming.
6 EM Lifetime Constrained Optimization
In the previous sections, we discussed the power grid sizing optimization ensuring
none of the interconnect trees fails based on the voltage-based EM immortality
check. However, such EM constraint may be too conservative because in reality,
some wires can be allowed to have EM failure as long as the power grid network is
still functional (its IR drop is still less than the given threshold) at the target lifetime
(e.g., 10 years).
6.1 New EM Lifetime Constrained Optimization Flow
In this section, we propose a new EM lifetime constrained P/G wire sizing
optimization method in which some segments of multi-segment interconnect wires
will be allowed to fail or to age. The impacts of these segments in terms of resistance
change or even wire openings will be explicitly considered and modeled. Such
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Fig. 7 Flowchart of the EM lifetime constrained P/G optimization process
aging-aware EM optimization essentially takes the EM aging-induced impacts or
guard bands into account so that the designed P/G networks can still function
nominally during the target lifetime. In this work, we only consider void formation,
which is the dominant EM failure effect and will lead to an increase in resistance.
The new optimization flow is shown in Fig. 7. In this new flow, we first check
whether a given power supply network can be optimized using Algorithm 1. If the
optimization fails due to EM constraint, then the lifetime of all the interconnect trees
will be computed based on the EM lifetime estimation method. We have several
scenarios to discuss before we perform the optimization again. Let us define tlife,m
as the lifetime of the mth interconnect tree and ttarget as the target lifetime.
If VE,m − Vcat,m > Vcrit,EM and tlife,m < ttarget
The mth interconnect wire will be marked as a failed wire. Then we have the
following changes for the wire before the next round of optimization.
If it is an early failure case, the cathode node of the wire segment connected
by the failed via will be disconnected, which is called wire disconnection. The
failure cases will depend on the current directions around the cathode node. Also
the disconnection will depend on whether the void growth can eventually reach the
critical void size or not as discussed in Sect. 4.1.
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If it is a late failure case, the wire segment associated with the cathode node will
have a resistance change. The specific resistance change for each failed segment will
be calculated based on the target lifetime using our EM lifetime estimation method.
If an interconnect tree is marked as failed, then its EM constraint will be disabled
as we do not need to consider its immortality anymore.
If VE,m − Vcat,m > Vcrit,EM and tlife,m > ttarget
The lifetime of interconnect wire still meets the target lifetime even though it will
have void nucleation and resistance change. This also includes the case in which
void growth saturates before its size reaches the critical void size. The wire still
works since the current can flow through the barrier layer.
The existing VE,m − Vcat,m value is used as the new EM constraint (defined
as VE,m,next − Vcat,m,next) for the mth wire only: VE,m − Vcat,m < VE,m,next −
Vcat,m,next. This is called constraint relaxation. The rational behind it is that we
expect the EM status of this wire to become worse during the next optimization
so its lifetime will not change too much and still meet the given lifetime after the
follow-up optimizations.
After resistance change, or wire disconnection, or constraint relaxation, a new
round of SLP programming optimization, which is similar to Algorithm 1, is carried
out.
7 Summary
In this chapter, a new P/G network sizing technique is presented, which is based
on a voltage-based EM immortality check method for general multi-segment
interconnect wires and a physics-based EM assessment technique for fast time
to failure analysis. The new P/G optimization problem subject to the voltage IR
drop and new EM constraints can still be formulated as an efficient sequence
of linear programming problem, and will ensure that none of the wires fails
if all the constraints are satisfied. To mitigate the overly conservative nature
of the optimization formulation, the EM-induced aging effects on power supply
networks for a target lifetime are further considered and an EM lifetime constrained
optimization method is demonstrated, which allows some short-lifetime wires to
fail and optimizes the rest of the wires. The new methods can effectively reduce the
area of the power grid networks while ensuring reliability in terms of immortality
or target lifetime, which is not the case for the existing current density constrained
P/G optimization methods.
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Monitor Circuits for Cross-Layer
Resiliency
Mahfuzul Islam and Hidetoshi Onodera
1 Introduction
The end of supply voltage scaling has pushed circuit designers to find for new
solutions to reduce power consumption. One key reason for the stoppage of supply
scaling is variability including aging. The International Technology Roadmap for
Semiconductors (ITRS) highlights performance variability and reliability manage-
ment in the next decade as a red brick (i.e., a problem with no known solutions) for
the design of computing hardware [1]. Instead of operating under predefined supply
voltage and clock frequency, the circuit must adapt itself according to its process
conditions, as well as to the dynamic changes of temperature, aging, and workload
to harness the full potential of technology scaling. With the resilient operations, a
chip’s lifetime can be extended, and energy consumption can be reduced.
Due to significant variations in temperature, workload, and aging, dynamic
tuning of not only the supply voltage and clock frequency but also the threshold
voltages has become a necessity for energy-efficient operation. However, without
knowing the device and environmental parameters, tuning of these parameters is not
possible. On-chip monitor circuits which provide the information about device and
environment come to play an important role. On-chip monitors realize an interface
between hardware and software, which then can be utilized for software-controlled
optimization. The future LSI (Large Scale Integration) chip will require lots of mon-
itors to track transistor performances, temperature changes, supply voltage droops,
and leakage current variations. This chapter describes some design techniques of
monitor circuits based on delay cells and then presents a reconfigurable monitor
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architecture to realize different delay characteristics with a small area footprint. An
extraction methodology of physical parameters from a set of monitor circuits is
presented for model-hardware correlation.
2 Cross-Layer Resiliency
This section describes the benefit of realizing cross-layer resiliency by dynamic
tuning of threshold voltage, supply voltage, and clock frequency. Cross-layer
resiliency enables energy-efficient operation by eliminating excessive margins. We
highlight the importance of run-time sensing of circuit delay, leakage current,
switching power, temperature, and threshold voltage to realize minimum energy
operation under process, voltage, temperature, activity and temperature variations.
Multiple on-chip monitor circuits are required to sense these parameters. Although
monitor circuits are not a part of the actual circuit, they are essential components
for run-time tuning.
2.1 Parameter Fluctuation and Aging
Variations in physical parameters such as transistor threshold voltage, and temper-
ature have spatial distributions over a chip with both of the random and systematic
components. Besides the physical parameter variations, environmental variations
also affect circuit performance significantly. Temperature variations of more than
50 ◦C between different parts within a chip are reported [2]. Increase in temperature
degrades circuit performance and increases leakage power. According to ITRS,
supply voltage fluctuation is considered to be ±10% of the nominal voltage.
Sudden drop of supply voltage may cause critical timing failure causing system
malfunctioning. Because of process variation, some chips can be slow and some
chips can be fast. Fast chips tend to be leaky causing larger energy consumption.
Designers thus face a challenge to meet both of the delay and power constraints,
since the circuit needs to operate correctly under all of the variation scenarios.
Device characteristics also degrade over time. Aging causes reliability issues
where high temperature accelerates device aging. Device phenomena such as
Negative Bias Temperature Instability (NBTI) is reported to cause 10% of delay
degradation in digital circuits for a 70-nm process over 10 years [3]. Designing the
circuit for the worst possible scenario is energy inefficient as it increases area, power,
and cost. A chip may face extreme worst-case scenarios once in several years.
The conventional worst-case design methodology, where the operating conditions
of a circuit are set such as to meet the worst-case performance, is way too energy
inefficient and new design paradigm incorporating on-chip monitor circuits have
become indispensable. In the new design paradigm, parameters such as the supply
voltage and threshold voltage are tuned in the run-time such that the target delay
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and power profile are achieved. As a result, instead of worrying for the worst-case
performance, the circuit can now be designed to achieve optimal performances.
2.2 Cross-Layer Resiliency for Energy-Efficient Operation
Figure 1 shows a typical design hierarchy of a system-on-a-chip. First, transistor
models for a target process technology node are given to circuit designers. These
transistor models contain statistical models to simulate the effects of variations on
circuit performance. To guarantee error-free circuit operation, a circuit is tested for
extreme cases by using the assumed models. As a result, the circuits tend to be over-
designed which result in excessive energy consumption. From a system perspective,
the circuits need to operate at different supply voltages and clock frequencies
while ensuring correct operations. The selection of adequate clock frequency and
supply voltage is performed pessimistically. Design-time optimization is an open-
loop operation; thus the operating conditions are set for the worst-cases. The
solution obviously is to create a feedback loop into the system which can only be
realized by tuning circuit parameters in the run-time. Run-time tuning relaxes the
design constraints on the circuit and as a result the circuit become better optimized
compared with the one where no run-time tuning is performed.
Figures 2 and 3 show two profiles of energy consumption for an LSI. Figure 2
shows simulated energy and frequency contour plots on the threshold voltage (Vth)
and the supply voltage (Vdd) plane for a model circuit operating at an activity rate of




















Fig. 1 Cross-layer optimization with the use of monitor circuits
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Fig. 2 Energy and frequency
contour plot on the Vth and
Vdd plane. Activity rate of
0.01 is assumed
Fig. 3 Total energy per clock
cycle against the ratio
between static and dynamic
energy for a clock frequency
of 100MHz. Having a
balanced static and dynamic






65 nm process is assumed here. Cross points in the plot show the sets of Vth and
Vdd values that give the minimum energy operation for each operating frequency.
We observe that the required Vth and Vdd values, that realize the minimum energy
operation, differ significantly with the changes in the clock frequency. Dynamic
adaptation of Vth and Vdd values ensures minimum energy operation for any
operating frequency. Figure 3 shows the total energy of the circuit operating at 100
MHz under different combinations of Vth and Vdd against the ratio of static energy
(Estatic) to dynamic energy (Edynamic). We observe that a ratio of 10 to 50% realizes
near minimum energy operation. Under the variations of circuit activity, operating
frequency and temperature, the energy ratio varies largely. To ensure minimum
energy operation, Vdd and Vth values need to be tuned such that a ratio between
10 and 50% is realized. From the figures, the need for run-time tuning of Vdd and
Vth values are apparent but the problem is how to realize such a mechanism.
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Two key mechanisms are required to realize a feedback system. One is the
sensing mechanism of the output. The other is to feedback the output to the input
of the system. Sensing mechanism is an essential component here. In the case of an
LSI, the output parameters are the Vth values, circuit delays, temperature, leakage
current, and switching current. Sensing these parameters requires multiple on-chip
monitor circuits. The monitors provide real-time information of the hardware which
can then be used to set the parameters of Vdd, Vth and clock frequency optimally for
reliable operation.
2.3 Role of Monitor Circuits
The past trend of using smaller transistors to achieve higher operating frequency
has come to an end [4]. Instead of the clock frequency, system throughput and
energy per throughput are the modern specifications for a device. The new era of
LSI scaling is a system-on-a-chip (SoC) approach that combines a diverse set of
components including adaptive circuits, integrated on-chip monitors, sophisticated
power-management techniques, and increased parallelism to build products that are
many-core, multi-core, and multi-function [5]. The ability to adapt to the changes
in environment and performance will give us the full benefit of technology scaling.
Tuning mechanisms and on-chip monitors are needed to realize circuits that have
the ability to adapt. The future SoC must have capabilities of post-silicon self-
healing, self-configuration, and error correction. Effective use of on-chip monitor
circuits will play a major role in continuing the advancement of LSI. Use of on-chip
monitors provides us the following advantages:
1. Reduce design margin in each layer of design hierarchy by eliminating pes-
simism.
2. Tune system parameters based on the actual hardware profile.
3. Provide information for silicon debugging and timing analysis.
To harness the above advantages, the following characteristics of on-chip monitor
circuits are preferred:
Digital Digital in nature realizes robust operation under different
supply voltages.
Design automation Monitor circuits for threshold voltage, temperature, sup-
ply voltage, interconnect, activity, and leakage current are
required. Thus, design automation is a key factor here for
low-cost implementation of the monitors. Cell-based design
with delay cells are preferred.
Area efficiency Area efficiency is an important parameter for fine-grain and
distributed implementation of monitor circuits on the chip.
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As the target parameters such as the temperature and leakage current are analog
values, mechanisms to convert the analog values to digital values are required to
interface with the other components of the system. Two design methodologies can
be adopted for designing monitor circuit. One methodology performs operations in
the analog domain to sense and amplify the effect of the parameter variation and
then convert the analog value to a digital value. The other methodology converts the
analog value to a digital value as early as possible and then make operations in the
digital domain. Incorporating the analog value in the delay of a logic gate realizes
the later. Furthermore, the well established cell-based design methodology for
automation can be adopted readily for the delay-based implementation of monitor
circuits. We therefore explore several delay-based implementations of monitor
circuits in this chapter.
3 Delay-Based On-Chip Monitor Design
Delay-based monitor circuits use the mechanisms of converting the target analog
value to the delay of a logic gate. The topology of the logic gate thus need to
be designed such that the target parameter variation is amplified in the delay. To
understand the delay-based monitoring, we first give an overview of the general
delay characteristics of logic gates. Then we explore several techniques to tune the
delay characteristics such that the monitoring of a target parameter can be realized.
Finally, we demonstrate a cell-based design of a reconfigurable monitor circuit that
can sense the parameters of nMOSFET and pMOSFET threshold voltages.
3.1 Delay Characteristics
Delay-based monitoring is based on the fact that the delay of a logic gate contains
information of the transistor drain current Id. Figure 4 shows four delay paths
consisting of different logic gates and interconnects. A delay path of Fig. 4a consists
of inverter gates. Delay paths of Fig. 4b and c consist of NAND2 and NOR2 gates.
A delay path of Fig. 4d consists of inverter gates with long interconnecting wires.
Depending on the topology of the logic gate and the interconnect length, delays
of different gates and interconnect show different behavior to process, voltage, and
temperature variation. Figure 5 shows the topology of four different logic gates.
Figure 5a shows a conventional inverter topology. Figure 5b shows a NAND2
topology where two nMOSFETs are placed in stack. Figure 5c shows a NOR2
topology where two pMOSFETs are placed in stack. Figure 5d shows an inverter
topology where two pMOSFETs and two nMOSFETs are placed in stack to mimic
the delay behavior of the both of the NAND2 and NOR2 gates.
Under the presence of large within-die random variation, each delay path might
behave differently. At a higher supply voltage, a particular path may show the






Fig. 4 Delay paths consisting of (a) inverter gates, (b) NAND2 gates, (c) NOR2 gates, and (d)













Fig. 5 Topology of different delay cells. (a) Inverter gate. (b) NAND2 gate. (c) NOR2 gate. (d)
Universal delay cell
worst-case delay, whereas at a lower supply voltage, a different path may show
the worst-case delay. Figure 6 shows the delay change against the change of supply
voltage. Topology with a stacked transistor shows higher sensitivity to Vdd change
than that without a stacked transistor. Topology with a reduced Vgs value shows
much higher sensitivity to Vdd change. The important point is that the delays of
different topologies show different sensitivities to process, supply voltage, and
temperature changes. Under the presence of within-die variation, the gates of the
same logic type also show different delay behavior. Thus, accurate delay estimation
of a circuit is challenging. Instead, we can monitor the delay of a representative
circuit that gives us a reasonable prediction of the actual delay of the circuit.
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Fig. 6 Delay versus supply
voltage for different inverter
topologies
3.2 Delay Model
A delay model is useful to intuitively understand the different delay characteristics
for different topology. The rise and fall delays of an inverter gate can be approxi-
mated by the following equations:
drise = Cload Vlogic
Idp
, (1)
dfall = Cload (Vdd − Vlogic)
Idn
. (2)
Here, Idp and Idn are the drain currents of pMOSFET and nMOSFET during the ON
state, respectively. Cload is the load capacitance that consists of the gate capacitance
of MOSFETs of the next gate, drain capacitance of pMOSFET and nMOSFET, and
interconnect parasitic capacitance. Vlogic is the logical threshold voltage at which
the next gate switches its output value. To model the transistor drain current, EKV
model based equation of Eq. 3 is useful to express the drain current that is continuous
from weak-inversion to strong-inversion operation: [6, 7].










Here, k is a technology-related parameter. γ is the body bias coefficient and λ is the
short-channel coefficient. Short-channel effect reduces the threshold voltage when
large Vds is applied to the transistor. Thus, large Vds value increases ON current
which is beneficial to switching delay, but causes exponential increase in the leakage
current.
For the pull-down operation of an inverter gate of Fig. 5a, Vbs is zero and Vds
changes from Vdd to Vlogic. However, in the case of a NAND2 gate, the values of
Vbs and Vds differ. The source of the nMOSFET that is connected to the output is
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not tied to ground. As a result, Vbs becomes negative that causes the Vth to increase.
Consequently, the Vds value remains within a small value. Smaller Vds value causes
less short-channel effect resulting in a higher Vth value than a larger Vds value. As a
result of negative Vbs value and smaller Vds value, the drain current decreases which
causes the delay to increase.
3.3 Delay-Based Monitor Circuits
Design of on-chip monitors requires careful choosing of the right topology. Here,
we discuss several delay-based design techniques that realize monitoring of different
parameters.
3.3.1 Critical Path Monitor
The first and the most important parameter to monitor is the maximum delay of a
circuit to ensure that the circuit operates at a certain clock frequency without any
timing error. The maximum delay of a circuit is the maximum of delays of all the
paths. As a circuit consists of thousands of delay paths, we can choose the following
two methods to monitor the maximum delay.
1. Monitor the delays of actual paths, and
2. Monitor the delay of a representative delay path.
The first method, which is in-situ monitoring, requires additional circuitry in the
actual delay paths. In the case of in-situ monitors, the Flip-Flops (FF) in a circuit
are replaced with special FFs with error detection sequential (EDS) functions. The
EDS can either detect whether a timing error has occurred [8, 9] or warn us before
the occurrence of actual errors [10–12]. Supply voltage and clock frequency are
adapted accordingly based on the EDS signals. The drawback of EDS-based in-
situ monitors is that the additional circuits add extra delays, and increase area and
power. To reduce the delay and area overhead, we can replace only those FFs where
the delays are critical. During the design phase, we can make a list of the potential
critical delay paths. However, as shown in Fig. 6, paths show different sensitivity
to process, supply and temperature changes. Thus, the number of candidates tend
to increase drastically under process, voltage, and temperature variations. Another
fundamental drawback to be overcame is that a critical path is not always sensitized.
Thus, it is necessary to properly estimate the actual timing slack of the critical path.
The second method requires an additional delay path that is placed near the actual
circuit that can track the delay of the actual circuit. This delay path is often called
a critical path monitor (CPM). The requirement of such a CPM is that it tracks
the maximum delay of the target circuit for all conditions of process, voltage, and
temperature variations. CPM is thus a delay path that is synthesized such that it
tracks the worst delay of the circuit. However, there is no universal solution on how
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Fig. 7 Synthesis of critical delay path from a combination of series and parallel delay paths.
(a) Parallel paths. (b) Series paths
to design a CPM that meets the above criterion. Two approaches have been proposed
on how to synthesize a CPM. One approach is to synthesize a critical path monitor
from a list of potential critical paths during the design phase [13–15]. The other
approach is to design a reconfigurable delay path consisting of different logic gates
and wire lengths, and then configuring the delay path during the test time, such
that the delay correlates with the maximum achievable frequency [16–19]. Figure 7
shows a general concept of the synthesis framework of a critical delay path [20].
Several paths such as the paths shown in Fig. 4 are put in parallel. Then the several
paths are placed in series. During the calibration process, combinations of parallel
and series paths are explored to find a combination that gives the worst delay for all
the operating conditions.
Instead of using a reconfigurable delay line, a general purpose delay line
consisting of inverter cells with stacked transistors are also proposed so that the path
mimics the worst-case delay [21]. Calibration is nonetheless required which can be
performed during the design phase and during the test. To encounter the effect of
systematic within-die variations, multiple CPMs can be used that are distributed at
various places on the chip [15, 21].
3.3.2 Threshold Voltage Monitor
For adaptation of Vth values to their optimum values, Vth monitors are required.
Although there is no universal definition of Vth, an arbitrary definition can be used
as a reference. For example, the Vgs value that gives a fixed Id value is often used
to define the Vth value. Conversely, we can track the Vth value by observing the
change of Id value if the Vgs can be set as a function of Vth. Then the delay change
resulting from the Id change can be measured and converted to digital with the
use of a reference clock signal. Figures 8 and 9 show two delay cells consisting
of inverter gates where either the nMOSFET Vgs or the pMOSFET Vgs voltage
becomes a function of the corresponding Vth values (Vthp for pMOSFET and Vthn for
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Fig. 8 Vthp-dominant delay
cell for Vthp monitoring
Vss|Vthp| Vss
Vdd Vdd
Fig. 9 Vthn-dominant delay





nMOSFET). The Vth-sensitive gate-source voltage is realized using pass-transistors
as shown in Figs. 8 and 9 [22, 23]. To illustrate the Vth monitoring capability of
the monitor cells, sensitivity vectors of different inverter topologies are shown in
Fig. 10 at nominal supply voltage for a 65 nm bulk process. Here, the sensitivity
vector consists of the sensitivity coefficients of the delay to Vthn and Vthp changes.
We observe that the sensitivity coefficients of the pass-transistor inserted cells are
multiple times larger than those of conventional inverter, NAND2, and NOR2 cells.
An all-digital process variability monitor based on a shared structure of a buffer
ring and a ring oscillator is proposed in [24]. The technique utilizes the differences
of rise and fall delays of inverter gates because of process variations.
As will be shown next, driving the load with the transistor leakage current also
gives us a delay that is exponentially related to Vth value change. However, driving
the load using leakage current requires careful design because leakage currents
through the pull-up and the pull-down paths get involved also. Gate-leakage current
is also a factor to degrade the accuracy of such monitors. The topologies of Figs. 8
and 9 give us compact designs that are minimal and fulfill the purpose.
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A critical path monitor also acts as an aging monitor. However, the differences in
activity rate may cause deviations in the aging between an actual critical path and a
monitor path. Therefore, delay paths of different activity rates can be implemented
to track aging. Multiple delay lines consisting of inverter gates with different activity
would give us precise aging information. Decoupling the NBTI and PBTI effects can
be useful for debugging and modeling purposes. In that case, different architectures
are proposed for independent NBTI and PBTI monitoring [25].
3.3.4 Sub-threshold Leakage Monitor
Sub-threshold leakage monitor helps us to estimate the leakage current of a circuit.
The information can then be used to tune Vth, Vdd or frequency optimally. Figure 11
shows a delay cell whose rise delay is several orders of magnitude larger than the
fall delay. The rise delay is driven by the pMOSFET OFF current, while the fall









































Fig. 13 Temperature monitoring utilizing inverter delay driven by nMOSFET OFF current.
(a) Logarithm of oscillation period driven by nMOSFET OFF current against temperature. (b)
Monitoring error against temperature after an one-point calibration
delay is driven by the nMOSFET ON current. As a result, the delay of a path
consisting of this cell is proportional to the pMOSFET OFF current. Similarly, delay
of a path consisting of delay cells of Fig. 12 is proportional to the nMOSFET OFF
current. Figure 13a shows the change of measured oscillation period for a delay
path consisting of 125 inverter stages against the temperature change. The inverter
topology of Fig. 12 is used here. The target process is a 65 nm bulk process. The
oscillation period here corresponds to the average OFF current of 125 nMOSFETs.
The logarithm of the delay changes linearly with the temperature showing that the
monitor tracks the leakage current change correctly.
3.3.5 Temperature Monitor
As leakage current is sensitive to temperature variation, a leakage current monitor
can be used for on-chip temperature monitoring. The logarithm of the oscillation
period, D, can be expressed by the following equation:
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ln (D) = aT + bT · T , (4)
where T is the absolute temperature, aT and bT are temperature coefficients.
Figure 13b shows the monitoring error after a one-point calibration for a 65 nm bulk
process. Calibration is performed at 15 ◦C. An error range of −1.3 ◦C to 1.4 ◦C is
observed. The above error range is small enough for real-time thermal and reliability
management.
3.3.6 Supply Voltage Monitor
Supply voltage fluctuation has always been a concern which is getting more
severe with the reduction of supply voltage. Supply voltage fluctuation has a static
component which results from the power delivery network (PDN) and a dynamic
component which is the result of transition from idle to active state of a circuit. As
critical path monitors are also sensitive to supply voltage fluctuations and have a
high bandwidth, they can also detect dynamic supply voltage fluctuations [17]. In
the case of CPMs, the output is the timing information obtained by comparing the
path delay and clock period. Thus, the error information does not give whether the
error is from temperature or supply voltage for example. However, when combined
with other monitors such as temperature and threshold voltage, identification of the
causes of timing error becomes possible. The identification of the sources of timing
error allows correct optimization and lifetime enhancement. On-chip supply voltage
droop monitoring mechanisms have been proposed to evaluate the power delivery
network (PDN) [26].
3.3.7 Activity Monitor
Run-time estimation of the static and the dynamic energy can be used to achieve
the minimum energy operation as suggested by Fig. 3. As the dynamic energy
is proportional to circuit activity rate, we can estimate the dynamic energy by
calculating the activity rate of a circuit. A digital dynamic power meter (DDPM)
has been used that computes a rolling average of signal activity over a fixed number
of clock cycles [27]. The accuracy of the power estimation here depends on careful
selection of signals, such that they correspond to the activity of structures that have
high power consumption. Instead of monitoring key logic signals, a clock activity
adder (CAA) for switching power estimation is also proposed [28]. The approach
of the CAA takes advantage of the fact that switching power is highly correlated
to register clock activity. Similarly, hardware-event monitors such as memory-
access counters and instruction-execution counters can be used for dynamic energy
estimation [29]. These monitors depend on counting signal transitions rather than
the delay itself.










Fig. 14 A reconfigurable inverter cell topology for Vthp and Vthn monitoring. “C” is a control
signal. (a) Reconfigurable topology. (b) Vthp-sensitive configuration, and (c) Vthn-sensitive config-
uration
3.4 Reconfigurable Delay Path for Multiple Parameter
Monitoring
Delay-based sensing enables us to design a reconfigurable architecture to monitor
multiple parameters by configuring the delay path accordingly [30, 31]. For
example, we can use the topology of Fig. 14a to monitor both of the Vthp and Vthn
variations. Figure 14b and c shows the two configurations to make the delay Vthp-
and Vthn-sensitive, respectively.
3.5 Cell-Based Design
The use of delay cells provides the advantage of the use of cell-based design flow
that enables us to place and distribute the monitors into different parts of the chip.
For example, temperature monitors need to be placed at hot-spots where power
density is high. Power density maps are generated during the design phase. A cell-
based design example in a 65 nm bulk triple-well process for a reconfigurable Vth
monitoring circuit is shown in Fig. 15. The cells with green highlights in Fig. 15b
are the monitor cells of Fig. 15a. The placements of the cells are performed carefully
utilizing the “do not touch” and “relative adjacent placement” features of the place
and route tool.
3.6 On-Chip Measurement and System Interface
The monitoring circuit needs to be interfaced with system for adaptation and self-
tuning. The following three mechanisms can be adopted for on-chip measurement
of monitor circuits.

















Fig. 15 Delay characteristics for different topology and supply voltage. (a) Cell layout of a
reconfigurable Vth monitor delay cell. (b) Chip micrograph and layout of a reconfigurable monitor


























Fig. 16 Three different measurement methods for system interfacing. (a) EDS-based method. (b)
Time-to-digital conversion based method, and (c) Frequency ratio based method
1. Edge detection [16, 17, 32].
2. Frequency counting [33].
Edge detection based system can have either a single bit output [16] or multiple
bits output [17, 32]. Figure 16 shows three different methods for digitizing the
monitored delay. Figure 16a checks whether the delay is smaller or larger than the
system clock period [17, 32]. If the delay is smaller, adaptation such as slowing
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down the system by reducing the supply voltage can be performed. If the delay is
larger, the system will speed up by increasing the supply voltage for example. To
ensure that the transitions occur without any timing error, margins are added in the
delay path. These margins include within-die random delay effects as well as the
response time of the adaptation. A resolution window can also be added to ensure
that the adaptation occurs without inducing any timing error.
Figure 16b uses multiple edge detectors to convert the time between the path
delay and the clock period to digital codes [16]. The digital codes are then
sent to the system controller where a look-up table (LUT) based adaptation can
be implemented. Figure 16c shows a measurement method that uses frequency
counting [33]. This measurement method is particularly useful for monitoring
device parameters of Vth, temperature, and so on. Using the system clock for the
conversion will require calibration of the monitoring circuit for every supply voltage
which will increase the test cost. Instead, we can utilize a locally generated clock
using a ring oscillator. The output in this case is the ratio of the monitor frequency
and the reference frequency. The measured values of the frequency ratio are then
compared with predefined values to monitor how much the monitoring parameter
varied from the targeted values. For applications where the clock frequency is
fixed, process and temperature sensitive monitors can also implemented with edge
detection mechanisms. An up/down counter based detection circuit to detect the Vth
deviation from predefined values has been employed for dynamic adaptation of Vth
values [34].
4 Parameter Extraction for Model-Hardware Correlation
The circuit techniques described in Sect. 3 realize delay characteristics that are
sensitive to particular parameter variations. However, they do not give us the value
of the parameter variation itself. In this section, we describe a parameter extraction
technique that takes the delay values of multiple delay paths and then estimates the
variations in each of the parameters. The parameters can be transistor threshold
voltage, temperature, gate-length or any device related parameter. We can then
utilize the extracted parameters for test strategies and process optimization.
4.1 Parameter Extraction Methodology
In the case of an inverter gate, the gate–source voltage of each transistor goes
through different values during a “High” to “Low” and a “Low” to “High”switching
events. Thus, it is not straight forward to relate physical device parameters to the
delay information. Parameter estimation gets harder when the supply voltage is
lowered, such that the delay becomes non-linear to the parameter changes. So, the
question is how to correlate the model to each chip to get a good accuracy.
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Fig. 17 Estimation of physical parameters from multiple delay paths. Sensitivity coefficient links
the physical parameters to delay values
Section 3 demonstrates different types of delay paths to monitor various physical
and environmental parameters. The designs are carefully performed to make the
delay particularly sensitive to the parameter of interest. The techniques allow us to
comparatively track the change of the parameters in the run-time. However, because
of the mismatch in the model and hardware, the absolute parameter monitoring
contains errors. Calibrations need to be performed to reduce the errors to acceptable
ranges. For debugging purposes, we may want to correlate our transistor models to
actual transistor characteristics in the chip. To perform model-hardware correlation,
key model parameters such as the Vth and β may suffice as they are the dominant
sources of fluctuations, although other parameters may also be used.
Figure 17 illustrates the concept of parameter extraction from multiple delay
values. The left side of the figure plots the delay of a path against the delay of a dif-
ferent path. The round point shows a point which is obtained by circuit simulation.
The cross point emulates a measured value from a chip. The difference between the
two points here contains process information. Using sensitivity coefficients, we can
estimate the amount of deviation in the process parameters and transform the delay
space to process space which is shown in the right side of the figure. The key point
here is not to use transistor I–V characteristics, rather use the delay characteristics to
extract these parameters. For robust extraction of the parameters, we need to design
the delay paths, such that the sensitivity matrix has a low condition number [22].
We can then build a system of linear equations using the sensitivity coefficients.
4.2 Measurement Results
To demonstrate the monitoring capability of the Vthp-sensitive and Vthn-sensitive
delay cells of Figs. 8 and 9, measurements of ring oscillators are performed for a
65 nm bulk process. Figure 18 plots the values of Vthp and Vthn estimated under
different body bias conditions for a particular chip. In the figure, the x-axis refers
to Vthp estimations and the y-axis refers to Vthn estimations. Rectangular points are
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Fig. 18 Estimation results of
Vthn and Vthp of a chip for
different body bias values.






































































estimated values of Vthp and Vthn when only pMOSFET is biased. Triangular points
refer to estimated values of Vthp and Vthn when only nMOSFET is biased. When
only pMOSFET is biased, the estimated point moves in the horizontal direction
referring that only Vthp is being changed in the estimation. When only nMOSFET
is biased, the estimated point moves in the vertical direction referring that only Vthn
is being changed in the estimation. Thus, it is demonstrated that any change in the
threshold voltage can be detected correctly by the proposed monitor circuits.
Figure 19 shows the measured frequencies of Vthp-sensitive and Vthn-sensitive
ring oscillators from several chips (open circles). The chips have been fabricated
targeting either of the five process corners of “TT,” “SS,” “FF,” “FS,” and “SF.” The
values are normalized by the values simulated with the transistor models targeted for
the “TT” process corner. Frequency values simulated using the other corner models
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Fig. 20 Vth estimation

































are also plotted in the figure (closed squares). In the figure, process shifts from the
“TT” model prediction are observed. Clear deviations are observed for “TT,” “SS,”
“SF,” and “FS” corners. The silicon values are higher than the model predictions.
With comparison with the models, we can have quick understanding of process shift
for each chip. This information allow us to take decisions for silicon debug and test
pattern generation. We can now extract the device parameters of Vthp, Vthn, and β
using sensitivity analysis, model-hardware correlation can be obtained that allows
us accurately predict the delay performance. Figure 20 plots the estimated Vthp and
Vthn values. Vth values provided in the corner models are also plotted in the figure.
Furthermore, Vth values provided by the Process Control Modules (PCM) that are
generally placed in the scribe-lines are also plotted. The estimated values correlate
with the PCM data and also show die-to-die variations.
5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have shown the importance of cross-layer resiliency for energy-
efficient and robust operation of circuits. Cross-layer resiliency is performed by
tuning the threshold voltage and supply voltage in run-time based on information
of process, leakage current, circuit activity, and temperature. Run-time monitoring
of these parameters are essential in achieving cross-layer resiliency. To incorporate
the monitor circuits into a cell-based design flow, we have discussed delay-based
monitoring techniques. Cell-based design of monitor circuits enables to place the
monitors inside the circuit. Placing the monitors inside the target circuit realizes
better correlations between the monitor behavior and the actual circuit behavior.
We have discussed a general design methodology to synthesize a critical path
monitor. There are several methods to monitoring the critical delay having a trade-
off relationship between accuracy and implementation cost. Implementation cost
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here can be area overhead, test cost, and/or both. The selection of a suitable critical
path monitor thus has to be made based on the critical nature of the application.
Besides the critical path monitoring, run-time monitoring of physical parameters
of threshold voltage, temperature, and leakage current are essential for energy-
efficient operation under parameter fluctuation and aging. Utilizing the relationship
between the delay of a logic gate and the physical parameters, several circuit
topologies are discussed that amplify the effect a certain parameter. Threshold-
dominant inverter topologies and leakage current driven inverters are suitable for
temperature, leakage current, and threshold voltage monitoring.
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Dealing with Aging and Yield in Scaled
Technologies
Wei Ye, Mohamed Baker Alawieh, Che-Lun Hsu, Yibo Lin, and David Z. Pan
1 Introduction
The aging and yield issues arise with aggressive scaling of technologies and
increasing design complexity [51, 53]. These issues impact the circuit performance
and functionality throughout the product life cycles. The sources of aging and yield
concerns lie in different aspects, getting more severe with technology scaling.
Modern VLSI designs have to cope with unreliable components and processes.
Device aging and interconnect electromigration effects are likely to cause unex-
pected performance degradation and even malfunctions at the end of circuit life
cycles. Meanwhile, process variations may lead to manufacturing defects and
inconsistent device characterization, causing yield issues. Ignoring these effects
leads short lifetime of designs and low yield, eventually increases the costs in
volume production and maintenance.
Thus, for the robustness of VLSI design methodology and cycles, reliability
and yield need to be accurately modeled, systematically optimized, and seamlessly
integrated into the existing design flow. This chapter will survey critical aging and
yield issues, and then review the state-of-the-art techniques to tackle them, including
both modeling and optimization strategies which reside across the Physics and
Circuit/Gate layers as part of the overall dependability scheme shown in Fig. 1. The
strategies often involve synergistic cross-layer optimization due to the complicated
VLSI design procedures nowadays. Novel modeling techniques leveraging machine
learning are analyzed along with analytical optimization approaches.
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Fig. 1 This chapter covers
reliability and yield issues

































The chapter starts by investigating the device and interconnect reliability issues
for modern VLSI designs in Sect. 2. It covers different device aging effects, such
as bias temperature instability and hot carrier injection, as well as electromigration
effects on power/ground and signal interconnections. The section introduces the
modeling techniques along with optimization strategies to increase the design
robustness under these effects. Section 3 dives into the state-of-the-art practices in
yield issues for both analog and digital circuits. This section examines the impacts
of process variations on circuit performance and manufacturing defects followed by
effective modeling techniques to capture these issues early in the design flow. In the
end, the chapter is concluded with Sect. 4.
2 Reliability Modeling and Optimization
With the continued feature size shrinking, reliability issue becomes increasingly
severe. This section covers recent researches on aging modeling and analysis and
divide the aging concerns into two sub-categories: aging at the device level and
aging at the interconnect level.
2.1 Device Aging
As CMOS technologies continue to shrink, device reliability becomes a major
challenge for high performance computing (HPC) and automotive applications
which require robust circuit design. This section presents the device reliability
modeling and optimization techniques along with mitigation strategies in advanced
CMOS technologies.
Device reliability can be divided into time-independent and time-dependent cat-
egories. Time-independent reliability issues are caused by manufacturing variations
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Fig. 2 Bathtub curve that illustrates the device life cycle
or noise such as random telegraph noise (RTN) or soft errors. Time-dependent
reliability issues, also known as aging effects, can be illustrated using the bathtub
curve in Fig. 2 which has high but decreasing failure rate in early life, low and
constant failure rate in normal operation, and increasing high failure rate at the end
of life wear-out period. This section focuses on modeling time-dependent reliability
issues including bias temperature instability (BTI) and hot carrier injection (HCI).
BTI is an aging mechanism characterized by an increase in the device threshold
voltage and a decrease in its mobility which eventually lead to an increase in
the gate delay, and thus performance degradation [9, 58]. The two major factors
contributing to the BTI phenomenon are the voltage bias and temperature. The term
bias refers to the gate-to-source voltage bias applied to the transistor gate which
is mostly a negative bias for PMOS, and a positive bias for NMOS. The theory
behind BTI can be jointly explained by the reaction–diffusion (R-D) model and the
charge trapping (CT) model [58]. The R-D model describes the degradation process
when hole accumulation dissolves Si-H bond (reaction) and hydrogen diffuses away
(diffusion), whereas the recovery stage takes place when voltage bias and duty
factor stress is not present [25, 26]. The CT model explains the threshold voltage
degradation by the trapped charge in the defected gate dielectrics. Early studies
focused on BTI mitigation partially due to the fact that BTI dominates aging in
early stages; however, HCI is more important at later stages where HCI contributes
40%–80% of device aging after 10 years of deployment [21, 47].
HCI is an aging phenomenon that degrades device drain current and is caused
by the accumulation of carriers (electrons or holes) under the lateral electric fields,
which can gain enough energy to damage and degrade the device mobility [16]. The
traditional theory behind HCI was called lucky electron model, which is a field-
based model [12, 57]. However, with the scaling of the supply voltage, the reduced
electric field made HCI prediction based on field-based models a challenging task.
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Fig. 3 BTI threshold voltage shift vs time for sub-45nm CMOS. BTI effect has stochastic nature
in deep-sub-micro devices. Averaging each sample across large sample size of 800 (a) can achieve
a well-defined voltage vs stress time curve while the voltage vs stress time trend in a much small
sample size (b) contains larger variation [34]
Recent researches have proposed energy-driven theories to generalize HCI effects
when devices are in low supply voltage [27, 52].
Characterizing aging degradation on circuit performance using aging model is a
crucial step prior to optimization. Researchers can build deterministic models for
BTI and HCI-related aging in old technologies such as 180 nm node. However,
Kaczer et al. studied the threshold voltage shift vs time under the BTI effect and
found its stochastic nature in deep-sub-micron nodes as shown in Fig. 3 [34]. Lorenz
et al. proposed the first gate-level timing analysis considering NBTI and HCI [43].
Huard et al. [32] characterized a digital library gates under NBTI and HCI aging
effects. Ren et al. discovered that BTI and HCI-related aging effects have layout
dependencies [54]. In [21, 22], Fang et al. proposed frameworks to analyze BTI
and HCI impacts on large digital circuits and [59] used ring oscillator-based sensors
to estimate HCI/BTI induced circuit aging. Moreover, flip-flop based sensor was
introduced in [2] to predict BTI aging circuit failure.
Recent researches not only model the aforementioned aging issues, but also
propose design methods and optimizations for more reliable designs. Reliability
optimization can be done at architecture level, logic synthesis level, and physi-
cal design level. At the architecture level, [48] demonstrated an aging analysis
framework that examines NBTI and HCI to predict performance, power, and
aging in the early design phase. Firouzi et al. [23] alleviated NBTI effects by
using NOP (No operation) assignment and insertion in the MIPS processor. At
synthesis level, Kumar et al. introduced standard cell mapping that considers signal
probabilities to reduce BTI stress [35]. In [20], both HCI and BTI were considered
during logic synthesis stage and put tighter timing constraint on paths with higher
aging rate. Chakraborty et al. [13] optimized NBTI-induced clock skew in gated
clock tree. Gate sizing [55, 64] and pin-reordering/logic restructuring [68] are also
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implemented to minimize BTI effects. At the physical design level, Hsu et al.
[29] proposed a layout-dependent aging mitigation framework for critical path
timing during standard cell placement stage and [81] introduced aging-aware FPGA
placement. Gate replacement techniques were used in [65] to co-optimize circuit
aging and leakage.
2.2 Interconnect Electromigration
As IC technologies continue to scale, complex chip functionalities have been
made possible by virtue of increasing transistor densities and aggressive scaling of
interconnects. Besides, interconnects are getting thinner and running longer. These
factors bring along higher current densities in metal wires, a phenomenon that
further exacerbates electromigration (EM). The failure time from EM is worsened
even further by the local temperature increase caused by self-heating of underlying
FinFETs.
EM is the gradual displacement of atoms in metal under the influence of an
applied electric field and is considered the primary failure mechanism for metal
interconnects. After the migration of atoms with electrons in a metal line for a
certain period, a void grows on one side, which increases the resistance of the metal
line and may eventually lead to open circuits. Hillock is formed on the other side and
may cause short circuits. Figure 4 shows the scanning electron microscopy (SEM)
images of void and hillock.
2.2.1 Power EM Modeling
An empirical model for the mean time to failure (MTTF) of a metal line subjected









Fig. 4 A void and a hillock generated by electromigration [10]
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where A is a constant which comprises the material properties and the geometry
of the interconnect, J is the current density, Ea is the activation energy, k is the
Boltzmann constant, and T is the temperature. n is the constant exponent of the
current density and is usually set to 2. With Black’s equation in Eq. (1), the relation
between interconnect lifetime and both current and temperature can be readily
estimated.
Power grid is one of the interconnect structures most vulnerable to EM due to
its high unidirectional currents. Lower-level metal layers of power grids are more
susceptible to EM failures due to smaller wire width. Besides, EM violations are
most likely to occur around weak power grid connections, which deliver current to
high power-consuming regions.
Hsu et al. [30] proposed an average power-based model to evaluate power
grid static EM at placement stage. Ye et al. [78] further modified the model by
considering the sum of the dynamic and leakage currents for a standard cell at this
stage, which is given by:
I = α · C · VDD · f + Ileak,
where α is the cell activity factor, VDD is the supply voltage, and f is the system
clock frequency.C is the sum of the load capacitance and the output pin capacitance.
Load capacitance further includes downstream gate capacitance and interconnect
capacitance. Since nets have not been routed at this stage, half-perimeter wirelength
(HPWL) [8] is widely adopted to estimate interconnect capacitance in placement.
Power tile is defined as the region between two adjacent VDD (or VSS) power
stripes and the adjacent power rails. Figure 5 demonstrates how to calculate the
maximum current in the local power rails within a power tile. Pl and Pr are the
left and right endpoints of the VDD power rail. dli and d
r
i are the distances from the
midpoint of the i-th cell to Pl and Pr , respectively.Rli andR
r
i are the wire resistances

























Therefore, there exists an EM violation in a particular power tile if max{I l, I r } >
Ilimit. In this way, the EM failures in the local power rails can be estimated at the
placement stage; thus, enabling an EM-aware placement that can effectively reduce
the EM violations.
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Fig. 5 The power grid model














2.2.2 Signal EM Modeling
Previously, electromigration on signal interconnects does not draw great attention.
Alternating current (AC) flows inside signal interconnects; when the direction of the
current in an interconnect is reversed, the direction of EM diffusion is also reversed.
The damage caused by EM can be partially cleared due to this compensation by
material backflow. This effect is known as a self-healing, which can significantly
extend the lifetime of a wire. Black’s equation for AC is given by [40, 63]:
MTTF = A






where J+ and J− are the current densities during positive and negative pulses. γ
is the self-healing coefficient which is determined by the duty factor of the current
and other factors influencing the scale of self-healing, such as the frequency [39].
Previously, signal electromigration has attracted little attention due to the benefits of
healing effect. However, EM failures in signal interconnects are no longer negligible
due to higher clock frequencies, large transistor density, and the negative impact of
FinFET self-heating at advanced nodes.
In [76], a set of features from the placement is extracted to train a machine
learning model for EM detection before routing. Despite the fact that the current
profile for the design is not available at the placement stage, multiple features
that are highly correlated with the current can be crafted. These features can
be divided into net-specific features and neighborhood related features. The net-
specific features—including HPWL, the number of net pins, etc.—capture the net
attributes. On the other hand, neighborhood related features are used to capture
information about possible congestion around net pins.
The pre-routing signal EM hotspot prediction can be reduced to a classification
problem [76]. A two-stage detection approach based on logistic regression shown
in Fig. 6 is introduced to reduce the number of false alarms. In the first stage, a
classification model M1 is trained to predict EM hotspots using all the nets in the
training dataset. After the first stage, all nets with NH (Non-hotspot) prediction
will be labeled as NH without further processing. For nets labeled H (Hotspot)
by M1, a new model, M2, is trained to prune out false alarms. With an accurate
classification model to detect signal EM hotspots based on the information available
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Fig. 6 The flow of the two-stage signal EM hotspot detection approach [76]
at the placement stage, early stage EM handling is enabled, which reduces iterative
EM fixing cost.
2.2.3 EM Optimization Flow
Through the preceding EM modeling in Eqs. (1) and (2), EM failures can
be detected after the physical design stage, and then be fixed through layout
modification. Xie et al. [69] proposed control logics to balance currents in both
directions of power rails to mitigate the EM effects. Lienig [38] suggested the
exploitation of several EM inhibiting measures, such as bamboo structure, short-
length, and reservoir effects. Other studies [14, 33] considered global routing for
EM optimization. In [49] de Paris et al. adopted a design strategy using non-default
routing (NDR) rules to re-route the wire segments of EM-unsafe signal nets that
present high current densities.
Conventionally, EM checking is invoked after the routing stage [36]. Current
densities in metal wires are computed and compared with foundry-specified limits to
detect EM failures. Next, the failures are fixed with engineering change order (ECO)
efforts. EM checking leverages post-routing information to detect violations, which
consequently limits the efficiency of addressing techniques. In the routing phase,
the locations of standard cells and the corresponding current distribution are already
fixed and the traditional fixing approaches such as wire widening and cell resizing
are not effective enough to handle the ever-growing number of EM violations [1]. It
is of vital importance to incorporate EM detection and fixing techniques into earlier
stages of physical design (PD).
Two clear benefits are associated with such early stage EM handling. First, the
number of EM violations can be decreased further by using various techniques at
different design stages. Second, introducing early stage mitigation techniques can
help reduce the resulting overhead when compared to post-routing fixing techniques.
Thus, moving the EM detection and resolving steps to earlier stages of the physical
design can help in reducing runtime or the number of iterations needed for design
closure. In [78], a series of detailed placement techniques was proposed to mitigate
power grid EM. Ye et al. [76] proposed a multistage EM mitigation approach
at placement and routing phases to address the problematic nets detected by the
classification model.
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3 Yield Modeling and Optimization
3.1 Performance Modeling
With technologies descending deep into the sub-micron spectrum, process variation
manifests itself among the most prominent factors limiting the product yield of
analog and mixed-signal (AMS) circuits. Thus, it is indispensable to consider
this variation in the design flow of modern ICs [42]. Conventionally, performance
modeling has been adopted to capture this variability through analytical models
that can be used in various applications such as yield estimation and design
optimization [4].
Given a set of samples, the performance model coefficients are conventionally
obtained through least-squares regression (LSR). However, LSR can build accurate
models only when the number of samples is much greater than the number of
unknown coefficients. Thus, given the high dimensionality of the performance
models in complex AMS circuit designs, the simulation cost for building accurate
models can be exorbitant. Hence, most recent performance modeling techniques
incorporate additional information about the model to reduce the number of
simulations needed [3, 5, 7].
3.1.1 Sparse Modeling
Although the number of basis functions representing the process variability is
large, a few of these basis functions are required to accurately model a specific
performance of interest (PoI). Hence, the vector of coefficients contains a small
number of non-zero values corresponding to important basis functions [37]. This
information can be incorporated in the modeling by constraining the number of
non-zero coefficients in the final model.
While constraining the number of non-zero coefficients accurately reflects the
sparse regression concept, the optimization problem is NP-hard. Besides heuristic
approaches that select important basis functions in a greedy manner, Bayesian
approaches have been widely applied to address this challenge [37]. In practice,
a shrinking prior on the model coefficients is used to push their values close to zero.
Examples of this include applying a Gaussian or Laplacian prior which results in
Ridge and Lasso regression formulations, respectively. This allows incorporating
sparse prior knowledge; however, such approaches do not perform explicit variable
selection and they penalize high coefficients values by pushing all coefficients close
to zero instead of selectively setting unimportant ones to zero.
On the other hand, a Bayesian spike and slab feature selection technique can
be employed to efficiently build accurate performance models [7]. Spike and slab
models explicitly partition variables into important and non-important, and then
solve for the values of the important variables independently of the feature selection
mechanism. A hierarchical Bayesian framework is utilized to determine both the
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importance and value of the coefficients simultaneously. At its highest level, the
hierarchy dictates that a particular coefficient is sampled from one of the two zero-
mean prior Gaussian distributions: a low variance distribution centered around zero,
referred to as the spike, and a large variance distribution, referred to as the slab.
This mixture of priors approach has demonstrated superior results compared
to traditional sparse modeling schemes while also providing a feature selection
framework that can easily select important features in the model [7].
3.1.2 Semi-Supervised Modeling
Traditionally, performance modeling has been approached from a purely supervised
perspective. In other words, performance models were built by using labeled
samples obtained through expensive simulations. However, as the complexity of
designs increased, obtaining enough samples to build accurate models has become
exorbitant. Recently, a new direction, derived from semi-supervised learning, has
been explored to take advantage of unlabeled data to further improve the accuracy
of performance modeling for AMS designs [3, 5].
In practice, the hierarchical structure of many AMS circuits can be leveraged
to incorporate unlabeled data via Bayesian co-learning [5]. In particular, such an
approach is composed of three major components. First, the entire circuit of interest
is partitioned into multiple blocks based on the netlist hierarchy. Second, circuit-
level performance models are built to map the block-level performance metrics to
the PoI at the circuit level. Such a mapping is often low-dimensional; thus it can be
accurately approximated by using a small number of simulation samples. Third, by
combining the aforementioned low-dimensional models and an unlabeled data set,
a complex, high-dimensional performance model for the PoI can be built based on
semi-supervised learning.
To implement this modeling technique, a Bayesian inference is formulated to
integrate the aforementioned three components, along with the prior knowledge
on model coefficients, in a unified framework. Experimental results shown in [5]
demonstrate that the proposed semi-supervised leaning approach can achieve up to
3.6× speedup when compared to sparse regression-based approaches.
While many AMS circuits exhibit a hierarchical structure, this feature is not
always present. Hence, a more general semi-supervised framework which makes no
assumption about the AMS circuit structure is desirable [3]. This can be achieved by
incorporating a co-learning technique that leverages multiple views of the process
variability to efficiently build a performance model. The first is the device level
variations such as VTH or weff, while the second view is the underlying set
of independent random variables, referred to as process variables. Traditionally,
performance modeling targets expressing the PoI as an analytical function of
process variables; however, capitalizing on information provided by the device level
variability as an alternative view can help efficiently build the performance model
for the PoI [3].
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Fig. 7 An iteration of the semi-supervised co-learning modeling framework is illustrated [3]
As shown in Fig. 7, the key idea is to use a small number of labeled samples to
build an initial model for each of the views of the data (x and v), then attempt to
iteratively bootstrap from the initial models using unlabeled data. In other words,
initial models can be used to give pseudo-labels for unlabeled data, then the most
confident predictions from a particular model are used as pseudo-samples for the
other model. In each iteration step, highly confident pseudo-samples are fused with
the small number of available labeled samples to build a new model. Experimental
results demonstrated up to 30% speedup compared to sparse regression-based
approaches [3].
3.1.3 Performance Optimization
Besides capturing the major sources of variability in AMS designs, one of the main
applications of performance modeling is yield estimation and optimization. In prac-
tice, performance optimization can make use of trained models towards optimizing
the performance of the design. This is established by first capturing correlations
between the performance variability and the device sizes or reconfiguration knobs,
then adjusting these parameters to improve the parametric yield [4, 6].
Moreover, with the increase in AMS circuits complexity, increasing nonlinearity
stands out as major factor limiting the capabilities of performance modeling
and optimization. Hence, performance optimization techniques relying on non-
parametric surrogate models and Bayesian optimization frameworks have been
recently proposed [31, 83]. These surrogate models are typically Gaussian Pro-
cesses, and Bayesian optimization is used to find optimal values given a black-box
function.
Bayesian Optimization is a sequential sampling based optimization technique for
optimizing block-box objective functions. At each step, a set of optimal sampling
locations are selected based on a chosen acquisition function. Then, queries of the
420 W. Ye et al.
objective function to be optimized, e.g. performance of an AMS circuit, which can
be costly, are only made at these optimized locations, e.g. via circuit simulations for
AMS verification. The new data collected at each step augments the training dataset
to retrain a probabilistic surrogate model that approximates the black-box function.
Such iterative sampling scheme contributes directly to the accuracy of the surrogate
model and guides the iterative global optimization process [31, 83].
3.2 Hotspot Detection
As the feature size of semiconductor transistors continues shrinking, the gap
between exploding design demands and semiconductor manufacturability using
current mainstream 193 nm lithography is becoming wider. Various designs for
manufacturability (DFM) techniques have been proposed; however, due to the
complexity of lithography systems and process variation, failures to print specific
patterns still happen, which are referred to as lithography hotspots. Examples of
two hotspot patterns are shown in Fig. 8.
The hotspot detection problem is to locate the lithography hotspots on a given
layout in physical design and verification stages. Conventional simulation-based
hotspot detection often relies on accurate yet complicated lithography models and
therefore is extremely time-consuming. Efficient and accurate lithography hotspot
detection is more desired for layout finishing and design closure in advanced
technology nodes.
Pattern matching and machine learning based techniques have been proposed
for quick and accurate detection of hotspots. Pattern matching forms a predefined
library of hotspot layout patterns, and then compares any new pattern with the
patterns in the library [70, 79]. There are some extensions that use fuzzy pattern
matching to increase the coverage of the library [41, 66]. However, pattern matching,
Core
Fig. 8 Example of two hotspot patterns. Core corresponds to the central location where a hotspot
appears






































































Fig. 9 An example of a neural network for hotspot detection [74]
including fuzzy pattern matching, is insufficient to handle never-before-seen hotspot
patterns. Recently, machine learning based approaches have demonstrated good
generalization capability to recognize unseen hotspot patterns [17, 18, 45, 50, 80,
82].
3.2.1 Lithography Hotspot Detection with Machine Learning Models
Various machine learning models have been used as hotspot detection kernels
with the goal of achieving high accuracy and low false alarms, including support
vector machine (SVM) [18, 80], artificial neural network (ANN) [18], and boosting
methods [45, 82]. Zhang et al. [82] have also proposed an online learning scheme to
verify newly detected hotspots and incrementally update the model. Recently, deep
neural networks (DNNs) have been adopted for hotspot detection [46, 60]. DNNs are
able to perform automatic feature extraction on the high-dimensional layout during
training, which spares the efforts spent on manual feature extraction. Promising
empirical results have been observed with DNNs in several papers [46, 60, 73, 74].
Figure 9 shows a typical configuration of the structure of a DNN.
The performance of DNNs usually relies heavily on manual efforts to tune the
networks, e.g., the number and types of layers. Matsunawa et al. [46] proposed a
DNN structure for hotspot detection that can achieve low false alarms. Yang et al.
[74] proposed Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) based feature representation to
reduce the image size for DNNs with a biased learning to improve accuracy and
decrease false alarms.
3.2.2 Evaluation of Hotspot Detection Models
One special characteristic of lithography hotspot detection tasks is the imbalance in
the layout datasets. Those lithography defects are critical, but their relative number
is significantly small across the whole chip. Among various machine learning





















Fig. 10 (a) An overlapping distribution of predicted scores for positive and negative samples and
(b) the ROC curves of two example classifiers. As the threshold in (a) moves to the left, both FPR
and TPR in (b) go up accordingly [77]
models at hand, the one with a highest true positive rate (TPR) and a lowest false
positive rate (FPR) is preferred, but in real-world scenarios, there is always a trade-
off between the two metrics. As Fig. 10a demonstrates, if the predicted score implies
the belief of the classifier that a sample belongs to the positive class, decreasing the
decision threshold (i.e., moving the threshold to the left) will increase both TPRs
and FPRs.
The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is considered a robust perfor-
mance evaluation and model selection metric for imbalanced learning problems. For
each setting of the decision threshold of a binary classification model (Fig. 10a), a
pair of TPR and FPR values is obtained. By varying the decision threshold over
the range [0, 1], the ROC curve plots the relationship between TPR and the FPR
(Fig. 10b).
The area under the ROC curve (AUC) is a threshold-independent metric which
measures the fraction of times a positive instance is ranked higher than a negative
one [62]. The closer the curve is pulled towards the upper left corner, the better is
the ability of the classifier to discriminate between the two classes. For example, in
Fig. 10b, classifier 2 has a better performance compared to classifier 1. Given that
AUC is a robust measure of classification performances especially for imbalanced
problems, it is useful to devise algorithms that directly optimize this metric during
the training phase.
It has been proven that AUC is equivalent to the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney
(WMW) statistic test of ranks [28, 44, 67]. However, AUC defined by the WMW
metric is a sum of indicator functions which is not differentiable, to which gradient-
based optimization methods cannot be applied. In order to make the problem
tractable, it is necessary to apply convex relaxation to the AUC by replacing the
indicator function with pairwise convex surrogate loss function. There are different
forms of surrogate functions: pairwise squared loss [19, 24], pairwise hinge loss
[61, 84], pairwise logistic loss [56], and piecewise function given in [71]. Ye et
al. [77] compare these surrogate functions and show that those new surrogate loss
functions are promising to outperform the cross-entropy loss when applied to the
state-of-the-art neural network model for hotspot detection.
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3.2.3 Data Efficient Hotspot Detection
Despite the effective machine learning models for hotspot detection, most of them
rely on a large amount of data for training, resulting in huge data preparation
overhead. Thus, it is necessary to improve the data efficiency during model training,
i.e., to achieve high accuracy with as small amount of data as possible.
Chen et al. [15] proposed to leverage the information in unlabeled data during
model training, when the amount of labeled data is small. They develop a semi-
supervised learning framework, using a multi-task network with two branches
to train the classification task for hotspot detection and the other unsupervised
clustering task at the same time. The network will label those unlabeled data samples
with pseudo-labels in each iteration. The pseudo-labeled data will be selected and
added to training with different weights in the next iteration, where the weights here
are determined by the clustering branch. The experimental results demonstrate over
3–4% accuracy improvement with 10%–50% amount of labeled training data.
Sometimes, there is additional flexibility to the learning problem where labels
for unlabeled data be can queried. This extra capability enables the use of active
learning which can actively select the data samples for training a better model. Yang
et al [72] propose to iteratively query the actual labels for unlabeled data samples
with low classification confidence in each training step and add these samples for
training in the next step. The experiments on ICCAD 2016 contest benchmarks show
similar accuracy with only 17% of training data samples.
One should note that semi-supervised learning and active learning are two
orthogonal approaches to tackle the insufficient of labeled training data. Semi-
supervised learning assumes the availability of unlabeled data, while active learning
assumes the capability of querying the labels for unlabeled data. They can even be
combined to achieve better data efficiency [85].
3.2.4 Trustworthiness of Hotspot Detection Models
Conventionally, hotspot detection approaches have been evaluated by judging upon
the detection accuracy and the false alarm rate. While these metrics are indeed
important, model trustworthiness is yet another metric that is critical for adopting
machine learning based approaches. Addressing this concern requires machine
learning models to provide confidence guarantees alongside the label predictions.
In practice, methods for obtaining confidence guarantees when using deep neural
network are costly and not yet mature. However, Bayesian-based methods are the
typical option when confidence estimation is needed. This can be achieved by
adopting a Gaussian Process (GP) based classification that can provide a confidence
metric for each predicted instance. With this approach, a label from a trained model
is only valid when its confidence level matches a user-defined metric, otherwise, the
prediction is marked as untrusted and lithography simulation can be used to further
verify the results [75].

















Fig. 11 Overall flow of Litho-GPA including data preparation with active sampling and hotspot
detection with Gaussian process [75]
The flow of Litho-GPA, a framework for hotspot detection with Gaussian Process
assurance, is illustrated in Fig. 11. In addition to addressing the issue of trust, Litho-
GPA adopts active learning to reduce the amount of training data while favoring
balance between classes in this dataset.
As a first step, an iterative weak classifier-based sampling scheme is leveraged
to prepare a training set containing enough hotspots. Next, a Gaussian Process
Regression (GPR) model is trained for the classification task with the selected
data samples. This learned model is then used to make predictions with confidence
estimation on the testing set. If GPR demonstrated high confidence in the predicted
label, the result is trusted; otherwise, the unsure testing samples are verified with
lithography simulations.
Experimental results shown in [75] demonstrate Litho-GPA can achieve compa-
rable accuracy to the state-of-the-art deep learning approaches while obtaining on
average 28% reduction in false alarms.
4 Conclusion
In this chapter, different important aging and yield issues in modern VLSI design
and manufacturing have been discussed. These issues include device aging, inter-
connect electromigration, process variation, and manufacturing defects are likely
to cause severe performance degradation or functionality failure, and thus need
to be addressed early in the physical design flow. The chapter has surveyed
recent techniques to not only build models for capturing these effects, but also to
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develop strategies for optimizing them with the proposed models. These practices
demonstrate that synergistic optimization and cross-layer feedback are encouraged
to resolve the aforementioned aging and yield issues for robust VLSI design cycles.
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Part V
Cross-Layer from Architecture to
Application
Michael Glaß
Possibly since the proposal of the von Neumann architecture, there exists an
invisible barrier between hardware and software in the narrower or architecture
and application in the broader sense. Given that powerful compilers have become
omnipresent for almost all architectures and languages, application developers are
able to treat the architecture layer and respective system components as black
boxes—as long as the architecture overprovides in the sense that requirements of
the application can be trivially fulfilled. Two well-known requirements that have
questioned this view in the past are performance and energy considerations. The for-
mer gave rise to DSPs and GPUs to name two exemplary architectures that address
the special needs of complete application domains while at the same time, the
applications have to be adapted to efficiently make use of the architectures and avoid
performance bottlenecks. The latter—together with real-time requirements—fueled
hardware/software co-design in the embedded system domain where individual
applications and their requirements are tailored and deployed to typically multiple
components featuring different architectures.
In the area of dependable—emphasis on reliable, available, and safe—systems,
respective and often stringent requirements have traditionally been addressed by
either (a) architectures/components that give guarantees on dependability properties
and achieve these by significant conservative margins and guard banding or by (b)
system-wide mitigation strategies like dual or triple modular redundancy schemes.
In these domains, one can assume dependability to be a prime, if not the prime,
design objective while accepting to sacrifice other objectives such as energy, area
consumption, or monetary costs.
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Continuous technology scaling with all its tremendous advantages has at the
same time threatened the dependability of CMOS devices: Increasing suscep-
tibility to aging and radiation effects combined with significant variation has
reached a point where hiding such effects from the application completely may
require excessive and—for many domains and especially embedded systems—
uneconomical overheads. At the same time, mentioned system-wide coarse-grained
mitigation techniques may be prohibitive due to other important design objectives
for embedded systems such as energy budgets, space constraints, and the like.
Assuming that errors at architecture layer may have to be exposed to the application,
an interesting and key observation is that not all parts of an application are equally
prone to errors on component/architecture layer and are equally costly to harden.
In this area of the book at hand, seven chapters present their endeavors to analyze
and exploit architectural as well as application properties concurrently to form
cross-layer approaches that combine architecture and application layer. At the center
of this area is the interplay of specific application (domain) properties on the one and
the computational and memory elements on the other hand. The area and its chapters
are organized as follows:
The following two chapters put focus on the interplay of applications and
memory: chapter “Exploiting Memory Resilience for Emerging Technologies: An
Energy-Aware Resilience Exemplar for STT-RAM Memories” investigates Spin
Transfer Torque Magnetic RAM (STT-RAM) as a technology which may replace
SRAM in near-future devices. However, the susceptibility of STT-RAMs to errors
especially during write operations depends on the state transition as well as the
applied current level. The chapter presents an architectural scheme for STT-RAM
cache memories that dynamically profiles the use of each individual bit by the
respective application to select cache way and current level; guaranteeing a maxi-
mum error rate while minimizing energy consumption. chapter “Design of Efficient,
Dependable SoCs Based on a Cross-Layer-Reliability Approach with Emphasis
on Wireless Communication as Application and DRAM Memories” investigates
inherently error-resilient applications—particularly wireless baseband processing—
and proposes to treat hardware errors in a similar fashion as transmission errors
over a noisy channel by means of the so-called dynamic resilience actuators. Since
wireless baseband applications are not only compute, but can as well be memory
intensive, their error resiliency is further exploited by a proposed approximate
DRAM technique which trades-off refresh rate and, thus, energy consumption, for
reliability according to the robustness of the application.
The next three chapters focus on variation when deploying applications to
multi-/many-core systems, covering dependable dynamic resource management,
uncertainty-aware reliability analysis, as well as approximate computing: chap-
ter “Power-Aware Fault-Tolerance for Embedded Systems” puts focus on appli-
cations to be deployed to multi-/many-core chips under thermal design power
constraints. The addressed challenge is to provide an optimal mix of hardware
and software hardening techniques for an application such that reliability goals
are met without violating power and/or performance constraints. As a remedy,
the chapter introduces a power-reliability management technique that combines
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design-time analysis and optimization as well as run-time adaptation to account
for variation in performance, occurring faults, and power. Chapter “Uncertainty-
Aware Compositional System-Level Reliability Analysis” addresses the problem
that uncertainties arising from manufacturing tolerances, environmental influences,
or application inputs may not be known at design time such that respective worst-
case assumptions result in extremely pessimistic reliability analysis results. As
a remedy, the chapter presents a compositional and uncertainty-aware reliability
analysis approach that explicitly models uncertainties and, thus, exposes not only
best-case or worst-case values but probability distributions. These can enhance cost-
efficient error mitigation by quantifying the probability of different best-/average-
/worst-case situations. Chapter “Hardware/Software Codesign for Energy Efficiency
and Robustness: From Error-Tolerant Computing to Approximate Computing”
puts focus on the margins that are applied to compensate for the ever-increasing
variability. The chapter first presents an approach to drastically reduce margins
for GPUs by means of an adaptive compiler that aims at equalizing the lifetime
of each processing element. Then, the reduction of margins is pushed so far that
errors have to accepted and computations become approximations for which the
chapter proposes an automatic FPGA design flow for accelerators that employ such
approximate computations.
The last two chapters in this area put their attention to two important appli-
cation domains in current and future embedded systems: Cyber-physical systems
and machine learning. Chapter “Reliable CPS Design for Unreliable Hardware
Platforms” investigates cyber-physical systems and especially battery-operated
systems where control loops are the key part of their applications. While such
control loops traditionally focus on certain metrics such as stability or overshoot,
they may affect system components such as the batteries themselves as well
as the processing components the applications are deployed to by accelerating
their aging. As a remedy, the chapter proposes a design flow that combines an
optimization of (a) quality-of-control and battery behavior at design time as well as
(b) quality-of-control and processor aging at run-time to satisfy safety requirements.
Chapter “Robust Computing for Machine Learning-Based Systems” investigates
machine learning approaches as key enablers for various upcoming safety-critical
applications from the domain of autonomous systems. Especially in this context,
the chapter investigates the susceptibility of these both intrinsically compute and
memory-intensive applications to reliability as well as security threats. The chapter
discusses techniques to enhance the robustness/resilience of machine learning
applications and outlines open research challenges in this domain.
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1 Introduction
Technology scaling has reached a point at which process and environmental variabil-
ities are no longer negligible, and can no longer be hidden from system designers,
as the exact behavior of CMOS devices becomes increasingly less predictable. This
will show in the form of static and dynamic variations, time-dependent device
degradation and early life failures, sporadic timing errors, radiation-induced soft
errors, and lower resilience to varying operating conditions [35]. Already today,
conservative margining, guardbanding, and conservative voltage scaling, come at a
large cost. Only turning away from conservative worst-case design methodologies
for a 100% reliable physical hardware layer will make further downscaling of
CMOS technologies a profitable endeavor [7, 32]. This calls for radically new cross-
layer-design concepts [14–16] (Fig. 1).
Until today, these problems have mostly been addressed at the lower design
levels. At the higher levels, systems are typically designed under the premise of
fault-free underlying hardware. Only in extremely critical applications, such as
avionics, where the system cost is less important than its dependability, triple
modular redundancy (TMR) and similar techniques are employed on a system
level. Thus, to no big surprise, the large body of related work focuses on low-level
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Fig. 1 Main abstraction
layers of embedded systems
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techniques to present higher abstraction and design levels with a practically error-
free platform built from potentially faulty elements.
To make a platform resilient against transient or permanent faults built-in
redundancy or built-in self-recovery techniques have to be employed. They all come
at the cost of chip area, power consumption, reduced system throughput, or other
implementation related metrics. Lower implementation cost, especially with regard
to energy consumption can be obtained when a degradation of hardware reliability
to a certain degree is tolerated. In fact, energy consumption and dependability of
integrated circuits can be seen as strongly interrelated problems: by decreasing
the operating voltage, the energy efficiency increases but at the same time the
dependability decreases. Thus, energy efficiency and dependability have to be
carefully traded off against each other.
An error-resilient architecture that can be seen as practically error-free can be
composed of protected components. Applications for these platforms can be imple-
mented in a traditional way, still assuming fault-free operation of the underlying
hardware. In addition to this horizontal integration, recent research also evaluates
the additional potential of a vertical integration of error resilience on the application
level with platforms having a reduced reliability. True cross-layer optimization
approaches do not only exploit the fact that some important classes of algorithms
are inherently error-tolerant, but also adapt applications and hardware architectures
jointly to achieve the best possible trade-offs. This chapter focuses on cross-layer
optimization for wireless communication systems with emphasis on errors on data
path and SRAMs. Furthermore, we consider undependable DRAM subsystems,
named approximate DRAM.
2 Wireless Baseband Processing
In this section, we present a wireless baseband processing system and a novel
cross-layer methodology using resilience actuators (see Sect. 2.1.2) to improve the
reliability of this system. Wireless communication systems have an inherent error
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Fig. 2 Wireless communication systems suffer from different sources of errors (indicated by red
arrows): channel errors, quantization errors, errors from suboptimal algorithms, and hardware
errors. Here, we focus on the receiver side only
resilience. They are designed to recover the originally transmitted data sequence in
spite of errors that occur during transmission over a noisy channel. Figure 2 shows
a simplified structure of such a system. To achieve a reliable transmission, today’s
communication systems use advanced forward error correction (FEC) techniques,
i.e. the sender adds redundancy to the actual information prior to transmission in
the channel encoder. This encoder connects to the modulator via an interleaver
(	). The interleaver is required to break dependencies between neighboring bits
while the modulator performs the mapping on symbols (e.g. QAM—quadrature
amplitude modulation) that are transmitted over the physical channel. On the
receiver side, the noisy signal is converted to the digital domain and fed into
the demodulator, which recovers the originally transmitted symbols by exploiting
the channel characteristics. After the deinterleaver (	−1) the channel decoder uses
the redundancy to correct transmission errors.
The primary goal is to correct errors from the noisy channel. But implementation
efficiency of communication systems in hardware mandates e.g. quantization of data
values and the use of suboptimal algorithms, i.e., algorithms that generate results
which deviate from the theoretically correct values. Both can be seen as further
sources of errors in addition to the noise on channel. In the same way, errors induced
by hardware faults can be considered as yet another error source in a communication
system. The question is if the hardware errors can be processed in a similar way than
the channel and what are the costs.
2.1 Methodology: Error Mitigation Using Dynamic Resilience
Actuators
Modeling of hardware errors is crucial for the design of dependable systems. Radi-
ation, thermal effects, aging, or process or parameter variations cause distortions on
a physical level which can be modeled by probabilistic bit flips according to the
resilience articulation point (RAP) model [16] (see also the chapter “RAP Model—
Enabling Cross-Layer Analysis and Optimization for System-on-Chip Resilience”
in this book). Depending on its location, a bit flip can have very different effects. An
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error in the controller, for example, usually leads to a system malfunction, whereas
individual errors in the memories or the data flow are often inherently corrected by a
wireless receiver ([12, 31]). Efficiency in terms of area and energy will be achieved
by recovering only from those errors which have a significant impact on the system
output and by choosing the layer on which the treatment of these error results in the
least overhead.
Dynamic approaches for error resilience also have to monitor the current hard-
ware status. This monitoring can be done on different abstraction layers. Examples
are error detection sequential (EDS) circuits on microarchitectural layer. EDS
circuits are very popular [6]; however, they require pre- and post-silicon calibration.
Monitors on higher abstraction layers are application-specific and normally more
efficient. For example, [3] proposed to detect timing errors with a small additional
hardware block which mimics the critical path under relaxed timing constraints.
The result of the mimic hardware is compared to the normally operating unit.
Deviations indicate timing errors. For a turbo and convolutional code decoder, the
mimic hardware only required 0.7% of the decoder area. In this article we focus on
resilience techniques which are employed after hardware errors have been detected,
not on the detection methods themselves.
Many state-of-the art publications utilize low-level static resilience techniques
to combat the effects of unreliable hardware, e.g., ECC protection of memories,
Razor flip flops, or stochastic logic [36]. Static methods have the disadvantage
of permanently decreasing the system performance in at least one of the terms
of throughput, area, or power, even when no errors occur. In [31] for example,
the static protection of a complete LDPC (Low-Density Parity Check) decoder for
WiMax/WiFi resulted in an area overhead of 21%.
Dynamic techniques often use available hardware resources or have very low
additional costs as we will show in Sect. 2.2.1. However, error detection circuits
result in additional costs. When comparing static and dynamic methods, this
additional cost has to be taken into account. In general, the choice of the protection
method will also depend on the expected hardware error statistics as we will
demonstrate in the next paragraph. Eventually, a combination of static and dynamic
protection will likely result in the least overhead.
2.1.1 The Dynamic Behavior of Wireless Systems
Modern wireless communication standards, such as LTE (Long Term Evolution)
or HSDPA (High Speed Downlink Packet Access) provide mechanisms to monitor
and dynamically adapt to changes in the Quality-of-Service (QoS). The QoS in a
wireless transmission system is typically defined as the bit or frame error rate with
respect to a given signal-to-noise ratio. If the desired QoS cannot be achieved for the
current transmission channel, communication parameters like code type, code rate,
etc. are adjusted to improve the communications performance (see Fig. 3a). A good
example for this dynamic behavior is the hybrid automatic repeat request (H-ARQ),
which is used in LTE, HSDPA. These systems typically transmit blocks of data at

























Fig. 3 The standard communication flow dynamically adjusts communication parameters to
achieve the required QoS, e.g., the code rate in Hybrid-ARQ systems. (a) Dynamic QoS flow of a
modern wireless communication system. (b) In Hybrid-ARQ systems the code rate is dynamically
adjusted for each block to ensure error-free transmission
a high data rate and with little error protection, i.e., with a very high code rate. If
the decoder fails, the transmission of additional data is requested until the block
is correctly decoded. Note that such a retransmission does not contain the same
data as before. Instead, different information will be sent every time, which had
been punctured on the transmitter side before. The additional information decreases
the data rate but at the same time increases the probability that the block can be
correctly decoded at the receiver. Figure 3b shows the throughput of a H-ARQ
system over different SNR values. For high SNR values, decoding succeeds after
the first transmission, i.e., the channel decoder can correct all errors, and a high
throughput is obtained. With a decreasing SNR, more and more blocks require
additional transmissions and the throughput is lowered. The system dynamically
adapts the code rate and the throughput for each block.
This example shows how wireless receivers adapt dynamically to changes in
the transmission channel, i.e., varying SNR, and correct transmission errors. The
question is how this idea can be applied to the case of hardware errors. It has been
shown that low rates of hardware errors in a wireless receiver are not visible on the
system level. This is due to the fact that for low SNR the channel errors dominate.
For high SNR, when the channel error rate is very low, the channel decoder is able
to correct the hardware errors. For moderate hardware error rates, some dynamic
high-level techniques exist, e.g., increasing the number of decoder iterations to
counterbalance the impact of hardware errors. However, for very high error rates
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on the hardware level, a purely software-based mitigation is not possible. An
increase of reliability can generally be achieved by either static low-level techniques,
like e.g., Razor flip flops, triple modular redundancy, or by dynamic high-level
techniques, which exploit the flexibility of the receiver, e.g., increase of decoder
iterations, or a combination of both. To their advantage, dynamic techniques are
mainly algorithmic changes, which can be controlled by software and do not require
a more costly change of the underlying hardware.
Consequently, it is possible to use high-level techniques to mitigate hardware
errors in wireless communication systems. However, the channel quality changes
over the time and channel noise and hardware noise may change independently from
each other. In good channel conditions, we can use a part of the error correction
capability of the receiver to combat hardware errors if needed. When the channel
quality is very poor, all high-level techniques are needed to obtain the required
QoS, and hardware errors have to be counterbalanced by static low-complexity
methods. This is shown in Fig. 4a. When the hardware reliability is very high, no
action has to be taken. High amounts of hardware errors cannot be overcome using
dynamic techniques exclusively. A combination of dynamic and static techniques
is mandatory. When the channel quality is very poor, only static techniques are
available. For medium noise levels, there are potential trade-offs between dynamic
and static techniques.
2.1.2 Concept of Dynamic Resilience Actuators
As mentioned before current standards, like HSDPA or LTE, adjust dynamically
the QoS at runtime, e.g., higher data throughput rates are specified for higher
SNR. This is due to the fact that the computational requirements on the different
algorithms decrease with higher SNR in order to enable higher throughput. In
future technologies the negotiated QoS may also depend on the reliability of the
receiver hardware under given operating conditions. This leads to an entirely new
paradigm—adaptive QoS with respect to communication reliability and hardware
reliability. An illustration of this is the possibility to relax reliability requirements on
the underlying hardware instead of providing a higher throughput at high SNR. For
example, voltage overscaling can be applied, where the voltage is reduced beyond
the point at which fault-free operation of the circuit is guaranteed in order to lower
the power consumption of the receiver. In this way, QoS, hardware reliability, and
implementation efficiency can be traded off against one another at runtime.
In [3], we presented how this new paradigm can be integrated into the existing
QoS flow of wireless communication systems. Figure 4b shows the extended version
of the original QoS flow from Fig. 3a. Low rates of hardware errors are implicitly
corrected by a wireless receiver. In that case no further action is required. A higher
rate of hardware errors results in a degradation of the QoS and, thus, can be detected
by the standard QoS flow. The standard QoS flow is already error-resilient by
itself, as it dynamically adjusts the communication parameters to obtain a certain
QoS. In most cases, however, it will be cheaper in terms of energy to correct a
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(a) Depending on the current hardware reli-
ability and channel quality, different static
and dynamic techniques (resilience actua-
tors) are available to mitigate the impact of
hardware errors. Entries in cyan color quan-
tify the example in Section 2.2.
  
(b) Extended dynamic QoS flow: The relia-
bility control unit chooses the resilience ac-
tuatorswhich result in the least overhead and,
thus, in an energy efficient design.
No
No
Fig. 4 Our new methodology integrates seamlessly into the existing QoS flow of today’s
communication systems. The available resilience techniques depend on the current channel quality
and hardware reliability. (a) Depending on the current hardware reliability and channel quality,
different static and dynamic techniques (resilience actuators) are available to mitigate the impact
of hardware errors. Entries in cyan color quantify the example in Sect. 2.2. (b) Extended dynamic
QoS flow: The reliability control unit chooses the resilience actuators which result in the least
overhead and, thus, in an energy-efficient design
temporary hardware error by the activation of a dynamic protection mechanism than
by changing the communication parameters as, e.g., a H-ARQ based correction is
very costly with respect to energy consumption.
As already mentioned a degradation of the QoS can be caused by either channel
errors or hardware errors. A differentiation of these two error sources is not possible
with the existing QoS monitoring system only. Therefore, it is necessary to monitor
the reliability status of each hardware component. Single bit flips in the data path
for example are often mitigated by the algorithmic error resilience of the receiver.
Application-specific detection circuits like the reduced-size ACS (add-compare-
select)-unit for turbo decoding proposed in [3] can indicate the status of one
component with only a small overhead.
We introduced a reliability control unit which activates one or several resilience
actuators according to the current monitoring status. A resilience actuator is a
dynamic protection mechanism, which can increase the error resilience either on
component or on system level. Resilience actuators can be found on hardware
level and on software level. So far, we identified four classes of actuators. On the
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lowest level, we can change the hardware operating point, e.g., the supply voltage
or the clock frequency. The trade-off between supply voltage, clock frequency,
and power consumption is well studied in the literature. Another possibility is the
use of low-level hardware techniques, such as the selective protection of critical
parts, or setting erroneous likelihood values to zero [31]. Many algorithms have
parameters which can be changed at runtime. Advanced channel decoders operate
iteratively. The number of iterations is a parameter which can easily be changed
for each individual block by the software. For many components, we have a choice
of different algorithms, starting from optimal algorithms with a high complexity
down to suboptimal algorithms with a very low complexity, which offers a trade-
off between QoS and implementation efficiency. The choice of parameters and
algorithms is another class of actuators [3]. There also exist resilience actuators on
system level. Adjusting the communication parameters, e.g., by choosing a channel
code with a better error correction capability, improves the error resilience, but the
effects are not immediate. A faster solution is to shift complexity between different
components, when one of the components has a low hardware reliability. It is
important to note that resilience actuators are only activated when hardware errors
cause a degradation of the QoS.
In general, different actuators or combinations of actuators are suited to deal
with different types of hardware errors. Normally, it is preferable to use actuators
which do not require changes inside the components or which can be implemented
with low complexity. Each actuator offers a different trade-off between hardware
reliability, QoS, and implementation performance (throughput, energy). Based on
the channel quality and the respective requirements on QoS, throughput, and
energy, the reliability control chooses those actuators, which will best fulfill the
requirements. Therefore, it is mandatory to characterize each actuator with regard
to its influence on communications performance, throughput, area, and energy
overhead. Sometimes, the reliability requirements necessitate the use of resilience
actuators which have a severe effect, e.g., on the system throughput. In these
cases, the reliability control also needs actuators which trade-off throughput and
communications performance. The big advantage of this reliability extension is the
dynamic protection of the wireless receiver, which is only activated when necessary.
2.2 A Case Study
In the last section, our new methodology was generally introduced. The trade-off
between channel quality and hardware resilience and the choice of the resilience
actuators are application-specific and cannot be quantified in a general fashion. In
this paragraph, we demonstrate our methodology on a concrete example in order to
make it more seizable.
Multiple-antenna or MIMO systems have the potential to increase the data rate of
wireless communication systems. They belong to the most advanced systems in 4G
and 5G communication standards, and their very high complexity is a challenge for
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Fig. 5 Generic architecture of an iterative MIMO-BICM receiver including main building blocks
and system memories
any hardware implementation. To demonstrate our novel methodology, we chose
to apply it to a double-iterative MIMO-BICM (bit-interleaved coded modulation)
transmission system.
Aforementioned, a channel code provides redundancy, which allows the correc-
tion of transmission errors in the receiver. An interleaver between channel encoder
and modulator reduces dependencies between neighboring bits. The modulated
symbols are multiplexed to an array of antennas and then transmitted in parallel
to increase the data rate. Such a system setup is called MIMO-BICM system. On
the receiver side, a MIMO detector decouples the multiple transmission streams,
and the channel decoder corrects errors, which have been induced by noise on
the communication channel. The most advanced receiver techniques combine the
MIMO detector and the channel decoder in an iterative feedback loop to further
improve the communications performance of the receiver [17]. These two blocks
exchange likelihood values, which reflect their confidence in the results of their
computations. The channel decoder can be iterative itself (and often is), which
results in a double-iterative receiver structure. The number of iterations is dynamic
and depends strongly on the respective system state and QoS requirements.
Multiple-antenna systems are combined with different types of channel codes in
the existing standards. WiFi features LDPC codes and convolutional codes, whereas
LTE supports only the trellis based convolutional and turbo codes. WiMax supports
all three kinds of channel codes. Therefore, we mapped the iterative receiver
structure from [11] onto a general architecture framework, which allows us to plug
in different MIMO detectors and channel decoders [13]. The generic architecture
shown in Fig. 5 connects the main building blocks via several system memories.
We presented in [11] the details of the implementation results for all components
of the iterative receiver [13, 34]. All designs were synthesized in a 65 nm low-power
bulk CMOS standard cell library. Target frequency after place and route is 300MHz,
which is typical of industrial designs (exception WiMax/WiFi LDPC decoder). The
size of the system memories is determined by the largest block length in each
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communication standard. For example, LTE turbo codes include up to 18,432 bits.
In this case, the system memories require approximately 40% of the total system
area. For WiMax/WiFi, the maximum block length is only 2304 bits which results
in a much smaller area for the system memories. The power consumption of the
memories is not neglectable when compared to the other components [13]. The total
power consumption depends heavily on the number of inner and outer iterations.
The system memories add substantially to the die area of such an iterative
MIMO-BICM receiver. Memories are very susceptible to hardware errors due to
their dense and highly optimized layouts. In [12], we analyzed the impact of
hardware errors in the different system memories on the system performance of
a MIMO-BICM system. We found out that especially the memories containing
complex-valued data, i.e. the channel information and the received vectors, are very
sensitive. Figure 6 shows the degradation of the communications performance when
errors are injected in the channel information memory. Up to a bit error probability
of pb = 10−6 the degradation is negligible for the typical frame error rates (FERs)
of a wireless system. Afterwards, the performance decreases gradually with an
increasing pb.
We assume that the memory errors result from supply voltage drops which occur
regularly during power state switching. In this context, several resilience actuators
exist, which can be applied to different degrees of hardware unreliability in order
to mitigate the impact of the hardware errors on the system performance [26].
Table 1 lists them with their influence on area, power consumption, and throughput










Fig. 6 The system communication performance is gradually decreasing for random bit flips in the
channel information memory. pb depicts the bit error probability
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Table 1 Quantitative comparison of resilience actuators for the system memories of an iterative
MIMO-BICM receiver
Tolerated hardware Tolerated hardware
Resilience actuator Impacts (un-) reliability error probability
Algorithmic Area +0% −200mV supply voltage 10−6
error resilience Power +0%
Throughput −0%
1 outer iteration Area +0% −300mV supply voltage 4 · 10−5
Power +0%
Throughput −75%
1-bit error Area +30% −400mV supply voltage 8 · 10−4
correction code Power +30%
Throughput −0%
8T memory cells Area +25% −500mV supply voltage 8 · 10−3
Power +0% for the equivalent
Throughput −0% 6T memory cells
and their error resilience. In Fig. 4a, these actuators are arranged according to
our methodology (cyan text). No action has to be taken as long as there is a
high hardware reliability, i.e. voltage drops of no more than 200mV. Within
this region, the receiver shows an inherent algorithmic error resilience. For a
decreased reliability in which voltage drops up to 300mV occur, we can react
on the highest level by increasing the number of iterations in order to regain
communications performance. For transient errors, this leads only to a temporary
throughput degradation without loss of communications performance. When errors
occur with a high probability pb > 5 · 10−5, high-level resilience actuators cannot
provide the necessary resilience. On a lower level, the contents of the memory can
be protected by a simple 1-bit error correction code. The resilience can be even
further increased on technology level by employing 8-transistor (8T) memory cells
instead of 6-transistor (6T) cells resulting in a smaller implementation overhead. 8T
memory cells can even tolerate voltage drops of 500mV. However, the increase in
area and power is in both cases permanent.
2.2.1 Resilience Actuators
Error resilience techniques for channel decoding have already been thoroughly
investigated (cf. [11]). However, there are potential trade-offs on system level
between MIMO detection and channel decoding, which we will discuss in the
following. Except for the hardware operating point, we will restrict ourselves to
application-specific resilience actuators. Universal, already established, low-level
hardware techniques can be applied to any application and result in a constant
overhead. Here, we focus on dynamic resilience techniques, which can be switched
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on and off as necessary and which do not have a large impact on implementation
complexity and energy consumption.
As MIMO detectors have no inherent error correction capability, algorithmic
changes inside the detector component cannot improve the error resilience. This
has to be done either on system level or by changing the hardware operating
point. These actions usually have a negative influence on system throughput and/or
communications performance. Therefore, we also introduce algorithmic resilience
actuators, enabling a trade-off of throughput and communications performance in
order to counterbalance these effects.
• Hardware operating point: When timing errors occur, the clock frequency can
be reduced or the supply voltage can be increased to make the circuit faster.
However, both approaches require additional control circuits and energy. The
trade-off between supply voltage and energy is well-understood. The number of
bit flips in a memory, for example, strongly depends on the voltage: Increasing
the supply voltage decreases the soft error rate. According to [8], the soft error
rate drops by about 30% when the operating voltage is increased by 100mV
compared to the nominal voltage. Changing the hardware operating point offers
a trade-off between reliability and energy consumption, which is often used for
voltage overscaling.
• Adjustment of detection quality: Changing the detection quality offers a trade-off
between communications performance and throughput but has no direct influence
on the error resilience. However, a higher throughput augments the available time
budget and, thus, offers a higher potential for error resilience. This resilience
actuator uses the available algorithmic flexibility and thus has only a negligible
influence on power and area consumption.
• External LLR (log-likelihood ratio) manipulations: Instead of accessing the
MIMO detector directly, we propose low-complexity techniques, which work
only on the LLR-input and -output values of the detector. LLR values have a high
robustness against hardware errors. If an LLR value is equal to zero, it contains
no information. Thus, the most important information is stored in the sign bit.
As long as this sign bit is not compromised, the core information is still correct
and the channel decoder can correct the hardware errors. For more details see
additionally [11].
Instead of increasing the reliability of components individually, the problem
can also be tackled on system level. The double-iterative structure of a MIMO-
BICM receiver offers several high-level possibilities to combat the unreliability of
its components. We present the most promising techniques in the remainder of this
section.
• Iteration control mechanisms: An iteration control typically monitors exchanged
values in an iterative system and checks stopping conditions to detect the
convergence of the processed block. In [12] we analyzed the impact of memory
errors on the system behavior of an iterative MIMO system. We observed that
errors in any of the memories before the MIMO detector have an increased
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1 outer - 5 code
2 outer - 5 code
3 outer - 5 code
4 outer - 5 code
1 outer - 20 code
2 outer - 20 code
3 outer - 20 code
Fig. 7 Example for complexity shifting in a double-iterative MIMO-BICM receiver by varying
the number of outer loop and channel decoder iterations
impact on the communications performance if the incorrect values are processed
repeatedly during the outer iterations. In [10], it was possible to reduce the
number of outer iterations to an average below 2 (from a maximum of 10)
without sacrificing communications performance. A further throughput increase
is possible by allowing a degradation of communications performance. The
additional effort for an iteration control is very low compared to channel
decoding [11].
• Complexity shifting between components: An example for a global algorithmic
adaption is to shift the complexity between system components: When a building
block cannot compensate an error locally, the system convergence can still be
achieved by increasing the computational effort of other building blocks. Such a
shift can be achieved, for instance, between the channel decoder and the MIMO
detector, leveraging the outer feedback loop.When theMIMO detector is not able
to counterbalance the impact of hardware errors, the number of channel decoder
iterations and/or the number of outer loop iterations can be increased in order to
maintain the communications performance. Figure 7 shows the frame error rate
for a 4×4 antennas, 16-QAM system employing aWiMax-like LDPC code where
complexity shifting can be used. We compare the frame error rate for different
numbers of decoder iterations and outer iterations. Let us consider the case when
the receiver is performing 3 outer iterations and 5 LDPC iterations. When the
MIMO detector suffers from hardware errors, e.g. due to a temperature increase,
we can temporarily shift more processing to the LDPC decoder by performing
only 2 outer iterations and 20 LDPC iterations. The new configuration provides






























MIMO detector LDPC decoder System 5 LDPC System 20 LDPC
same performance
Fig. 8 Implementation efficiency of MIMO detector, WiMax/WiFi LDPC decoder, and two
system configurations using the efficiency metrics from [25]
the same communications performance. The question is how such a shift changes
the energy efficiency of the MIMO receiver. Figure 8 shows the implementation
efficiency of MIMO-BICM receiver and its components. The red curve shows
the efficiency of the MIMO detector for different search radii and in a MMSE-
SIC configuration (single red point). The blue curve shows the efficiency of an
LDPC decoder running with different number of iterations. The LDPC decoder
is a flexible decoder which supports all code rates and code lengths from WiMax
and WiFi standard. The yellow and the green curve show the system efficiency
for different numbers of outer iterations with 5 LDPC iterations (yellow) and
20 LDPC iterations (green), respectively. With the help of this graph, we can
quantify the influence of a complexity shift: when changing from 3 outer and
5 LDPC iterations to 2 outer and 20 LDPC iterations, the energy efficiency
of the system is reduced by approximately 50% (blue circle). However, the
same communications performance is achieved and when the temperature in
the MIMO detector decreases, the reliability control can return to the original
configuration.
• Shifting of error correction capability between components: Typically, MIMO
detector and channel decoder are designed and implemented independently of
each other. The MIMO transmission scheme provides a large data rate but has
no error correction abilities. The error correction capability is solely provided
by the channel code to improve the error rate performance of the transmission
system. From a system point of view, the MIMO detector does not work on
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completely independent data as there are dependencies from the overlaying
channel code. However, this diversity cannot be exploited by the detector as the
channel interleaver hides the code structure from the detector and because most
channel code constraints span over many MIMO detection vectors. Kienle [24]
introduced a small block code in eachMIMO detection vector in order to generate
a small diversity gain in the MIMO detector while simplifying the outer channel
code to keep the overall coding rate constant. While this approach targeted the
decoding complexity, it can also be used to increase the error resilience of the
MIMO detector. Each parity check in one MIMO vector improves the error
correction capabilities of the detector. On a system level, the diversity gain can
be split between detector and decoder dynamically, thus, allowing the system to
react dynamically to changing hardware error rates. The only drawback of this
approach is that the diversity separation has to be done on the transmitter side,
which causes a higher latency.
3 Approximate DRAM
Some communication systems require large data block sizes that cannot be stored in
on-chip memories (SRAMs) anymore. In this case data has to be stored externally
in DRAMs. Thus, in the following we shift our focus on DRAMs.
Approximate DRAM is a new concept that adapts the idea of approximate
computing to DRAMs [23, 30]. Approximate DRAM exploits this fact by lowering
the refresh frequency (reducing vendor guardbands) or even disable the refresh
completely and accepting the risk of data errors. The underlying motivation for an
Approximate DRAM is the increasing power consumption and performance penalty
caused by unavoidable DRAM refresh commands. The authors of [29] and [1]
predicted that 40–50% of the power consumption of future DRAM devices will
be caused by refresh commands. Moreover, 3D integrated DRAMs like Wide I/O
or HMC worsen the scenario with respect to increased cell leakage, due to the
much higher temperature. Therefore, the refresh frequency needs to be increased
accordingly to avoid retention errors [37].
The characteristic refresh parameters of DRAMs, listed in datasheets, are very
pessimistic due to the high process margins added by the vendors to ensure correct
functionality under worst-case conditions and most important a high yield [28].
Thus, the DRAM refresh rate recommended by the vendors and JEDEC (tREF =
64ms) adds a large guardband, as shown in Fig. 9.
As mentioned before many applications like wireless systems have an inherent
error resilience that tolerates these errors and therefore, refresh power often can be
reduced with a minimal loss of the output quality.
Figure 9 qualitatively shows the retention error behavior over time and the design
space for Approximate DRAM. The sphere around the curve represents the process
variation, Variable Retention Times (VRT), and Data Pattern Dependencies (DPD).
In general, we have two key parameters for Approximate DRAM: The data lifetime



















Fig. 9 Qualitative retention error behavior of DRAMs
and the application robustness. Both parameters lead to three possibilities in this
design space:
• Refresh can be switched off if the data lifetime is smaller than the actual required
refresh period.
• Refresh can be turned off if the data lifetime is larger than the required refresh
period and the application provides resilience to the resulting number of errors at
this working point.
• If the application only provides a maximal robustness the refresh rate is
configured according to the resulting working point.
The reliability-energy trade-off for Approximate DRAMs can be explored only by
using fast and accurate retention error-aware DRAM models.
In [39] we developed such a model that is usable in full system level simulations.
The model was calibrated to the measurement results of DDR3 DRAM devices. A
measurement statistic is shown in Fig. 10. Here we measured 40 identical 4Gbit
DDR3 chips from the same vendor. Each single device has been measured ten
times at four different temperatures and five retention times, resulting in a total
of 8000 measurement points. We plot the retention times versus the normalized and
averaged number of errors obtained during each measurement step. The bars mark
the minimum and the maximum measured number of errors. We find here a quite
prominent variation in the order of 20% (max. number of errors), which shows a
large temperature dependency. This needs to be considered as realistic guardband
in approximate computing platforms utilizing the Approximate DRAM approach
(cf. the sphere in Fig. 9). Additionally, the figure shows a histogram of the absolute
number of bit errors (between 1 · 106 and 4 · 106) measured at the data point with
100s retention time and a temperature of 25 ◦C.














































Figure 11 shows our closed-loop simulation flow for investigations on Approx-
imate DRAM. It is based on SystemC Transaction Level Models (TLM) for
fast and accurate simulation. This simulation loop uses the modular DRAMSys
framework [21] and consists of four key components: DRAM and core models [21],
a DRAM power model [5], thermal models [38], and the aforementioned DRAM
retention error model. The remaining models are shortly introduced in the follow-
ing:
• DRAM and Core Models: The DRAM model of the framework is based on a
DRAM specific TLM protocol called DRAM-AT [20]. Due to TLM’s modular
fashion several types of DRAM and controller configurations can be modeled.
For modeling the cores the gem5 simulator is used [2]. We developed a coupling
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between gem5 and SystemC to be able to integrate this powerful research
platform in our simulation loop [19].
• DRAM Power Model: Since DRAMs contribute significantly to the power
consumption of today’s systems [9, 27], there is a need for accurate power
modeling. For our framework we use DRAMPower [4, 5], which uses either
parameters from datasheets, estimated via DRAMSpec [33] or measurements to
model DRAM power.
• Thermal Model: 3D packaging of systems like Wide I/O DRAM starts to
break down the memory and bandwidth walls. However, this comes at the
price of increased power density and less horizontal heat removal capability of
the thinned dies. Therefore, we integrated the thermal simulator 3D-ICE [38]
in a SystemC wrapper [18] that is included in our closed-loop simulation for
Approximate DRAM analysis.
In a detailed case study [22] we used the presented simulation framework
(Fig. 11) to investigate the influence of Approximate DRAM on three different
applications. We achieved in average a more than 10% decrease of the total energy
consumption.
4 Conclusions
Technology scaling is leading to a point where traditional worst-case design
is no longer feasible. In this chapter, we presented a new methodology for
the design of dependable wireless systems. We combined cross-layer reliability
techniques to treat hardware errors with the least possible overhead leading to
a high energy efficiency. This methodology enables efficient trade-offs between
communications performance, throughput, and energy efficiency. However, the
exact trade-off depends on the real application requirements, which was not in the
focus of this work. Application-specific resilience actuators together with low-level
techniques offer the ability to respond to the changing requirements on reliability
and quality-of-service. We illustrated our new methodology on a state-of-the-art
generic double-iterative MIMO-BICM receiver which belongs to the most complex
systems in modern communication standards.
We identified dynamic resilience actuators on all layers of abstraction. Each
actuator offers a trade-off between communications performance, implementation
performance (throughput, power), and error resilience. Any actuator which trades
off communications performance for throughput, e.g., the sphere radius, can be
reused to increase the error resilience, when combined with a reduction of the clock
frequency. Throughput and error resilience are, thus, closely related. As we have
shown, algorithmic resilience actuators offer a great potential for dynamic trade-
offs between communications performance, implementation performance, and error
resilience. This work emphasizes the strong mutual dependencies between these
three design metrics in a wireless receiver.
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When the requirement in communication systems on data block sizes exceeds the
capacities of the on-chip memories (SRAMs), external memories, such as DRAMs,
have to be used. To reduce their impact on energy and performance we exploited
the concept of Approximate DRAM. However, this comes at the cost of reduced
reliability. For the exploration of approximate DRAMs we introduced a holistic
simulation framework that includes an advanced DRAM retention error model. This
model is calibrated to real measurements of recent DRAM devices. Finally, we
demonstrated using the holistic simulation platform that the impact of Approximate
DRAM on the quality (QoS or QoR) is negligible while saving refresh energy for
three selected applications.
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1 Introduction
Continuous technology scaling necessitates to design today’s embedded systems
from electronic components with growing inherent unreliability. This unreliability
arises from susceptibility to neutron-induced soft errors, negative-bias temperature
instability, short-channel effect, gate leakage, etc. Therefore, it is vital to analyze
system reliability at design time and employ appropriate reliability-improving
techniques if necessary. A variety of reliability analysis techniques have been
proposed for both the relatively low levels of abstraction that focus on technology as
well as the system level that considers the interplay of hardware and software. But,
there exists a gap between the levels where the faults originate, e. g., transistor level,
and the system level for which the analysis is required. To close this gap and tame the
ever increasing system complexity, cross-level analysis methodologies are required.
These collect knowledge at lower levels by combining different analysis techniques
and provide proper data for the analysis at higher levels of abstraction [24].
Evaluating the reliability of a system at design time, proper reliability-improving
techniques can be explored and integrated into the system. However, these tech-
niques typically come with higher monetary costs, latency, energy consumption,
etc. This necessitates a multi-objective DSE! (DSE!) which maximizes reliability
without deteriorating other design objectives. Usually, DSE! explores and evaluates
millions of possible design alternatives (also called implementations) to find the
Pareto-optimal ones. Herein, the efficiency of the reliability evaluation and explo-
ration algorithm are the main challenging issues [2]. In [3], we propose an efficient
and scalable reliability analysis technique based on Success Trees (STs) which is
integrated into a DSE! framework to automatically evaluate an implementation’s
reliability. Most existing analysis techniques quantify a system’s reliability without
giving any hint on what to change to improve it, such that exploration algorithms
basically perform random changes, e. g., through genetic operators in case of
EA!s (EA!s). In [4, 6, 7, 11], we propose to employ the notion of component
importance to rank components based on their contribution to the system reliability.
Later, to improve the reliability of a system with limited budgets, we only need to
improve the reliability of highly important components. In [5, 28], we show this
guides the DSE! towards highly reliable, yet affordable implementations. So far,
most existing analysis approaches assume that the reliabilities of components—
or their lower bound—are more or less known precisely. Due to shrinking cell
geometries, semiconductor devices encounter higher susceptibility to environmental
changes and manufacturing tolerances such that a component’s reliability has to be
considered uncertain. An overview of the most important types of uncertainties for
system design is given in Fig. 1.
Effects of unreliability and the associated uncertainty of components can propa-
gate to the system level and become a challenge for system-level design method-
ologies. Even worse, destructive effects such as extreme temperature can affect
several components simultaneously, resulting in correlated uncertainties. Neglecting
such correlations can impose an intolerable inaccuracy to reliability analysis.
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Fig. 1 Uncertainties that influence a system’s response and its characteristics: Uncertain environ-
mental influences $e like cosmic rays may cause soft errors. Manufacturing tolerances $m may
lead to changing system behavior and permanent defects. Finally, uncertainty may also be present





































Fig. 2 Impact of uncertainty correlation among the reliability functions of different components
on the uncertainty of the system MTTF! for an implementation candidate of an H.264 encoder/de-
coder. (a) Correlated component uncertainty. (b) Non-correlated component uncertainty
As an example, Fig. 2 depicts the distribution of system MTTF! (MTTF!) for
an H.264 encoder/decoder implementation with and without the consideration of
uncertainty correlations. While considering these correlations shows a good match
between the simulated cases and the bounds, neglecting them may result in huge
deviations from those bounds. This motivates the consideration of uncertainties
and especially their correlations in cross-level reliability analysis. In this realm,
this chapter introduces a methodology for CRA! (CRA!) that combines various
reliability analysis techniques across different levels of abstraction while being
aware of existing uncertainties and their correlations.
Considering uncertainty, system reliability is no longer a single value, but instead
represented by a set of samples, upper and lower bound curves, or distribution
functions which requires that a DSE! can consider implementations with uncertain
objectives. Therefore, this chapter focuses on (a) the explicit modeling of uncer-
tainties and their correlations in reliability analysis and (b) the integration of such
an analysis into a framework for system-level DSE!. The techniques proposed are
not tailored to a specific abstraction layer, but can be best classified as combining
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Fig. 3 Main abstraction
layers of embedded systems
and this chapter’s major






























architecture and application layers according to the embedded system abstraction
layers as depicted in Fig. 3.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Sect. 2 reviews related work and
introduces required fundamentals. Section 3 introduces a formal CRA! framework
and its application using a case study. An explicit modeling of uncertainty in
reliability analysis and optimization is given in Sect. 4. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes
the chapter.
2 Related Work and Fundamentals
2.1 Reliability Analysis and Optimization
Reliability analysis and optimization are thoroughly studied research topics that are
of great importance fornearly every safety-critical system [12], especially embedded
systems [36]. However, one can observe that the different areas raise significantly
diverse needs for the applied analysis techniques. An overview of well-known
reliability analysis techniques can be found in [35].
Up to now, several approaches have been presented for analyzing the reliability
of embedded systems at system level which are typically integrated into system-
level DSE!. In [16], fault-tolerant schedules are synthesized using task re-execution,
rollback recovery, and active replication. The authors of [47] try to maximize
reliability by selectively introducing redundancy while treating area consumption
and latency as constraints. Reliability is introduced as an objective into system-
level design in [13]. However, the employed reliability analysis techniques are
restricted to series-parallel system structures which render them infeasible for
typical embedded systems where processing and communication resources have to
be shared. On the other hand, reliability analysis at low levels of abstraction has been
studied thoroughly, e. g., transistor level [42] or for prospective switching devices
like carbon nanotubes [32].
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So far, few systematic approaches have been proposed to upscale the knowledge
gathered at low abstraction levels to the system level. The work in [1] proposes a
system-level dynamic temperature management scheme to prevent thermal hot spots
through a run-time application re-mapping, and to efficiently mitigate aging effects
in a many-core architecture. In [23], thermal effects in a Multiprocessor System-
on-Chip (MPSoC) on its reliability are propagated into a scheduling and binding
optimization at system level. Their analysis is based on a simulation of the MPSoC
and given relations between the temperature profile and the resulting reliability.
Similar reliability analysis techniques are used in [34] in order to optimize the
lifetime of MPSoCs using the so-called slack allocation. However, these techniques
are able to capture thermal effects only, without investigating the possibility to
include and propagate these effects into a more holistic analysis that also takes into
account, e. g., soft errors or a complex system structure like a networked embedded
system consisting of several interconnected processors or MPSoCs.
2.2 Compositional Approaches to Reliability Analysis
A first attempt to close the gap on accurate power models for reliability analysis
between the ESL! (ESL!) and the gate level is presented in [40]. While the approach
sounds promising in modeling thermal effects on the component reliability, it fails to
offer a formal framework that allows to integrate different analysis techniques cross
level. Herkersdorf et al. [24] [RAP-Chap.] propose a framework for probabilistic
fault abstraction and error propagation and show that all physically induced faults
manifest in higher abstraction levels as a single or multiple bit flip(s). Similarly, the
proposed CRA! model aims to propagate the effects of uncertainty and the resulting
faults originating from lower levels of abstraction into the system-level analysis
by incorporating appropriate reliability analysis techniques for each relevant error
model at a specific level of abstraction. As a result, the developed concepts become
independent of an actual error model since it abstracts from the actual source
of unreliability during upscaling, i. e., the propagation of data from lower levels
to higher levels by means of abstraction and data conversion. CRA! approaches
that consider component-based software are presented in [37]. Although these
approaches try to develop a more general compositional analysis scheme, they miss
a well-defined mathematical underpinning and do not focus on automatic analysis
as needed during DSE!.
The use of composition and decomposition in well-defined formal models that
allow abstraction to avoid state space explosion has been addressed in, e.g., [25].
An especially interesting and formally sound approach can be found in [9]. In this
chapter, we develop a formal approach, inspired by techniques from the verification
area, for CRA!. A particular challenge will be the consideration and explicit
modeling of uncertainties in the formal model where there is no similar technique
or need in the area of verification given.
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2.3 Uncertainty Considerations
There exist intense studies on the effect of uncertainties on the system reliability for
general engineering problems, cf. [38], as well as circuits and microarchitectures,
cf. [27]. However, few studies focus on the cross-level reliability analysis of
embedded systems in the presence of uncertainty arising from manufacturing
tolerances, etc.
Uncertainty-Aware Analysis One example is a cross-level adaptive reliability
prediction technique proposed in [17] that derives information from different levels
of abstraction and allows to consider the simultaneous effects of process, voltage,
temperature and aging variations, and soft errors on a processor. The authors of [18]
propose a cross-level framework to analyze the combined impact of aging and
process variation on the SER! (SER!) and static noise margin of memory arrays
in near threshold voltage regimes. This framework enables to explore workload, as
instruction per second, and cache configuration, as cache size and associativity, in
order to minimize SER! and its variations for 6T and 8T SRAM cells. Contrary
to all mentioned approaches, this chapter explicitly treats each effect of uncertainty
during reliability analysis of a system. Proposed is an analysis technique that obtains
the range of reliability that is achievable for a system given its configuration and the
uncertainties of its components.
Uncertainty-Aware Optimization Optimization problems may be affected by var-
ious sources of uncertainty including perturbation of decision variables as well
as effects of noise and approximation on objective functions [26]. In this work,
uncertainty is explicitly modeled as variations in component failure rates and
costs. The uncertainty propagates through reliability analysis and cost evaluation at
system level and renders design objectives to be uncertain as well. To make correct
decisions when comparing and discriminating implementations during DSE!, the
employed optimization algorithm needs to take the uncertainty of the design
objectives into account as well. The work in [44] proposes a mathematical approach
to calculate the probability of an implementation dominating another, given all
uncertain objectives follow either uniform or any discrete distributions. However,
extending this approach to consider diversely distributed uncertain objectives
requires solving difficult integrals demanding a huge computational effort. To this
end, approximate simulation-based approaches, e. g., in [30], provide trade-offs
between execution time and accuracy of calculating this probability. In [33], it is
proposed to compare uncertain objectives with respect to their lower and upper
bounds. However, this approach fails to distinguish largely overlapping intervals
with even significantly different distributions. A lot of work has been proposed
for problems with continuous search spaces and linear objective functions, see
e. g.,[15]. However, typical embedded system design problems have discrete search
spaces, non-linear and often not differentiable objective functions, and have to cope
with stringent constraints. Thus, these optimization techniques cannot be applied
without further investigation and modification. In [39], an approach based on an
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uncertainty-awareMOEA! (MOEA!) that targets reliability as one design objective
is presented. The approach takes into account the uncertainty of the reliability of
each system component and tries to maximize the robustness of the system. This
chapter presents a novel uncertainty-aware multi-objective optimization approach
applicable for DSE! of reliable systems at system level, see Sect. 4.
2.4 System-Level Design Fundamentals
This chapter targets the system-level design of embedded MPSoCs, typically
specified by an application graph, a resource graph, and a set of possible task-to-
resource mappings. The application graph includes a set of tasks to be executed and
specifies the data and control flow among them. The resource graph consists of hard-
ware resources, namely, processors and accelerators connected by communication
infrastructures such as buses or networks-on-a-chip. The mappings specify which
tasks can be executed on which resources. Figure 4 shows an example specification
with three tasks ti , i ∈ [0 . . . 2], five resources rj , j ∈ [0 . . . 4], and eight mappings
mi,j from ti to rj .
Implementation candidates are derived via system-level synthesis [10] perform-
ing the steps: (a) Resource allocation selects a subset of resources that are part of
the implementation. (b) Task binding associates at least one instance of each task
to an allocated resource by activating the respective task-to-resource mapping. (c)
Scheduling determines a feasible start time for each task instance. An implementa-
tion is feasible if and only if all constraints regarding, e. g., communication, timing,
















application graph mapping edges resource graph
Fig. 4 A specification comprising (a) an application graph where edges indicate data dependen-
cies of tasks, (b) a resource graph with edges representing dedicated communication between
resources, and (c) a set of task-to-resource mappings which model possible execution of tasks
on resources. A possible implementation candidate obtained by system-level synthesis is depicted
with non-allocated resources and non-active bindings being grayed out
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with non-allocated resources and non-activated mappings being grayed out. More
details of the underlying system synthesis and DSE! in the context of reliability
analysis and optimization can be found in [22, 43].
3 Compositional Reliability Analysis (CRA)
This section introduces models and methods for CRA! as proposed in [21]. Figure 5
shows a schematic view of CRA! and its required mechanisms. To realize a cross-
level analysis, it encapsulates existing reliability analysis techniques in CRN!s
(CRN!s) at multiple RAL!s (RAL!s). It tames analysis complexity within a certain
RAL! using composition and decomposition and connects different RAL!s through
adapters. Each CRN! applies an analysis step Y(t) = X(S) at a specific RAL!
where X is a concrete analysis technique and S is a (sub)system. A CRN! derives
a specific measure Y over time t . A RAL! in CRA! may combine several (design)
abstraction levels where the same errors and, especially, their causes are significant.
Adjacent RAL!s are connected by the concept of adapters that have to perform
three tasks: (a) refinement provides the data required for the analysis in the lower
RAL!, (b) data conversion transforms the output measures from the lower RAL! to
the input required at the higher RAL!, and (c) abstraction during both refinement
and data conversion tames analysis complexity. A concrete example of CRA!
describing a temperature-reliability adapter for MPSoCs is presented in Sect. 3.1.
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CRN j
































Fig. 5 A schematic view of CRA!
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Another important aspect of CRA! concerns the feasibility of composition and
decomposition with respect to reliability analysis. While, of course, composition
and decomposition should reduce the complexity of the analysis, errors caused by
approximation or abstraction should be bounded. For example, a rule to bound the
approximation error of a decomposition D of a given system S into n subsystems
S1, . . . , Sn is as follows:
D(S) = {S1, . . . , Sn} is feasible, if ∃ε : |X(S)−
(
X(S1) ◦ . . . ◦X(Sn)
)| ≤ ε
with ◦ being an analysis-dependent operator, e. g., multiplication, and ε being the
maximum approximation error. A special focus of these investigations is the proper
handling of decomposed nodes that influence each other. Nowadays, hardly any
subsystem of an embedded system is truly independent of all other subsystems.
Thus, this rule should be extended as follows to consider both the truly independent
individual properties of the decomposed nodes and their dependencies during
composition C:
D(S) = {S1, . . . , Sn} is feasible, if ∃ε :
|X(S)− C(X(S1) ◦ . . . ◦X(Sn), P ({S1, . . . , Sn}))| ≤ ε. (1)
In this case, the compositionC not only takes into account the parts of the subsystem
that can be analyzed independently, but also performs a corrective postprocessing P
to take into account their interactions.
Similarly, we have developed rules for the connection of different RAL!s. The
task of an adapter is to convert the measure Y used at the lower RAL! into the
measure Y ′ used at the higher RAL!s, for example, Y ′ = A(Y). Especially because
of the models and methods needed for converting from one RAL! to another, a
thorough analysis of the function A needs to be carried out. In most cases, this
function will not provide an exact result, but will require an abstraction such as by
the determination of tight upper and lower bounds. Thus, the developed rules will
define requirements for the functions in the adapter used for abstraction and data
conversion.
3.1 CRA Case Study and Uncertainty Investigations
In [21], a concrete application of CRA! to realize a temperature-aware redundant
task mapping approach is presented. In the following, a brief summary of the case
study is given with focus being put on the aspect of uncertainty introduced due to
the application of composition and decomposition. This further motivates the need
to develop techniques to explicitly model and consider uncertainty during analysis
and optimization as is presented in Sect. 4.
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3.1.1 CRA Case Study
In the context of system-level design and especially the design of reliable embedded
systems as introduced in Sect. 2, deploying redundant (software) tasks can be
considered a rather cost-efficient technique to enhance system reliability. However,
the resulting additional workload may lead to increased temperature and, thus, a
reliability degradation of the (hardware) components executing the tasks. The case
study in [21] combines three different techniques on three RAL!s: At the highest
RAL!, a reliability analysis based on BDD! (BDD!), see, e. g.,[20], computes the
system reliability of a complete 8-core MPSoC and requires the reliability function
of each component (core) in the system. To determine the latter, an intermediate
RAL! uses the behavioral analysis approach RTC! (RTC!) [45] to derive the upper
bound for the workload of each core over time. This workload is passed to the
lowest RAL! where this information is used to carry out a temperature simulation
based on HotSpot [41] to deliver a temperature profile of each core. Using these
temperature profiles and assuming electromigration as a fault model, [21] proposes
an adapter that—based on the works in [14, 46]—delivers a temperature-aware
reliability function for each core back to the highest RAL! in order to complete
the system analysis.
3.1.2 Uncertainty Investigations
As given in Eq. 1, composition/decomposition may result in an imprecision εo of an
output measure o ∈ O. In [19], we present techniques for formal decomposition
and composition for CRN!s that describe the system via Boolean formulas,
typically used by BDD!s, Fault Trees, etc. Here, functional correlations between
components are fully captured in the Boolean formulas, and we propose an exact
composition/decomposition scheme on the basis of early quantification. However,
correlations are typically non-functional, with heat dissipation between adjacent
cores being a prominent one. Consider again the case study described before and
Fig. 6: Not decomposing the system into individual cores results in a temperature
simulation of all cores at the lowest level, implicitly including the effect of heat
dissipation in-between cores, see Fig. 6 (top-left). A naive decomposition could
decompose the system into independent cores such that the workload of each core is
determined and a reliability function would be gathered by per-core temperature
simulations on the lowest level, see Fig. 6 (middle-left). This, however, would
completely neglect the effect of heat dissipation between cores. As a third option,
[21] investigates a corrective postprocessing within the adapter between the lower
levels where the workload of cores and the temperature simulation are analyzed
independently, while a simple model that considers the distance and steady-state
temperature of each core is used to approximate the respective heat flow, see Fig. 6
(bottom-left).
The imprecision resulting from the three discussed decomposition variants is
given in Fig. 6 (right), derived from ≈8000 different system implementations
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Fig. 6 A simulation of two cores captures heat dissipation (exact, top) while a decomposition
(naive, middle) is unable to capture heat dissipation between cores. A corrective postprocessing (P ,
bottom) enables to reduce analysis complexity while providing a basic notion of heat dissipation.
The resulting imprecisions in percentage on system-wide MTTF! are depicted on the right
analyzed as part of a DSE!: While no decomposition is treated as an exact
base value—with respect to heat dissipation being considered and not the overall
exactness of the simulation—the naive decomposition constantly overestimates the
system-wide MTTF! by ≈26%. On the other hand, the corrective postprocessing
delivers results with a rather good match in terms of the median and average error,
but also shows that the correction may come at errors of up to ≈10%. At the same
time, compared to the complete simulation, the decomposition including corrective
postprocessing achieves a≈2× average speed-up. These results further motivate the
need for analysis and optimization techniques—as presented in the next section—
that can explicitly model uncertainty such as the shown imprecision.
4 Uncertainty in Reliability Analysis and Optimization
To design and optimize systems for reliability, existing uncertainties in their envi-
ronment and internal states, see Fig. 1, must be explicitly integrated into reliability
analysis techniques. Implicit uncertainty modeling hides the effects of controllable
and non-controllable uncertainties, e. g., into a single reliability function, and fails
to distinguish between them. On the other hand, explicit modeling determines the
range of achievable reliability of a component or subsystem, e. g., using upper and
lower bound functions.
We introduce two solutions for uncertainty modeling: (a) using upper and
lower bounding curves for the achievable reliability and (b) abstracting various
uncertainties into a finite set of typical use cases and providing a system reliability
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Fig. 7 Reliability functions R(t) that result from uncertainties in the internal heat dissipation of
a silicon system that arise from, e. g., changing task binding on a processing unit. Shown is a
range that is determined by an upper Ru(t) and a lower bound Rl (t) reliability function and the
reliability functions for 5 use cases, e. g., 5 favored task schedules that show a distribution within
the range
function for each case, see Fig. 7. While the former offers a range and abstracts
from the distributions in between bounds, the latter variant explicitly determines
important cases in that range, but of course, comes with an increased complexity.
This section covers both approaches and assumes that uncertainty obtained from
lower abstraction levels is available at higher levels as known distributions or
sampled data.
As introduced earlier, incorporating reliability-increasing techniques into a sys-
tem at design time may deteriorate other design objectives. Due to the explicit mod-
eling of uncertainties, a multi-objective uncertainty-aware optimization becomes
necessary. Given that the system reliability is no more a single value, optimization
algorithms must be able to handle uncertain objectives given as probability distribu-
tions, a set of samples or upper and lower bound curves, and allow for a quantitative
comparison of different designs.
4.1 Uncertainty-Aware Reliability Analysis
The uncertainty-aware reliability analysis technique introduced in the following
is originally proposed in [29]. It models the reliability of a component r with
uncertain characteristics Ur using reliability functions Rr (t) that are distributed





A sampler is used to take Ur as input and deliver a sampled reliability function
Rsr (t) with Rlr (t) ≤ Rsr (t) ≤ Rur (t). It ensures that the sampled reliability
functions follow the intended distribution within the given bounds, and enables
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Fig. 8 An overview of the proposed uncertainty-aware reliability analysis
the consideration of arbitrary distributions, in particular well-known discrete and
continuous distributions.
In practice, component reliability is typically derived frommeasurements that are
fitted to closed-form exponential (Rr (t) = e−λr ·t ) and Weibull (Rr (t) = e−λr ·tβr )
reliability functions with λ being the component’s failure rate. The uncertainty
model Ur includes a set of uncertain parameters Pr , distributed within the bounds
[P lr , P ur ]. The sampler takes a sample from each parameter pr ∈ Pr and constructs a
sample reliability function. For example, for an exponential distribution with bounds
[λlr , λur ] = [0.0095, 0.0099], a sample reliability functionRsr (t) = e−0.0098 t can be
generated.
The overall flow of the analysis approach is shown in Fig. 8 and includes the
following steps: (a) The sampler samples a reliability function Rsr (t) from the
uncertainty distribution of each component r , (b) an analysis core uses these samples
and calculates a sample reliability function for the given system implementation
Rsimp(t), and (c) a statistical simulator collects a set of sampled reliability functions
Φimp = ⋃ns=1{Rsimp(t)} and constructs the uncertainty distribution of the system
reliability.
The analysis core can be realized by any existing technique that requires a
reliability function of each component and calculates the system reliability function.
In the concrete case, Fig. 8 shows a formal technique based on BDD!s that models
the reliability of a system implementation with two components in series. The
statistical simulator determines the number of required samples n to later obtain
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desired statistics like mean and quantiles from Φimp with a guaranteed confidence
level.1 As an example, for each sample Rsimp(t) in Φimp, the MTTF! can be









Using sample MTTF!s, design objectives such as the best-, worst-, and average-case
MTTF! can be derived.
4.1.1 Uncertainty Correlation
To model any existing correlation between uncertain parameters of system com-
ponents, we investigate whether they are exposed to common uncertainty sources,
and are, thus, subject to correlative variations. Take temperature as an example:
Components that are fabricated in the same package may be exposed to the same
temperature, which means their reliability characteristics can be considered in a
correlation group, whereas components in different packages might be considered
independent. Assuming that the uncertainty sources and the correlation groups are
given, we introduce models for obtaining correlated samples from the uncertainty
distribution of component reliability functions in [29, 31]: To sample from an
uncertain parameter p, we check if it is a member of any correlation group or not.
If p is a member of G, we first generate a random probability g for the group
G at the beginning of each implementation evaluation step and then calculate a
sample from p using the inverse CDF! (CDF!) of the probability distribution of
p at point g. Otherwise, a sample is taken independently from the distribution
of p. Note that since the uncertain parameters in a correlation group might be
differently distributed, returning the same quantile g from their distributions does
not necessarily yield the same value, see Fig. 9. Thus, through sampling, the
uncertain parameters in G vary together, and their variations are independent of
those of the parameters outside G.
4.2 Uncertainty-Aware Multi-Objective Optimization
Finally, to enable the optimization of system implementations with multiple uncer-
tain objectives, we propose an uncertainty-aware framework in [29]. It extends a
state-of-the-art DSE! [43] and employs a MOEA! as the optimization core. These
techniques introduce dominance criteria to compare different implementations and
select which one to store in an archive and vary for the next iteration.
1Efficient sampling techniques [8] can be used to reduce the number of required samples.

























































Fig. 9 Generating samples for correlated uncertain parameters p1 and p2
To maximizem objectivesO1, . . . , Om, each being a single value, the dominance
of two implementations A and B is defined as follows:
A % B ⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ [1, v] : OA(i) ≥ OB(i) ∧ ∃j ∈ [1, v] : OA(j) > OB(j)
(3)
Here, A % B means “A dominates B” and OA(j) > OB(j) means “A is better
than B in the j -th objective.” Since this dominance criterion compares each of the
m objectives independently, we refer to O(i) as O for brevity.
The proposed uncertainty-aware optimization compares uncertain objectives
using the following three-stage algorithm: (a) If the intervals of O, specified by
the lower bound Ol and upper bound Ou, of two implementations A and B do not
overlap, one is trivially better (>) than the other. (b) If the intervals overlap, we
check if one objective is significantly better with respect to an average criterion,
e. g., mean, mode, or median. (c) If the average criterion does not find a preference,
a spread criterion compares objectives based on their deviation, e. g., standard
deviation, variance, or quantile intervals, and judges whether one is considerably
better. In case none of the three stages determines that one objective is better, the
objectives are considered equal. The flow of this comparison operator is illustrated
in Fig. 10.
To find if one uncertain objective has significantly better average Oavg or
deviation Odev compared to the other, we use two configurable threshold values
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Fig. 10 The flow of the proposed three-stage comparison operator
εavg and εdev, respectively. For the average criterion, a configurable threshold value
εavg determines if the difference of the considered average-case objective values is
significant with respect to the given objective bounds. This enables to control the











Here, εavg = 0 always prefers the objective with better average case, while εavg = 1
renders the average criterion ineffective since the left-hand side of Eq. (4) is always
less than one. Thus, the scope of εavg must be carefully selected based on the
objective’s criticality to guarantee a required precision.
The spread criterion prefers the objective value with smaller deviation and uses
a threshold value εdev to control the sensitivity of the comparison, i. e.,
OdevB −OdevA
OdevA +OdevB
≥ εdev ⇒ OA > OB. (5)
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Given εdev = 0, any small difference between OdevA and OdevB is reckoned,
which can lead to crowding in the solution archive. It causes solution A which is
indeed weakly dominated by another solution B to be regarded as non-dominated
because one of its uncertain objectives has a slightly better deviation than the
corresponding objective of B. On the other hand, the spread criterion becomes
ineffective if εdev = 1 and any significant difference between deviations of two
uncertain objectives would be overlooked. Therefore, the value of εdev must be
carefully selected.
Note that the statistics of an uncertain objective O required in the proposed
comparison operator are calculated using samples from its distribution. Given a set












with Oμ denoting the mean of the distribution of O. Moreover, to find the qth
quantile of this distribution, we use the inverse empirical distribution function which
traverses the samples in the ascending order and returns the very first sample after
the q% smallest samples.
Figure 11 shows the resulting Pareto fronts for optimizing MTTF! and cost
of an H.264 specification using the proposed comparison operator vs. a common
uncertainty-oblivious approach that compares instances of uncertain objectives with
respect to their mean values. The specification incorporates 15 resources, 66 tasks,
and 275 mappings. The proposed operator uses mean and 95% quantile interval
as the average and spread criteria, respectively. Depicted are the mean values,



















Fig. 11 Pareto fronts when optimizing MTTF! and cost of an H.264 encoder/decoder using a
common uncertainty-oblivious approach vs. the proposed comparison operator
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boxes enclosing the uncertainty distributions, and lines connecting the worst cases.
The results show that the proposed comparison operator enables the DSE! to find
implementation candidates of smaller uncertainty, and yet comparable quality in the
average case.
5 Conclusion
Progressive shrinkage in electronic devices has brought them vulnerabilities to
manufacturing tolerances as well as environmental and operational changes. The
induced uncertainty in component reliability might propagate to system level,
which necessitates uncertainty-aware cross-level reliability analysis. This chapter
presents a cross-level reliability analysis methodology that enables handling the
ever increasing analysis complexity of embedded systems under the impact of
different uncertainties. It combines various reliability analysis techniques across
different abstraction levels by introducing mechanisms for (a) the composition
and decomposition of the system during analysis and (b) converting analysis data
over abstraction levels through adapters. It also provides an explicit modeling of
uncertainties and their correlations. The proposed methodology is incorporated
in an automatic reliability analysis tool that enables the evaluation of reliability-
increasing techniques within a DSE! framework. The DSE! employs meta-heuristic
optimization algorithms and is capable of comparing system implementation candi-
dates with objectives regarded as probability distributions.
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1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) has emerged as the principal tool for performing complex
tasks which are impractical (if not impossible) to code by humans. ML techniques
provide machines the capability to learn from experience and thereby learn to
perform complex tasks without much (if any) human intervention. Over the past
decades, many ML algorithms have been proposed. However, Deep Learning (DL),
using Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), has shown state-of-the-art accuracy, even
surpassing human-level accuracy in some cases, for many applications [31]. These
applications include, but are not limited to, object detection and localization, speech
recognition, language translation, and video processing [31].
The state-of-the-art performance of the DL-based methods has also led to the
use of DNNs in complex safety-critical applications, for example, autonomous
driving [11] and smart healthcare [10]. DNNs are intrinsically computationally
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Fig. 1 Overview of different reliability and security vulnerabilities to machine learning-based
systems. (Picture sources: [47, 49])
Fig. 2 Main abstraction
layers of embedded systems
and this chapter’s major
























intensive and also require high memory resources [53]. Current research mainly
focuses on the development of less computationally intensive and resource-efficient
DNNs that can offer high accuracy, and energy and performance efficient DNN
accelerators for ML-based applications [1, 18, 23, 29, 34, 36, 37, 44, 53]. However,
when considered for safety-critical applications, the robustness of these DNN-based
systems to different reliability and security vulnerabilities also becomes one of
the foremost objectives. An overview of different types of vulnerabilities in ML-
based systems is shown in Fig. 1, which are discussed from the architectural- and
application-layer perspective in this chapter. Figure 2 shows the abstraction layers
in the context of the SPP 1500 covered in this chapter.
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Reliability Threats: In hardware design, reliability is the ability of the hardware to
perform as intended for a specified duration, i.e., the lifetime of the hardware. There
are a number of hardware related vulnerabilities that can disrupt the functionality of
a digital system in its lifetime.
1. Soft Errors are transient faults caused by high energy particle strikes. These
faults surface at hardware-layer as bit-flips and can propagate to the application
layer resulting in incorrect output.
2. Aging is the gradual degradation of the hardware due to different physical phe-
nomena like Hot carrier Injection (HCI), Negative-Bias Temperature Instability
(NBTI), and Electromigration (EM). It leads to timing errors and eventually can
also lead to permanent faults [56].
3. Process variations are the imperfections caused by the variations in the fabrica-
tion process of the chips. This can lead to variations in the timing and leakage
power characteristics within a chip as well as across different chips [45].
Apart from the above-listed vulnerabilities, environmental conditions can also
affect the reliability of a system. Such factors include temperature, altitude, high
electric fields, etc.
A number of techniques have been proposed for improving the resilience of the
systems against the reliability threats. However, most of these mitigation techniques
are based on redundancy, for example, DMR: dual modular redundancy [58] and
TMR: triple modular redundancy [35]. The redundancy based approaches, although
considered to be very effective for other application domains [19], are highly
inefficient for DNN-based systems because of the compute intensive nature of
the DNNs [48], and may incur significant area, power/energy, and performance
overheads. Hence, a completely new set of resource-efficient reliability mechanisms
is required for robust machine learning systems. A list of techniques proposed for
improving the reliability of DNN-based systems, which are later discussed in the
following sections of the chapter, are mentioned in Fig. 3.
Security Threats: In system design, security is defined as the property of a system
to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the hardware and the data
while performing the assigned tasks. There are several security vulnerabilities that
can be exploited to perform security attacks.
1. Data Manipulation: The input data or data during inter-/intra-module commu-
nication in a system can be manipulated to perform several security attacks. For
example, in DNNs, the training dataset and the inference data can be manipulated
to perform misclassification or confidence reduction attacks [17, 24, 26, 27, 43,
51].
2. Denial-of-Service: A tiny piece of code/hardware or flooding the communi-
cation channels can be used to trigger the malfunctioning or failure of the
system. For example, in DNNs, adding an extra neuron/set of neurons [17] or
introducing the kill switch in DNN-based hardware can lead to system failure or
malfunctioning, i.e., misclassification.




• Gradient Sign-based Adversarial Aacks [28,25,43]
• Opmizaon-based Adversarial aacks [6,54]
• Backdooring Aacks [15]
• Pruning-based Defenses [15]
• Preprocessing-based Defenses [26,27,3,55] 
• GAN-based Defenses [52,9,63,67]
• Methodology for Building Resilient Hardware [18]
• Error-Resilience Analysis [18,17]
• Fault-Aware Pruning (FAP) [66]
• Fault-Aware Pruning + Training (FAP+T) [66]
• Timing Error-Drop (TE-Drop) [64]
• Stac Voltage Underscaling (ThVolt-Stac) [64]
• Per-layer Voltage Underscaling (ThVolt-Dynamic) [64]
Fig. 3 Overview of the works discussed in this chapter for addressing reliability and security
vulnerabilities of deep learning-based systems
3. Data/IP Stealing: The side-channel information (in hardware, power, timing,
and loopholes or behavior leaking properties of the algorithms) can be exploited
to steal the confidential information. For example, in DNNs, the gradient
information can be used to steal trained model [50, 57, 60].
Several countermeasures have been developed to address these threats, but most of
these defenses are either based on obfuscation or run-time monitoring [3, 22]. These
techniques are very effective for traditional systems, however, DNN-based systems
require different approaches because of their unique security vulnerabilities, i.e.,
training/inference data manipulation. Some of the techniques proposed for address-
ing the security of DNN-based systems are listed in Fig. 3 and are later discussed in
the chapter.
In the following sections, we discuss:
1. A brief overview of DNNs and the hardware accelerators used for efficiently
processing these networks.
2. In Sect. 3, we present our methodology for building reliable systems and discuss
techniques for mitigating permanent and timing errors.
3. The security vulnerabilities in different types of DNNs are discussed in Sect. 4.
4. Open challenges and further research opportunities for building robust systems
for ML-based safety-critical applications
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Deep Neural Networks
A neural network can be described as a network of interconnected neurons. Neurons
are the fundamental computational units in a neural network where each neuron
performs a weighted sum of inputs (dot-product operation), using the inputs and
the weights associated with each input connection of the neuron. Each output
is then (optionally) passed through an activation function which introduces non-
linearity and thereby allows the network to learn complex classification boundaries.

























Fig. 4 Illustration of (a) a multi-layer perceptron and (b) a convolutional layer
In neural networks, neurons are arranged in the form of layers. There are several
types of NNs, for instance, Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), Recurrent
Neural Networks (RNNs), and Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLPs) [31]. Although the
techniques discussed in the following sections are not limited to a specific type
of NNs, in this chapter, we mainly focus on feed-forward neural networks (i.e.,
CNNs and MLPs) because of their widespread use in many artificial intelligence
applications.
AnMLP is a type of NN that is composed of multiple fully-connected layers. In a
fully-connected layer, each neuron is connected to all the neurons in the neighboring
layers. An example illustration of a three layer MLP is shown in Fig. 4a.
A CNN is a type of NN that is composed of several convolutional layers and the
fully-connected layers. An example illustration of a convolutional layer is shown
in Fig. 4b. The layer is composed of multiple filters which are convolved with the
input feature maps to generate the output feature maps. The depth of the filters and
the input feature maps is the same. Each filter results in one output feature map
and, therefore, the number of output feature maps is equal to the number of filters
in a convolutional layer. These input and output feature maps are also referred to as
activation maps. A detailed description of CNNs can be found in [53].
2.2 Hardware Accelerators for Deep Neural Networks
To enable the use of DNNs in energy-/power-constraint scenarios as well as in
high performance applications, several different hardware architectures for DNN
acceleration have been proposed. While all the accelerators provide some unique
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features and support some specific dataflows in a more efficient manner, systolic
array-based designs are considered among the promising ones [18, 23, 37, 61].
A systolic array is a homogeneous network of processing elements (PEs),
which are tightly coupled together. Each PE in the network receives data from its
nearest neighbors, performs some function, and passes on the result and data to
the neighboring PE/s. The systolic array-based architectures alleviate the memory
bottleneck issue by locally reusing the data, without the need of expensive memory
read and write operations. Moreover, the systolic arrays are intrinsically efficient at
performing matrix multiplications, which is the core operation of neural networks.
Therefore, many accelerators use these arrays at their core for accelerating the neural
networks [18, 23, 37, 61]. The Tensor Processing Unit (TPU), a DNN accelerator
that is currently in use in the datacenters of Google, is a systolic array-based
architecture that uses an array of 256× 256 multiply-and-accumulate (MAC) units.
The TPU provides 15 × −30× faster execution, and 30 × −80× more efficient
(in terms of performance/Watt) performance than the K80 GPU and the Haswell
CPU [23].
Figure 5 illustrates a design overview of an exemplar DNN accelerator which is
based on the TPU architecture. The design is used as the basic architecture in the
following section. The architecture is composed of a systolic array of MAC units,
similar to that in the TPU. Prior to the computations, the weights are pre-loaded
in the PEs from the weight memory in a manner that the weights from the same
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Fig. 5 A systolic array-based DNN accelerator architecture (adapted from [65])
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weights are held stationary inside the PEs and the activations are streamed in from
the activation memory. At each clock cycle, the activations are passed-on from left
to right while the partial sums are moved downstream. The activations across rows
are aligned such that the activations corresponding to a particular output reaches a
particular PE at the same instance when its partial sum reaches that PE. In case, the
size of a filter/neuron is larger than the number of rows in the array, each output
computation related to the filter/neuron is divided into multiple portions and the
accumulators at the bottom are used for temporarily holding the partial sums while
rest of the corresponding partial sums are computed by the array. A more detailed
explanation of the architecture can be found in [65].
3 Reliable Deep Learning
In this section, we present our methodology for building reliable hardware for DNN-
based applications. We also highlight a few case studies, targeting different types
of reliability threats, for building reliable yet efficient hardware for DNN-based
applications.
3.1 Our Methodology for Designing Reliable DNN Systems
Figure 6 presents our design flow for developing reliable hardware for DNN-based
applications [17]. The methodology is composed of two parts: (1) Design-time
steps; and (2) Run-time steps.
The design-time steps focus on proposing a hardware architecture which is
capable of mitigating different types of reliability faults that arise due to process
variations and aging, as well as aggressive voltage scaling (i.e., permanent faults
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Fig. 6 Our methodology for designing reliable hardware for DNN-based applications (adapted
from [17])
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and timing errors). Provided a set of design constraints, representative DNN
models, and resilience of the DNNs to different types of reliability threats and
errors, a baseline hardware architecture is designed. We then reinforce it with
different architectural enhancements for mitigating permanent faults (see Sect. 3.3)
and handling timing errors (see Sect. 3.4). The architectural enhancements are
performed in a manner that they do not significantly affect the resource efficiency
of the baseline architecture. Once the architecture is finalized, the hardware is
synthesized using reliability-aware synthesis techniques, for example, by using
standard cells to selectively harden vulnerable nodes in the hardware [33], to harden
the more vulnerable parts of the hardware design.
The run-time steps focus on proposing mapping policies for mapping DNN
computations to the synthesized hardware. The mapping policies are decided
based on the fault maps generated using post-fabrication and testing, and the
error resilience of the DNNs. Techniques like error injection can be used for
the resilience analysis [16, 46]. Fault-aware training of DNNs can also be used
for designing/modifying network architecture/parameters (see Sect. 3.3). Moreover,
adaptive voltage scaling can be employed for trading off reliability with energy
efficiency based on the error resilience of the DNNs. If required, software-level
redundancy can also be employed to further improve the reliability by performing
the computations related to critical neurons/filters multiple times.
3.2 Resilience of DNNs to Reliability Threats
Neural Networks are assumed to be inherently error resilient [12]. However,
different types of errors can have different impact on the output of a DNN. This
section presents the accuracy analysis of DNNs in the presence of different types of
reliability faults.
3.2.1 Resilience of DNNs to Permanent Faults
This section highlights the resilience of DNNs to permanent faults by empirically
analyzing the effects of stuck-at permanent faults in the TPU-based accelerator
(presented in Fig. 5) on the classification accuracy of different DNNs. The datasets
(i.e., MNIST and TIMIT) and the corresponding network architectures used for this
analysis are listed in Table 1. To study the resilience, the TPUwith a systolic array of
256×256 MAC units is synthesized using 45 nm OSU PDK to generate a gate-level
netlist and then stuck-at faults are inserted at internal nodes in the netlist. For this
analysis, faults only in the data-path were considered as the faults in the memory
components can be mitigated using Error Correction Codes (ECC) and faults in
control-path can lead to undesirable results.
Figure 7a shows the impact of using a faulty TPU for two different classification
tasks, i.e., image classification using the MNIST dataset and speech recognition
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Table 1 Datasets and the corresponding 8-bit DNNs used for evaluation (adapted from [65])
Dataset Network architecture Accuracy(%)
MNIST [30] Fully-connected (L1–L4): 784×256×256×256×10 98.15
TIMIT [4] Fully-connected (L1–L4):
1845×2000×2000×2000×183
73.91
ImageNet [7] Convolutional (L1–L2): (224, 224, 3)×(27, 27,
64)×(13, 13, 192)
76.33 (Top-5)
Convolutional (L3–L5): (13, 13, 384)×(13, 13,
256)×(6, 6, 256)
Fully-connected (L6–L8): 4096×4096×1000
Fig. 7 Impact of stuck-at-faults in the baseline TPU-based architecture on DNN applications.
(a) Classification accuracy drop due to stuck-at-fault MACs. (b) Impact of TPU stuck-at-faults
on DNN applications (adapted from [66])
using the TIMIT dataset. It can be seen in the figure that the classification accuracy
of both the tasks decreases significantly with the increase in the number of faulty
PEs in the hardware. For example, the classification accuracy for the TIMIT dataset
drops from 74.13 to 39.69% when only four (out of 256×256) MAC units are faulty
and is almost 0% when the number of faulty MACs increases to 16 or more.
The reason for the significant drop in accuracy can be understood by comparing
the golden (fault-free) output of the neurons of a particular layer with the outputs
computed by the faulty TPU. Figure 7b shows that the computed output of the final
layer of the network used for the TIMIT dataset in most of the cases has higher
activation value as compared to the expected. This is mainly because of the fact
that stuck-at faults, in some of the cases, affect the higher order bits of the MACs
output. This highlights the need for permanent fault mitigation in the hardware to
increase the yield as hardware with permanent faults cannot be used for ML-based
applications, specifically for the safety-critical applications.
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3.2.2 Resilience of DNNs to Timing Faults
Timing failures in high performance nanometer technology-based digital circuits
are a major reliability concern and are caused by various mechanisms, e.g., power
supply disturbance, crosstalk, process variations, as well as aging. Moreover, the
operating conditions, which play a vital role in defining the performance and
energy efficiency of the hardware, also have a significant impact on the frequency
of the timing errors. Although it is assumed that the critical paths, which are
more vulnerable to timing errors, are rarely exercised, the timing errors can
significantly affect the functionality of an application. Here, we highlight this
for DNN-based applications by analyzing the energy-quality trade-off achieved
using voltage underscaling. We show the analysis for two widely accepted types
of timing error mitigation techniques: (1) timing error detection and recovery
(TED) [9]; and (2) timing error propagation (TEP) [41, 62]. The TED makes use of
additional components (e.g., using Razor flip-flops [9]) for detecting timing errors,
and recovers by reliably re-executing the function in case of errors. On the other
hand, TEP allows errors to propagate through to the application layer in the hope
that the application is error resilient.
For this analysis, the TPU-based hardware architecture discussed in Sect. 2.2 is
considered. The architecture is assumed to be composed of a 256×256 MAC array.
The terms Local Timing Error and Global Timing Error are used to characterize
the resilience. The local timing error is used to denote the error in a single MAC
unit. The global timing error defines the error in the complete systolic array. Figure
8b shows the impact on the classification accuracy for the MNIST dataset with
voltage underscaling when the timing errors are allowed to propagate through to
the application layer. It can be seen from the figure that as soon as the timing errors
start occurring, i.e., below the voltage underscaling ratio of r = 0.9 (as shown in
Fig. 8b), the classification accuracy of the DNN for TEP drops sharply.
As mentioned above, the TED-based approaches work on the principle of error
detection and recovery. The recovery phase in TED defines its limitation for huge
systolic array-based systems as, for synchronization of the data flow, the complete
systolic array has to be stalled to recover the error in a single PE. This limitation of
the TED-based approach can be highlighted using Fig. 8a which shows the impact of
voltage underscaling on the overall energy consumption of the TPU-based hardware
architecture for generating accurate outputs. It can be noted from the figure that
the overall energy consumption for a recovery based technique starts increasing as
soon as errors start appearing, which is the case for even the most naive type of
error recovery mechanism, i.e., single cycle recovery.
3.2.3 Resilience of DNNs to Memory Faults
To illustrate the importance of memory faults, we presented an analysis in [17]
where we injected random faults at bit-level in the weight memory (i.e., the memory
storing the network parameters) and studied the impact of those faults on the
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Fig. 8 (a) Timing error probabilities versus voltage underscaling ratio, and the corresponding
energy cost for global TED. (b) DNN accuracy on the MNIST versus voltage underscaling for
TEP. (Adapted from [65])
accuracy of a DNN. The analysis concluded that, for the higher significance bits
of the weights, the accuracy of the DNNs drop sharply with the increase in error
rate. We also studied the impact of different types of bit-flips, i.e., from 0 to 1 bit-
flips and from 1 to 0 bit-flips, and found that the 0 to 1 bit-flips result in erroneous
output while the 1 to 0 bit-flips do not impact the accuracy much. This is inline
with the concept of dropout [20] and dropconnect [59] in the sense that in case of
1 to 0 bit-flips the erroneous output is leaned towards 0 value, whereas in case of 0
to 1 bit-flips the error can increase significantly if the bit-flip occurs in any of the
higher significance bits. This analysis was performed on the AlexNet network using
the ImageNet dataset. Similar, fault injection methods, e.g., [16] and [46], can also
be used for analyzing the resilience of DNNs, as a whole as well as of individual
layers/neurons of the networks.
3.3 Permanent Fault Mitigation
To mitigate permanent faults in the computing units of the hardware, two different
methods have been proposed: (1) Fault-Aware Pruning (FAP); and (2) Fault-Aware
Pruning + Training (FAP+T).
The Fault-Aware Pruning (FAP) works on the principle of pruning the weights
(i.e., setting them to zero) that have to be mapped on faulty MAC units. The
principle is inline with the concepts of dropout [20] and dropconnect [59] which
are commonly used for regularization and avoiding over-fitting. For this work, the
TPU architecture shown in Fig. 5 with static mapping policy is assumed. The static
mapping policy means that each weight is mapped to a specific PE while multiple
weights can be mapped to the same PE at different time instances. Moreover, it is
also assumed that post-fabrication tests are performed on each TPU chip to extract
the fault map which indicates the faulty PEs.
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Fig. 9 Systolic array-based
architecture for permanent




























Figure 9 shows an implementation that can be used to realize the concept where
a bypass path is provided for each MAC unit [66]. The bypass path enables to skip
the contribution of a specific partial sum in case the specific PE is faulty, which is
equivalent to setting the weight to zero. The area overhead of the modified design is
only around 9% [66].
The Fault-Aware Pruning + Training (FAP+T) technique starts with the FAP
approach, however, it additionally retrains the unpruned weights while forcing the
pruned weights to zero to optimize the network parameters. One drawback of this
approach is that the fault map of each chip can be different which means that a
network has to be retained for each chip based on its own fault map.
Figure 10 shows the impact on the classification accuracy versus the percentage
of faulty MAC units for three different classification problems mentioned in
Table 1. The results show that both the techniques show significant resilience to the
permanent faults. Moreover, the FAP+T technique outperforms FAP because of the
involved optimization of the network parameters and allows the DNN-based system
to run with negligible accuracy loss even when 50% of its MAC units are faulty.
However, in cases where FAP+T is impractical FAP can also provide reasonable
accuracy, specifically in cases where the number of faulty units is less.
3.4 Timing Fault Mitigation
As mentioned in Sect. 3.2.2, the conventional TED approaches have significant
overheads when used for DNN accelerators. Here, we discuss the new architectural
innovations proposed in Thundervolt [65] for mitigating timing errors in DNN
accelerators in a performance efficient manner.
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Fig. 10 Classification accuracy versus percentage of faulty MACs using FAP and FAP+T for the
networks used corresponding to (a) MNIST and TIMIT; and (b) ImageNet datasets (adapted from
[66])
Fig. 11 A block-level
diagram illustrating the
architectural modifications
for TE-Drop and the impact
of timing errors on the
























Thundervolt [65] proposed a novel technique to deal with timing errors in a systolic
array-based DNN accelerator, i.e., TE-Drop. TE-Drop utilizes the Razor flip-flops to
detect timing errors, however, it does not re-execute erroneous MAC operations.
Similar to the FAP techniques, TE-Drop also works on the principle that the
contribution of each individual MAC output to the output of a neuron in DNNs is
small. Hence, a few MAC operations can be ignored without significantly affecting
the overall accuracy of the network. In case of a timing error, TE-Drop allows the
MAC unit to sample the correctly computed output to an alternate register operating
on a delayed clock. The succeeding PE is then bypassed and the correctly computed
output is provided instead. The architectural modifications required to realize the
concept are shown in Fig. 11.
Figure 11 illustrates the functionality of the TE-Drop with the help of a timing
diagram. Here, it is assumed that the shadow clock is delayed by 50% of the clock
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Fig. 12 Timing error probabilities for each layer of the networks used corresponding to
(a) MNIST. (b) TIMIT, and (c) ImageNet datasets (adapted from [65])
period. It is assumed that the clock frequency is defined such that the error signal
and correct partial sum from the erroneous MAC become available after this much
duration. Note that the error signal is obtained by OR-ing the bitwise XOR of all the
individual Razor flip-flop at the output of the MAC unit.
3.4.2 Per-Layer Voltage Underscaling
In most of the accelerators, it is assumed that the layers of a DNN are executed in
a serial fashion (i.e., one after the other), where processing of each layer can take
thousands of clock cycles, depending on the size of the layer. Figure 12 shows the
timing error rate versus voltage underscaling ratio plots for each individual layer of
three DNN architectures mentioned in Table 1. It can be seen from the figures that
the error rate varies significantly across layers. Based on this observation, a per-layer
voltage underscaling scheme was proposed in Thundervolt [65] that distributes the
total timing error budget equally among the layers of a network to ensure that the
more sensitive layers should not consume a significant part of the budget and limits
the achievable efficiency gains.
Figure 13 compares two versions of Thundervolt:
1. ThVolt-Static where each voltage underscaling ratio is kept the same throughout
a DNN execution.
2. ThVolt-Dynamic that utilizes per-layer voltage underscaling based on the
sensitivity of each layer.
For the baseline, the results of the TEP scheme are also shown. The plot for
ThVolt-Static is obtained by sweeping voltage underscaling ratios, and that of
ThVolt-Dynamic is obtained by sweeping the total timing error budget. The figures
show that for each case Thundervolt outperforms TEP scheme, and for complex
tasks (e.g., image classification on the ImageNet dataset) the ThVolt-Dynamic
outperforms the ThVolt-Static approach.
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Fig. 13 Accuracy versus energy trade-off using Thundervolt [65] on validation data. (a) MNIST.
(b) TIMIT (c) ImageNet (adapted from [65])
4 Secure Deep Learning
In this section, we present different security attacks on DNNs and potential
countermeasures.
4.1 Security Attacks on DNNs
Several security attacks have been proposed by exploiting the security vulnerabil-
ities, especially data dependency and unpredicted behavior of intermediate layers
of DNN-algorithms during training as well as inference. However, adversarial and
backdooring attacks are some of the most effective and popular attacks for DNNs.
Therefore, in the following subsections, we analyze the state-of-the-art adversarial
attacks and proposed backdoor attacks.
4.1.1 Adversarial Perturbation Attacks
It can be defined as the crafted imperceptible noise to perform targeted or untargeted
misclassification in a DNN-based system. In these attacks, an attacker’s objective
can be summarized as follows: given an image x with a classification label y =
classifier(x), where classifier is the function of the neural network. The attacker aims
to find an image x′ whose classification label is y′, such that y′ = classifier(x′) = y,
and ‖x′ − x‖ ≤ δ, where δ is an upper bound of the distortion from x to x′. For
example, some input adversarial attacks are shown in Fig. 14.
Several attacks have proposed to exploit the adversarial vulnerabilities in DNN-
based systems. However, based on the attack methodology, these attacks can broadly
be categorized into Gradient Sign Methods and Optimization-based approaches.
1. Gradient Sign Methods: These attacks exploit the derivatives and backpropa-
gation algorithm to generate the attack images with imperceptible crafted noise.
The main goal of these attacks is to minimize the prediction probability of the
true label so as to mislead the network to output a different label (can be targeted
or untargeted) other than the ground truth. Some of the most commonly proposed
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Fig. 14 Clean and adversarial images with different prediction labels, where the clean image of
a horse and its adversarial images remain extremely similar, however, their prediction labels are
quite distinct and each targets a totally different class
attacks are Fast Gradient Sign (FGS), Iterative Fast Gradient Sign (IFGS), and
Jacobian-based saliency map attack (JSMA) methods [42]. Based on the similar
principle, there are following attacks which do not require training data and also
have less convergence time (in terms of queries):
• TrISec: This attack exploits the backpropagation algorithm to identify the
small change (attack noise) in input pixels with respect to misclassification
at the output, while ensuring the imperceptibility [25].
• RED-Attack: Most of the state-of-the-art attacks require a large number of
queries to generate an imperceptible attack. However, in resource-constraint
scenarios, these attacks may fail, therefore, we proposed a methodology that
generates an attack image with imperceptible noise while requiring a very less
number of queries [26].
2. Optimization-based Approaches: Unlike the gradient-based approaches, these
attacks redefine the loss function (i.e., the cost function used for optimization) by
adding extra constraints with respect to targeted or untargeted misclassification,
and then propose different optimization algorithms to generate adversarial
images. For example, Limited Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno (L-BFGS)
[54] and Carlini and Wagner (CW) [5] attacks use the box-constrained L-BFGS
algorithm with single and multi-objective optimization, respectively.
Other types of neural networks, i.e., Capsule Networks and Spiking Neural Net-
works, are emerging as an alternative because of their robustness to affine transfor-
mations and potential for offering higher energy efficiency, respectively. However,
recent works showed that these networks are also vulnerable to adversarial attacks
[38, 39].
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4.1.2 Backdoor Attacks
Due to expensive and computationally intensive training, the training (or fine-
tuning) of DNNs is usually outsourced which opens the new frontiers of security
threats, e.g., backdoored neural networks (BadNets [14]). These threats arise
due to the involvement of untrusted third party service providers that can insert
backdoors by training the ML models on compromised training data, or by altering
the DNN structure. The untrusted third party also ensures the required accuracy
of the backdoored model on most validation and testing inputs, but cause targeted
misclassification or confidence reduction based on backdoor trigger. For example,
in case of autonomous driving use case, an attacker can introduce the backdoor
in a street sign detector while ensuring the required accuracy for classifying street
signs in most of the cases, however, it can perform either targeted or untargeted
misclassification, i.e., classifies stop signs with a particular sticker as speed limit
signs or any other sign different from stop sign. This kind of misclassification
can lead to catastrophic effects, e.g., in case of misclassification of a stop sign,
autonomous vehicle does not stop at the intersection which can result in an accident.
4.2 Defences Against Security Attacks on DNNs
Several countermeasures have been proposed to defend against the adversarial
attacks, i.e., DNN masking, gradient masking, training for known adversarial
attacks, and pre-processing of the CNN inputs [6]. For examples, Fig. 15 shows
L-BFGS FGSM BIM
99.47%Classify as Stop Sign with Confidence 99.47% 99.47%
85.68%Classify as Speed limit60km/h with Confidence 75.68% 89.68%
72.74%Classify as Stop Sign with Confidence 78.45% 70.39%
78.64%Classify as Speed limit60km/h with Confidence 68.45% 85.64%
Classification of the Original
samples
Classification the perturbed 
samples
Classification of the perturbed 
samples after filtering
Classification of the perturbed 
samples with filtering effects
Input Label = Stop





(a) Attack Model I: An attacker can directly perturb the




Input Label = Stop






(b) Attack Model II: An attacker have access to the input of 
the pre-processing noise filter.
DNN
Integrated IP
Fig. 15 Impact of the pre-processing filtering on the state-of-the-art adversarial attacks with
different attack models with and without the access of filters. (a) Attack model I: an attacker can
directly perturb the pre-processed data and does not have input of the pre-processing noise filter.
(b) Attack model II: an attacker have access to the input of the pre-processing noise filter (adapted
from [24, 27])
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that low-pass pre-processing filters that can nullify the adversarial attacks if they
are not known to the attacker [24, 27]. Therefore, based on this analysis, we have
proposed to utilize the pre-processing quantization to improve the perceptibility of
the attack noise [2]. Similarly, Sobel-filers can also be used to decrease the attack
strength [55].
However, these defences are not applicable to backdoor-based attacks because
the backdoor attacks intrude the networks and are activated through a specific
trigger. Therefore, to address these attacks, we propose to use pruning as a natural
defense because it eliminates the neurons that are dormant on clean inputs, conse-
quently disabling backdoor behavior [14]. Although these defenses are effective,
most of them provide defense against known adversarial and backdoor attacks.
Therefore, one of the most important problems in designing secure machine learning
systems is the ability to define threats, and model them sufficiently so that any
learning system can be trained to be able to identify such threats.
4.2.1 Generative Adversarial Networks
To address the above-mentioned challenge, Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs) have emerged as one of the prime solutions because of their ability to
generate the model by learning to mimic actual models [13]. In particular, GANs
is a framework to estimate generative models where simultaneously two models
are trained, generator (G) and discriminator (D) (see Fig. 16). This is achieved
through an adversarial process where the two models are competing with each other
for achieving two opposite goals. Simply speaking, D is trying to distinguish real
images from fake images and G is trying to create images as close as possible to
real images so as D will not be able to distinguish them, as illustrated in Fig. 16.
When dealing with inference scenarios, the challenge is to provide a training set
which includes attack-generated data patterns labeled of course correctly as attacks.
For example, an autonomous system may rely on visual information to orient and
steer itself or to undertake significant decisions. However, white or patterned noise
can be maliciously inserted into a camera feed that may fool the system, and thus
results in potentially catastrophic scenarios. The problem with modeling these types












Fig. 16 GANs framework: an illustration of how G and D are trained, adapted from [21]
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hard, if not impossible, to replicate and therefore, train the system to recognize them
as attacks. Hence, GANs provide us with this capability, as we can utilize the G
model to generate-and-evaluate threat models and train the D model to differentiate
between what we consider an attack or not. However, GAN-based threat comes
with the following challenges [21, 40]:
1. Collapsing: In this case G produces only a single sample or set of similar
samples, regardless the type of input given to it.
2. Convergence: Since G and D models are competing towards achieving two
opposite goals, this may make the model parameters to oscillate, destabilizing
the training process.
3. Gradient Vanish: If one of the two models becomes more powerful than the
other, the learning signal is becoming useless, making the system incapable to
learn.
4. Over-Fitting: This is typically due to the unbalance optimization of G and the
D models, e.g., if too much time is spent on minimizing G, then D will most
likely collapse to a few states.
5. Sensitive: It is characterized by being highly sensitive to the selection of the
hyperparameters, i.e., learning rate, momentum, etc.; making the training process
much more tedious.
4.2.2 Case Study: Noisy Visual Data, and How GANs Can be Used to
Remove Noise and Provide Robustness
To illustrate how a GAN-based framework can be used to define threats and
subsequently to provide robustness in a DNN-based system, we use computer vision
as an example because security threats in computer vision applications may arise
from either physical attacks, cyber attacks or a combination of both. We use the
hazing in images to model such threats. To remove this threat, we use the GANs
because of their capability in preserving fine details in images and producing results
that look perceptually convincing [28]. The goal is to translate the input image with
haze, into a haze-free output image. In this case, the noise distribution z is the noisy
image, and it is given as input to the GANs, i.e., haze input image. Afterwards, a
new sample image F is generated by G. D will receive as input the generated image
F and the ground truth haze-free image, to be trained to distinguish between real
and artificially generated images (see Fig. 17).
This approach has recently been used for haze removal [8, 52, 63]. These methods
mainly differ from each other, based on the utilized deep learning structure for G
and D, i.e., using three types of G to solve the optimization of the haze removal
problem [63], using the concept of cycle GAN introduced in [67]. Also they may
differ for the type of loss function used for the training process, where the overall
objective functions is constrained to preserve certain features or priors. However,
they provide a solution that, in most of the cases, is capable to improve the quality
performances of the state-of-the-art haze removal methods for single image, so as
making this quite a promising area.
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Fig. 17 Example of GANs used for removing haze noise from a single image. The haze image is
input to G that generate an output image F and D receives as input both the generated image F
and the free-haze image. Input images taken from [32]
5 Open Research Challenges
Machine learning has paved its way to a majority of the fields that involve data
processing. However, regardless of all the work which has been carried out in
interpreting the neural networks and making the ML-based systems reliable, there
are still quite some challenges which are to be addressed before ML algorithms
(specifically, DNNs) can be widely accepted for complex safety-critical applica-
tions. Following is a list of a few of the main challenges in this direction.
• Error-Resilience Evaluation Frameworks: One approach towards this for
timing error estimation is proposed in [64]. However, more sophisticated frame-
works are required to study the impact of multiple types of reliability threats and
their interdependence in a time efficient manner.
• Methodologies for Designing Robust and Resource-Efficient DNNs: Retrain-
ing a DNN in the presence of hardware-induced faults [15] can improve their
resilience. However, there is a need to investigate the types of DNN architectures
which are inherently resilient to most (if not all) of the reliability threats.
Furthermore, there is a need to investigate frameworks to develop robust ML
systems by synergistically investigating reliability and security vulnerabilities.
• Reliable and Resource-Efficient Hardware Architectures: With all the secu-
rity and reliability challenges highlighted in the chapter, there is a dire need to
re-think the way current DNN hardware is designed, such that the vulnerabilities
that cannot be addressed at the software-level have to be addressed through a
robust DNN hardware.
• Interpretability of Deep Neural Networks: Developing interpretable DNNs
is a challenge, however, it has to be addressed in order to better understand
the functionality of the DNNs. This will help us in improving the learning
capabilities of the DNNs, as well as in uncovering their true vulnerabilities and
thereby will help is developing more efficient and robust network architectures.
• Practicality of the Attacks: With the ongoing pace of the research in ML, new
methods and types of network architectures are surfacing, e.g., CapsuleNets.
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Also, the focus of the community is shifting more towards semi-/un-supervised
learning methods as they overcome the need for large labeled datasets. Therefore,
there is a dire need to align the focus with the current trends in the ML
community. Also, the attacks should be designed considering the constraints of
the real systems, i.e., without making unrealistic assumptions about the number
of queries and the energy/power resources available to generate an attack. An
early work in this direction by our group can be found at [26].
Acknowledgments This work was supported in parts by the German Research Foundation
(DFG) as part of the priority program “Dependable Embedded Systems” (SPP 1500—
spp1500.itec.kit.edu) and in parts by the National Science Foundation under Grant 1801495.
References
1. Ahmad, H., Tanvir, M., Abdullah, M., Javed, M.U., Hafiz, R., Shafique, M.: Systimator: a
design space exploration methodology for systolic array based CNNs acceleration on the
FPGA-based edge nodes (2018). arXiv:1901.04986
2. Ali, H., Tariq, H., Hanif, M.A., Khalid, F., Rehman, S., Ahmed, R., Shafique, M.: QuSecNets:
quantization-based defense mechanism for securing deep neural network against adversarial
attacks (2018). arXiv:1811.01437
3. Athalye, A., Carlini, N., Wagner, D.: Obfuscated gradients give a false sense of security:
circumventing defenses to adversarial examples (2018). arXiv:1802.00420
4. Ba, J., Caruana, R.: Do deep nets really need to be deep? In: Ghahramani, Z., Welling,
M., Cortes, C., Lawrence, N.D., Weinberger, K.Q. (eds.) Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, vol. 27, pp. 2654–2662. Curran Associates, New York (2014). http://
papers.nips.cc/paper/5484-do-deep-nets-really-need-to-be-deep.pdf
5. Carlini, N., Wagner, D.: Towards evaluating the robustness of neural networks (2016).
arXiv:1608.04644
6. Chakraborty, A., Alam, M., Dey, V., Chattopadhyay, A., Mukhopadhyay, D.: Adversarial
attacks and defences: a survey (2018). arXiv:1810.00069
7. Deng, J., Dong, W., Socher, R., Li, L.: ImageNet: a large-scale hierarchical image database.
In: 2009 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pp. 248–255 (2009).
https://doi.org/10.1109/CVPR.2009.5206848
8. Engin, D., Genç, A., Ekenel, H.K.: Cycle-Dehaze: enhanced cycleGAN for single image
dehazing. In: 2018 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops,
CVPRWorkshops 2018, Salt Lake City, June 18–22, 2018, pp. 825–833 (2018). https://doi.org/
10.1109/CVPRW.2018.00127. http://openaccess.thecvf.com/content_cvpr_2018_workshops/
w13/html/Engin_Cycle-Dehaze_Enhanced_CycleGAN_CVPR_2018_paper.html
9. Ernst, D., Das, S., Lee, S., Blaauw, D., Austin, T., Mudge, T., Kim, N.S., Flautner, K.: Razor:
circuit-level correction of timing errors for low-power operation. IEEE Micro 24(6), 10–20
(2004)
10. Esteva, A., Robicquet, A., Ramsundar, B., Kuleshov, V., DePristo, M., Chou, K., Cui, C.,
Corrado, G., Thrun, S., Dean, J.: A guide to deep learning in healthcare. Nat. Med. 25(1),
24 (2019)
11. Fink, M., Liu, Y., Engstle, A., Schneider, S.A.: Deep learning-based multi-scale multi-object
detection and classification for autonomous driving. In: Fahrerassistenzsysteme 2018, pp. 233–
242. Springer, Berlin (2019)
500 M. A. Hanif et al.
12. Gebregiorgis, A., Kiamehr, S., Tahoori, M.B.: Error propagation aware timing relaxation for
approximate near threshold computing. In: Proceedings of the 54th Annual Design Automation
Conference 2017, p. 77. ACM, New York (2017)
13. Goodfellow, I.J., Pouget-Abadie, J., Mirza, M., Xu, B., Warde-Farley, D., Ozair, S., Courville,
A., Bengio, Y.: Generative adversarial nets. In: Proceedings of the 27th International Confer-
ence on Neural Information Processing Systems - Volume 2, NIPS’14, pp. 2672–2680. MIT
Press, Cambridge (2014). http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2969033.2969125
14. Gu, T., Dolan-Gavitt, B., Garg, S.: BadNets: identifying vulnerabilities in the machine learning
model supply chain (2017). arXiv:1708.06733
15. Hacene, G.B., Leduc-Primeau, F., Soussia, A.B., Gripon, V., Gagnon, F.: Training modern
deep neural networks for memory-fault robustness. In: 2019 IEEE International Symposium
on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), pp. 1–5. IEEE, Piscataway (2019)
16. Hanif, M.A., Hafiz, R., Shafique, M.: Error resilience analysis for systematically employing
approximate computing in convolutional neural networks. In: 2018 Design, Automation and
Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition (DATE), pp. 913–916. IEEE, Piscataway (2018)
17. Hanif, M.A., Khalid, F., Putra, R.V.W., Rehman, S., Shafique, M.: Robust machine learning
systems: reliability and security for deep neural networks. In: 2018 IEEE 24th International
Symposium on On-Line Testing and Robust System Design (IOLTS), pp. 257–260. IEEE,
Piscataway (2018)
18. Hanif, M.A., Putra, R.V.W., Tanvir, M., Hafiz, R., Rehman, S., Shafique, M.: MPNA: a
massively-parallel neural array accelerator with dataflow optimization for convolutional neural
networks (2018). arXiv:1810.12910
19. Henkel, J., Bauer, L., Dutt, N., Gupta, P., Nassif, S., Shafique, M., Tahoori, M., Wehn, N.:
Reliable on-chip systems in the nano-era: lessons learnt and future trends. In: Proceedings of
the 50th Annual Design Automation Conference, p. 99. ACM, New York (2013)
20. Hinton, G.E., Srivastava, N., Krizhevsky, A., Sutskever, I., Salakhutdinov, R.R.: Improving
neural networks by preventing co-adaptation of feature detectors (2012). arXiv:1207.0580
21. Hui, J.: Gan why it is so hard to train generative adversarial networks! Elsevier, Amster-
dam (2018). https://medium.com/@jonathan_hui/gan-why-it-is-so-hard-to-train-generative-
advisory-networks-819a86b3750b
22. Jia, J., Gong, N.Z.: Attriguard: a practical defense against attribute inference attacks via
adversarial machine learning. In: 27th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security
18), pp. 513–529 (2018)
23. Jouppi, N.P., Young, C., Patil, N., Patterson, D., Agrawal, G., Bajwa, R., Bates, S., Bhatia,
S., Boden, N., Borchers, A., et al.: In-datacenter performance analysis of a tensor processing
unit. In: 2017 ACM/IEEE 44th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture
(ISCA), pp. 1–12. IEEE, Piscataway (2017)
24. Khalid, F., Hanif, M.A., Rehman, S., Qadir, J., Shafique, M.: Fademl: understanding the impact
of pre-processing noise filtering on adversarial machine learning (2018). arXiv:1811.01444
25. Khalid, F., Hanif, M.A., Rehman, S., Shafique, M.: ISA4ML: training data-unaware imper-
ceptible security attacks on machine learning modules of autonomous vehicles (2018).
arXiv:1811.01031
26. Khalid, F., Ali, H., Hanif, M.A., Rehman, S., Ahmed, R., Shafique, M.: Red-attack: resource
efficient decision based attack for machine learning (2019). arXiv:1901.10258
27. Khalid, F., Hanif, M.A., Rehman, S., Qadir, J., Shafique, M.: FAdeML: understanding
the impact of pre-processing noise filtering on adversarial machine learning. In: Design,
Automation and Test in Europe. IEEE, Piscataway (2019)
28. Kupyn, O., Budzan, V., Mykhailych, M., Mishkin, D., Matas, J.: Deblurgan: blind motion
deblurring using conditional adversarial networks. In: Proceedings of IEEE/CVF Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) (2018)
29. Kwon, H., Samajdar, A., Krishna, T.: MAERI: enabling flexible dataflow mapping over
DNN accelerators via reconfigurable interconnects. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Third
International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating
Systems, pp. 461–475. ACM, New York (2018)
Robust Computing for Machine Learning-Based Systems 501
30. LeCun, Y., Bottou, L., Bengio, Y., Haffner, P.: Gradient-based learning applied to document
recognition. Proc. IEEE 86(11), 2278–2324 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1109/5.726791
31. LeCun, Y., Bengio, Y., Hinton, G.: Deep learning. Nature 521(7553), 436 (2015)
32. Li, B., Ren, W., Fu, D., Tao, D., Feng, D., Zeng, W., Wang, Z.: Benchmarking single-image
dehazing and beyond. IEEE Trans. Image Process. 28(1), 492–505 (2019)
33. Limbrick, D.B., Mahatme, N.N., Robinson, W.H., Bhuva, B.L.: Reliability-aware synthesis
of combinational logic with minimal performance penalty. IEEE Trans. Nuclear Sci. 60(4),
2776–2781 (2013)
34. Lu, W., Yan, G., Li, J., Gong, S., Han, Y., Li, X.: FlexFlow: a flexible dataflow accelerator
architecture for convolutional neural networks. In: 2017 IEEE International Symposium on
High Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA), pp. 553–564. IEEE, Piscataway (2017)
35. Lyons, R.E., Vanderkulk, W.: The use of triple-modular redundancy to improve computer
reliability. IBM J. Res. Development 6(2), 200–209 (1962)
36. Marchisio, A., Shafique, M.: Capstore: energy-efficient design and management of the on-chip
memory for CapsuleNet inference accelerators (2019). arXiv:1902.01151
37. Marchisio, A., Hanif, M.A., Shafique, M.: CapsAcc: an efficient hardware accelerator for
CapsuleNets with data reuse (2018). arXiv:1811.08932
38. Marchisio, A., Nanfa, G., Khalid, F., Hanif, M.A., Martina, M., Shafique, M.: Capsattacks:
robust and imperceptible adversarial attacks on capsule networks (2019). arXiv:1901.09878
39. Marchisio, A., Nanfa, G., Khalid, F., Hanif, M.A., Martina, M., Shafique, M.: SNN
under attack: are spiking deep belief networks vulnerable to adversarial examples? (2019).
arXiv:1902.01147
40. Metz, L., Poole, B., Pfau, D., Sohl-Dickstein, J.: Unrolled generative adversarial networks. In:
Proceedings of the International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR’17) (2017)
41. Nakhaee, F., Kamal, M., Afzali-Kusha, A., Pedram, M., Fakhraie, S.M. Dorosti, H.: Lifetime
improvement by exploiting aggressive voltage scaling during runtime of error-resilient appli-
cations. Integr. VLSI J. 61, 29–38 (2018)
42. Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Jha, S., Fredrikson, M., Celik, Z.B., Swami, A.: The limitations
of deep learning in adversarial settings. In: 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and
Privacy (EuroS&P), pp. 372–387. IEEE, Piscataway (2016)
43. Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Goodfellow, I., Jha, S., Celik, Z.B., Swami, A.: Practical black-
box attacks against machine learning. In: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 506–519. ACM, New York (2017)
44. Putra, R.V.W., Hanif, M.A., Shafique, M.: ROMANet: fine-grained reuse-driven data organi-
zation and off-chip memory access management for deep neural network accelerators (2019).
arXiv:1902.10222
45. Raghunathan, B., Turakhia, Y., Garg, S., Marculescu, D.: Cherry-picking: exploiting process
variations in dark-silicon homogeneous chip multi-processors. In: 2013 Design, Automation
and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition (DATE), pp. 39–44. IEEE, Piscataway (2013)
46. Reagen, B., Gupta, U., Pentecost, L., Whatmough, P., Lee, S.K., Mulholland, N., Brooks, D.,
Wei, G.Y.: Ares: a framework for quantifying the resilience of deep neural networks. In: 2018
55th ACM/ESDA/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC), pp. 1–6. IEEE, Piscataway
(2018)
47. Rehman, S., Shafique, M., Henkel, J.: Reliable Software for Unreliable Hardware: A Cross
Layer Perspective. Springer, Berlin (2016)
48. Schorn, C., Guntoro, A., Ascheid, G.: Efficient on-line error detection and mitigation for deep
neural network accelerators. In: International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and
Security, pp. 205–219. Springer, Berlin (2018)
49. Shafique, M., Garg, S., Henkel, J., Marculescu, D.: The EDA challenges in the dark silicon era:
temperature, reliability, and variability perspectives. In: Proceedings of the 51st Annual Design
Automation Conference, pp. 1–6. ACM, New York (2014)
50. Shokri, R., Stronati, M., Song, C., Shmatikov, V.: Membership inference attacks against
machine learning models. In: 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pp. 3–18.
IEEE, Piscataway (2017)
502 M. A. Hanif et al.
51. Suciu, O., Marginean, R., Kaya, Y., Daume III, H., Dumitras, T.: When does machine learning
{FAIL}? Generalized transferability for evasion and poisoning attacks. In: 27th {USENIX}
Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security’18), pp. 1299–1316 (2018)
52. Swami, K., Das, S.K.: Candy: conditional adversarial networks based fully end-to-end system
for single image haze removal (2018). https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.02892v2
53. Sze, V., Chen, Y.H., Yang, T.J., Emer, J.S.: Efficient processing of deep neural networks: a
tutorial and survey. Proc. IEEE 105(12), 2295–2329 (2017)
54. Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan, D., Goodfellow, I., Fergus, R.:
Intriguing properties of neural networks (2013). arXiv:1312.6199
55. Tariq, H., Ali, H., Hanif, M.A., Khalid, F., Rehman, S., Ahmed, R., Shafique, M.: SSCNets: a
selective sobel convolution-based technique to enhance the robustness of deep neural networks
against security attacks (2018). arXiv:1811.01443
56. Tiwari, A., Torrellas, J.: Facelift: hiding and slowing down aging in multicores. In: Proceedings
of the 41st Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture, pp. 129–140.
IEEE Computer Society, Washington (2008)
57. Tramèr, F., Zhang, F., Juels, A., Reiter, M.K., Ristenpart, T.: Stealing machine learning models
via prediction APIs. In: 25th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security’16), pp.
601–618 (2016)
58. Vadlamani, R., Zhao, J., Burleson, W., Tessier, R.: Multicore soft error rate stabilization using
adaptive dual modular redundancy. In: Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation
and Test in Europe, pp. 27–32. European Design and Automation Association, Leuven (2010)
59. Wan, L., Zeiler, M., Zhang, S., Le Cun, Y., Fergus, R.: Regularization of neural networks using
dropconnect. In: International Conference on Machine Learning, pp. 1058–1066 (2013)
60. Wang, B., Gong, N.Z.: Stealing hyperparameters in machine learning. In: 2018 IEEE Sympo-
sium on Security and Privacy (SP), pp. 36–52. IEEE, Piscataway (2018)
61. Wei, X., Yu, C.H., Zhang, P., Chen, Y., Wang, Y., Hu, H., Liang, Y., Cong, J.: Automated
systolic array architecture synthesis for high throughput CNN inference on FPGAs. In:
Proceedings of the 54th Annual Design Automation Conference 2017, p. 29. ACM, New York
(2017)
62. Whatmough, P.N., Das, S., Bull, D.M., Darwazeh, I.: Circuit-level timing error tolerance for
low-power DSP filters and transforms. IEEE Trans. Very Large Scale Integration Syst. 21(6),
989–999 (2013)
63. Yang, X., Xu, Z., Luo, J.: Towards perceptual image dehazing by physics-based disentangle-
ment and adversarial training. In: Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI) (2018)
64. Zhang, J.J., Garg, S.: Fate: fast and accurate timing error prediction framework for low power
DNN accelerator design. In: Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided
Design, p. 24. ACM, New York (2018)
65. Zhang, J., Rangineni, K., Ghodsi, Z., Garg, S.: ThUnderVolt: enabling aggressive voltage
underscaling and timing error resilience for energy efficient deep neural network accelerators
(2018). arXiv:1802.03806
66. Zhang, J.J., Gu, T., Basu, K., Garg, S.: Analyzing and mitigating the impact of permanent faults
on a systolic array based neural network accelerator. In: 2018 IEEE 36th VLSI Test Symposium
(VTS), pp. 1–6. IEEE, Piscataway (2018)
67. Zhu, J., Park, T., Isola, P., Efros, A.A.: Unpaired image-to-image translation using cycle-
consistent adversarial networks. In: 2017 IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision
(ICCV), pp. 2242–2251 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCV.2017.244
Robust Computing for Machine Learning-Based Systems 503
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution, and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Exploiting Memory Resilience
for Emerging Technologies: An
Energy-Aware Resilience Exemplar
for STT-RAM Memories
Amir Mahdi Hosseini Monazzah, Amir M. Rahmani, Antonio Miele,
and Nikil Dutt
1 Introduction
In the recent years, the aggressive progress in technology scaling has allowed
to integrate a larger number of processing cores in the same chip thus leading
to the fabrication of multicore and manycore devices. To efficiently exploit such
processing power, it is imperative to proportionally increase the performance and
bandwidth of the on-chip cache memory sub-system.
Unfortunately, the commonly-used static RAM (SRAM) technology imposes
fundamental limitations for the quest of high memory performance in the next
generation computing systems. Indeed, the low density of SRAM cells forces to
dedicate approximately 60% of the area of today’s chips to the cache memo-
ries [7, 19]. Moreover, SRAM memories present a considerably high leakage power
consumption becoming a considerable issue with the continuous technology scaling
A. M. H. Monazzah ()
Iran University of Science and Technology (IUST), Tehran, Iran
Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Tehran, Iran
e-mail: monazzah@iust.ac.ir
A. M. Rahmani
University of California, Irvine (UCI), Irvine, CA, USA
e-mail: a.rahmani@uci.edu
Institute of Computer Technology, TU Wien, Austria
e-mail: antonio.miele@polimi.it
A. Miele
Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy
e-mail: dutt@uci.edu
N. Dutt
University of California, Irvine (UCI), Irvine, CA, USA
© The Author(s) 2021
J. Henkel, N. Dutt (eds.), Dependable Embedded Systems, Embedded Systems,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52017-5_21
505
506 A. M. H. Monazzah et al.
beyond 40 nm leading to the leakage power to contribute up to 80% of the overall
energy consumption of the cache memories [7].
For these reasons, a recent trend is to consider Non-Volatile Memory (NVM)
technologies, such as Phase Change Memory (PCM), Resistive RAM (ReRAM),
Ferroelectric RAM (FeRAM), and Spin Transfer Torque Magnetic RAM (STT-
MRAM or STT-RAM) as alternative solutions to SRAMs in multicore and many-
core chips [23]. Among them, various studies [2, 3, 11, 17, 20] have observed that
STT-RAM represents the most promising technology for on-chip cache memories.
In particular, STT-RAM allows to increase the memory size, thanks to its higher
density, and outperforms the SRAM counterpart in terms of energy consumption. In
fact, since STT-RAM is a non-volatile technology, its leakage power consumption
is negligible.
Unfortunately, STT-RAM technology suffers from a different set of reliability
issues that has to be carefully addressed in order to realize its deployment in
commercial products. STT-RAMs present a high susceptibility to failure both during
write/read operations and in idle status [2, 23]. More precisely, the memory cell
may suffer from retention errors, which are caused by thermal noises that lead to
an unintentional bit flip of the value stored in an idle cell. Moreover, during read
operations, it may occur that the cell content incorrectly flips leading to the so-
called read disturbance, or the returned value has an undistinguished state, dubbed
as false read. Finally, also the write operation may suffer from write errors, which
are caused by thermal fluctuations in the magnetization process that lead to storing
a wrong value in the cell w.r.t. the one in the input. Among these reliability threats,
write errors impose the most challenging issue [2, 7].
A circuit-level strategy to eliminate write errors is to increase the current
(voltage) applied during the write operation [23]. However, it mainly leads to
higher energy consumption, and secondarily to a higher probability of permanent
failures of the device. Indeed, higher current implies an increase in the temperature
and in turn to an increase in the probability of junction barrier breakdown [7].
An alternative design strategy is the use of Error Correction Codes (ECCs) to
harden the architecture of the cache memory [1]. However, if it is applied in a
naive way, it may result in a significant area overhead. For instance, when Bose–
Chaudhuri–Hocquenghem (BCH) 7 ECC is employed, such overhead can be as
high as 15% of the data block area [2]. Such additional area causes a significant
energy overhead. Given such rationale, several studies [2, 3, 6, 7, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24]
have individually investigated these techniques and proposed strategies to improve
their effectiveness. Given this background, we believe that there is an opportunity
for a larger improvement of these hardening schemes by holistically amalgamating
these two techniques. Moreover, an opportunistic integration and tuning of these
two techniques can also lead to a considerable improvement in energy consumption
of the cache memory architecture while at the same time guaranteeing the error rate
threshold.
This chapter proposes FlexRel, a reliability improvement technique which
utilizes the STT-RAM write current as an actuation knob and multi-level ECC
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Fig. 1 Positioning of the
proposed approach in the
overall cross-layer vision of
the book
protection scheme to conduct an optimal trade-off between reliability and energy
consumption in STT-RAM cache memories. Targeting an overall block write error
rate threshold that should be guaranteed in applications running on a platform,
FlexRel proposes a cache way partitioning scheme that utilizes different combi-
nations of write currents and ECC protection codes in each partition to satisfy
that threshold. Then, during the run-time of applications, the FlexRel controller
redirects the more vulnerable blocks to more robust partitions to keep the write
error rate below the write error threshold. Within the overall cross-layer vision of
the book, the main contribution of this chapter can be primarily classified as an
architecture-to-application cross-layer approach, also using gate/circuit-level actua-
tion, as illustrated in Fig. 1. In fact, this approach exploits application-level profiled
information as an input to an architecture-level memory hardening technique based
on ECC while using current tuning at circuit-level, with the final goal of optimizing
energy consumption and application reliability.
We evaluate FlexRel using gem5 simulator [4] running SPEC CPU2006 [9]
workloads. We compare the efficiency of FlexRel against an optimized uniform pro-
tection (OUP) scheme from reliability, energy, area, and performance perspectives.
The simulation results show that, while FlexRel meets the write error rate threshold,
it outperforms OUP scheme in terms of energy and area by up to 13.2 and 7.9%,
respectively. Furthermore, The restriction of write traffics to specific partitions in
FlexRel incurs only a 1.7% performance overhead to the system, on average.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the necessary
background presenting the basic architecture of a STT-RAM cell and the energy/er-
ror rate issues of this technology. Section 3 briefly surveys the previous approaches
for hardening STT-RAMs highlighting the adopted strategies and differentiating
them from the proposed approach. Section 4 is the core of this chapter and presents
our proposed FlexRel approach, consisting of an enhanced memory architecture
capable of trading off reliability and energy consumption. The proposed solution has
been experimentally validated and results are discussed in Sect. 5. Finally, Sect. 6
draws conclusions.
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2 STT-RAMs and Their Energy-Reliability Challenges
This section introduces the basics of STT-RAM technology, its architecture and
how read/write operations are performed. The second part of the section focuses on
energy vs. write error issues in this type of memory. This discussion represents the
preliminaries for the proposed energy-aware error-tolerant scheme for STT-RAM.
2.1 Basic Architecture of STT-RAM
Figure 2 shows the basic cell structure of a STT-RAM, called 1 Transistor 1
Magnitude Tunnel Junction (MTJ), shortly 1T-1J. The cell is constructed from an
MTJ element and an access NMOS transistor. MTJ itself includes three layers which
are a MgO-based barrier (called tunneling oxide barrier), a ferromagnetic layer with
fixed magnetic field direction (called reference layer), and a ferromagnetic layer
with free magnetic field direction (called free layer). The MgO-based barrier layer
is sandwiched between two ferromagnetic layers. STT-RAM works based on the
relative magnetic field direction of the free layer and the reference layer (parallel
or anti-parallel states). As shown in the figure, the parallel state will represent a
logic value ”0” while the anti-parallel one a logic value ”1.” The different relative
ferromagnetic field directions lead to different resistances in MTJ, i.e. RHigh and
RLow (RH and RL) [5]. In the following, we explore the read and write operation
mechanisms in a STT-RAM cell.
The read operation in a STT-RAM cell is initiated by setting the word line (WL
in the figure) to turn on the access NMOS transistor. Then, a small read current IR
(or read voltage, VR) is applied to the MTJ from the source line (SL in the figure)


















Fig. 2 A typical STT-RAM cell structure: on the left side, a parallel magnetic field direction
represents a logic value 0, while on the right side, an anti-parallel magnetic field direction a logic
value “1”
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sensed on the bit line (BL in the figure). Based on the sensed values of current or
voltage in the BL during the read operations,the resistance of MTJ is determined as
high (RH ) or low (RL). The STT-RAM cell value is determined by calculating the
Tunneling Magneto Resistance (TMR), a ratio parameter defined as
TMR = (RH − RL)
RL
(1)
The parallel (anti-parallel) state of MTJ leads to low (high) resistance of MTJ,
calculated by means of the following equations:
VBLL = IR × (RL + RNMOS) (2)
VBLH = IR × (RH + RNMOS) (3)
If the sense amplifier which calculates the voltage (current) of bit line decides the
sensed voltage is the same as VBLL , the MTJ value is logically “0,” otherwise, if the
sensed voltage is the same as VBLH , MTJ value is logically “1.”
To perform a write operation and modify the value stored in MTJ, we need to
change the magnetic field direction of MTJ free layer. By changing the magnetic
field direction of the free layer, the resistance of MTJ will change [5, 10]. To this
end, again the access transistor should be turned on by setting the word line. Then,
a write current is applied from the source line to the baseline or vice versa. The
direction of applied write current determines the magnetic field direction of the free
layer. By applying the write pulse to the MTJ, when the amount of spin polarized
current exceeds a threshold value, the magnetic field direction of the free layer flips.
2.2 Error Rate vs. Energy Consumption Trade-Off
One of the main issues in STT-RAM is its stochastic switching nature caused by
the effects of thermal fluctuations. Among the side-effects of stochastic switching,
write failure is the most important reliability challenge [2, 7]. More precisely, write
failure occurs during the write operation and its effect is that the value stored in the
MTJ will be different from the one provided as data input. From a physical point
of view, it happens according to the stochastic behavior of STT-RAM cell when the
magnetic field direction of the free layer could not change during the pre-determined
write pulse width [12, 27]. There are many parameters that contribute to switching
the MTJ state during the write operations, e.g., MTJ switching current, process
variations, thermal fluctuations, and switching pulse width. According to [16], the
write failure probability can be calculated using the following equation:
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where  is the thermal stability factor, IC0 is the critical MTJ switching current at
0 ◦K, c is the Euler constant, e is the magnitude of electron charge, m denotes the
magnetic momentum of the free layer, p is the tunneling spin polarization, μB is the
Bohr magneton, Iw is the write current, and tw is the write pulse width.
While STT-RAM technology is a promising candidate to resolve the static energy
challenge of SRAM technology in on-chip memories, from the dynamic energy
consumption perspective, it imposes considerable energy consumption for a reliable
write operation due to its stochastic switching feature; the higher the Iw, the lower
the write error rate of STT-RAM will be. For example, we used NVSim [8] to
experimentally compare two alternative implementations, in SRAM and STT-RAM
technologies, with the same 32KB cache architecture with 64Byte word lines
implemented in 45 nm. Our results show that from the leakage power point of
view, the SRAM cache imposes 41.896mW power consumption, while STT-RAM
cache only charges 9.066mW power consumption to the design. On the other hand,
each read operation in SRAM and STT-RAM implementations uses 11.421 and
82.493 pJ dynamic energy consumption, respectively. Finally, each write operation
in SRAM and STT-RAM technologies enforces 5.712 and 534.375 pJ dynamic
energy consumption to the design, responsively. As a conclusion, Iw in Eq. 4 is the
main contributor for dynamic energy consumption in STT-RAM. Accordingly, Iw
is one of the effective circuit-level knobs available to control the reliability-energy
trade-off during a write operation. Generally, a lower Iw decreases the write energy,
but it also amplifies the probability of write failure.
To systematically analyze this aspect, we performed a quantitative evaluation of
the write error rate of STT-RAM at different write current amplitudes by using the
STT-RAM SPICE model introduced in [14]. In particular, we characterized a STT-
RAM cell by using parameters reported in Table 1 and ran several Monte Carlo
simulations. Figure 3 depicts the write error rate of the STT-RAM cell when the
write current is varied and the cell is flipped from 0 → 1 (in red) or vice versa
(in blue). As shown in Fig. 3, we retrieved the trend lines of error rate patterns in
both directions to generate the STT-RAM write error rate formulas. These formulas
are useful to estimate the write error rates of STT-RAM at any write current. We
therefore conclude that Iw is an effective circuit-level knob available to control the
Table 1 STT-RAM HSPICE
model configurations
Parameter Value (μ± 3σ )
MTJ length 32 nm
MTJ width 96 nm
MTJ thickness 2.44 nm
Relative initial angle 0± 35◦/180± 35◦
Transistors technology size 32 ± 1 nm






















0->1 Transition 1->0 Transition Expon. (0->1 Transition) Expon. (1->0 Transition)
Fig. 3 STT-RAM cell write error rate vs. write current in different MTJ state transitions (write
pulse width fixed at 10 ns)
quality-energy trade-off during a write operation. Moreover, it can be noted that the
write error rate is asymmetric and 0→ 1 is the most critical transition. This is due
to the fact that the initial MTJ state affects the total energy required to change its
resistance [29]. For 0→ 1 bit transition, to change the MTJ state from parallel (low
resistance) to anti-parallel (high resistance), more energy (powercdot time) needs to
be spent compared to the amount of energy needed for the transition in the opposite
direction (1 → 0) [28]. As a consequence, the MTJ state transition is asymmetric
from the error rate vs. energy consumption perspective.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that unlike the provided knob in SRAM technol-
ogy (memory bank voltage scaling) that is coarse-grained and affects a large portion
of data in memory, STT-RAM exploits Iw which is fine-grained and can be tuned
for granularity of a data block in memory. As we show in the following, this feature
offered by STT-RAM provides a unique opportunity for flexible adjustment of the
energy-reliability knob.
3 Related Work on STT-RAM Reliability
In recent years, several studies have addressed reliability issues of STT-RAM. In
[23], the authors present a survey of the preliminary approaches addressing faults
in various non-volatile memory technologies with the focus on both permanent and
transient faults. Regarding permanent faults, the basic strategies are to (1) increase
the current during write operations and (2) augment the architecture by using Error
Correction Codes (ECCs). Indeed these strategies are the ones later used by many
subsequent approaches.
In [22], the authors propose a strategy, Verify and Correct (VnC), which consists
of reading each value immediately after the write operation in the STT-RAM cache
to assess its correctness. Since read delay is negligible, such an approach may lead to
performance degradation in case of high failure rate. The approach is later enhanced
by combining VnC with a limited ECC to reduce the need of rewriting upon
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failures. Ahn et al. [1] propose a scheme where ECC is shared among several cache
blocks thus reducing its hardware cost. Cheshmikhani et al. [6] and Azad et al. [3]
present ECC schemes with an optimized interleaved bit selection mechanism to
minimize codewords’ vulnerability variations. Finally, the authors of [25] introduce
adaptiveness in the hardening scheme; where two different levels of ECC can be
selectively chosen for each incoming block in the STT-RAM cache. The level of
protection is selected based on the vulnerability of the incoming block which is
calculated by enumerating the number of 0 → 1 bit transitions. The idea of using
several ECC scheme in an adaptive way is further explored in [2] by defining an
STT-RAM cache architecture, called A2PT using several ECC levels and integrating
a specific hardware module which selects the replacement candidate in order to
minimize the Hamming distance between the stored block the newly incoming one.
A different strategy is proposed in [11] where the classical Least-Recently-
Used (LRU) cache replacement policy is substituted with a new algorithm which
performs a Least-Error-Rate (LER) replacement. To reduce the probability of write
errors in STT-RAM, this algorithm tries to write the incoming block in a location
which imposes the least number of 0 → 1 bit transitions among the victim
block candidates. In [7], the authors observe that the stochastic switching in write
operations is mainly caused by the device heating. Therefore, to reduce the write
errors, they propose to replace the LRU policy with a thermal-aware counterpart,
which tries to write the incoming block in a location which imposes the least
temperature increase among the victim block candidates.
As discussed in Sect. 2, acting on the current applied during the write operation
sensibly affects the correctness of the stored value; moreover, 0 → 1 is the
most susceptible bit transition. For these reasons, Kim et al. [13] propose two
different circuit design techniques applied at each single bit-line to balance out
the asymmetric write current and optimize the memory design in terms of write-
power and reliability. In a similar manner, Monazzah et al. [17] exploit the tuning
of the write current to explicitly trade memory reliability for energy saving in the
context of approximate computing. The approach considers software applications
capable of tolerating a certain degree of errors in the results, such as image
processing applications. Therefore, for each write operation, the current to be
applied is dynamically selected based on the reliability requirement annotated in
the application source code as well as the Hamming distance between the block to
be written and the candidate to be replaced. In such a way, the energy consumption is
minimized under a predefined number of errors that can be ignored in the application
output.
The main contribution of our approach presented in this chapter is to holistically
integrate ECC deployment and write current tuning based on our prior works
presented in [2] and [17]. The main property of our approach is its self-adaptiveness
to dynamically tune the system operating point to the characteristics of the running
applications to optimize the energy consumption of the system while keeping the
observed error rate under control.
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4 FlexRel: An Energy-Aware Reliability Improvement
Approach for STT-RAM Caches
In this section, we present our proposed approach called FlexRel. As a preliminary
discussion, first we explore the conventional ECC deficiency in tolerating the write
failures of STT-RAM caches. Then, we observe how different data patterns lead
to different write error rates in cache blocks. At the end, we discuss in detail
the FlexRel approach for the STT-RAM caches which utilizes the STT-RAM
write current actuation knob and multi-level ECC protection scheme to conduct an
optimum trade-off between reliability and energy consumption.
4.1 The Effects of Write Patterns on ECC Protection Level
As mentioned in previous sections, the write error rate in the STT-RAM cache
depends on the bit differences between the contents of data that was previously
stored in the cache block and the contents of the new incoming block. Indeed, during
a write operation while failure may occur in the bit locations that should be toggled,
for the other bit locations that will not experience any toggle, we do not observe
any write error. In Sect. 2.2, we observed that in STT-RAM the write error rates of
0 → 1 bit transitions is higher than 1 → 0 bit transitions by about two orders of
magnitude for the same current amplitude in both directions. Accordingly, FlexRel
will mainly focus on 0→ 1 bit transitions since they represent the main contributor
to write error rate in STT-RAM.
Generally, the total number of 0→ 1 bit transitions in a STT-RAM cache block
is proportional to the Hamming Weight (HW) of the new incoming block, that is the
total number of 1 in the bit representation of each block [2, 26]. On the other hand,
the maximum number of 0 → 1 bit transitions in a cache block write operation
happens when all of the bit locations storing value “1” in the new incoming block
should store on bit locations that previously contained “0.” Considering this fact,
for a STT-RAM cache that is protected with an ECC code with t-bit error correction
capability, we can estimate the Block Error Rate (BER) of a STT-RAM cache write
operation according to Eq. 5 [26]:





ER 0→1(1− PER 0→1)w−i (5)
where, PER 0→1 is the bit failure rate in 0 → 1 switching, t the error correction
capability of ECC, w the HW of the incoming data, and Ciw the combination of HW
taken i at a time.
We conducted an experimental evaluation of the BER of STT-RAM cache write
operations for the incoming blocks when varying HW. In particular, we configured































Fig. 4 Block Error Rate (BER) in different ECC schemes for various Hamming Weight (HW)
data
a 512-bit STT-RAM cache block, with 0 → 1 write error rate, i.e., PER 0→1 of
10−3 as reported in [1, 22, 26]. Figure 4 depicts the results of the experiments which
verify that the BER of the cache blocks with different ECC protection scheme are
considerably affected by the HW of the incoming data. For example, if we consider
ECC with protection capability of t bit errors in a cache block, for HW of 25 we
observed the BER of 10−15, while for HW of 50 and 100 this protection scheme
delivers BER of 10−13 and 10−11, respectively, which is considerably different.
The results shown in Fig. 4 are calculated based on Bose, Chaudhuri, and
Hocquenghem (BCH) coding scheme [15] which is a well-known scheme in
protecting memory architectures. In BCH code, ECC converts to k-bit data and
(n − k) ECC check bits. The complexity of the peripherals that is required to
protect the k-bit data is also increased with the increase in the ECC protection
capability. Generally, for protecting a k = 512 bit cache line using BCH code
with (t + 1) bit error correction capability, we require (10t + 1) check bits [2].
The results demonstrated in Fig. 4 is calculated for various coding schemes: SEC-
DED (Single Error Correction-Double Error Detection), DEC-TED (Double Error
Correction-Triple Error Detection), 3EC4ED, 4EC5ED, 5EC6ED, 6EC7ED, and
7ED8EC codes with t = 1, t = 2, t = 3, t = 4, t = 5, t = 6, and t = 7
error(s) correction capabilities, respectively.
With the emergence of ECC protection scheme in the cache memories to
protect the data, conventionally, all the cache blocks are protected with the same
ECC protection capability (t). This conventional ECC protection scheme is called
Uniform, i.e., all of the blocks in the cache utilize the same ECC protection level.
However, as we can see in Fig. 4, the different HWs in write requests lead to
various BER for each cache block during the execution time. Accordingly, in the
Uniform protection scheme the highest HW needs to be considered to select an
ECC protection level that satisfies the write error rate threshold. As an example,
considering Fig. 4, the ECC protection level t = 6 should be selected to satisfy the
























HW (Total number of '1') in cache block for each write operation
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Fig. 5 The distribution of write operations based on Hamming Weight (HW) across a 4-MB 16-
way shared L2 cache
write error rate threshold of 10−6 in the worst case where all of the bit locations
in the target cache block experience toggle for the new incoming write request.
However, satisfying a write request that all of its bit locations experience 0→ 1 bit
transition is a very rare event. Therefore, using ECCwith t = 6 correction capability
is usually more than enough.
Accordingly, we investigated the distribution of HW across a 4-MByte 16-way
set associative shared L2 cache during the execution of workloads. To this end,
we ran combinations of benchmarks that are selected from SPEC CPU2006 [9]
benchmark suite.1 Figure 5 depicts the distribution of write requests’ HWs across
the shared L2 cache. Figure 5 illustrates that most of the write requests had less than
350 HW, while for the uniform full-protection ECC schemes we need to consider the
worst-case HW (512 in 512 bit cache line size) for reliable write operations leading
to significant under-utilization of resources.
One of the main concerns in utilizing uniform full-protection ECC configuration
for the caches is the amount of energy consumption that is imposed to the system.
Indeed, as illustrated in Figs. 4 and 5, while utilizing the full-protection configura-
tion guarantees the reliable write operations, it imposes high energy consumption for
most of the time that the write operations contain lower number of value 1 than the
considered ECC-related threshold. For this reason, FlexRel exploits a non-uniform
multi-protection level ECCs scheme to save energy. In addition, it improves the
hardening scheme by deploying different write current levels introducing different
STT-RAM write error rates.
1The details of simulator configurations and workload combinations will be mentioned later in
Sect. 5, in particular in Tables 3 and 4.
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4.2 FlexRel Organization
In FlexRel, we divide a cache memory into several protection level zones. Unlike
the previous studies that benefit only from different ECC codes to conduct multi-
level protection scheme (e.g. [2, 3, 25]), in FlexRel we consider a combination of
write current level and ECC protection level to satisfy a pre-determined write error
rate threshold at each zone. The main strategy that is considered in FlexRel for
cache partitioning is to assign the lowest possible write current for the zones that
face high amounts of write operations to alleviate STT-RAM high write energy
consumption and instead apply stronger ECC protection codes in these zones to
satisfy the write error threshold. On the other hand, for the zones that experience
low amounts of write operations we consider high write current with weaker ECC
protection codes to alleviate the static energy consumption of ECC parts of the
cache ways. For the sake of better intuition, in the following we explain the FlexRel
approach considering a STT-RAM L2 cache memory architecture being 16-way
set-associative and having a 64 Byte (512 bit) cache line as our case study example,
while in general, FlexRel approach is applicable to all associative STT-RAM caches
with any configuration and at any memory abstraction level.
The first step in designing a FlexRel-equipped cache is to classify the write
requests of the cache based on the HW (which shows the vulnerability of write
requests) and the portion of write requests. The partitioning in FlexRel applies at
way granularity. Here, as an example, we consider four protection levels in our
case study FlexRel-equipped cache. The straightforward approach to assign the
cache ways to one of the four protection levels is the uniform assignment (in case
of 16-way set associative cache it implies to assign four ways to each protection
level). Considering the efficiency challenge that was mentioned for the uniform ECC
protection technique, this straightforward assignment may face a considerable waste
of resources. Therefore, our approach to enhance FlexRel has been to consider once
again the write request patterns depicted in Fig. 5 to configure the portion of cache
ways in each protection level. For this decision, we need to consider the cumulative
amount of write requests in each protection level to provide enough space for them
and keep the system performance as high as possible.
Thus, we partition the 16-way FlexRel-equipped cache to four protection levels
as depicted in Fig. 6. According to the figure, we assign half of the cache ways
to protection level 2 (101 ≤ HW ≤ 250) which should serve the most amount of
write requests. Furthermore, protection level 1 (HW ≤ 100) which should serve the
second most amount of write requests benefits from a quarter of cache ways, while
each of protection levels 3 and 4 only utilizes two ways to serve their low-intensive
write requests. Figure 7 depicts the proposed FlexRel scheme for our case study
example which includes four zones regarding protection levels.
After the way partitioning of FlexRel-equipped cache is completed, we should
determine combinations of STT-RAM write current and ECC code to deliver a
reliable write operation in each zone. To select these combinations, first we should
consider a write error rate threshold to meet during the write operations in FlexRel-
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FlexRel Cache Replacement PolicyHamming Weight Calculator
Fig. 7 A 16-way set associative FlexRel-equipped cache
equipped cache. To guarantee this threshold, FlexRel can either increase the write
voltage and decrease the protection level of ECCs or vice versa. As an example, we
consider 10−8 as write error rate threshold that should be met in all protection levels
considering the write requests’ HWs.
Consequently, Table 2 depicts a transducer map considered for FlexRel. As
shown in the table, based on the configuration of write currents and ECC protection
capabilities different dynamic energies and static powers are consumed in FlexRel-
equipped cache ways. The last row of the table shows the amount of dynamic energy
and static power of a uniform full-protection scheme with the same write error rate
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threshold mentioned for FlexRel-equipped cache. It is worthy of mentioning that
in each protection level, FlexRel should provide the required facilities so that the
highest HW write request in that level meets write error rate thresholds. The write
currents at different protection levels in Table 2 reveal the mentioned strategy in
FlexRel way partitioning. For example, comparing protection level 2 (with high
amounts of write operations) with protection level 4 (with low amounts of write
operations), for level 2 we considered lower write current (666.9μA) with stronger
ECC code (t = 3) to alleviate the high write energy consumption of STT-RAMs.
On the other hand, for level 4, we consider higher write current (935.0μA) with
weaker ECC code (t = 1) to alleviate the ECC static energy consumption.
Now that the data storage architecture of FlexRel is explored, the final element
that we should consider in the architecture of FlexRel-enable cache is to design a
mechanism to redirect the write request to their corresponding ways based on their
HW during the execution. As depicted in Fig. 7, we developed a new replacement
policy to perform this redirection.
Considering our case study example, Algorithm 1 depicts the traffic controller
and replacement policy defined for FlexRel-equipped cache. This algorithm can
be easily modified to apply to any other FlexRel-equipped cache with different
configurations than the case study example. The FlexRel controller is responsible
for calculating the HW of the incoming write request (Line 1). Then, if the write
request is hit in the cache (Lines 3–10), FlexRel controller will verify the possibility
of writing the new request to the hit block. To this end, FlexRel controller checks
the HW of the new incoming request with the HW boundaries of the hit block’s way
protection level (Line 4). If the new incoming block satisfies the HW boundaries of
the hit block’s way protection level, FlexRel controller will satisfy the write request
(Lines 5–7). Otherwise, the hit block will become invalid, and a cache miss signal
will be triggered for the new incoming write request (Lines 7–10).
On the other hand, if the new incoming write request is missed in the cache (Line
11–24), based on the HW of this request that was calculated previously (Line 1),
the FlexRel replacement policy should select the appropriate protection level for
this request and evict a block from the protection level’s assigned ways. It should
be noted that FlexRel replacement policy uses LRU replacement policy in each
protection level to evict the blocks (Lines 13, 16, 19, and 22).
5 Experimental Results
To explore the effectiveness of FlexRel in saving the energy consumption while
meeting the reliability constraints we conducted a set of simulations. To this end,
we used gem5 [4] simulating a quad-core ARM processor. The frequency of this
processor is set to 1GHz. The details of simulation configurations are summarized
in Table 3. We extracted the dynamic and leakage power of STT-RAM cache ways
from NVSim [8] with the aid of HSPICE. SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suites [9]
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Algorithm 1: FlexRel controller and replacement policy for 16-way set
associative cache
input : New incoming write request (WR)
output : The target block in cache for satisfying request
1 HW = calculate_HW(WR);
2 blk = Hit(WR);
/* Check the availability of the requested block. */
3 if blk then
/* The requested blk is found in the cache (hit). */
4 satisfy_request = check_way_boundary(blk→way,HW);




9 blk = null;
/* After generating a miss signal for this request,
FlexRel replacement policy will decide about the new
location of this block. */
10 end
11 else
/* The requested blk is not found in the cache (miss). */
12 if HW ≤ 100 then
13 blk = LRU(way0 ∼ way3);
14 return(blk);
15 else if 101 ≤ HW ≤ 250 then
16 blk = LRU(way4 ∼ way11);
17 return(blk);
18 else if 251 ≤ Hw ≤ 400 then
19 blk = LRU(way12 and way13);
20 return(blk);
21 else




were used as the workloads in this study. Table 4 depicts the combination of
benchmarks in each workload.
It should be noted that, for the sake of improving the accuracy of the experiments,
all of the simulation results were retrieved after skipping the L2 cache warm-
up phase. During the experiments, we implemented and compared the following
schemes:
• Optimized Uniform Protection—In this scheme, L2 cache ways were protected
with uniform 7EC8ED BCH code with low write current mentioned in the last
row of Table 2 (OUP). This uniform protection satisfied the considered block
write error rate considered in this study (i.e., 10−8).
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No. of cores 4
L1 $ size, assoc. 32KB, 4
L2 $ size, assoc. 4MB, 16
Cache configuration L1 (Private)
L2 (Shared, FlexRel-enabled)
Cache block size 64B
Cache warm-up instructions 100 million
No. simulated instructions 100 million
Table 4 Workload
combinations
Combination Core 0 Core 1 Core 2 Core 3
Comb1 perlbench bzip2 mcf soplex
Comb2 perlbench bzip2 omnetpp xalancbmk
Comb3 perlbench mcf omnetpp xalancbmk
Comb4 bzip2 mcf soplex xalancbmk
Comb5 gcc bwaves mcf cactusADM
Comb6 namd dealII soplex calculix
Comb7 perlbench gcc mcf namd
Comb8 perlbench namd soplex xalancbmk
Comb9 bwaves dealII namd calculix
Comb10 gcc bwaves soplex xalancbmk
• FlexRel —In this scheme, L2 cache ways were protected with variable strength
ECCs and write currents mentioned in Table 2, according to the discussed cache
structure in FlexRel.
Figure 8 depicts the normalized energy consumption of FlexRel-equipped shared
L2 cache compared with the optimized uniform scheme. We evaluated the efficiency
of FlexRel in terms of energy consumption from three perspectives, i.e., dynamic
energy consumption, static energy consumption, and overall energy consumption.
According to Fig. 8, FlexRel increased the dynamic energy consumption of ways
by up to 19% in comb1 which intensively used the protection levels that consume
high write energy consumption. It is worth noting that since the optimized uniform
scheme utilizes the least write current, the FlexRel scheme will impose more
dynamic energy. On the other hand, since FlexRel utilizes low protection ECCs in
comparison with optimized uniform ECC scheme, it significantly improves the static
energy consumption in almost all of the combinations. Indeed, while the leakage
power of the ways in the FlexRel-equipped cache was significantly lower than the
optimized uniform scheme, the high-performance overhead experienced in comb2
(see Fig. 9) led to the same static energy consumption in both schemes, and further
increased the overall energy consumption by 3%.
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Fig. 8 Energy consumption of the ways of 4MB shared FlexRel-equipped L2 cache normalized
































Fig. 9 The Instruction per Clock (IPC) of a system includes a 4MB shared FlexRel-equipped L2
cache normalized to the IPC of a system that includes optimized uniform scheme in its L2 cache
In general, since static energy consumption is the main contributor in the energy
consumption of the cache ways, FlexRel achieves a considerable improvement in
the overall energy consumption (static + dynamic) of ways in the L2 cache. On
average, while FlexRel increases the dynamic energy consumption of the ways by
8%, it saves the static energy consumption and overall energy consumption of L2
cache ways by 12% and 9%, respectively. The calculated amount of saved static
power in each FlexRel-equipped cache’s way is about 70.6mW. With this amount
of power, we will be able to supply the static power of more than seven 32KB L1
caches (like the ones considered in this study) each consuming 8.9mW static power.
Figure 9 shows the Instruction per Clock (IPC) of a system using a 4MB shared
FlexRel-equipped L2 cache normalized to the IPC of a system that incorporates the
optimized uniform scheme in its L2 cache. Since FlexRel modifies the replacement
policy of the L2 cache to redirect the write requests to their corresponding protection
level’s ways it may impose some performance penalty to the system in the situations
when (1) the target protection level’s ways face intensive write requests from
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ECC check bits % of area improvement
Protection Level
1 2 21 8.5
2 3 31 6.6
3 2 21 8.5
4 1 11 10.2
% of average area improvement 7.9
different addresses or (2) we should evict a hit block because the total number of
“1”s in this block forces FlexRel to change its location.
According to Fig. 9, in the worst case scenario, i.e., comb2 that the miss penalty
in FlexRel approach is considerable, the IPC of the system is degraded by 6%.
This result illustrates the importance of cache partitioning in the performance of
the system. In other words, while the considered partitioning provides reasonable
performance for most of the workloads, for comb1, comb2, and comb4, the con-
sidered partitioning utilized by Algorithm 1 led to high-performance overheads for
these workloads. Previously we mentioned that these performance overheads even
affect the energy efficiency of FlexRel for comb1, comb2, and comb4 workloads.
On average, FlexRel decreases the IPC of the system by a negligible 1.7%.
Finally, w.r.t. area, ECC check bits assigned at each protection level are the
main contributor. Accordingly, Table 5 reports ECC check-bits, and the area saving
at different protection levels of FlexRel compared with the optimized uniform
protection scheme. In general, considering a 16-way set associative L2 cache, the
flexible scheme provided by FlexRel could save the occupied ways’ area by about
7.9%, on average.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we proposed FlexRel, an energy-aware reliability improvement
architectural scheme for STT-RAM cache memories. FlexRel is an architecture-
to-application cross-layer approach that considers a memory architecture provided
with Error Correction Codes (ECCs) and a custom current regulator for the various
cache ways and conducts a trade-off between reliability and energy consumption.
The FlexRel cache controller dynamically profiles the number of 0 → 1 bit
transitions of each write operation and, based on this critical parameter it selects
the most-suitable cache way and current level to deliver the necessary reliability
level (in terms of occurred write errors) while minimizing the energy consumption.
The results of evaluating FlexRel show that, while the scheme satisfies the
reliability requirements, it delivers up to 13.2% energy saving and up to 10.2% cache
ways’ area saving, compared with the most efficient uniform protection scheme. The
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performance overhead imposed by FlexRel to the system due to the modifications
of cache ways’ access traffics is 1.7%, on average.
As future work, we will further improve and refine the FlexRel in two aspects.
First, we will focus on the proposed replacement policy to improve the performance
of the system for workloads that face significant block evictions due to HW
boundary violations. To minimize the performance overhead, we will attempt to
devise a dynamic cache partitioning scheme capable of changing the configuration
of the FlexRel-equipped cache when considerable performance degradation is
observed.
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Hardware/Software Codesign for Energy
Efficiency and Robustness: From
Error-Tolerant Computing to
Approximate Computing
Abbas Rahimi and Rajesh K. Gupta
1 Introduction
Let us step back and first look at an ideal hardware where the entire software
stack can be executed. In reality, however, the hardware underneath of computing is
being challenged as CMOS scaling continues to nanometer dimensions [14, 41]. The
hardware experiences different sources of variability over time, or across different
parts (see Fig. 1a). These variations include: manufacturing process variability that
causes static variations in critical dimension, channel length, and threshold voltage
of devices [6]; temporal aging/wear out variability that causes slow degradation in
devices [22]; and finally, dynamic variability in ambient condition that is caused
by fluctuations in operating temperature and supply voltage [8, 25]. The way that
designers typically combat with these sources of variability is to consider worst-
case design by imposing a large margin in hardware to ensure the correct execution
of the software stack. This conservative margin leads to a loss of energy efficiency.
Further, the ever-increasing amount of variability [15] limits how far we can drive
down the energy per operation (i.e., voltage scaling). This means that we cannot
reduce the energy as we used to.
What if we reduce the excessive margin to enable better energy scaling? The
direct manifestation of reducing margin is a timing error as shown in Fig. 1b. A tim-
ing error means capturing an invalid value to a storage element like a flip-flop or a
memory cell, so the result of computation might become wrong. Instead of blindly
dealing with variability and its resulting timing errors, we propose to expose them to
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(b) Reducing excessive margin results in timing errors.
Fig. 1 Overdesigned (i.e., worst-case) hardware vs. underdesigned hardware and their interactions
with software stack. (a) Worst-case design by considering excessive margin leads to loss of energy
efficiency. (b) Reducing excessive margin results in timing errors
the higher levels in the stack where their side effects can be mitigated [27]. Essen-
tially, we develop an opportunistic software layer that can operate with reduced
margins and sense variability in underdesigned hardware—instead of overdesigned
hardware with positive margins. The software layer accordingly performs adaptation
by means of metadata mechanisms that reflect the state of hardware and variability,
then the software can perform introspection and adaptation. The main continuations
of this chapter lie on the application, software, and architectural layers as illustrated
in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2 Main abstraction
layers of embedded systems
and this chapter’s major


























1.1 Clockwise Y-Chart: From Positive Margin, to Zero Margin,
to Negative Margin
In the following, we discuss about the possible approaches to reduce margin and
handle timing errors. The tree possible approaches are conceptualized in a Y-chart
shown in Fig. 3.
This first approach is to predict and prevent the errors by keeping a positive
margin. Hence, we try to reduce the excessive margin but it is still positive to ensure
the error-free execution of software. In this direction, our work spans defining and
measuring the notion of error tolerance, from instruction set architecture (ISA)
to procedures, and to parallel programs. These measures essentially capture the
likelihood of errors and associated cost of error correction at different levels. We
first characterize the manifestations of variability in ISA [28] that is the finest
granularity to represent a processor functionality. Then, we characterize a sequence
of instructions where the timing errors can be eliminated [31]. Going higher in the
software stack, we schedule different procedure calls in multi-core architecture [29]
and finally a large number of kernels on massively parallel cores [32] such that there
are no timing errors. At the boundary of hardware/software, we focus on adaptive
compilation methods to reduce the side effects of aging and increase lifetime for
massively parallel integrated architectures like GPUs [30].
What is the next approach? The next approach is about detecting and correction
errors by reducing the margin to zero (i.e., operating at the edge of errors). Basically,
we reduce the margin to zero such that the errors can occur. Hence, we first need
to detect the errors by means of circuit sensors [7, 11, 46] and then take actions
to correct them. Our focus was instead on reducing the cost of error correction in
software. In this direction, we focus on variability-aware runtime environment to
cover various embedded parallel workloads in OpenMP including tasks [34, 38],
parallel sections, and loops [37].
Finally, the third approach is about accepting errors—i.e., approximate
computing—by pushing the margin to negative. This means that the errors and
approximations are becoming acceptable as long as the outcomes have a well-
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OpenMP Support for Approximation
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Approximate Functional Unit
Approximate Instruction Reuse
Fig. 3 Taxonomy of error tolerance in a clockwise Y-Chart: from positive margin, to zero margin,
to finally negative margin
defined statistical behavior. In this approach, fatal errors can be avoided at the
cost of benign approximation that can in fact allow for improving throughput
and energy efficiency. Toward this goal, we enable approximate computing
in instructions [33, 36, 39, 40], functional units [16–19], runtime execution
environments [35], and ultimately hardware description languages [47], and high-
level synthesis [23].
By looking at the Y-chart clockwise, we go from preventing errors, to correcting
errors, and finally to accepting errors. This move also changes the margin from
positive, to zero, and eventually to negative, leading to higher energy efficiency. In
the rest of this chapter, we only focus on two methods describing how cooperative
hardware/software techniques can improve energy efficiency and robustness in
the presence of variability. These two methods, highlighted with bold in the Y-
chart, cover examples from approaches with positive margin (i.e., predicting and
preventing errors in Sect. 2) and negative margin (i.e., accepting errors in Sect. 3).
Interested readers can refer to [42] for reading more about approaches with zero
margin (i.e., detecting and correcting errors).
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2 Positive Margin Example: Mitigating Aging in GPUs
by Adaptive Compilation
In this section, we demonstrate a prime example of software that can respond to
hardware variations due to aging. The goal is to reduce the excessive margin due to
device aging in a setting where margin is still positive to guarantee correct execution.
The idea is to combine hardware sensing circuits and adaptive software (an aging-
aware compiler) to manage the workload stress. One major aging mechanism is
negative bias temperature instability (NBTI) that adversely affects the reliability of
a processing element by introducing new delay-induced faults. However, the effect
of these delay variations is not uniformly spread across processing elements within
a chip: some are affected more—hence less reliable—than others. We propose
an NBTI-aware compiler-directed very long instruction word (VLIW) assignment
that uniformly distributes the stress of instructions among available processing
elements, with the aim of minimizing aging without any performance penalty [30].
The compiler matches the measured aging degradation with the distribution of
instructions to equalize the expected lifetime of each processing element.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 covers an overview of
NBTI-induced performance degradation. Section 2.2 describes a GPU architecture
and its workload distribution used in this study. Finally, our adaptive compiler is
presented in Sect. 2.3.
2.1 NBTI Degradation
Among various aging mechanisms in hardware, the generation of interface traps
under NBTI in PMOS transistors has become a critical issue in determining
the lifetime of CMOS devices [10]. NBTI manifests itself as an increase in the
PMOS transistor voltage threshold (Vth) that causes delay-induced failures (see
Fig. 4 (left)). NBTI is best captured by the reaction–diffusion model [26]. This
model describes NBTI in two stress and recovery phases. NBTI occurs due to
the generation of the traps at the Si–SiO2 interface when the PMOS transistor is
negatively biased (i.e., during the stress phase). As a result, Vth of the transistor
increases which in turn slows down the device. Removing stress from the PMOS
transistor can eliminate some of the traps which partially recover the Vth shift. This
is also known as the recovery phase. The work in [5] derived a long-term cycle-to-
cycle model of NBTI. NBTI effects can be significant: its impact on circuit delay is
about 15% on a 65 nm technology node and it gets worse in sub-65 nm nodes [4].
Further, NBTI-induced performance degradation is typically non-uniform which is a
major concern for many-core GPUs, e.g., with up to 320 five-way VLIW processing
elements [1].




































































Fig. 4 Adaptive compiler to mitigating aging in GPUs: (left) sensing NBTI degradation; (middle)
naive kernel execution and its impact on degradation of processing elements; (right) adaptive
compiler and healthy kernel execution
2.2 GPU Architecture and Workload
We focus on the evergreen family of AMD GPUs (a.k.a. Radeon HD 5000 series),
designed to target not only graphics applications but also general-purpose data-
intensive applications. The Radeon HD 5870 GPU compute device consists of 20
compute units (CUs), a global front-end ultra-thread dispatcher, and a crossbar to
connect the global memory to the L1-caches. Every CU contains a set of 16 stream
cores. Finally, each stream core contains five processing elements (PEs), labeled X,
Y, Z, W, and T constituting a VLIW processor to execute machine instructions in
a vector-like fashion. The five-way VLIW processor capable of issuing up to five
floating point scalar operations from a single VLIW consists primarily of five slots
(slotX, slotY , slotZ , slotW , slotT ). Each slot is related to its corresponding PE. Four
PEs (X, Y, Z, W) can perform up to four single-precision operations separately and
perform two double-precision operations together, while the remaining one (T) has a
special function unit for transcendental operations. In each clock cycle, VLIW slots
supply a bundle of data-independent instructions to be assigned to the related PEs
for simultaneous execution. In an n-way VLIW processor, up to n data-independent
instructions, available on n slots, can be assigned to the corresponding PEs and be
executed simultaneously. Typically, this is not done in practice because the compiler
may fail to find sufficient instruction-level parallelism to generate complete VLIW
instructions. On average, if m out of n slots are filled during an execution, we call
the achieved packing ratio is m/n. The actual performance of a program running on
a VLIW processor largely depends on the packing ratio.
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2.2.1 GPU Workload Distribution
Here, we analyze the workload distribution on the Radeon HD GPUs at architecture
level, where there are many PEs to carry out computations. As it is mentioned
earlier, the NBTI-induced degradation strongly depends on the resource utilization,
which depends on the execution characteristics of the workload. Thus, it is essential
to analyze how often the PEs are exercised during the execution of the workload.
To this end, we first monitor the utilization of various CUs (inter-CU) and then the
utilization of PEs within a CU (intra-CU).
To examine the inter-CU workload variation, the total number of executed
instructions by each CU is collected during a kernel execution. We observe that the
CUs execute almost equal number of instructions, and there is a negligible workload
variation among them. We have configured six compute devices with different
number of CUs, {2, 4,..., 64}, to finely examine the effect of the workload variation
on a variety of GPU architectures.1 For instance, during DCT kernel execution,
the workload variation between CUs ranges from 0% to 0.26% depending on the
number of physical CUs on the compute device. Execution of a large number of
different kernels confirms that the inter-CU workload variation is less than 3%,
when running on the device with 20 CUs (i.e., HD 5870). This nearly uniform inter-
CU workload distribution is accomplished by load balancing and uniform resource
arbitration algorithms of dispatcher in the GPU architecture.
Next, we examine the workload distribution among the PEs. Figure 4 (middle)
shows the percentage of the executed instructions by various PEs during execution
of kernels. We only consider four PEs (PEX, PEY , PEZ , PEW ) which are identical
in their functions [1]; they differ only in the vector elements to which they write
their result at the end of the VLIW. As shown, the instructions are not uniformly
distributed among PEs. For instance, the PEX executes 40% of ALU instructions,
while the PEW executes only 19% of the instructions. This non-uniform workload
variation causes non-uniform aging among PEs. In other words, some PEs are
exhausted more than other and thus have shorter lifetime as shown in Fig. 4
(middle). Unfortunately, this non-uniformity happens within all CUs since their
workload is highly correlated together. Therefore, no PE throughout the entire
compute device is immune from this unbalanced utilization.
The root cause of non-uniform aging among PEs is the frequent and non-uniform
execution of VLIW slots. In other words, higher utilization of PEX implies that
slotX of VLIW is occupied more frequently than the other slots. This substantiates
that the compiler does not uniformly assign the independent instructions to various
VLIW slots, mainly because the compiler only employs optimization for increasing
the packing ratio through finding more parallelism to fully pack the VLIW slots.
The VLIW processors are designed to give the compiler tight control over program
1The latest Radeon HD 5000 series, HD 5970, has 40 CUs featuring 4.3 billion transistors in 40 nm
technology.
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execution; however, the flexibility afforded by such compilers, for instance, to tune
the order of instructions packing, can be used towards reliability improvement.
2.3 Adaptive Aging-Aware Compiler
The key idea of an aging-aware compilation is to assign independent instructions
uniformly to all slots: idling a fatigued PE and reassigning its instructions to a
young PE through swapping the corresponding slots during the VLIW bundle code
generation. This basically exposes the inherent idleness in VLIW slots and guides
its distribution that does matter for aging. Thus, the job of dynamic binary optimizer,
for k-independent instructions, is to find k-young slots, representing k-young PEs,
among all available n slots, and then assign instructions to those slots. Therefore,
the generated code is a “healthy” code that balances workload distribution through
various slots maximizing the lifetime of all PEs (see Fig. 4 (right)). Here, we briefly
describe how these statistics can be obtained from silicon, and how the compiler can
predict and thus control the non-uniform aging. The adaptation flow includes four
steps: (1) aging sensor readout; (2) kernel disassembly, static code analysis, and
calibration of predictions; (3) uniform slot assignment; (4) healthy code generation.
We explain them in the following.
The compiler first needs to access the current aging data (Vth) of PEs to be
able to adapt the code accordingly. The Vth is caused by the temporal degradation
due to NBTI and/or the intrinsic process variation, thus PEs even during the early
life of a chip might have different aging. Employing the compact per-PE NBTI
sensors [44, 45] which provide Vth measurement with 3σ accuracy of 1.23 mV
for a wide range of temperature enables large scale data-collection across all PEs.
The performance degradation of every PE can be reliably reported by a per-PE
NBTI sensor, thanks to the small overhead of these sensors. The sensors support
digital frequency outputs that are accessed through memory-mapped I/O by the
compiler in arbitrary epochs of the post-silicon measurement. After sensor readouts,
the compiler estimates the degradation of PEs using the NBTI models. In addition to
the current aging data, the compiler needs to have an estimate regarding the impact
of future workload stress on the various PEs. Hence, a just-in-time disassembler
disassembles a naive kernel binary to a device-dependent assembly code in which
the assignment of instructions to the various slots (corresponding PEs) are explicitly
defined and are thus observable by the compiler. Then, a static code analysis
technique is applied that estimates the percentage of instructions that will be carried
out on every PE in a static sense. It extracts the future stress profile, and thus
the utilization of various PEs using the device-dependent assembly code. If the
predicted stress of a PE is overestimated or underestimated, mainly due to the static
analysis of the branch conditions of the kernel’s assembly code, a linear calibration
module fits the predicted stress to the observed stress, in the next adaptation period.
Thus far, we have described how the compiler evaluates the current performance
degradation (aging) of every PE and their future performance degradation due to
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the naive kernel execution. Then, the compiler uses this information to perform
code transformations with the goal of improving reliability, without any penalty in
the throughput of code execution (maintaining the same parallelism). To minimize
stress, the compiler sorts the predicted performance degradation of the slots increas-
ingly and the aging of the slots decreasingly and then applies a permutation to assign
fewer/more instructions to higher/lower stressed slots. This algorithm is applied for
every adaptation period. As a result of the slot reallocation, the minimum/maximum
number of instructions is assigned to the highest/lowest stressed slot for the future
kernel execution. This reduces Vth shifts by 34%, thus uniforming the lifetime of
PEs and allowing for reducing the positive margin as shown in Fig. 4 (right).
Execution of all examined kernels shows that the average packing ratio is 0.3
which means there is a large fraction of empty slots in which PEs can be relaxed
during kernels execution. This low packing ratio is mainly due to the limitation of
instruction-level parallelism. The proposed adaptive compilation approach super-
poses on top of all optimization performed by a naive compiler and does not
incur any performance penalty since it only reallocates the VLIW slots (slips the
scheduled instructions from one slot to another) within the same scheduling and
order determined by the naive compiler. In other words, our compiler guarantees
the iso-throughput execution of the healthy kernel. It also runs fully in parallel with
GPU on a host CPU, thus there will be no penalty for GPU kernel execution if
dynamic compilation of one kernel can be overlapped with the execution of another
kernel. You can refer to [49] for further details.
3 Negative Margin Example: Enabling Approximate
Computing in FPGA Workflow
Modern applications including graphics, multimedia, web search, and data analytics
exhibit significant degrees of tolerance to imprecise computation. This amenability
to approximation provides an opportunity to reduce the excessive margin, namely to
negative, by accepting errors that trade the quality of the results for higher efficiency.
Approximate computing is a promising avenue that leverages such tolerance of
applications to errors [12, 13, 20, 21, 24, 47]. However, there is a lack of techniques
that exploits this opportunity in FPGAs.
In [23], we aim to bridge the gap between approximation and the FPGA
acceleration through an automated design workflow. Exploiting this opportunity is
particularly important for FPGA accelerators that are inherently subject to many
resource constraints. To better utilize the FPGA resources, we devise an automated
design workflow for FPGAs [23] that leverages imprecise computation to increase
data-level parallelism and achieve higher computational throughput. The core of
our workflow is a source-to-source compiler that takes in an input kernel and
applies a novel optimization technique that selectively reduces the precision of the
kernel data and operations. By selectively reducing the precision of the data and
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operation (analogous to setting margin to negative), the required area to synthesize
the kernel on the FPGA decreases allowing to integrate a larger number of
operations and parallel kernels in the fixed area of the FPGA (i.e., improving energy
efficiency per unit of area). The larger number of integrated kernels provides more
hardware context to better exploit data-level parallelism in the target applications.
To effectively explore the possible design space of approximate kernels, we exploit
a genetic algorithm to find a subset of safe-to-approximate operations and data
elements and then tune their precision levels until the desired output quality is
achieved. Our method exploits a fully software technique and does not require
any changes to the underlying FPGA hardware. We evaluate it on a diverse set of
data-intensive OpenCL benchmarks from the AMD accelerated parallel processing
(APP) SDK v2.9 [3]. We later describe OpenCL execution model and its mapping
on FPGA in Section 3.1. The synthesis result on a Stratix V Altera FPGA shows that
our approximation workflow yields 1.4×–3.0× higher throughput with less than 1%
quality loss (see Sect. 3.2).
3.1 OpenCL Execution Model and Mapping on FPGAs
Altera and Xilinx recently offer high-level acceleration frameworks for OpenCL [2,
43], hence we target acceleration of data-intensive computational OpenCL applica-
tions. The challenge is however devising a workflow that can be plugged into the
existing toolsets and can automatically identify the opportunities for approximation
while keeping the quality loss reasonably low. OpenCL is a platform-independent
framework for writing programs that execute across a heterogeneous system
consisting of multiple compute devices including CPUs or accelerators such as
GPUs, DSPs, and FPGAs. OpenCL uses a subset of ISO C99 with added extensions
for supporting data and task-based parallel programming models. The programming
model in OpenCL comprises of one or more device kernel codes in tandem with
the host code. The host code typically runs on a CPU and launches kernels on
other compute devices like the GPUs, DSPs, and/or FPGAs through API calls.
The instance of an OpenCL kernel is called a work-item. These kernels execute on
compute devices that are a set of compute units (CUs), each comprising of multiple
PEs having ALUs. The work-items execute on a single PE and exercise the ALU.
The Altera OpenCL SDK [2] allows programmers to use high-level OpenCL
kernels, written for GPUs, to generate an FPGA design with higher performance
per Watt [9]. In this work, an OpenCL kernel is first compiled and then synthesized
as a special dedicated hardware for mapping on an FPGA. FPGAs can further
improve the performance benefits by creating multiple copies of the kernel pipelines
(synthesized version of an OpenCL kernel). For instance, this replication process
can make n copies of the kernel pipeline. As the kernel pipelines can be executed
independently from one another, the performance would scale linearly with the
number of copies created owing to the data-level parallelism model supported by
OpenCL.
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In the following, we describe how our method can reduce the amount of resources
for a kernel pipeline to save area and exploit remaining area resources to boost
performance by replication. Our method systematically reduces the precision of data
and operations in OpenCL kernels to shrink the resources used per kernel pipeline by
transforming complex kernels to simple kernels that produce approximate results.
3.2 Source-to-Source Compiler
We provide a source-to-source compiler to generate approximate kernels from
OpenCL kernels with exact specification as shown in Fig. 5. This transformation
automatically detects and simplifies parts of the kernel code that can be executed
with reduced precision while preserving the desired quality-of-result. To achieve
this goal, our compiler takes in as inputs, an exact OpenCL kernel, a set of input
test cases, and a metric for measuring the quality-of-result target. The compiler
investigates the exact kernel code and detects data elements, i.e., OpenCL kernel
variables, that provide possible opportunities for increased performance in exchange































Fig. 5 FPGA approximation design workflow

























Fig. 6 Example of mapping exact and approximate kernels of Sobel filter on FPGA
means of a genetic algorithm. It can select the approximate kernels that produce
acceptable results with the help of GPU profiling. These approximate kernels
provide improved performance benefits by reducing the area when implemented
on the FPGAs. The compiler finally outputs an optimized approximate kernel with
the least area whose output quality satisfies the quality-of-result target.
The compiler uses the precision of the operations and data to tune performance as
a trade-off against precision. The transformation investigates a set of kernels where
in each version, some of these potential variables are replaced with a less accurate
variable. To avoid a huge design space exploration, we devise an algorithm that
first detects those variables that are amenable to approximation and then applies a
genetic algorithm to approximate the kernel. We discuss the details of our algorithm
in [23].
Figure 6 shows an example of Sobel filter kernel that is optimized by our
compiler. Naive mapping of exact Sobel kernel allows us to map five instances of
the kernel on the FPGA. However, by using the approximate version of kernel, we
can map 13 instances of kernel on the same FPGA roughly improving throughput
by 2×, thanks to the data-level parallel execution of the kernel, while meeting
the quality constraint. We set the quality loss target to a maximum of 0.7% for
image processing applications (which is equivalent to PSNR of a minimum 30 dB)
and 1% for other applications which is conservatively aligned with other work on
quality trade-offs [20, 21, 24, 48]. Benchmarking five kernels from OpenCL AMD
APP SDK v2.9 shows that our compiler integrates a larger number of parallel
kernels on the same FPGA fabric that leads to 1.4×–3.0× higher throughput on
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a modern Altera FPGA with less than 1% loss of quality. This is a prime example of
accepting disciplined errors, in the context of approximate computing, for improved
throughput. The approach can be generalized to any controllable error caused by
various sources. Further details are provided in [23].
4 Conclusion
Microelectronic variability is a phenomenon at the intersection of microelectronic
scaling, semiconductor manufacturing, and how electronic systems are designed and
deployed. To address this variability, designers resort to margins. We show how such
excessive margins can be reduced, and their effects can be mitigated, by a synergy
between hardware and software leading to efficient and robust microelectronic
circuit and systems.
We first explore approaches to reduce the margin and enable better than worst-
case design while avoiding the errors. We demonstrate its effectiveness on GPUs
where the effect of variations is not uniformly spread across over thousands
processing elements. Hence, we devise an adaptive compiler that equalizes the
expected lifetime of each processing element by regenerating an aging-aware
healthy kernel. Such new kernel guides its workload distribution that does matter
for the aging, hence effectively responding to the specific health state of GPUs.
Next, we focus on approaches that significantly reduce the margins by accepting
errors and exploiting approximation opportunities in computation. We explore
purely software transformation methods to unleash untapped capabilities of the
contemporary fabrics for exploiting approximate computing. Exploiting this oppor-
tunity is particularly important for FPGA accelerators that are inherently subject
to many resource constraints. To better utilize the FPGA resources, we develop
an automated design workflow for FPGA accelerators that leverages approximate
computation to increase data-level parallelism and achieve higher computational
throughput.
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Hardware Platforms
Wanli Chang, Swaminathan Narayanaswamy, Alma Pröbstl,
and Samarjit Chakraborty
1 Introduction
Battery-operated cyber-physical systems (CPS) increasingly exist in households,
factories, and the public area. For instance, zero local emission, independence from
fossil fuels, and potential improvement of energy conversion efficiency have made
electric vehicles (EVs) an alternative of conventional vehicles with internal com-
bustion engines (ICEs). Design of the underlying embedded control loops such as
electric motor control, braking control, stabilization, and battery management plays
a crucial role in EVs and other types of battery-operated devices. Conventionally,
these control loops are evaluated by a number of quality-of-control (QoC) indices.
One common QoC metric is settling time. In order to ensure performance and
reliability, the design also needs to take into account a number of issues on the
hardware implementation platforms, such as battery behaviour and semiconductor
aging. Battery is the key component influencing the device performance, when
being the main power source. As the integrated circuit fabrication technology has
progressed, processors become more and more susceptible to aging. In order to
ensure correct functioning, the processor operating frequency has to be reduced,
which could potentially worsen QoC and compromise reliability. The focus of this
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chapter is on a design framework towards reliability of CPS considering unreliable
hardware platforms.
A battery pack with large capacity is needed to offer longer usage. However,
with larger capacity, the battery weight also increases leading to higher energy
consumption. Moreover, the capacity is often restricted by the space that can be
allocated to the battery pack. One potential solution to the above problem is to
design the controller in such a way that the energy consumption of the control task
can be minimized.
All off-the-shelf battery packs are labelled with a nominal capacity. However,
due to the rate capacity effect, the full charge capacity (FCC) of a battery pack,
which is defined to be the amount of electric charges that can be delivered from
the battery after it is fully charged, actually varies with different discharging current
profiles. Generally speaking, larger discharging current tends to reduce the FCC.
For most common lithium-ion batteries in the market, the capacity could potentially
get significantly compromised if the rate capacity effect is not properly considered
in the control systems design. In this chapter, we discuss an optimization framework
considering QoC as one design objective and battery usage as the other. We quantify
the battery usage by the total duration that the battery can be used to continuously
run the control task after one full charge. In order to maximize the battery usage, the
energy consumption of the control task should be small and the battery FCC should
be increased by generating a battery-friendly discharging current profile. The battery
aging effect can also be incorporated. That is, the battery behaviour in the long run
is another optimization dimension.
The other important design aspect is processor aging. As a processor ages, the
switching time of its transistors increases, resulting in longer path delays. On-chip
monitors could be used to measure the delay of the critical path. It always has to be
guaranteed that the signal transmission can be completed along any path within one
clock cycle. Therefore, the processor operating frequency is reduced based on the
new critical path delay. On the other hand, a shorter sampling period can potentially
provide a better QoC. Therefore, with a smaller processor operating frequency, the
sampling period increases and QoC gets deteriorated, which is dangerous and thus
highly unwanted for safety-critical applications such as electric motor control in
EVs. To deal with the above situation, we can re-optimize the controller with the
longer sampling period, which results from processor aging.
The entire design flow towards CPS reliability considering unreliable hardware
platforms is divided into two phases. In Phase I, before the processor ages, an
optimization framework is used with QoC and battery behaviour considered as
design objectives. With heuristic methods implemented, this battery-aware con-
troller design gives a Pareto front of well-distributed and non-dominated solutions.
The trade-off between these objectives is explored. In Phase II, after the processor
ages, QoC is found to get degraded if the controller design does not change. The
same optimization framework is used with slight modification. The processor aging
effect is mitigated in the way that there is a minimal change of QoC with all safety
requirements satisfied.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Sect. 2 gives an overview
of the background on embedded control systems design, battery rate capacity effect
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and aging, as well as processor aging. In Sect. 3, we present the reliable CPS design
framework, and finally, Sect. 4 concludes the chapter.
2 Background
2.1 Control Systems
In this subsection, we first describe the feedback control application considered
in this chapter and several background concepts. Then, we present the system
modelling of the electric motor control application in EVs.
2.1.1 Basic Concepts
Plant Dynamics A control scheme is responsible for controlling a plant or
dynamical system. In this chapter, we consider linear time-invariant (LTI) single-
input single-output (SISO) systems,
ẋ(t) = Ax(t)+ Bu(t),
y(t) = Cx(t), (1)
where x(t) ∈ Rm is the state vector, ẋ(t) is the derivative of x(t) with respect to
time, y(t) is the output, and u(t) is the control input applied to the system. The
number of dimensions for the system is m. Constant matrices A, B, and C are of
appropriate dimensions with respect to m. In a state-feedback control algorithm, the
control input u(t) is computed utilizing the plant states x(t) as feedback signals. The
computed u(t) is then applied to the plant, which is expected to achieve the desired
behaviour.
Discretized Dynamics In most applications, the controller is implemented in a
digital fashion on a computer. This implies that the plant states must be sampled
when measured by the sensors. Assuming the sampling period to be a constant, the
continuous-time system in (1) can be transformed into the following discrete-time
system:
x[k + 1] = Adx[k] + Bdu[k],
y[k] = Cdx[k],
(2)
where sampling instants are {tk | k ∈ N}, the sampling period is tk+1 − tk = h, and






B, Cd = C. (3)
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It is noted that x[k] and y[k] are the values of x(t) and y(t) at t = tk . The initial
condition is denoted as x[0]. The control input u[k] is applied to the plant from tk
to tk+1.
Feedback Controller One common goal of a control task is to make y[k] → r as
soon as possible, where r is the reference for y[k] to track. Towards this and other
application-specific objectives, we design u[k] utilizing the states x[k]. This is then
a state-feedback controller with a general structure as follows:
u[k] = Kx[k] + Fr, (4)
where K is the feedback gain vector and F is the feedforward gain.
Closed-Loop System With the feedback controller as shown in (4), the system
closed-loop dynamics from (2) becomes
x[k + 1] = (Ad + BdK)x[k] + BdF r = Aclx[k] + BdF r, (5)
where Acl is the closed-loop system matrix. Different locations of the closed-loop
system poles, i.e., eigenvalues of Acl , result in different system behaviours. In the
pole placement, poles are placed (eigenvalues are set) to fulfil various high-level
goals, such as optimization of QoC and other application-specific objectives, and
constraints satisfaction. In order to ensure system stabilization, all the poles must be
less than unity. In this chapter, we restrict the poles in the real non-negative plane—
which is common in most of the real-life design problems.
Once the poles are decided, the feedback gain vector K can be computed with
Ackermann’s formula. The static feedforward gain F used to make y[k] track the
reference r can be computed by
F = 1
(Cd(I− Acl)−1Bd) , (6)
where I is an n-dimensional identity matrix [2].
QoC We use settling time as the metric to quantify the QoC. The time it takes for
the system output y[k] to reach and stay in a closed region around the reference
value r (e.g., 0.98r–1.02r) is the settling time and denoted as ts . Shorter ts indicates
better QoC. When the controller poles are given, and the feedback and feedforward
gains are computed accordingly, the output behaviour can be simulated, and the
settling time can be derived.
Constraints There are often hard physical constraints that have to be respected in
the embedded control systems, as part of the safety requirements [6, 8]. For instance,
the input signal u[k] could be constrained by an upper limit Umax and a lower limit
Umin. Similarly, the plant states could be constrained by a region. With the given
controller poles and the corresponding gains, both the plant states and the control
input throughout the entire control task can be simulated. Therefore, the constraints
satisfaction can be evaluated.











Fig. 1 A diagram of a DC motor with the armature circuit powered up by a battery pack
Fig. 2 Pulse-width
modulation control signals in
the armature circuit to adjust







2.1.2 Electric Motor Control
Electric motor control is a key function in EVs. As shown in Fig. 1, we consider
a DC motor running in the speed control mode. The controller is supposed to
operate the motor at various speeds according to the driver input and environmental
conditions. The DC voltage provided by the battery pack is V . The resistance and
inductance in the armature circuit are R and L, respectively. The back electromotive
force (EMF) from the motor is e. The insulated gate bipolar transistor (IGBT) works
as a switch controlled by pulse-width modulation (PWM) signals at the gate. When
the switch is on, V is applied to the armature circuit. When the switch is off, the
diode flows out the remaining current in the motor and thus the applied voltage is
equivalent to zero. Periodic PWM signals are shown in Fig. 2, where the duty cycle




and the effective voltage applied in the armature circuit is
Veff = cV . (8)
We can clearly see that Veff is adjustable between 0 and V by controlling the PWM
signals.
In general, the torque T generated by a DC motor is proportional to the armature
current i and the strength of the magnetic field. We assume the magnetic field to be
constant and thus the torque is calculated as
T = Kti, (9)
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where Kt is the motor torque constant. We denote the angular position of the motor
to be θ . The angular velocity and acceleration are then θ̇ and θ̈ , respectively. The
back EMF is proportional to the angular velocity of the shaft by a constant factor
Ke as follows:
e = Keθ̇. (10)
A viscous friction model is assumed and the friction torque is proportional to the
shaft angular velocity θ̇ by a factor of b. Now we can derive the following governing
equations based on Newton’s second law and Kirchhoff’s law:




+ Ri = Veff −Keθ̇,
(11)
where J is the moment of inertia of the motor. It is noted that in the steady state




































The states are the angular velocity of the motor θ̇ , constrained in [0, θ̇max], and the
armature current i, constrained in [0, imax]. The control input is the effective voltage
Veff , constrained in [0, V ] as discussed above. The system output is θ̇ . The control
goal is to make θ̇ track r .
2.2 Battery
Batteries are increasingly used as power source for many applications nowadays
ranging from low-power applications such as portable electronics, wearable devices
to high-power applications such as EVs and stationary electrical energy storage
(EES) systems for smart grid applications [3]. Lithium-ion battery chemistry has
been dominating the market for most low-power and high-power applications
mainly due to their high energy and power densities compared to other rechargeable
battery chemistry. While the terminal voltage and nominal capacity of a single
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lithium-ion cell are limited for achieving high operating voltages and high capacities
required for EVs, multiple individual lithium-ion cells are combined in series or
parallel to form a high-power battery pack.
Major concerns affecting the widespread adoption of EVs include range anxiety
and battery degradation that will result in an early replacement of their power
source. For instance, battery packs in EVs have to be replaced when their state-
of-health (SoH), a ratio of capacity at present to the capacity when the battery was
new, falls below 70%. In addition to the long-term aging, battery packs are also
subject to capacity degradation within individual charging–discharging cycles. This
is mainly due to the rate capacity effect, which states that discharging a battery
with a higher current will reduce the overall capacity of the pack that can be used
in this cycle. Therefore, while designing control applications that use battery as a
power source, the capacity degradation at single charging–discharging cycles and
long-term battery aging have to be considered for maximizing the battery usage and
its lifetime.
2.2.1 Battery Basics
Batteries are electrochemical storage devices, meaning their chemical reaction is
coupled with an electron transfer. They perform a reversible chemical reaction,
which allows them to store electrical energy (charging) and release the stored
electrical energy by performing the opposite reaction (discharging). The basic unit
of a rechargeable battery is an electrochemical cell, which consists of a positive
electrode cathode, a negative electrode anode, and an electrolyte to favour the
movement of the charge carriers between the two electrodes inside the cell as shown
in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3 Electrochemical cell.
Shuttle ions (M+) are
oxidized at the anode and
move towards the cathode
releasing an electron (e−) to
the outer circuit powering the
load [13]
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During the discharging process, shuttle ions (M+) are oxidized at the anode side
and release electrons (e−), which travel through the outer circuit to power the load.
The oxidized shuttle ions move through the electrolyte to the cathode inside the cell
and are reduced by the incoming electrons from the outer circuit. This process is
represented by the following equations:
Anode : M → M+ + e− (Oxidation) (14)
Cathode : M+ + e− → M (Reduction). (15)
The opposite reaction takes place during charging, facilitating storage of electrical
energy in the form of chemical reactions.
In the ideal case, one would assume that while discharging the voltage of the
electrochemical cell as seen by the load stays constant throughout the discharging
process and suddenly drops to zero when the battery capacity is empty. Moreover,
the capacity of the battery stays constant irrespective of the amplitude of the
discharge current. However, in reality, the battery exhibits several non-linear
effects and as a result the battery voltage instead of remaining constant slowly
decreases with time while discharging. Furthermore, the usable capacity of a battery
significantly depends on the rate of the load current. Discharging a battery with a
higher current will result in a reduced effective capacity obtained from the cell.
2.2.2 Rate Capacity Effect
The FCC of a battery pack is reduced when a battery is discharged with a higher
discharge current [5]. This can be seen from Fig. 4 where discharging a cell with
a higher current reaches the lower threshold voltage faster than discharging with a
lower current. This effect is termed as rate capacity or rate effect. The fundamental
concept behind the rate capacity effect can be explained in terms of overpotential
as in [13]. Whenever a current is drawn from a battery, the voltage of that battery
will drop depending upon the magnitude of the discharging current. For a battery
to obtain maximum energy output, the cell voltage VT should follow the discharge
profile of the equilibrium voltage V0, which is defined as the cell voltage at the
chemical equilibrium at a given state of charge and temperature. However, the
cell voltage deviates with the discharging current and this deviation is termed as
overpotential η, which can be expressed as
η = V0 − VT . (16)
This overpotential is mainly divided into three parts as ohmic, activation, and
concentration overpotentials. At higher states of charge, the cell voltage is predomi-
nantly dominated by ohmic overpotentials, which behaves like a resistive drop to the
cell voltage and as the cell discharges to a lower state of charge, the activation and










Fig. 4 Higher discharge current results in a reduced usable capacity of the cell due to rate capacity
effect. The discharge rate is given by C rating, where 1C means the cell is discharged completely
within 1 h [9]
concentration overpotentials dominate the ohmic drop. This reduction in cell voltage
and the capacity due to the overpotentials of the cell is termed as rate capacity effect.
In battery terminology, the C-rate is often used to define the charge or discharge
current of a battery. 1C corresponds to the current necessary to charge or discharge
the battery completely in 1 h, whereas a 2C discharge will deplete the battery in half




where L is the battery lifetime, I is the discharge current, a and b are constants
obtained from experiments. In ideal case a would be the battery capacity and b
would be equal to 1, whereas in reality a is close to the battery’s capacity and b is
greater than one. While this model holds good for predicting battery capacity for
constant continuous load, it does not work well with variable or interrupted loads.








where t ′1 = 0 is the starting time stamp and Lt = t ′n+1 is the total duration that the
battery can be used and divided into n slots.
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2.2.3 Battery Aging
In addition to the single cycle capacity loss due to rate capacity effect, which can be
rectified by reducing the discharging current at subsequent cycles, battery aging is
a long-term process where the battery cell cannot hold the same amount of charge
as it was new. Battery aging can be classified into calendar aging and cycling aging,
where the former refers to the loss of capacity due to storing at high states of charge
and high temperatures and the latter refers to the loss of lithium-ions due to the
charge/discharge process. The main factors for battery cycling aging are depth of
discharge (DoD), average state of charge, state-of-charge swing, temperature, and
the rate of the discharge current [18] as
Qloss = f (t, T ,DoD,Rate) , (19)
where t is the cycling time. Without the DoD, which does not significantly affect








where R is the gas constant, T is the temperature, Ah is the ampere-hour throughput
of the cell, z is the power law factor, and B is a constant obtained by experimental
data. With multiple experimental analysis for different discharge rates performed in
[18], the value of z was approximated to 0.55 and the constant B was calculated for
each C-rate. Figure 5 shows that with a higher discharge current the battery capacity
drops significantly and will reach their end-of-life faster than discharging at a lower
discharge current.
















Fig. 5 Capacity loss due to higher discharge rates [5]
Reliable CPS Design for Unreliable Hardware Platforms 555
The capacity loss with discharging can be approximately modelled by the
following equation as proposed in [18]:
Qloss = B.exp






Processors are known to age over time and stress resulting in reduced operating
speed. This is problematic in the sense that lower processor speed negatively impacts
the performance of applications running on it.
2.3.1 Aging Mechanisms
The main transistor aging mechanisms are hot carrier injection and negative bias
temperature instability [1, 17]. Hot carrier injection results in changes in the
threshold voltage of the semiconductor. Similarly in the case of negative bias
temperature instability, the threshold voltage of MOSFETs is increased. These
aging-induced voltage changes result in longer transistor switching time. And as
a consequence, the operation of the transistor becomes less reliable, which is of
course highly undesirable. Such increased switching time lowers the performance
of a processor and of applications running on the processor. Applications then
potentially violate performance requirements and produce faulty calculation results,
which in most cases is not acceptable.
2.3.2 Countermeasures
As a countermeasure to increased path delays, chips typically would run at very
conservative clock rates, also called guard bands or safety margins. Such guard
bands include enough margin to achieve the same clock rate throughout the whole
intended lifetime of a processor. Intuitively, we see that this pessimistic approach
results in a huge waste of resources or energy as the processor could generally
achieve much higher speeds [11]. The problem even becomes more severe as we
see a trend to decreasing transistor sizes which increases operational variations.
However an increase in the supply voltage could compensate for aging circuits
[16]. By that, the delays could be kept constant and the operating frequency could
stay the same throughout the intended lifetime of the processor. An adaptive control
circuit accommodates for the currently required voltage settings. The downside
of this approach is quadratically increased dynamic power consumption of the
processor [14] and additional constraints such as maximum input current, cooling
requirements, and temperature-dependent reliability problems [17].
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Another measure to be taken is to decrease the operating frequency of the
processor to compensate for critical path delays [1]. Other than increasing the supply
voltage, decreasing the operating frequency actually lowers the power consump-
tion. However, the processor becomes slower, which results in degraded control
performance [4] and schedulability issues [12]. Nevertheless, dynamic operating
frequency adjustments are a promising approach due to not negatively impacting
the overall energy consumption while maintaining high usage of resources.
If aging could be measured on-chip in real-time, the operating voltage and
frequency could be adjusted to always provide the maximum speed possible. This
however means that control applications—that were designed for a higher speed,
which becomes infeasible at some point in time—need to be readjusted to the
changes. Such on-chip aging monitors have been developed for the delay of critical
paths. Paths that potentially become critical in the future need to be identified first
and then their degradation needs to be watched [19]. The path timing monitors
typically work on replications of the paths that have statically been identified as the
critical ones to not interfere with real functions. The information gathered from the
replicated paths is then used to decide if the operating frequency needs to be changed
and the according new frequency can be determined from the monitored delays.
Processors that implement such critical path monitors are also called autonomic
frequency scaling processors.
From the application designers’ perspective, the processors lose speed over
time and this needs to be considered when designing applications that will run
on those processors. Lower processor operating frequency results in longer worst-
case execution time of programs. However, in control applications that require high
sampling frequencies this worst-case execution time may become the bottleneck for
reliable control output. As already outlined above, safety margins between worst-
case execution time and sampling period are possible but costly as the processor
would run much below its capabilities throughout most of its lifetime. Hence,
making full use of the available resources, here the processor speed, is of high
interest in cost-sensitive domains.
2.3.3 Aging Estimation
A simple model of critical path delays uses temperature, supply voltage, and stress
time, i.e., time during which the processor is active [12]. Let us use this model to
consider the use case of processor aging in an electrical taxi. Assuming that the
electrical taxi is in use for two-thirds of a day with drivers taking shifts, i.e., for
16 h, we can now estimate the decrease of the processor speed used in the car. We
find that after 2 years of taxi use, the on-time of the processor is approximately
1.33 years. As a consequence, the processor speed has degraded in the worst case
by roughly 7%. The degradation then continues. After four and then 10 years, the
corresponding duration of the processor being switched on amounts to 2.66 and 6.66
years, respectively. These on-times relate to critical path delays of roughly 9% and
12%. As a vehicle usually incorporates many real-time and safety-critical tasks on
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multiple processors and at the same time the automotive domain can be considered
to be very cost-sensitive, such delays need to be considered in the design stage.
2.3.4 Related Work from the Software Perspective
Multiple works have proposed techniques to design software for aged processors
or to reduce the aging process. Processors that have slowed down due to aging
have higher execution delays of tasks, which is particularly problematic in the
context of hard real-time systems and safety-critical applications [12]. As a result,
the schedulability analysis for such safety-critical systems needs to take the
estimated worst-case execution delays into consideration and the traditional problem
formulation needs to be extended by system lifetime constraints. All scheduled tasks
with worst-case delays need to meet their respective deadlines at all times even with
severe aging-induced slow-down of the processor speed.
Mitigation of aging can be done in multi-core systems. Such systems often use
redundant multi-threading to reduce soft errors. The aging variation among cores
is due to varying workloads. Such unbalanced aging states are highly undesired as
the system lifetime is constrained by the weakest component, i.e., the slowest core.
As a remedy, the mapping of tasks should consider the current aging status of the
respective cores. The proposed system [10] maps tasks in a way that aging variations
are mitigated and aging of already slower cores is reduced.
3 Reliable CPS Design Framework
We formulate the reliable CPS design on unreliable hardware platforms to be an
optimization problem with two objectives—ts to quantify QoC and Lt to quantify
the battery usage. We aim to minimize ts and maximize Lt . Usually an optimization
technique takes objectives either to minimize or maximize but not both. Therefore,
we minimize f1 = ts and f2 = −Lt . It is noted that Lt is only related to the single-
cycle behaviour with the battery rate capacity effect. Other objectives with respect
to battery aging can also be defined, such as the total duration that a battery can
run the control task after some time like 1 year, i.e., the Lt in 1 year, or when the
capacity drops below the threshold like 70%.
The constraints are on the plant states and control input. Additional constraints
on the objectives can be imposed depending on the requirements. For example, ts
can be set as shorter than or equal to 20 s. The decision variables are the poles that
are less than unity on the real non-negative plane. Clearly, the decision space is
continuous. Given a set of decision variables, the objectives and constraints can be
evaluated as explained in Sect. 2.
There are generally two goals to pursue in solving bi-objective or multi-objective
optimization problems. First, the final solution set (i.e., the obtained Pareto front)
only consists of non-dominated points. By convention, Point A is said to dominate
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Point B, if Point A is better than or equal to Point B in all objectives and better
than Point B in at least one objective. Second, the final solution set has a good
distribution in terms of objective values. This gives designers better options under
different circumstances.
It is challenging to solve the formulated non-convex optimization problem with
a continuous design space. Stochastic population-based heuristics such as the non-
dominated sorting genetic algorithm (NSGA) can be used. In NSGA, an initial
population is first generated and serves as parents. Offspring are then produced
with crossover and mutation. The crossover function tries to keep the good genes
of parents, which in this context means that the offspring are close to parents in the
decision space.1 The mutation function aims to better explore the decision space.
Elitism is implemented for environmental selection, so that the next generation is
selected among both the parents and offspring. This not only speeds up convergence
but also ensures that good solutions will not be lost once they are found. There are
two termination conditions whether the population has converged and whether the
maximum allowed number of generations has been reached.
In selection, all the parents and offspring are sorted and ranked by domination.
For each point, the number of points that dominate it (i.e., dominating points)
is its rank. The new generation is filled in a way that points with lower ranks
have priorities. This sorting feature values dominance more than the differences
in individual objectives.
Among all the non-dominated points obtained by the above NSGA-based
optimization, some may be very close to others in both the objectives. Therefore,
it is not necessary to keep all of them. We need to choose a few points to form
a well-distributed final solution set. First of all, we define the crowding distance
below. As illustrated in Fig. 6, assuming that there are two objectives {f1, f2} and
n solution points {x1, x2, . . . , xn}2 ordered by the value of either objective, for each
point xi , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, that is not at the end of this point sequence, the crowding
distance of xi in terms of the objective fk , k ∈ {1, 2} can be calculated as
qki = |fk(xi+1)− fk(xi−1)|, (22)
Fig. 6 Illustration of the






1This may not be the case in general. Offspring can be quite different from the parents.
2These are just general notations to explain the method. In this chapter, the decision variables are
the poles as discussed earlier.
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Algorithm 1 Removal of less representative solution points according to the
crowding distance ranking
Input: S = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, nd , {ρ1, ρ2}, {f1, f2}
Output: Sd = {x1, x2, . . . , xnd }
26 for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− nd } do
27 for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− j + 1} do
28 calculate q1i and q
2
i for the element xi as in (22)
29 for k ∈ {1, 2} do
30 sort S based on qki from maximum to minimum for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− j + 1} do
31 assign the position index (1 for maximum to n − j + 1 for minimum) of xi in S to
rki
32 for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− j + 1} do
33 calculate r0i as in (23)
34 Remove the element with the maximum r0i from S
35 Sd = S
where xi+1 and xi−1 are the two closest points to xi on each side, respectively.
Since we deal with a set of Pareto points that are non-dominated, xi+1 and xi−1 are
closest to xi in terms of both objectives. Both the end points of the point sequence
are assumed to have infinite crowding distance calculation.
The algorithm removing the less representative points to achieve a good distri-
bution is shown in Algorithm 1. The desired number of Pareto points is denoted as
nd . First, for each point, we calculate the two crowding distances corresponding to
the two objectives. (Lines 2–4) Two ranks r1 and r2 are assigned to it based on the
comparison in crowding distances with other points. (Lines 5–10) If the point xi has
the maximum crowding distance in terms of f1 among all the n points, then r1i = 1.
If xi has the minimum crowding distance, then r1i = n. The overall rank of xi is
r0i = ρ1r1i + ρ2r2i , (23)
where ρ1 and ρ2 are importance factors of the two objectives, respectively. (Lines
11–13) These values depend on the application and
ρ1 + ρ2 = 1. (24)
For example, if in an application, only the distribution in terms of f1 is important,
we may set ρ1 to be 1 and ρ2 to be 0. In this case, r0i is equal to r
1
i and all the points
are ranked according to their crowding distances in terms of f1. After each point xi
has an overall rank r0i , the point with the largest r
0
i is removed from the solution
set. (Line 14) The entire process starting from crowding distance calculation is
iterated until the desired number of points nd is reached. Both the end points of
the point sequence are always kept in the set (due to the infinite crowding distances)
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Fig. 7 An example trade-off
between QoC and battery
usage















Table 1 The ten design options: the original values and the aged values
Design option ts Lt Aged ts Aged Lt
1 1.1257 s 4.2643 h 1.2369 s 9.88% 4.4601 h 4.59%
2 2.8972 s 5.4000 h 3.1859 s 9.96% 5.2717 h −2.38%
3 3.9540 s 5.4182 h 4.3483 s 9.97% 5.2742 h −2.66%
4 5.6430 s 5.5315 h 6.2062 s 9.98% 5.3111 h −3.98%
5 7.2314 s 5.5412 h 7.9534 s 9.99% 5.5423 h 0.02%
6 8.2142 s 5.5959 h 9.0345 s 9.99% 5.5141 h −1.46%
7 10.0238 s 5.6377 h 11.0251 s 9.99% 5.5639 h −1.31%
8 11.1746 s 5.6506 h 12.2910 s 9.99% 5.5627 h −1.56%
9 13.3920 s 5.6663 h 14.7302 s 9.99% 5.4613 h −3.62%
10 18.0271 s 5.6930 h 19.8287 s 9.99% 5.5239 h −2.97%
The percentage with the aged values is computed based on the original values
to maintain the coverage of the solution set. It is noted that Algorithm 1 takes two
objectives into account and can be trivially extended for more objectives.
An example trade-off between QoC and battery usage with the electric motor
control presented earlier in this chapter is illustrated in Fig. 7. As the processor
ages, there is a decrease in the processor operating frequency and an increase in
the sampling period. Taking the number 10% as an example, the change of both
objectives is reported in Table 1. In 8 out of the 10 design options shown in Fig. 7,
the aged points are dominated by the original points. That is, the settling time is
increased (with a positive percentage) and the battery usage is decreased (with
a negative percentage). The average deterioration in the control performance is
9.97%. The average deterioration in the battery usage is 1.53%. It is noted that for
design option 2, the constraints on the plant states and control input, as discussed
earlier in this chapter, are not satisfied anymore.
The processor aging effect can be mitigated by re-optimizing the controller poles
with the prolonged sampling period, using the design framework earlier in this
chapter. After obtaining the Pareto front, there can be different ways to reach the
final solution set. For instance, Algorithm 1 can be deployed again. Alternatively,
for each design option, we can keep the point that is closest to the original point
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Table 2 The ten design
options: the recovered values
with re-optimization
Design option Recovered ts Recovered Lt
1 1.1475 s −7.23% 4.2345 h −5.06%
2 2.8389 s −10.89% 5.3361 h 1.22%
3 3.9264 s −9.70% 5.4116 h 2.60%
4 5.9551 s −4.05% 5.5294 h 4.11%
5 7.5233 s −5.41% 5.5676 h 0.46%
6 8.1094 s −10.24% 5.5754 h 1.11%
7 10.8225 s −1.84% 5.6383 h 1.34%
8 10.8225 s −11.95% 5.6383 h 1.36%
9 13.7615 s −6.58% 5.6595 h 3.63%
10 13.7615 s −30.60% 5.6595 h 2.45%
The percentage is computed based on the aged values
in the settling time. The latter is executed in this case. The recovered results
after re-optimization are shown in Table 2. In 9 out of the 10 design options, the
recovered points dominate the aged points. That is, the settling time is decreased
(with a negative percentage) and the battery usage is increased (with a positive
percentage). The average improvement in the control performance is 9.85%. The
average improvement in the battery usage is 1.32%. It should be noted that the
design options 7 and 8 have the same recovered point. So do the design options 9
and 10. For all the design options, the constraints on the plant states and control
input are guaranteed to be satisfied.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have discussed a design optimization framework for CPS. We
consider unreliable hardware platforms with respect to processor aging and battery
aging and rate capacity effect. The trade-off between the QoC and battery usage is
explored. Furthermore, when the processor ages, both the QoC and battery usage get
deteriorated, and safety requirements may be violated. The processor aging effect
can be mitigated by re-optimizing the controller with the prolonged sampling period,
using the same design framework. The change of QoC is minimal and the safety
requirements are guaranteed to be met—leading to reliable CPS design. Besides the
processor and battery, there are other hardware components that can be unreliable
and should be investigated, e.g., the memory and communication systems [7].
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1 Introduction
High core integration in multi-/many-core chips can facilitate reliability man-
agement through exploiting different hardening modes considering variants of
redundant multithreading (RMT) [17]. However, in such large-scale chips the
maximum number of cores that can simultaneously operate is constrained by
the thermal design power (TDP, i.e., the maximum amount of power a chip is
expected to dissipate and the nominal value for the cooling system to be designed
around). Under a given TDP budget either less cores can be powered-on at the full
performance level (the power-gated cores are referred to as dark silicon) or relatively
more cores can be powered-on at a lower performance level (referred to as “dim”
or “gray” silicon) [16]. In case TDP is exceeded, the elevated on-chip temperatures
beyond the cooling capacity aggravate reliability threats like temperature-dependent
transient faults and aging [1, 5, 6], unless the chip is throttled down which may
lead to performance degradation. Reliability management under TDP constraints
becomes even more challenging in the presence of manufacturing process variations
that result in chip-to-chip or core-to-core variations in the maximum operating
frequency and leakage power. This chapter presents a system-level power–reliability
management technique for dark silicon multi-/many-core processors that jointly
accounts for transient faults, process variations, and the TDP constraint.
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Fig. 1 Main abstraction
layers of embedded systems
and this chapter’s major


























In this chapter, at first, the system modeling including the power consumption
and reliability models, as well as the reliability techniques are presented. Then, the
power, reliability, and performance tradeoffs at the software and hardware levels as
well as for different hardening modes are studied. After that, the power–reliability
management technique is presented. It jointly considers multiple hardening modes
at the software and hardware levels, each offering distinct power, reliability, and
performance properties. At the software level, it leverages multiple reliable code
versions that vary in terms of their reliability, performance, and power properties.
At the hardware level it exploits different protection features and different RMT
modes, subjected to the manufacturing process variations and different operating
conditions (like changing the voltage–frequency levels). Finally, a framework for
the system-level optimization is introduced. It considers different power–reliability–
performance management problems for many-core processors depending upon
the target system and user constraints (i.e., power, reliability, and performance
constraints).
The main contributions of this chapter in the scope of this book lie on the
application, SW/OS, and architectural layers as illustrated in Fig. 1.
2 System Models
2.1 Power Consumption Model
Power consumption in digital systems consists of static power (e.g., due to
sub-threshold leakage) and dynamic power (mainly dissipated due to the circuit
switching activities). The power consumption, when the system is operating under
a supply voltage and a corresponding maximum allowable frequency (we call it a
voltage and frequency (V-f) level), can be written as Eq. 1. For the systems that
support the dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS), different V-f levels are
specified at the design time, while at run time, a V-f level is selected considering the
Power-Aware Fault-Tolerance for Embedded Systems 567
system workload [10]. The static power PStatic increases exponentially when the
threshold voltage (Vth) decreases and is proportional to the supply voltage (V ). The
dynamic power PDynamic is proportional to the circuit switching activity (α), load
capacitance (CL), operating frequency (f ), and the square of the supply voltage (V )
[11, 12, 14, 15].
P(V, f ) = PStatic + PDynamic = I0e
−Vth
ηVT V + αCLV 2f (1)
2.2 Fault and Reliability Models
In this chapter, transient faults which appear randomly in the underlying hardware
and then disappear after certain time are considered. Examples of transient faults
are single- and multiple-bit upsets due to energetic radiation particle strikes, circuit
metastability, signals cross-talk, voltage noises due to electromagnetic interference
(EMI), etc. [1, 5]. Transient faults in the hardware level may manifest themselves as
bit-flips in the memory or combinational logic, i.e., the so-called soft errors. These
errors may propagate to the software level (e.g., as silent data corruption, crash, halt,
and wrong register values) and may finally result in a software failure [5].
These transient faults occur randomly and are typically modeled as a Poisson
process with rate λ. The fault rate increases exponentially with a decrease in supply
voltage V , as Eq. 2 [11, 12, 15].
λ(V ) = λ010 Vmax−V (2)
In Eq. 2, λ0 is the raw fault rate at the maximum voltage Vmax (i.e., the minimum
value for fault rate λ) and the parameter  determines the amount of increase in
fault rate with one step decrease in voltage.
The software’s vulnerability to soft errors due to hardware-level transient faults
at the instruction-level can be quantified by the function vulnerability index (FVI)
model [8, 9]. This model projects the error probability for an application software
considering vulnerabilities of different instructions (modeled using instruction
vulnerability index (IVI)) when executing through different hardware units (e.g.,
different pipeline stages) in a core. The IVI refers to the probability of an
instruction’s result being erroneous. It accounts for temporal vulnerabilities of
different instructions (i.e., different instructions have different execution latency,
instruction dependency, and intervals of the operand values) as well as spatial
vulnerabilities (i.e., different hardware components occupy different chip area and
perform different operations) [8, 9]. Knowing the hardware-level fault rate (λ)
and the software vulnerability to soft errors (FV I ), the software failure rate can
be projected as λ(V ) · FV I . Accordingly, the functional reliability FR of an
application execution that is defined as the probability of failure-free execution of
the application can be written as [11, 12, 15]:
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FR(FV I, c, V , f ) = e−λ(V )·FV I · cf (3)
In Eq. 3, c
f
is the application execution time under the operating frequency f and c
is the number of clock cycles that are required by the core to finish the application
execution.
Besides the functional reliability of an application, in many systems (e.g., real-
time embedded systems), it is also required that the application execution has to
finish before a deadline, referred to as timing reliability (i.e., probability of meeting
deadlines). To jointly consider the functional reliability FR and timing reliability
T R, the functional–timing reliability model of Eq. 4 can be employed. In this model,
the parameter 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 specifies the priority for functional and timing reliability.
For example, for the systems with tight timing constraints, lower values for β are
considered, and for the systems with severe constraints of timing and reliability
(e.g., hard real-time systems), β = 0.5 can be considered to represent the same
priority for functional and timing reliability.
R = βFR + (1− β)T R (4)
The reliability for a single application execution given by Eq. 4 may not satisfy
the reliability constraint of the target system. In the following section, we study
reliability techniques and hardening modes that can be used for soft error mitigation
and reliability improvement in many-core processors.
2.3 Reliability Techniques
One prominent technique for tolerating transient faults in many-core processors is
process level redundancy (PLR), where multiple identical copies of an application
task are executed on different cores and the application finishes successfully
if at least one of the task executions finishes successfully (i.e., the application
execution fails only if all the task executions fail). Therefore, the total application
reliability is defined as the probability of at least one application task being executed
successfully. Suppose that n identical copies of an application task are executed on
n different cores and possible faults can be detected with the probability of μFD .
The total reliability of the application can be calculated as:








In Eq. 5, Ri is the reliability of the i-th task copy execution (given by Eq. 4). Here,
it is assumed that (1) there is no spatial correlation between fault occurrences in
different cores and (2) parallel task executions on different cores are not dependent
from the viewpoint of fault propagation, i.e., a fault occurrence in a core does not
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affect the operation of the other cores. This assumption is also considered for the
other reliability techniques in this chapter in which we have parallel task executions
on different cores.
2.3.1 Software Error Detection with Re-execution (SEDR)
In this technique, each application task is executed on a single core and a
software error detection mechanism (e.g., software-based control flow checking and
acceptance tests) is used for error detection. Here, if an error occurs during the task
execution, the task is re-executed once again on the same core for error recovery.
Therefore, the reliability of this technique can be calculated by Eq. 6, where
μSFD is the error detection coverage of the software error detection mechanism
(i.e., the probability of detecting existing errors).
RSEDR(R) = μSFD(R + (1− R)R) = μSFD(2R − R2) (6)
Here, it is assumed that there is no temporal correlation between the fault occur-
rences in consecutive executions of the same task, i.e., a fault occurrence during
an execution of a task does not affect the next execution of the same task. This
assumption is also considered for the other reliability techniques in this chapter in
which we have consecutive task executions on the same core.
2.3.2 Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR) with Re-execution (DMRR)
Software-based error detection in the SEDR technique may not provide a high
error detection coverage and also it may not be useful for some applications, e.g.,
it may entail incurring extra delay that may not be acceptable for hard real-time
systems. One practical and powerful error detection mechanism is the comparison
of the output result. In this mechanism, two identical copies of each application
task are executed on different cores in parallel and the output results of the task
are compared for error detection (i.e., DMR is applied at the individual core
level). If the comparison task finds that the results are in agreement, the result is
assumed to be correct. The implicit assumption here is that it is highly unlikely
that both task executions experience the identical errors and they produce identical
erroneous results. If the results are different, an error has occurred during the task
execution, and the task is re-executed on another core for error recovery. Let Rcmp
be the reliability of the result comparison process. Assuming that the two cores are
identical, each with a reliability R, the reliability of the DMRR technique can be
calculated by Eq. 7.
RDMRR(R,Rcmp) = Rcmp
(
R2 + 2(1− R)R2
)
= Rcmp(3R2 − 2R3) (7)
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2.3.3 Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)
N-Modular redundancy (NMR) that is an M − of − N system with N (an odd
number) and M = (N + 1)/2 can be applied at the individual core level, where
N copies of each task are executed on N different cores in parallel and the results
of at least M of them are required to be identical for proper operation. Thus, the
task execution fails when the majority voting task finds that fewer than M results
are identical [13]. This is similar to the redundant multithreading (RMT) approach if
considering architecture-level redundancy management or process level redundancy
(PLR) approach if considering operating system-level redundancy management.
Here, it is considered that TMR (N = 3) is applied at the individual core level,
i.e., three copies of each task are executed in parallel on three different cores,
and majority voting is performed on the results for error masking. Let Rvot be the
reliability of the majority voting task. The reliability of TMR can be calculated by
Eq. 8.
RT MR(R,Rvot ) = Rvot
(








3.1 Tradeoffs at the Hardware Level
Due to technology process variations, the maximum operating frequency and the
leakage power consumption vary for different cores in a single chip [3]. Figure
2a illustrates that the core-to-core frequency and leakage power variations in
an Intel’s 80-core test chip are up to 38 and 47%, respectively [7]. Therefore,
regardless of which application is executed, different processing cores present
different performance and power consumption.
Fig. 2 (a) Core-to-core variations in maximum operating frequency and leakage power and (b)
hardware-level fault rate and power variations at different V-f levels. Adapted from [15]
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Fig. 3 Core-to-core variations in power, execution time, and reliability when executing the same
application. Adapted from [15]
One effective way to reduce power consumption is to decrease the operating V-
f level through the DVFS technique. However, based on Eq. 2, decreasing the V-f
level increases the hardware-level fault rate. Figure 2b shows that how the total
power consumption (Eq. 1) and the hardware-level fault rate (given by Eq. 2) for a
given core vary at different V-f levels. For the processor cores in our experiments, it
is considered that the V-f level can have five different values as shown in Fig. 2b, i.e.,
the minimum V-f level is [0.72V, 490MHz] and the maximum V-f level is [1.23V,
970GHz], see details in Sect. 5.
Due to the core-to-core variations in the frequency and leakage power, when a
given application is executed on different cores but under the same supply voltage, it
presents different power consumption, performance (execution time), and reliability.
Figure 3 shows core power consumption, application reliability, and execution time
for the discrete cosine transform (DCT) application when it is executed on different
cores but under the same supply voltage. Figure 3a illustrates that due to core-to-
core variations in operating frequency, executing a given application on different
cores presents different power consumption and performance properties.
According to Eq. 3, the application reliability depends upon the hardware-
level fault rate, software vulnerability, and application execution time. Figure 3b
illustrates that when a given application is executed on different cores, it provides
different reliability levels. This is because, in this case, software vulnerability
(FV I ) and hardware-level fault rate (λ) remain the same in Eq. 3 (the same
application is executed under the same voltage level) but due to core-to-core
variations in operating frequency, the application execution time ( c
f
) varies when
executed on different cores.
The analyses in Figs. 2 and 3 illustrate that the diversities in power and perfor-
mance of different cores in a chip when executing the same application along with
exploiting different V-f levels can be utilized for efficient reliability management at
hardware level.
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3.2 Tradeoffs at the Software Level
Since different applications execute different instructions on different operand
values, they present different power, performance, and reliability properties even
when executed on the same core and under the same V-f level. Figure 4 shows
the power consumption, execution time, software vulnerability, and reliability for
different applications when executed on the same core and under the same V-
f level. Different applications exhibit different circuit switching activity and also
require different clock cycles to complete, and hence, they exhibit distinct power
consumption and execution time properties even when executed on the same core;
see Fig. 4a.
Also, since different instructions present different vulnerabilities to soft errors
(e.g., single event upsets), as shown in Fig. 4b, different applications exhibit distinct
software vulnerabilities. Figure 4b shows that different applications, even when
executed under the same V-f level (i.e., under the same hardware-level fault rate) and
on the same core, exhibit different system-wide reliability. This is because, based
on Eq. 3, the application reliability also depends upon its software vulnerability
and execution time.
The above analysis shows that different applications exhibit different power,
performance, and reliability levels when executed on different cores, thus enabling
power–reliability–performance tradeoffs at software level.
3.3 Tradeoffs for Hardening Modes
3.3.1 Tradeoffs for Reliability Techniques
Reliability techniques usually employ different types of redundancy (e.g., hardware,
software, and time redundancy) and different redundancy levels (e.g., dual or triple
modular redundancy). Therefore, they offer different reliability, performance, and
power properties. Also, two different reliability techniques may provide the same
error tolerance capability but at different performance and power cost. For example,
Fig. 4 Application-to-application variations in power, execution time, software vulnerability, and
application reliability when executed by the same core. Adapted from [15]
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Fig. 5 System-wide reliability and power for different reliability techniques when performed at
the minimum and maximum V-f levels (V-fmin and V-fmax, respectively). Adapted from [12]
both the DMRR and TMR techniques can tolerate one single task failure; however,
when an error occurs, DMRR requires more time to re-execute the task for error
recovery, which incurs a performance overhead. Nevertheless, DMRRmay consume
less power and energy when compared to TMR. This is because when no error
occurs, which could be a case for most of the time, DMRR does not require re-
executing the task, while TMR always executes the third copy.
Figure 5 shows system reliability and power consumption when the reliability
techniques in Sect. 2.3 are employed. To illustrate the effects of scaling the operating
V-f level on the system reliability and power consumption, the reliability techniques
are executed under the minimum and maximum V-f levels (i.e., V-fmin and V-
fmax). Also, in this figure, reliability techniques with different redundancy levels
are considered (i.e., SEDR with a low redundancy level and TMR with a high
redundancy level). Figure 5 illustrates that increasing the redundancy level (from
SEDR to TMR) and V-f level (from V-fmin to V-fmax) improves reliability but at the
cost of increased power consumption.
The experiment in Fig. 5 shows that different reliability techniques when oper-
ating in different V-f levels exhibit distinct power, performance, and reliability
properties, enabling power–reliability–performance tradeoffs that can be employed
for power–reliability management.
3.3.2 Tradeoffs for Software Hardening
To further expand the power–reliability–performance optimization space, a
reliability-aware compiler can be used to generate multiple reliable compiled
code versions for a given application task through reliability-driven software
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Fig. 6 Different compiled code versions of each application have different: (a) Power and
performance (execution time); and (b) Software vulnerability (in log scale) and application
reliability. Adapted from [15]
code transformations (see more details in [8, 9]). Different code versions of the
same task present dissimilar power, reliability, and performance properties while
implementing the same functionality. For instance, Fig. 6 shows power, execution
time (in terms of clock cycles), software vulnerability, and overall reliability (given
by Eq. 3) of different compiled code versions for five applications.
The reliability and execution time of an application task also vary with the
operating V-f level of the underlying core. Figure 7 shows the reliability and
execution time of three code versions for the ADPCM application under different
V-f levels. Figure 7a illustrates that how different code versions of the ADPCM
application when executed under different V-f levels can be used to achieve a given
reliability requirement for the application (Rreq in this figure). For instance, to meet
the reliability requirement Rreq ≥ 0.999, shown by the dotted horizontal line in
Fig. 7a, the operating V-f level for the code versions cv1 and cv2 should be at least
[0.97V, 730MHz], whereas the V-f level for the code version cv3 can be [0.85V,
650MHz]. Assume that the application execution has a deadline constraint to finish
within 5ms, as shown by the dotted horizontal line in Fig. 7b. In this case, the
operating V-f level for the code version cv2 should be at least of [0.85V, 650MHz],
for cv1 should be at least [0.97V, 730MHz], and for cv3 should be at least [1.1V,
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Fig. 7 Reliability and execution time of three compiled code versions for the ADPCM application
under different voltage–frequency levels. Adapted from [11]
850MHz]. Now assume that the underlying core has a TDP constraint that requires
its operating V-f level should be at most [0.85V, 650MHz] (the TDP1 constraint
in Fig. 7). Under the TDP1 constraint, to meet the reliability constraint we should
select the code version cv3; see Fig. 7a. However, under the given TDP1 constraint,
if the deadline constraint has to be met, we would select the code version cv2; see
Fig. 7b. As another example assume that the core has the TDP2 constraint (i.e.,
the operating V-f level for the core should be at most [0.97V, 730MHz]). In this
case, the code version cv1 is the best choice since it can satisfy both the reliability
constraints of Rreq ≥ 0.999 and the deadline constraints within 5ms while meeting
the power constraint TDP2.
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4 Power–Reliability–Performance Management
From Sects. 2 and 3, the following key observations can be derived that lay the
foundation of designing an efficient system for power–reliability–performance
Management.
1. Executing tasks at a higher V-f level provides lower execution time and fault rate,
resulting in higher system-wide reliability. However, the task power consumption
at a high V-f level may be beyond the chip power constraint.
2. An effective way to decrease the power consumption is to lower the operating V-f
level, e.g., through DVFS. However, lowering the V-f level leads to an increased
execution time of the task that may result in a performance degradation and a
missed deadline.
3. Different compiled code versions for an application task exhibit different vulner-
ability and execution time properties when executed on the same core.
4. Different compiled code versions for each application task when executed by
different reliability techniques on different cores with frequency variations and
supporting different V-f levels present distinct power, reliability, and performance
properties.
In short, the variations in vulnerability and execution time of different compiled
versions for each task along with the variations in reliability, power, and perfor-
mance when using different reliability techniques and V-f levels can be exploited
for power–reliability–performance optimization.
The previous works, dynamic redundancy and voltage scaling (DRVS) [12]
and dark silicon reliability management (dsReliM) [11], consider the above-
mentioned variations at hardware and software levels for run-time power–reliability
management. DRVS exploits run-time reliability technique (task-level redundancy)
with V-f selection for each application task to minimize system power consumption
under reliability and timing (deadline) constraints. dsReliM leverages multiple
pre-compiled code versions for each application task with V-f selection at run
time to maximize reliability under timing and power constraints. However, such
techniques that solely use task-level redundancy or pre-compiled code versions may
impose the following restrictions on power–reliability management. Although task-
level redundancy can substantially increase reliability, it may increase chip power
consumption beyond its power constraint. Also, this technique can only be used
if sufficient cores are available for task-level redundancy. In this case, it may be
useful to leverage reliable compiled codes to improve reliability, since no extra cores
are required to execute different code versions for each application task. Although
compile-time software hardening can decrease power consumption, it may increase
the execution time of the tasks beyond their timing constraint. Therefore, power–
reliability management requires joint considerations of reliability, performance, and
power properties of hardening techniques at both software and hardware levels,
which is the primary consideration of this chapter.
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4.1 Problem Definition
System reliability and total power consumption, V-f level and code version assign-
ments, and task-to-core mapping are represented by different matrices with n×m×
c × v elements. Here, n is the number of ready tasks, m is the number of available
code versions for each task, c is the number of free cores, and v is the number of
available V-f levels for each core. The matrices are:
• R ∈ Rn×m×c×v: A matrix to represent the system reliability. In this matrix, each
element Ri,j,k,l represents the reliability of the task i when the code version j of
the task is executed by the core k under the V-f level l.
• P ∈ Rn×m×c×v: A matrix to represent the system total power consumption. In
this matrix, each element Pi,j,k,l represents the power consumption for the task i
when the code version j of the task is executed by the core k under the V-f level l.
• X ∈ {0, 1}n×m×c×v: A matrix to represent the code version and V-f level
assignments and task-to-core mapping. Code version j for the task i is mapped
to the core k and is executed under the V-f level l if and only if Xi,j,k,l = 1.
Considering power, reliability, and performance as a design object or a design
constraint, the potential goals of a power-aware reliable system design can be:
1. Maximize system reliability while keeping total power consumption under a
given power constraint (e.g., TDP) and meeting tasks timing requirements (e.g.,
tasks deadlines) OR
2. Minimize power consumption while satisfying the system reliability and timing
requirements.
The power–reliability–performance management problems can be formulated as
a constrained 0-1 integer linear program (ILP). In the following, the problem is
formulated where reliability is the design objective, while power and performance
are the design constraints. That is,
• Optimization Goal: Maximizing the system reliability that is defined by the





This is a 0–1 assignment problem, and hence, we have
Xi,j,k,l ∈ {0, 1} (10)
• Chip Power Constraint: Total power consumption of the chip, i.e., the sum of
power consumption of all cores should be less than the chip power constraint
(i.e., chip-level TDP).
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∑
i,j,k,l
Xi,j,k,lPi,j,k,l ≤ PT DP,chip (11)
• Cores Power Constraint: Power consumption of each core should be less than
the core power constraint (i.e., core-level TDP).
Xi,j,k,lPi,j,k,l ≤ PT DP,k (12)
• Tasks Timing Constraint: The execution time wi,j
fk,l
of a task i when the code
version j of the task (with wi,j clock cycles) is executed on the core k at the V-f





• Code Version Constraint: The code version does not change during a task
execution, i.e., for each execution of a task only one code version can be used.
∀ i, k, l
∑
j
Xi,j,k,l = 1 (14)
• V-f Levels Assignment Constraint: The V-f level does not change during a task
execution, i.e., during a task execution the underlying core can only perform
under a single V-f level.
∀ i, j, k
∑
l
Xi,j,k,l = 1 (15)
4.2 Proposed Solution
The power-aware fault-tolerance (PAFT) technique in this chapter jointly accounts
for soft errors, process variations, user defined reliability constraint, and processor
power constraint (i.e., TDP). At design time, considering the inherent software-
level variations in the execution time of the applications, power, and vulnerability,
the PAFT technique selects suitable code versions from multiple compiled codes
for each application task (Sect. 4.2.1). At run time, considering the hardware-level
variations in performance, fault rate, and power, the PAFT approach selects the
hardware/software hardening mode (i.e., reliability technique and code version for
each task) and performs task mapping and V-f level allocation (Sect. 4.2.2).
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4.2.1 Design-Time Code Selection
As discussed in Sect. 3.3, different compiled code versions for an application
task and also different reliability techniques (with different redundancy levels)
exhibit different reliability, performance, and power properties. Therefore, for each
application task, a tradeoff can be made between two cases:
1. Exploiting a code version with higher reliability and a reliability technique with
lower redundancy level (e.g., SEDR) to achieve both high reliability and low
power consumption.
2. Exploiting a code version with higher performance and a reliability technique
with a higher redundancy level (e.g., TMR) to achieve both high performance
and high reliability.
To enable the above tradeoff at run time, we leverage the design-time generated
multiple code versions for each task using a reliability-aware compiler (see details
in [8, 9]). Then, two types of code versions are chosen as follows (as shown
in Fig. 8):
1. Reliability-Driven Code Selection: At run time, the reliability of executing
a code version of a task on a single core (in the SEDR mode) may be high
enough to satisfy the system reliability requirement. In this case, for the task,
there is no need to employ a reliability technique with a higher redundancy
level. However, the execution time of all the code versions with high reliability,
even when executed on a high-performance core and at the maximum V-f level
may not be low enough to meet the task deadline constraint. Also, the power
consumption of a code version with high reliability may be higher than the
processor power budget. Therefore, at design time, for each application task,
a set of code versions with high reliability, low execution time, and low power
consumption is selected. To do this, first we find the reliability-wise best code
versions. Then, from the highly reliable code versions, the performance-wise
best code versions (i.e., the code versions with the lowest execution time) are
selected. Finally, from the selected code versions, the code versions that provide
the lowest power consumption are chosen.
2. Performance-Driven Code Selection: The reliability of executing a single task
on a single core (in SEDR mode) may not be high enough to satisfy the task
reliability requirement. In this case, the task can be executed under a reliability
technique with a higher redundancy level (e.g., in the DMRR or TMR mode)
to improve its reliability. Here, a code version with a high performance is
executed under a high redundancy level to make a balance between timing and
functional reliability. Therefore, the performance-wise best code versions with
high reliability and low power consumption are chosen.
580 M. Salehi et al.
Fig. 8 Overview of the design-time part of the power-aware fault-tolerance (PAFT) technique
4.2.2 Run-Time Hardening Mode and V-f Level Selection and
Task-to-Core Mapping
The run-time part of the PAFT technique is shown in Fig. 9. It chooses the hardening
mode (reliable code version and reliability technique), operating V-f levels and set
of cores to implement the reliability techniques, such that the design objectives are
achieved while satisfying the design constraints (e.g., maximized system reliability
under timing and power constraints). The problem can be effectively solved by
the use of existing ILP solvers (formulated in Sect. 4.1). Since 0-1 ILP problems
belong to the class of NP-complete problems, ILP solvers generally exploit branch-
and-bound mechanisms to find the optimal solution which leads to an exponential
increase in their run-time complexity. Therefore, ILP solvers cannot be used in
online scenarios where the parameters that are required for decision-making are
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Fig. 9 Overview of the run-time part of the power-aware fault-tolerance (PAFT) technique
determined at run time (e.g., ready tasks and free cores). In the case of this problem,
the complexity of ILP solvers increases at run time with the number of ready
tasks, code versions for each task, reliability techniques, free cores, and V-f levels.
Therefore, for this problem, a heuristic is developed, which at first aggressively
chooses the hardening mode, operating V-f levels and set of cores in such a way that
the highest possible reliability and performance are obtained. Afterwards, it iterates
and updates the hardening mode, operating V-f levels and task-to-core mapping until
the design constraints (e.g., reliability, deadline, and power constraints) are satisfied.
To do this, the run-time part of the PAFT technique gives the chip processor variation
map, chip-level redundancy map, design constraints, and library of selected code
versions for each application task as input and performs the following four key steps
to each ready application:
1. Initial Hardening Mode Assignment: First, a reliability-wise best code version
is assigned to each task to achieve the highest possible functional reliability
for each task. Then, beginning from the task with the lowest reliability, the
reliability-wise best technique is assigned to the reliability-wise worst tasks.
Therefore, the reliability of the tasks with the lowest reliability is improved,
resulting in an improvement in the overall system reliability (the overall system
reliability is less than or equal to the reliability of the task with the lowest
reliability).
2. Initial Mapping: In this step, starting from the task with the highest execution
time (lowest performance), the performance-wise worst tasks are mapped on the
performance-wise best cores (cores with the highest operating frequency).
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3. Finding the Base Solution: Until now, the highest possible reliability and
performance have been achieved for the tasks which may be higher than the
system performance and reliability requirements. Also, this may lead to an
increased chip power consumption beyond its power constraint. In this step,
starting from the task with the highest power consumption, the redundancy and
V-f level assigned to the task are increased to reduce power consumption until
the point that the chip power constraint is satisfied. Here, reducing the operating
V-f level may lead to a task deadline miss. In this case, the task code is replaced
with a code version with less execution time.
4. Updating the Base Solution: At run time, missed deadlines can be considered
for performance monitoring and the number of encountered errors can be
considered for making the reliability decision. Also, the power information
can be acquired from a proxy power monitor. By the use of the run-time
reliability, performance, and power monitoring information the system considers
the following cases for power–reliability–performance management:
(a) When the execution of a task finishes, the free cores are employed to
improve the system reliability and performance through updating reliability
techniques and task-to-core mapping.
(b) When an error occurs, after tolerating the error by the use of a recovery
mechanism, the redundancy and V-f levels assigned to the tasks are increased
to compensate the reliability degradation and also to provide high reliability
against possible consequent errors.
(c) When chip power consumption approaches its power constraint, redundancy
and V-f levels are decreased to reduce power consumption.
Since estimating the tasks reliability, power, and performance properties is time-
consuming, the decisions in steps (a)–(c) are made at run time based on the
reliability, power, and performance values that are obtained through the design-time
measurements and simulations.
Figure 10 shows how the run-time part of the system works on a ready task.
In this figure, for simplicity of the explanations, it is assumed that the reliability
technique (e.g., SEDR, DMR, and TMR) and the underlying cores for the task
execution are already determined and now the code version and V-f level should be
chosen under timing (deadline) and power (TDP) constraints. Suppose that, for the
task, the design-time code selection part has selected different pre-compiled code
versions (cv1, cv2, cv3, . . . ) with different reliability and execution time properties.
At run time, to achieve maximum reliability without considering the deadline and
power constraints, the code version with the highest reliability (i.e., cv1 in Fig. 10)
is selected to be executed at the maximum V-f level (V-fmax). In Fig. 10, without
loss of generality, it is assumed that the execution time of cv1 at V-fmax is less than
its deadline but its power consumption at V-fmax exceeds the chip power (TDP)
constraint. In this case, the V-f level is scaled down until the power consumption
decreases below the TDP constraint. Suppose the case where reducing the V-f level
to a lower level increases the task execution time beyond the task deadline (the task
timing constraint is missed). In this case, the code is changed to a version with less
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Fig. 10 Code version and
V-f level assignment for
reliability management under
timing (deadline) and power
(TDP) constraints
execution time (the code version that can meet the deadline). Here, among the code
versions that can meet the deadline, the one is selected that provides the maximum
execution time reduction and the minimum reliability loss (i.e., the code version
with the maximum time/reliability). However, if there is no code version
that can meet the deadline, to achieve the minimum performance degradation, the
one with the minimum execution time is selected. After selecting the suitable code
version, the V-f level is scaled down and if needed, the code version is updated until
the TDP constraint is met (as shown in Fig. 10).
5 Experimental Setup and Results
Figure 11 shows the experimental setup and evaluation framework. Experiments
were conducted by the use of a system-level many-core simulator developed in
the C/C++ language. Accurate power and performance (execution time) parameters
of applications and underlying hardware were provided for the simulator through
processor synthesis, logic simulation, and power estimation. To do this, the Synop-
sys Design Compiler and a TSMC 45 nm technology file were used to synthesize
a VHDL implementation of a LEON3 processor core [2]. Different benchmark
applications of MiBench [4] (listed in Fig. 4) were used, and multiple compiled code
versions for each application task were generated by the use of a reliability-aware
compiler of [8, 9]. ModelSim was used for logic simulation to acquire execution
time (clock cycles) and activity factors for each compiled code versions of each
application. Power estimation was done using the Synopsys Power Compiler with
the process synthesis and logic simulation outputs.
As another input for the simulator, the process variation maps were generated
through SPICE simulations. The frequency and leakage power variations were
modeled through simulating a 13-stage ring oscillator containing FO4 inverters
based on two-input NAND gates (like in [11, 12, 15]). To implement DVFS for
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Fig. 11 The experimental setup and simulation flow
the processor cores, it is considered that the voltage level can change from 0.72
to 1.23V, with 0.13V steps, and the corresponding frequency to the minimum and
maximum voltage levels is 490MHz and 970GHz, respectively.
For reliability evaluations, multiple fault vectors were generated by a Poisson
process where the transient fault rate at different V-f levels was modeled based on
Eq. 2 with λ0 = 10−4 and  = 1V . Also, for the system, two types of reliability
requirements were considered: (1) functional reliability (FR) where only correct
output of the tasks is required and the tasks have no deadline and (2) functional–
timing reliability (FTR) where both correct output of the tasks and meeting tasks
deadlines are required. For FTR, for each task, we considered a deadline between
its execution time and 1.5× its execution time. Considering the stochastic behavior
of transient faults, multiple combinations of benchmark applications were executed
for 100,000 times (as a Monte Carlo simulation) and reported the average results.
To model chip power budget, different TDP constraints were considered for each
chip between 40 and 100% of its maximum power consumption when all cores
perform at their maximum V-f level. This determines a wide range of TDP from a
high TDP constraint where up to 40% of the cores can perform at their highest V-f
level (i.e., at least 60% dark silicon) to no TDP constraint where all of the cores can
perform at their highest V-f level (i.e., 0% dark silicon). Also, two types of system
workload were considered in the experiments: (1) high workload, when the number
of ready tasks is more than 50% of available cores and (2) low workload, when the
number of ready tasks is less than 50% of the number of available cores.
To evaluate the accuracy and run-time efficiency of the power-aware fault-
tolerance (PAFT) technique in finding solutions at run time, it was compared with
the following techniques:
• dsReliM [11]: which uses compile-time software hardening (different reliable
code versions) with run-time code version and V-f level selection.
• DRVS [12]: which exploits run-time task-level redundancy through the SEDR,
DMRR, and TMR modes (explained in Sect. 3.3) with V-f level selection.
• ILP Solver: which exploits both compile-time software hardening and run-time
task-level redundancy with code version and V-f selection. It searches for the
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Fig. 12 Reliability and execution time for different power–reliability management techniques. (a)
Reliability under low workload. (b) Reliability under high workload. (c) Execution time. Adapted
from [15]
optimum solution through ILP solving. For this system, Gurobi1 was used as a
well-known ILP solving tool.
The results of the reliability and execution time efficiency evaluations are shown
in Fig. 12. From this figure, the following observations can be made:
• All four techniques achieve higher reliability when there is no timing constraint
for the tasks (denoted by FR in Fig. 12) compared to the case when the tasks
have a timing constraint (denoted by FTR in Fig. 12). This is because when
tasks have no deadline, a higher task-level redundancy (more task copies) can
be considered for the execution of the tasks, resulting in a higher reliability. In
addition, highly reliable code versions even with a high execution time can be
executed. However, when there are timing constraints only the code versions that
can satisfy the timing constraints can be selected. For the same reasons, similar
results are obtained for higher system workloads (see Fig. 12b).
• All four techniques provide higher reliability when the chip power budget
increases from 40 to 100% of the maximum chip power consumption. This is
because more cores can be powered-on and higher redundancy levels can be
leveraged for more task executions. In addition, highly reliable code versions
even with higher power consumption can be executed.
• From the viewpoint of accuracy, reliability levels provided by PAFT deviate far
less than one order of magnitude from the optimum reliability provided by ILP
Solver, while the execution time of PAFT is up to 1680× less than the execution
1http://www.gurobi.com/.
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time of ILP Solver for an 8× 8 cores chip (Fig. 12c shows the average execution
time for chips with 4× 4, 6× 6, and 8× 8 cores).
• As Fig. 12c shows, the execution time for PAFT is up to 3% higher than the
execution time of DRVS and dsReliM, while it achieves at least one order
of magnitude more reliability. This is because PAFT leverages both task-level
redundancy and code version and V-f selection to discover better tradeoffs
between reliability, power, and performance.
6 Conclusion
This chapter presents a power-aware fault-tolerance technique (PAFT) that jointly
accounts for transient faults, process variations, and the TDP constraint in multi-
/many-core chips. It synergistically exploits different reliability techniques, software
hardening modes, and V-f levels at run time for power–reliability management. The
problem was modeled as a constrained 0–1 integer linear program (ILP), and a
computationally lightweight yet efficient heuristic-based technique for solving the
problem was proposed. Results have shown that compared to an ILP solver tool,
PAFT deviates far less than one order of magnitude in terms of reliability efficiency
while seeding up the reliability management decision time by a factor of up to 1680.
PAFT also provides at least one order of magnitude reliability improvement under
different TDP constraints when compared to the systems that use either hardware
reliability techniques or software hardening modes while increasing the execution
time less than 3%.
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Our Perspectives
Jian-Jia Chen and Joerg Henkel
Research and development in the last decades have led to a silicon process that has
been expected to become inherently undependable in the near future when migrating
towards new technologies. The special priority program (SPP) 1500 funded by the
German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) in 2010–
2016 and the Variability Expedition funded by the National Science Foundation
(NSF) in 2010–2015 made a joint effort to explore design challenges of Power
Consumption, Reliability, Interference, and Manufacturability under such a design
requirement.
The exploration started with a vision to go beyond simply developing fault-
tolerant systems that monitor the device at run-time and react to error detection.
Instead, the design should consider error as a design constraint and develop method-
ologies to achieve resilience at the presence of errors. Under such a design principle,
error is inevitable and the error rate should be a tradeoff against performance.
This book summarizes the achievements of the SPP 1500 partners, the Variability
Expedition partners, and their collaborators. After telling the successful stories in
the previous chapters, this chapter provides a summary of our perspectives of the
exploration and a short outlook of future.
One important perspective to achieve resilience at the presence of faults is to
quantitatively define resilience and errors and use the resilience in a cross-layer
manner. Specifically, the RAPmodel summarized in chapter “RAPModel–Enabling
Cross-Layer Analysis and Optimization for System-on-Chip Resilience” provides a
milestone to help annotate how variability related to physical faults can be expressed
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at higher abstraction levels. RAP is a result of several working group meetings
and collaborative efforts among SPP 1500 partners. It has been also used as a
demonstrator in several projects. We believe that RAP is an initial step towards
good abstractions that can be used to model the faulty hardware and its impact on
the software. It may be possible that the probabilistic information encoded in RAP
is not precise enough for further optimizations. We envision that a more flexible and
more precise model to correctly quantify the resilience will be needed in the future.
It may be a set of models that can be configured depending on the required accuracy
level.
One possible way to analyze system-level resilience in a modularized manner
is to enable compositional reliability analysis. The support of composition and
decomposition is important for modularized analysis and can be used to model
uncertainties in both functional and non-functional properties. The modulability
provided in chapter “EM Lifetime Constrained Optimization for Multi-Segment
Power Grid Networks” extends the existing compositional performance analysis
(CPA) (or real-time calculus) to handle reliability. We believe that there is a great
potential to utilize the concept in the system design. However, to achieve composi-
tion and decomposition, rules to bound the approximation errors of composition
and/or decomposition would be needed. The automatic design of efficient and
effective rules is essential for compositional reliability analysis.
In many of the results of the SPP 1500 and Variability Expedition partners,
cross-layer and interactive optimization has been explored. Unlike the classic
multi-layered approach, in which each layer passively takes the input from the
higher/lower layers, the cross-layer approach applies active optimization routines
across multiple layers. Since the system-level resilience cannot be optimized unless
all the layers are optimized, such a cross-layer approach has been used as interfaces
between different layers. An overview of the (coarse-grained) layers and their
interactions can be found in Fig. 10 in chapter “RAP Model–Enabling Cross-Layer
Analysis and Optimization for System-on-Chip Resilience”.
To validate the research results, fault injection through instrumentation, emula-
tion, and simulation has been developed and used. Fault injection is an important
routine that should be deployed before fault detection. The computational effort of
fault injection can become a bottleneck. Proper models and tools for fault injections
are important contributions of the research partners. For example, the FPGA
fault injection tool in chapter “Dependability Aspects in Configurable Embedded
Operating Systems” can be used to emulate the entire SoC with specific faults.
Different fault injection scenarios can be found in chapter “Lightweight Software-
Defined Error Correction for Memories”. Despite its importance, to the best of our
knowledge, there is no integrated tool that can be used for benchmarking the quality
and (intended) consequence of fault injection. Although there have been several
attempts to provide an integrated tool from the partners in SPP1500 for different
types of fault injection, the diverse scenarios in the cross-layer settings made the
integration very difficult. We envision that fault injection tools that can be configured
and applied for different layers and scenarios can be developed in the near future so
that cross-layer design and optimization can be further modularized and deployed.
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When the design considers error as a design constraint, the system has to be
adaptive to react (or even be proactive) according to the faults and errors to
achieve the targeted resilience. Adaptive methods in physical, micro-architecture,
architecture (ISA), compiler, and operating systems are explored and discussed.
It has been demonstrated in several research results that adaptivity should be applied
across layers. For example, the error semantics in chapter “Soft Error Handling for
Embedded Systems using Compiler-OS Interaction” in the software development
process provides the information in the compilation needed for the operating
systems to be adaptive according to faults. Moreover, the annotation of multiple
execution versions in chapter “Cross-Layer Dependability: From Architecture to
Software and Operating System” provides a means to the run-time system to execute
different versions according to the reliability condition. Furthermore, the depend-
ability aspects can be further configured in operating systems as demonstrated in
chapter “ASTEROID and the Replica-Aware Co-scheduling for Mixed-Criticality”.
We strongly believe that adaptivity is a key insight. However, the reported achieve-
ment is based on ad hoc treatments for well-defined scenarios. It will be very
practical and impactful to explore automatic adaptivity so that suggestions of proper
means can be provided to the designers for achieving high resilience.
The adaptive handling of errors and faults naturally makes the timing behavior
dynamic over time. When there is no fault, an embedded system functions correctly
with respect to the specified timing. However, when there are faults, the embedded
system may not function correctly anymore since some jobs may be aborted or may
miss their deadlines. Therefore, it is of importance to explore both functional and
timing correctness. If all jobs have to meet their deadlines, the hardware may have
to be over-dimensioned. If some jobs can be allowed to miss their deadlines when
faults are present, the system designer just has to ensure that all the desired timing
behavior can be verified offline. Such dynamic timing requirements can be modeled
as mixed criticality. When the system does not suffer from any fault, it is at the low-
criticality mode. When the system suffers from some faults, it is promoted to the
high-critical mode. Such a treatment has been presented in chapter “Dependability
Aspects in Configurable Embedded Operating Systems”. An alternative is to explore
the probability (or miss rate) of deadline misses, presented in chapter “Cross-Layer
Dependability: From Architecture to Software and Operating System”. Although
the above treatments are successful, they are not originally from the resilience
perspectives. It remains open whether the timing requirements to achieve system
resilience should be treated as the first-class design objective. More specifically,
although dynamic timing behavior and requirements are considered, they are not
directly related to resilience. Moreover, the tradeoffs of the timing requirement and
system resilience in the presence of faults are still in the infant stage and require
more research efforts to reach a conclusion.
We believe that the successful stories in the previous chapters and the perspec-
tives presented in this chapter provide cornerstones for the design of dependable
systems on unreliable hardware. Based on the foundation established by the part-
ners, designs which consider faults/errors as a design constraint will be continued in
different directions, including physical, micro-architecture, architecture (ISA), com-
piler, and operating systems layers, and, most importantly, in a cross-layer manner.
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